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ABSTRACT 
This thesis represents a cross Systems Command (NAVSEA/NAVAIR) 
developed product.  The product  the Sunset Supply Base (SSB) system - provides a 
complete system for addressing the risks and supportability issues involved with 
Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) products in Navy combat and support systems.  The 
SSB system was implemented on three Navy combat weapon systems at various phases 
of the product development life cycle.  The main body provides to the Program 
Management Offices (PMO) and other decision makers, a high level summary of 
performance expectations.  Appendix A  The Sunset Supply Base Architecture  
identifies at a high level of abstraction a collaborative architecture providing a roadmap 
for design and development of the SSB system.  Appendix B  The Systems Engineering 
Development and Implementation (SEDI) plan  is a prescriptive or How to manual 
describing activities that have been used to successfully implement the SSB system.  
Appendix C  Business Case Analysis (BCA)  presents the data collected as a result of 
SEDI plan implementation then addresses the business/programmatic attributes showing 
the viability and value proposition possible through the SSB system.  Appendix D  The 
Marketing Plan for the SSB system - defines methods and practices necessary to establish 
the SSB system as the alternative of choice. 
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This thesis as the Capstone requirement for the PD-21 Masters program 
perpetuates the emphasis of the program in providing the appropriate tools necessary in 
development of a product  taking a light bulb idea and making a real product that 
works for the intended purpose.  This thesis represents a cross Systems Command 
(NAVSEA/NAVAIR) developed product.  The product  the Sunset Supply Base system 
- encapsulated in the five parts of this thesis paper, provides a complete system for 
addressing the risks and supportability issues involved with Commercial Off the Shelf 
(COTS) products in Navy combat and support systems.  In addressing the COTS 
challenges - Head-on - the information contained herein was implemented on three Navy 
combat weapon systems at various phases of the product development life cycle: 
AN/ASQ-20X Sonar Mine Detecting Set (E&MD transferring to production), SSDS MKI 
Ships Self Defense System (a legacy system), and SSDS MKII Ships Self Defense 
System (current production). 
The thesis body and each of the four appendixes (A  D) are written as standalone 
documents addressing specific functional areas regarding the SSB system.  The main 
body of the thesis describes the background, challenges, and issues that are addressed due 
to COTS products in Navy systems then presents extracted highlights from the four 
appendixes to illustrate the approach, systematic methodologies employed, and 
subsequent results yielded through the implementation of the SSB system.  It also 
provides to the Program Management Offices (PMO), PMO support groups, and other 
decision makers a high level summary of performance expectations. 
Appendix A  The Sunset Supply Base Architecture  identifies at a high level of 
abstraction a collaborative architecture to provide a roadmap for design and development 
of the SSB system, which will meet the Navys needs.  Appendix B  The Systems 
Engineering Development and Implementation (SEDI) plan for the SSB system  is a 
prescriptive or How to manual to enable implementation activities with processes, 
methods, tools, and practices that have been used to successfully implement the SSB 
system.  The SEDI plan takes a Systems Engineering approach leveraging internal Navy 
 xvii
resources and the supporting COTS supply base then matches these resources to the 
PMOs needs and existing DoD infrastructure (i.e. PPBS, supply system, Fleet 
requirements).  Appendix C  Business Case Analysis (BCA)  presents the data 
collected as a result of implementing the SSB system as described in the SEDI plan and 
communicates in tabular and graphical methods the information and knowledge gained.  
The BCA addresses the business and programmatic attributes showing the viability and 
value proposition possible through the SSB system.  Appendix D  The Marketing Plan 
for the SSB system  identifies the internal, external, and customer environments and 
defines methods and practices necessary to establish the SSB system as the alternative of 







Over the years the Department of Defense (DoD) has been plagued with 
development programs that have experienced significant cost overruns and schedules that 
have slid to the right all too often.  In the end, the delivered weapon systems prove to be 
of little value due to the enormous delay of deploying them.  The challenge to design, 
develop and implement processes to address these issues is an ongoing initiative.  Making 
government more efficient has been a continuous theme for years now.  In fact, as early 
as 1980 Congress passed the Paperwork Reduction Act in a step towards improving 
government performance.  In 1993 the Government Performance and Results Act, which 
required government agencies to set strategic goals, measure performance, and report on 
the degree to which goals were met.[1) NIH]  More recently, in 1996, Congress passed 
the Information Technology Management and Reform Act [2) Clinger-Cohen].  This act 
essentially required government agencies to improve the way they selected and managed 
Information Technology (IT) projects.  Soon after, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) established circular A-130, Management of Federal Information Resources.  The 
purpose of this circular was to further establish a policy for managing Federal 
Information Resources.[3) OMB].  The result of the Clinger-Cohen Act and OMB 
Circular A-130 was the establishment of a comprehensive approach by individual federal 
agencies to improve the acquisition and management of their IT development efforts.  
Working within this new process, program offices began aligning their resources in 
support of their respective strategic missions.  To be effective they began to implement 
investment management strategies that established control mechanisms that would align 
the appropriation of funds to their strategic mission.  In effect, they improved the way 
they selected, planned and managed their development programs by restructuring the way 
they allocated their resources before any initial investment was made in a particular 
program.  One of the ways these agencies achieved this was rethinking the selection 
process.  Traditionally, priorities were given to their programs and decisions on which 
programs would be funded were made based on this prioritization.  Under this new way 
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of thinking, the selection process was centered on a programs cost, benefit and risk 
assessments.  These three elements would be quantified and analyzed prior to any release 
of funds.  In essence, a Business Case Analysis (BCA) was performed as part of the 
selection process.  
In an effort to provide best-value in acquiring new weapon systems or 
upgrading existing platforms, the DoD sought to establish specific guidance to the 
Program Management Offices (PMO) for reducing life cycle costs.  One of these 
initiatives was the use of Commercial off the shelf (COTS) products and services.  The 
COTS Initiative was brought about by the fact that the commercial sector essentially 
drives technology change at an extremely fast pace and that the DoD could take 
advantage of this while reducing life cycle costs.  The COTS Initiative provided a 
potential path to infuse new technology into the military systems and at the same time 
avoid the developmental costs associated with grooming the new technology.  The rate at 
which private industry can develop and deliver new technologies is orders of magnitudes 
faster than traditional DoD acquisitions. 
The use of COTS products in military weapon systems is a reality. DoD 5000.2 
and the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) have both advocated the use of COTS 
products due to the potential benefits associated with leveraging big business capabilities.  
These capabilities include developing state-of-the-art technologies and delivering them in 
products that are produced in quantities that reduce cost.  To this end, the COTS 
manufacturers position in the marketplace, the company size and its technology edge, 
impact the direction and update cycles of technology and the products that employ them.  
Therefore, they hold a significant place in weapon system development and 
manufacturing because they can effectively facilitate the quick response to DoD changing 
needs.  The net result to the DoD is a reduction in initial costs for COTS products as well 
as improved reliability and availability of the weapon system.  However, since military 
weapon systems are typically unique, the use of COTS becomes a tricky business in 
terms of dictating system design and ultimately life cycle support.  In terms of software, 
military applications tend to be very specific, and the weapon system cannot tolerate or 
support changes without adequate response time.  Compatibility and configuration-
 2
control become crucial elements for both software and hardware due to their 
interdependency.  Support activities are pressured to maintain stabilized baselines in 
order to keep the certification of the system verifiable.  These baselines include not only 
the initial integration site but also the interoperability of fielded systems subsequent to 
changes (i.e., installation of replacement parts, firmware, software or hardware revisions, 
etc).  Needless to say there are significant risks associated with COTS and therefore 
managing these risks is a crucial element for success. For weapon systems that do use 
COTS products some of the more identifiable risks are: 
• Engineering changes, increased costs, and potential schedule delays due to 
poor supportability late in the development or after fielding the system. 
• Life cycle costs estimates for COTS product usage is inaccurate due to poor 
logistical support analysis. 
• Poor sustainability due to not considering supportability during the design 
phase. 
[4) DAU] 
Understanding these risks helps us to better define where the problem lies.  With 
the problem description provided above, we can conclude that additional supportability 
solution alternatives are needed to address the shortcomings of the present COTS 
environment.  A proactive position must be taken to include these alternatives in strategic 
supportability planning that will effectively mitigate the risks associated with COTS 
product usage in military weapon systems. 
This document introduces and defines a support solution alternative that 
specifically addresses these shortcomings.  This solution alternative is known as the 
Sunset Supply Base system..  The Sunset Supply Base (SSB) system is a unique 
alternative approach to extend the supportability of COTS products predicated on the 
needs of the Navy Programs.  The extension of product availability, beyond the Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) assigned date to drop the products as obsolete items, 
provides stability to the system baseline configuration, during periods of time between 
scheduled Technical Refresh and Insertion.  The uniqueness of the SSB system is evident 
through how it is structured.  The OEMs are: a) market driven, b) high volume and high 
technology, c) their business plan is driven by their commercial customer base, with only 
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about 0.4 % of their business going to DoD and d) Experience fast update cycles (< 18 
months).  In contrast to these OEM attributes, DoD has: 1) Unique applications with 
lengthy life cycles (20-40 years), 2) requires a minimum technology refresh or update 
cycle of not less than 5 years, and 3) have operational readiness and maintainability 
support issue that span the entire life cycle.  To bridge the gap between the OEM 
business planning and the Navys need for long-term support, the OEM is given 
incentives to continue production and if necessary  a third party is brought in.  This third 
party is the Sunset Supplier.  The Sunset Supplier makes a contractual relationship with 
the OEM to produce the obsolete products for the OEM customer base.  The OEM 
transfers the intellectual property and assembly know-how to the Sunset Supplier and for 
this the OEM receives royalty on the sale of all products produced. Internal to the Navy 
are support infrastructures to ensure supportability of Sunset products by mitigating any 
component part obsolescence issues if they exist on those products.  The infrastructure 
and support of the SSB process yields, not only, significant cost savings but also provides 








Supportability of products defined by customer need, (5, 10, 15, 20 years) 
Life Cycle Cost (LCC) savings, due to no life-time buy at the assembly level is 
needed, so the assemblies are procured as the customer require them. 
Reparability of assemblies over the designated life cycle (5, 10, 15, 20 years) 
Hardware/software/firmware stability between Technology Refresh 
(TR)/insertion cycles 
Significant reduction in Program risk as related to COTS and life cycle 
management 
Improved schedule flexibility and support options that can be tailored for Fleet 
needs 
Minimal or no impact on system operational performance. The performance 
will remain constant through the use of exactly the same part: form, fit, and 




The focus of this document is to present and discuss the characteristics of the 
Sunset Supply Base system as it applies to the acquisition of military weapon and support 
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systems.  By identifying the current status of economic and sustainment problems with 
COTS product usage, we can essentially offer and subsequently evaluate the Sunset 
Supply Base infrastructure as an alternative support solution to the obsolescence issues 
involving COTS products.  To this end, this document offers a system-architecture, a 
process implementation plan, a business case analysis and finally a marketing plan, which 
collectively evaluates the feasibility, effectiveness, usefulness and challenges to and for 
DoD acceptance.  Each is provided as a separate enclosure and can be used independently 
from the other enclosures for purposes tailored to specific reader needs. In reading any of 
the four deliverables, it is important to understand the purpose of the SSB process. 
2. SSB Purpose 
The overall purpose of the SSB is to provide dependable, cost effective 
supportability insurance for COTS based weapon and support systems.  The result will 
provide a solution to COTS obsolescence issues, material shortages issues, and extend the 
supportability of COTS components.  The architecture should address COTS technology 
obsolescence management through product and technology obsolescence forecasting 
methodologies and provide a new process for managing changes with COTS based 
systems.  The final architecture should respond to the voice of the customer, who is 
demanding credible combat power through design and supportability, by putting speed 
and agility into the process, and ultimately provide some value as perceived by the 
customers.  To be successful, the SSB process has defined specific goals and objectives 
derived from the present COTS product supportability inadequacies. Furthermore, this 
effort describes and discusses general DoD acquisition objectives and mandates. In the 
end we can effectively propose, execute and evaluate the SSB implementation against 
substantial and appropriate criteria. 
Ultimately, the SSB architecture exists to respond to the demands of the 
warfighter.  The warfighter requirements are communicated to the program office, and 
the PMO is tasked to develop and support systems that provide the expected combat 
power.  As part of the Systems Engineering approach employed through the SSB system 
the program managers develop a support strategy that accommodates the warfighter 
requirements.  The SSB architecture offers a support alternative that, when implemented 
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as part of the support strategy, adds speed and agility into the supportability process, 
ultimately providing value as perceived by the warfighter. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Area of Research 
The purpose of this research is to define, document, pilot and implement a support 
system for Navy hardware that incorporates the use of Commercial Off The Shelf  
(COTS) products.  This Thesis provides a set of transportable/transferable tools, methods, 
and processes and, when taken in whole, will represent a reusable product. Identified 
within the body or as appendices shall be four deliverables: Systems Architecture model, 
Systems Engineering Development and Implementation (SEDI)plan, Business Case 
Analysis (BCA), and Marketing Plan.  The documents (i.e. deliverables) will be 
iteratively and recursively developed in parallel with the piloting of these concepts on 
three programs.  The end result will represent a useable product, already tested and 
refined on three Navy programs. 











What are the current COTS supportability methods, processes, and tools? 
Are those supporting efforts effective in meeting the Navys needs? 
Can long term supportability of COTS be realized?   
Does the Navy have current systems that can be leveraged to better support 
COTS? 
What are the real, root causes of the COTS supportability issue, If there are 
any? 
Can the COTS issues be addressed with minimal impact to other functions and 
systems?   
Can a fiscally responsible solution be identified, measured, and tracked? 
What resources, internal and external to the Navy will be required and at what 
price? 
Is there a compelling business case for developing a long term COTS 
supportability solution? If one could be developed, how would it be sustained 
and verified? 
If such a solution were developed what methods or means could be used to 






Is this solution in concert with Acquisition Reform (AR), the 5000 series 
documents, and other DoD and Navy initiatives? 
What is the effect of this new resolution system having on Total Ownership 
Cost (TOC)? 
Can the impact to the using community (i.e. customers) be reasonably 
estimated? 
3. Discussion 
The subject under consideration is an old initiative, which was ushered in at the 
beginning of Acquisition Reform (AR) and has affected nearly all procurements of 
military hardware.  The initiative is the use of Commercial Off The Shelf /Non 
developmental Items (COTS/NDI) / products where possible in lieu of custom military 
unique products.  One would expect that, after over 10 years of experience with living 
with this initiative and especially since it is deeply imbedded in policy, reviewing criteria, 
and procurement methodologies, that issues or unintended consequences as a result of the 
initiative would be resolved.  However, with the long development cycles and time 
consuming implementation efforts regarding military systems, the effects of 
implementing the COTS/NDI initiative have finally started to show the cause and 
effect relationship between COTS/NDI and perturbations evident in fielded systems.  
The Defense Acquisition Deskbook (DAD) provides over 230 listings, as of April 2002, 
when searched on COTS/NDI covering such areas as: policy, planning, designing, 
fielding, costing, life cycle support, and many others. The new release of DoD 5000.2-R 
has tried to address some of the major problematic areas, thereby providing a few lessons 
learned.  Specifically the areas of interoperability, testing & evaluation, and even a 
dedicated section, paragraph C5.2.3.5.7 Commercial, Off-the-Shelf (COTS) 
Considerations, are incorporated to help guide the use of COTS/NDI.  The issues now 
emerging which are effecting most fielded systems are described piece meal in this large 
volume of information and an attempt will be made to summarize, in the discussion 
below, some of the issues and their associated root causes. 
a) Market Driven Forces Versus DoDTtimelines 
The primary emphasis behind the push for the COTS/NDI initiative was 
the speed at which the market forces drove the latest technology.  In fact the explosion of 
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new capability is described in a mathematically identified expression called Moores 
Law.  Moores Law states that the speeds of computing power will double every eighteen 
months. It is this new capability, which causes the market place to move forward at such 
a furious pace, such that it causes the commercial product lines to cannibalize older less 
capable product lines, even if they are within the same company.  The results of these 
forces provide new product generations to be developed and released every 18 months.  
In contrast, the development of military systems traditionally takes 10-15 years and these 
systems are then deployed and require support for as much as 30 years or more. Many of 
the systems once deployed are fielded with out-dated technologies that are very 
expensive to support.  The COTS/NDI initiative provided a potential path to infuse new 
technology into the military systems and at the same time avoid the developmental costs 
associated with grooming the new technology.  As a primary goal the initiative was 
envisioned to reduce the cost of development while increasing the speed of technology 
infusion into the military systems.  However, increasing the speed of deployment of the 
newer technology into our military systems acts as a two edged sword.  On the one hand, 
the latest technology may yield new capability at a lower development cost and allow 
continual upgrades to our military systems.  On the other hand, the rate of change 
required to keep pace with these commercial markets (i.e., every 18 months) is 
incompatible with existing support and product development systems currently in place.  
Several DoD support systems are purposely constructed to take a conservative, thoughtful 
approach to implementing change and provide obstacles to the time elements necessary to 
keep pace with the commercial environment.  What is most important with regard to 
these conservative approaches is the disconnect between the life cycle of the COTS/NDI 
products (approximately 1.5  5 years) and the typical reaction time for fielded 
equipment to be upgraded which is usually no less than 2 - 3 years in planning and 
additionally 5  7 years for implementation.  This disconnect is further exacerbated when 
the fielded equipment is expected to perform over an extended life cycle possibly greater 
than 15 years.  The specific systems which have been set up to provide methodical, time 
phased controls on the change process and which impact the implementation of the 
COTS/NDI initiative are summarized as follows: 
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PPBS 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)  This system is 
intentionally conceived to provide fiscal and planning oversight.  Consisting of a five step 
process: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Enactment, and Execution; this process 
takes 2 years prior to the release of funds.  Although the system may be short circuited by 
reprogramming of current funds, the process is not user friendly and may take an act of 
congress (to be taken in the literal sense) to receive authority to proceed.  Experience has 
shown that following the PPBS process or reprogramming funds to meet obsolescence 
issues due to COTS/NDI products is a tough sell, especially since the new wiz-bang 
system although functional is not supportable or worse yet, obsolete before the design 
engineering is complete.  Important to note is that once a COTS manufacturer has gone to 
the next generation of product, the previous product shall only be supported for a limited 
period of time, usually 1 2 years.  When the support period has passed the manufacturer 
abandons the earlier products  this means no design information is available, parts and 
repair methods are no longer available, and the testing programs and test sets are not 
retained.  Therefore fielded hardware cannot be supported. 
Repair & Support 
DoD traditionally developed project management planning for programs 
that have been based on long term deployment of fielded systems were supported by 
various levels of depot maintenance activities and a slow to respond material support 
system.  These program plans have not taken into account the fluid nature of the COTS 
environment; therefore the program gets blind-sided by unforeseen changes that need 
immediate attention to protect the supportability of fielded hardware.  When dealing with 
systems maintenance the usual system of depots is inappropriate because the government 
never paid for the design or intellectual property rights and therefore does not know 
enough about the design or configuration to test or repair the COTS/NDI products.  The 
second major issue is the lack of insight into the product development path taken by the 
commercial manufacturer.  These manufacturers will react to their primary customers in 
industry and respond accordingly to the market forces regardless of what plans have been 
made by the small niche market (< .4% of the business base) of DoD.  In the area of 
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maintainability/supportability DoD is at the mercy of the COTS manufacturer.  However, 
the procurement of spares for system support is dependant on a limited time availability 
of products soon to become obsolete and require intense focus by our material support 
systems, this will require some level of pain to meet required deadlines. 
Field Change Implementation  
Controlling changes to a baseline, in the design cycle or for fielded 
hardware, is a convoluted, time-consuming process.  In the case of a system currently in 
the design process it will require multiple design reviews, which could lead to further 
perturbation by involving oversight activities as identified in DoD 5000.2-R.  In the case 
of fielded systems an ORDALT (Operational Requirements Document Alteration) needs 
to be prepared, tested, materials purchased, kits assembled, Fleet assets scheduled, visits 
requested then made, kits installed, tested, and finally integrated with the particular 
requirements of the specific hull involved.  Typically an ORDALT for a system will 
require at a minimum 5  7 years to implement on combat weapon systems.  If the change 
to the COTS product is provided as a no impact or Drop-in replacement (i.e., no 
change to form fit or function) the process followed is that which is required for a type 2 
Engineering Change Proposal (ECP).  This process truncates the test and evaluation 
process to a mere 30-step process, which based on experience, may take 6  12 months to 
complete. 
b) Interoperability and Configuration Control 
Interoperability through open systems architecture is still a dream, which 
has not been realized in our fielded systems.  Our current fielded systems are closely 
coupled and rely in a great extent on the hardware characteristics of specific products.  
These characteristics must remain stable for the software intensive combat weapon 
systems to function and meet their certification requirements.  One of the major flaws of 
the COTS/NDI initiative is the lack of control over the configuration of COTS products.  
The government is purchasing an off-the-shelf product but not the design, design 
disclosure nor the assurance of a configuration to be controlled to some pre-planned 
baseline.  The manufacturer has no requirement to inform the government of any changes 
to the internal hardware or software (firmware) characteristics of their COTS products.  
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The manufacturer specification sheets only provide inputs and outputs in rather vague 
terms, which will satisfy the needs of their primary customers in industry.  Although this 
point seems to be a minor issue to the commercial customers, with military combat 
weapon systems built on closely coupled software the result can, and many times is, 
catastrophic.  A simple change of an internal chip using different firmware has required 
thousands of hours of software engineering to get a combat weapon system to function 
then many more test hours to re-certify the system for use.  In defining the COTS/NDI 
policy an assumption was made that control over the configuration was either 
unnecessary or that our systems were robust enough to handle the perturbations of 
potential change, neither is true.  Our currently fielded systems are very sensitive to small 
changes and the stability of the hardware is paramount in the continued supportability of 
those systems. 
D. BENEFITS OF THE SSB SYSTEM 
1. Objectives and Goals 
a) Expectations 
Understanding the needs of the customers we must now derive specific 
goals to meet those needs.  These goals we must be related to our national defense 
strategy and acquisition policies.  To align the customer needs with appropriate goals it is 
crucial to understand the necessity for effective collaboration between the warfighter, the 
program offices, and private industry to successfully meet the system requirements.  To 
this end, we expect the architectural form of such a process will exhibit the characteristics 
of a collaborative system, which necessitates voluntary participation.  Figure 1 - The 
COTS Collaborative Environment - depicts a conceptual illustration of such a 
collaborative system within the Navy for the Sunset Supply Base.  This voluntary 
participation is needed for the assemblage and maintenance of such a system and is 
crucial to its success.  Success will be measured continuously for those properties that 
emerge against how well they fulfill the purpose and how well they are managed to 
accomplish their specified tasks.  Through abstraction we can visualize a system that has 
very distinct elements that work together for mutual gain and to satisfy a common need.  
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Therefore, we can expect that such a system should evolve from existing support 
structures, processes, and methods currently used in support of the Navys systems. 
Program Office COTS Original EquipmentManufacturer (OEM) Sunset Supplier
Assessment/Reporting/
Facilitating Activity  
Figure 1: The COTS Collaborative Environment 
b) Sunset Supply Base Objectives 
The objectives of the SSB process provide the rational for deciding to 
implement the SSB infrastructure.  By formally stating the overall objectives of this 
subject, we essentially establish a basis by which the analysis can assign values to 
specific benefits and ultimately guide this effort into making a reasonable conclusion 
statement and provide realistic recommendations.  These objectives are categorized and 
discussed below. 
Financial and Business Performance 
The overall objective mandated by the current DoD Systems Acquisition 
Process (DoD 5000) is to improve performance, including quality, at lower costs.  This 
process focuses on delivering advanced or at least current technology to the warfighter 
faster.  PMOs are challenged to offer rapid acquisition of reliable and supportable 
technology while also reducing Total Ownership Costs (TOC) and improved 
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affordability.  In meeting this challenge, we see a proliferation of interoperable systems 
using COTS products.  Quite often the use of similar COTS across weapon systems that 
are separate and distinct which have no physical or logical dependence on each other 
share the same COTS items.  The use of COTS in itself brings a certain risk of being able 
to support them long-term due to Diminishing Manufacturers Sources and Material 
Shortages (DMSMS) and obsolescence.  The fact that many different programs or 
weapon systems are using the same COTS products, only increases the risk and threat to 
system sustainability across these programs.  Therefore, the SSB process attacks these 
two areas, risk and costs, by providing a potential architectural solution that specifically 
addresses the issue of obsolescence and DMSMS problems, thereby reducing both risk 
and costs to the program.  In answering the mail on this, the SSB process strives to 
compress the provisioning timeframes, by partnering with private industry and providing 
them with incentives (as previously mentioned) to assume some of the risk (i.e., 
immediate supportability and warranty) and costs (i.e., stockage, storage and issue of 
COTS spares and repair parts).  Doing so, will have positive impacts in terms of 
supportability, program planning, program risk and TOC. 
Strategic Position and Ownership 
Partnering with the private sector to take advantage of commercial 
technology advances as well as the support and maintenance of COTS products are 
firmly established mechanisms used by the DoD/Navy.  DoD determined a potential cost 
savings would be possible by pooling the expertise and capabilities found in private 
industry.  Partnering takes on many forms (i.e. teaming, procurement/sales, work-share 
arrangements); but the important point here is that they exist and are being utilized more 
and more by the PMOs.[5) OSD]  Furthermore, the Program Manager as part of the 
acquisition strategy must establish a support strategy.  In fact, this plan must address 
life-cycle sustainment and continuous improvement of product affordability, and 
supportability, while sustaining readiness.[6) OSD].  To this end, the Program Manager 
has at their disposal a set of tools to help in the decision-making process for determining 
the most cost effective alternative for supporting the system.  The SSB architecture is 
challenged to position itself within this toolset as a viable alternative.  A strategy for 
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positioning the SSB architecture within the supportability analysis repertoire would 
include establishment or improvement of strategic alliances.  The SSB architecture has 
already been implemented on three Navy programs (SSDS MKI, SSDS MKII and 
AN/AQS-20/X Sonar Mine Detection Set).  The relationships developed between the 
participating commercial entities and the Navy agencies should lobby the DoD Program 
Executive Offices (PEO) with sufficient detail as to the benefits of implementing the SSB 
architecture on the respective programs.  Since the SSB architecture was built on existing 
expertise and functions within the Navy, the SSB process is in fact owned and therefore 
managed by the DoD/Navy.  Additionally, the long-term relationships that will be 
realized through the SSB environment should further emphasis and influence the policy-
making office within the DoD as to the potential gains, not only in the performance of 
supportability and sustainability functions, but in maintaining key technologies as well. 
Operations and Functions 
The objective here is simple  to improve program supportability by 
extending COTS reparability for 5 years and beyond.  Why 5 years?  Typically, the 
development of military systems has been 10 to 15 years, and the DoD/Navy have 
experienced approximately 5 to 7 year efforts for technology refresh or insertion.  The 
reason for this is primarily due to the inherent nature of DoD to take a purposely 
conservative and thoughtful approach to implementing change.  DoD has constructed 
very well-defined controls for managing the acquisition process, which have in effect 
created obstacles for keeping pace with commercial product development.  This 
conservative approach has resulted in disconnect between the life cycle of COTS 
products and the typical reaction time of the DoD/Navy to field new equipment.  The life 
cycle for COTS products are approximately 18 months to as much as 5 years (although 
rare), whereas the DoD typically takes 2 to 3 years in planning and an additional 5 to 7 
years for implementation.  The problem of supporting these weapon systems is further 
compounded when these weapon systems are expected to perform over an extended life 
cycle  possibly greater than 15 years.  Given this situation, the SSB process has 
identified as an objective to support the product development cycle and ultimately the 
system life cycle.  For weapon systems that have deployed COTS, the SSB architecture 
 14
offers an opportunity for supporting existing technologies.  Success in these areas will 
fulfill the SSB architectures commitment to improving operations and functions for the 
PMO since they are the entity who are responsible to manage the program over its 
lifetime.  
Product and Services 
In terms of product and service, the SSB architecture offers a truly unique 
and effective process for improving customer satisfaction.  The customer in this case is 
the warfighter who use and maintain the system.  The PMO must ensure that they deliver 
key enabling technologies that must also be supportable for fixed periods of time.  The 
SSB architecture offers an additional alternative for the PMO to consider as part of their 
support strategy.  Furthermore, the SSB process allows the program manager to match 
the COTS update cycles with the programs technical roadmap or refresh effort.  The 
product is essentially a set of well-defined tools that provide obsolescence indicators and 
reports, as well as the ability to mitigate maintenance and supportability issues at the 
assembly level.  Establishing and managing this information, the PMO becomes 
empowered with the knowledge necessary to deliver an improved customer service.  In 
the long run the system integrity is maintained, which has several implications in terms of 
integrated logistical support (i.e., training, manuals, configuration control.) 
Image 
This is an unusual area since we are not talking about the image of a 
specific entity like an agency or company.  The objective here is to promote the idea of 
the SSB architecture as a viable, effective and valuable alternative based on costs and 
benefits.  At first glance, it may appear to some that the SSB process is trying to hold 
onto older technology.  Old, meaning technology associated with COTS products that 
have been discontinued.  The fact of the matter is that the DoD/Navy has not been able to 
keep up with commercial product update cycles.  In a perfect world, it would be great to 
be able to transfer commercial state-of-the-art technology to the warfighter the moment it 
was deemed ready or at least when it emerges in the market.  But the acquisition process 
institutionalized by the DoD offers too many obstacles to achieve this.  Although 
Acquisition Reform has yielded great gains in streamlining the acquisition process, it is 
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still purposely conservative, deliberate and methodical, which translates to slow when 
compared to the current commercial development cycles.  Although DoD pressures the 
PMOs toward COTS products for the reasons discussed earlier, it does not adequately 
define all aspects of supporting them.  The military acquisition community is pushed by 
DoD 5000 to use COTS products as the preferred alternative for use in its weapon 
systems, whereby the obsolescence issues are slowly getting worse.  So even though the 
use of COTS products is growing, the PMOs continually struggle with DMSMS issues, 
which is why they routinely fund and support DMSMS activities to meet the Navys ever 
increasing need.  The SSB system is designed to specifically address these risks, but more 
importantly, it is expected to work with existing support systems as an interfacing method 
to optimize solutions in managing the obsolescence risk on COTS products.  
Furthermore, not only does the SSB system offer significant supportability and cost 
benefits to the Program Offices, it also strives to be recognized as a contributor in 
Navy/Industry cooperation, a major initiative underway particularly in the Navy.  A 
major objective of this effort is to establish the SSB system as a unique standard practice 
while projecting its image as an enabler of currently used support systems, that are 
employed during the decision-making processes regarding supportability of COTS 
products.  The results derived from implementation on three Navy programs 
demonstrates how the SSB system is a collaborative system in which the participants 
voluntarily use the system and in return receive value added products and outputs. 
c) SSB Specific Goals 
The systems architecture shall have the following goals: 
To be able to identify, quantify, and mitigate supportability risk to 
programs. 
This process must be affordable and be able to successfully assess the cost 
savings attributed to the process.  The information derived from identification and 
mitigation of supportability risk shall be quantifiable and readily accessible by 
participants. 
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Extend the life cycle and supportability of COTS. 
Supportability of fielded hardware shall be defined by the warfighter.  The 
process shall take this into account as it defines the metrics for assuring late-life cycle 
supply source.  To be successful the DoD shall continue to leverage commercial 
developments with appropriate economies of scale in order to reach expected military 
performance goals and still offset the problem of diminishing material. 
Provide infrastructure to support existing platform/combat systems in 
support of the Program Office. 
This goal is to provide an infrastructure earlier in the development process 
to demonstrate and prove COTS components and to support existing weapon systems.  
This will provide significant reduction in program risk as related to COTS and life cycle 
management. 
Achieve significant and quantifiable cost savings over the product life cycle. 
Cost structures shall be tracked and continually assessed over the entire 
product life cycle.  This will significantly impact the effectiveness of informed decision-
making that is needed for success.  The up front cost assessments will contribute to the 
life cycle cost savings, due to NO lifetime buys at the assembly level.  The assemblies 
would be procured, as the customer requires them. 
A reliable, affordable, repeatable, and expandable process that meets the 
customer’s performance expectations (e.g., accessible, transportable, 
maintainable, predictable). 
The process shall have definable and repeatable characteristics in order to 
provide a comprehensive and flexible solution to supporting fielded hardware.  It shall 
provide an independent utility (an alternative option for DMSMS/Obsolescence 
Management) for programs when implementing COTS products and whose solutions will 
have minimal or no impact on system operational performance. 
Institutionalize methods for proactive management of COTS including 
DMSMS issues. 
The institutionalization of these methods will require the development of 
non-standard Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) and contract strategies and 
implementation methodologies that will access the commercial support base.  In doing 
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this, the process must be sensitive to proprietary design rights and provide a forum for 
appropriate negotiations.  The methods employed shall improve product supportability 
problem detection and provide sufficient time for appropriate decision-making processes 
to implement analysis for alternatives and solutions.  Overall it shall provide aid to the 
decision-maker by providing technology assessment and management guidance at 
various levels - piece parts, lowest replaceable units, units, subsystems and multiple 
platforms. 
A system that leverages Navy and commercial supportability assets and 
provides a networked solution. 
The process must take advantage of inherently governmental functions for 
DMSMS Management at the various field activities and coordinate with the commercial 
supportability assets.  This coordination must be embraced through a thoroughly meshed 
and maintainable communication network. 
Leverage across government programs with extended applicability through 
contract strategies, methodologies, and incentives to entice commercial 
industry participation. 
The process must be transportable in terms of its applicability to various 
DoD entities and their contract strategies.  Aggressive integration of common 
components across DoD entities should lead to flexible integrated logistical support of 
COTS products and should provide incentive for the commercial industry to develop 
long-term relationships.  
Forecast budget requirements in support of the programs/war 
fighter/consumer. 
The process shall provide predictive information for the decision-making 
components of the DoD program offices.  In forecasting budget requirements in support 
of programs/warfighter/customer the outputs from trade-offs and assessments must 
achieve a high level of confidence with the program office. 
Improve schedule flexibility and support options of system upgrades or new 
development initiatives.  
The process should incorporate improved schedule flexibility and support 
options that can be tailored for the warfighter and the support activities needs.  One of the 
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main objectives shall be the compression of provisioning timeframes.  To this end, 
increased responsibility on the contractor's part is assumed in terms of stockage, storage 
and issue of COTS spares and repair parts.  The benefits that we will strive to achieve 
shall include immediate supportability, elimination of government levels of inventory 
stock, employ large commercial distribution systems, no source inspection, commercial 
packaging, fast and direct delivery to the warfighter, and warranty of components. 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Scope 
The scope of this thesis is broken down into essentially four deliverables: 
a) System Architecture 
The overall purpose is to provide dependable, cost effective supportability 
insurance for COTS based weapon systems.  The result will provide a solution to COTS 
obsolescence issues, material shortages issues, and extend the supportability of COTS 
components.  The architecture should address COTS technology obsolescence 
management through product and technology obsolescence forecasting methodologies 
and provide a new process for managing changes with COTS based systems.  The final 
architecture should respond to the voice of the customer, who is demanding credible 
combat power through design and supportability, by putting speed and agility into the 
process, and ultimately provide some value as perceived by the customers 
b) System Engineering Development and Implementation (SEDI) 
Plan 
The purpose of this plan is to put into perspective the processes, methods 
and tool needed to implement the Sunset Supply Base (SSB) system.  This document is 
presented as a stand-alone prescriptive set of actions, which can be taken in the 
establishment of an SSB system.  However, this document does not portend that it is the 
only process or method to establish such a system but instead is the method the authors 
had chosen to implement the SSB system.  The document is constructed in three major 
sections, which follow a brief introduction to the SSB system concept.  The primary 
issues grappled with in the SEDI plan are those faced during implementation and 
encountered primarily when bringing the idea into reality.  The first section of the plan 
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address introduction to the program and the infrastructure needed to support the effort, 
such areas as: teaming structure, computer resources, communication methods, interface 
with the Programs, data structure requirements, management participation, etc.  The 
second section of the plan covers the implementation of the SSB system and, in turn, 
presents many challenges to overcome in realizing the SSB system.  Examples of some of 
these challenges include: identification of the COTS Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(OEM), interface methods with the OEMs, interface with the Program, understanding the 
Programs needs and requirements, building relationships between the OEMs and the 
Navy, identifying suitable partnerships between the OEMs and small build-to-print 
suppliers where applicable.  The final section of the plan identifies methods and metrics 
to measure the impact of implementing a SSB system, thereby providing adequate 
indicators for the programs to assess the effectiveness and value proposition in using the 
system. 
c) Business Case Analysis (BCA) 
The Business Case Analysis focuses on the Sunset Supply Base system for 
supporting Navy hardware that incorporates the use of Commercial Off The Shelf  
(COTS) products.  It is offered as a tool that supports planning and decision-making for 
SSB implementation.  The Business Case Analysis (BCA) was performed for the Ship 
Self-Defense System (SSDS) MKI but can be applied to any acquisition program.  The 
BCA addresses the financial and non-financial consequences of implementing the SSB 
on the SSDS MKI program.  Not only does it show the funding profiles for various 
scenarios of support it also includes the methods and rationale that were used for 
quantifying benefits and results.  The baseline constraints of this case is a time period of 
ten-years which gives us a framework for providing decision-makers key information for 
developing program strategies and execution tactics for reducing cost, improving 
supportability requirements and reducing risk. 
d) Marketing Plan 
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This Marketing Plan is one of the four foundational documents created to 
establish the SSB system as a Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) supportability alternative 
for Navy fielded systems containing COTS products.  The plan analyzes the 
environments (external, internal, customer) in which the marketing functions will be 
operating.  The SSB system is evaluated for its attributes, both positives and negatives 
through a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis.  Each of 
these characteristics is then matched to a marketing strategy to improve the systems 
marketability.  Two goals are set: A) capture 20% of market share (72 Navy programs or 
80 man-yr per year effort), B) Establish an image for the SSB system as the alternative of 
choice for COTS supportability that enables cost effective technology insertion in fielded 
Navy systems.  Based on a defined Target Market, a Marketing Mix is defined that 
identifies a series of marketing action to take to achieve a competitive advantage for the 
SSB system in maximizing market penetration.  This Marketing Plan is an integral part of 
overall System Engineering approach used to develop the SSB system whereby the 
implementation of the Marketing Plan is contained within the system implementation 
process. 
2. Methodology 
The methodology is focused on the previously described four deliverables in and 
effort to exhaustively address the main problem described within this document of 
supporting COTS product usage within military weapon and support systems.  In doing 
so, the method takes a four-step approach that is aligned with each deliverable. 
STEP 1. Create an architecture that can affordably and effectively mitigate 
program supportability risk.  
The methodology used during the development of the System Architecture for the 
SSB system required review and evaluation of various attributes which contribute to the 
supportability or lack of supportability of the COTS products in Navy systems.  The first 
area reviewed dealt with defining the current issues with the COTS products as perceived 
by the Fleet, the PMOs, the program support teams, the OEM suppliers, the Fleet support 
activities, and internal Navy support infrastructures.  To accomplish this task an 
exhaustive literature search was done and combined with the results from interviews with 
each group affected.  These efforts identified several problems and systemic issues that 
needed to be addressed in the architecture.  The next area, which needed to be evaluated 
was the structure and dynamics of the current support systems, identifying how these 
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system met the unique characteristics presented through the use of COTS products.  With 
this evaluation in hand, a gap analysis was done to pinpoint shortcomings in current 
support strategies and practices.  An environmental analysis both pre-and-post 
Acquisition Reform (AR) was accomplished to identify potential causes and candidate 
resolutions.  The pre AR environment was characterized by a rules-based, hierarchical, 
requirements rich environment defined through the use of military specifications, this 
yielded a risk adverse posture.  The post AR environment was characterized by a 
performance based environment which resulted in a requirements poor environment that 
necessitated a risk management posture.  The pre-and-post AR environments provided 
the backdrop and context in which to interpret the feedback we received from the 
different entities interviewed.  The architectural form chosen was a collaborative 
architecture and was formulated through the evaluations and analysis identified above 
and is documented in Appendix A  Systems Architecture for the SSB system .  
Development of the architecture followed the sequential steps listed below, which defines 
major attributes/characteristics of the architecture.  
• Need 
• Purpose 
• Goals  Expectations, Objectives, & Specific Goals 
• Collaborative Concept 
• Function & Form  Overarching System, SSB Standalone System, Interface 
Management 
• Timing 
• User Environment 
STEP 2. Implement the architecture.  
The second step is the actual setup and execution of the SSB architecture. 
Implementation occurred on the SSDS MKI & MKII Systems and the AN/AQS-20/X 
Sonar Mine Detection Set.  Implementation was accomplished with specific expectations.  
First, in order to effectively assess the overall value and feasibility, measurable goals 
which was established under the architectural design of the SSB system would be used as 
evaluation criteria.  Furthermore, the implementation would provide crucial financial data 
to be analyzed as quantifiable measures.  The information derived from this step is 
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categorized into financial and non-financial.  The financial information would support the 
Business Case Analysis (BCA) whereas the non-financial would provide lessons learned.  
The experiences of implementation are to be recorded and presented as guidance within a 
formalized Systems Engineering Development and Implementation Plan.  Actual 
implementation would also yield both benefits and shortcomings that help significantly to 
improve the system during the evolutionary process, the expected development path for 
our collaborative system. In short, this step provides two key elements that contribute to 








Lessons learned and valued experienced that supports the establishment of a 
Systems Engineering Development and Implementation Plan, which is offered 
as guidance for future SSB architecture implementations. 
Specific, quantifiable data collected for evaluation and analysis conducted 
under the Business Case Analysis. 
STEP 3: Conduct a Business Case Analysis. 
In this step we conduct a business case analysis of the actual SSB implementation 
on the Ship Self-Defense System MKI.  This system was chosen as a case study because 
it provided the most data and experience in terms of the SSB process.  The outcome of 
this step is a document that essentially: 
Organizes data collected in the previous step. 
Converts the data into useable and pertinent information. 
Analyzes the results. 
Derives knowledge from the results. 
Makes appropriate recommendations. 
In following this general 5-step process, the final document serves as a tool that 
supports the planning and decision-making with respect to implementing the Sunset 
Supply Base system.  Of course, it could not be expected that the SSB system would be 
the solution for all Navy programs nor is it intended to replace traditional support 
practices, but this step intends to show how the SSB architectures true value is realized 
when its implementation is in conjunction with current processes.  In fact, the acceptance 
of the SSB system only provides the program manager with additional cost effective 
solution scenarios in terms of weapon system support, maintainability and operational 
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readiness.  This document focuses on the SSB as a viable solution alternative for the 
Navy Program Offices to consider in their decision-making efforts with respect to 
optimizing return-on-investment (ROI).  The phrase return-on-investment is not 
necessarily used in the strict sense here, but rather alludes to the challenge of reducing 
life-cycle costs while maintaining adequate support levels and system baseline stability 
over predefined periods of time.  However, since ROI is in effect a measure of a 
companys performance, it is appropriate in this case since the task of the Program 
Offices is to get the most bang for the buck, which is in essence a measure of their 
performance.  The analysis presented within the BCA considers several financial metrics 
and how they relate to the value of this business case in the selection process.  The 
Business Case Analysis (BCA) will detail the likely financial results and business 
consequences of implementing the SSB system so that the proposed benefits and risks are 
succinctly documented and understood.  
The BCA looks at the implementation of the SSB system on the Ship Self-
Defense System (SSDS) Mk1.  It considers the consequences of implementing the SSB 
infrastructure for providing COTS support for the SSDS program.  These consequences 
include both tangible and intangible results, and are analyzed for conformance to DoD 
policy, program requirements and overall cost/benefit.  Furthermore, it looks at how well 
the actual implementation relates to the goals and objectives of the SSB. In short, the 
business case examines the likely costs and benefits that will result in implementing the 
SSB system for supporting the SSDS program. In considering SSB implementation the 





Traditional support practices.  
Full SSB implementation in which all COTS components are support via 
Sunset Supply Base infrastructure. 
Partial SSB, where only those COTS components are supported in which the 
OEM and/or Sunset Supplier have agreed to enter into a contractual 
relationship.  
Modified SSB implementation, where the use of the SSB system is only used 
where it makes sense. The SSDS COTS Working Group, which is responsible 
for overall execution and management of the SSB system for a particular 
program, makes these decisions. 
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STEP 4: Development of a Marketing Plan 
In this step a Marketing Plan was established that promotes the SSB system as a 
Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) supportability alternative for Navy fielded systems 
containing COTS products.  This document defines the marketing strategy and 
boundaries for gaining DoD recognition and acceptance as a value added support 
solution alternative.  In essence, the Marketing Plan brings together the details of the 
previous steps and relates them to the environment and community to which the SSB 
system will exist.  The environmental and community aspects are researched and 
documented in terms of the external (private) and internal (organic) environments, 
expected competition, policy and legal constraints, and forecasts or estimates.  The 
Marketing Plan then identifies and lists the SSB systems strengths, weaknesses , 
opportunities and threats  commonly referred to as a SWOT Analysis.  The SWOT 
Analysis is an effective mechanism for focusing available energy in terms of SSB system 
acceptance into areas or programs that are believed to be where the SSB system can be 
most effective.  Also, this analysis helps in divulging the greatest opportunities for future 
SSB implementations.  In addition, this analysis helps to uncover and identifies potential 
problems, puts these problems into perspective, and establishes what important tasks 
have to be performed to overcome these problems.  The Marketing Plan is neither an 
independent or stand alone process/method, instead it is embedded as an integral part of 
the SSB system itself such that a marketing customer focus is maintained throughout all 
aspects of the approach.  Therefore in order to understand the marketing implementation 
efforts, knowledge of the SSB systems implementation or SEDI plan is necessary. 
Each step of the methodology is encapsulated and delivered as a stand-alone 
document (Appendices A-D) that specifically addresses the SSB system from four 
interrelated perspectives.  The System Architecture defines the problem and proposes a 
well thought out holistic solution alternative that establishes clearly define objectives and 
goals.  The Systems Engineering Development and Implementation (SEDI) Plan 
effectively puts the SSB System into practice. Implementation and execution of the SSB 
process is then assessed with respect to the established goals, objectives and expectations 
offered in the System Architecture plan.  This implementation helps to collect valuable 
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data to support continuous evolution of the SSB process as well as developing a BCA and 
Marketing Plan.  The BCA converts the data into information for analysis and reports on 
the results leading to knowledge that directly supports and enhances the decision-making 
process.  Additionally, the BCA offers recommendations and/or feedback for SSB system 
improvement.  Finally, the Marketing Plan feeds off of the SSB implementation (lessons 
learned and overall experiences) and the BCA results, as well as environmental study, 
and develops a strategy that provides guidance for future SSB implementation 
opportunities. 
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II.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Acquisition Reform and the policies that it invoked brought about the 
implementation of COTS.  Those policies required the avoidance of unique requirements, 
restrictive statements of need, and detailed specifications.  Together with DoD 5000.2 
and the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), DoD hoped to leverage the large 
businesses in terms of state-of-the-art technologies and quantity of manufacturing in 
order to provide state-of-the-art technology at lower costs.  COTS technologies are driven 
by the market forces of that industry, and the COTS manufacturers are driven by their 
customer base of which DoD only makes up approximately 0.4%.[7) Hartshorn]  To hold 
a place in their market, COTS manufacturers must remain competitive, which means a 
continual push in the development and use of technology.  It is this intense competition 
that drives the fast technical update cycles and ultimately influences technology change 
and direction.  To this end, the COTS manufacturer's position in the marketplace is 
dependent on: the company size and its technology edge.  These factors impact the 
direction and update cycles of technology and the products that employ them.  Therefore, 
the COTS manufacturers hold a significant place in weapon system development and 
manufacturing because they can effectively facilitate the quick response to DoD changing 
needs. 
Typically DoD design and develop cycles span 5 to 7 years (10-15 years 
historically) [8) McDermott] and are expensive and often deploy out of date equipment.  
COTS manufacturers on the other hand take a big business approach in offsetting 
development costs through economies of scale and volume rate productions.  Therefore, 
they can effectively implement technology change in a more timely manner.  Through the 
Acquisition Reform Initiatives, DoD is encouraged to capitalize on these big business 
characteristics and allow industry to be burdened with the technology development costs.  
The expected result for DoD is lower overall developmental investments and an 
opportunity to be able to synchronize their design efforts with state-of-the-art 
technologies. 
 27
The widespread use of COTS in military weapon systems does however bring 
certain challenges.  Nothing is as easy as it looks.  There are serious obsolescence issues 
associated with the use of COTS, as well has other material shortages issue.  The 
challenge is to provide life cycle support of fielded systems that use COTS products as 
part of the systems critical components.  The life cycle for some military weapon systems 
may exceed 20 or 30 years.  This is not at all consistent with big business timelines, and 
there is presently no incentive for COTS manufacturers to continue production of DoD 
COTS products on a small scale.  The driving force here is the market driven rate of 
technology change in the commercial world.  In the commercial world technology 
updates occur over an 18-month to 2 year cycle.[8) McDermott, 9) Glum, 10) Robinson]  
By contrast, the DoD experiences technology refresh cycles between 5 and 7 years.[8) 
McDermott]  This cycle is impacted not only by software and hardware updates but by 
programmatic schedule changes as well.  The challenge is further exacerbated by how the 
military will continue to develop weapon systems that do not fall prey to technology that 
will not last or technology that will undergo significant change. 
Technology changes will occur in the COTS arena and will have direct impacts 
on military weapon systems existing and even those under development.  Slight changes 
in software could have devastating effects.  Quite often systems are built around 
software, which means systems architectures are dictated by software and slight software 
changes will likely have significant cost impacts.  Relatively small software changes 
could have very expensive consequences.  To expound on the implication of software 
change impacts, we need to understand that software may not only dictate certain 
standards, but that software changes occur fairly regularly in the commercial world and 
re-integration is difficult and expensive.  The DoD has to be aware of the impacts to 
hardware due to software changes.  Likewise, slight changes in COTS hardware may 
impact software applications.  Additionally, there could likely be impacts in terms of 
interfaces with other equipment or systems that may not be so apparent.  Subtle 
specification changes to COTS hardware (i.e. timing, execution) could have 
devastating ripple effects.  These negative effects will be at the system level and will 
substantially increase the risks associated with using COTS in the future.  
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Since military weapon systems are typically unique, the use of COTS becomes a 
tricky business in terms of dictating system design and ultimately life cycle support.  In 
terms of software, military applications tend to be very specific, and the weapon system 
cannot tolerate or support changes.  Compatibility and configuration-control become 
crucial elements for both software and hardware.  Support activities are pressured to 
maintain stabilized baselines in order to keep the certification of the system verifiable.  
These baselines include not only the initial integration site but also the interoperability of 
fielded systems subsequent to changes (i.e. installation of replacement parts, firmware, 
software or hardware revisions, etc..) 
To fully understand this issue of support, we must revisit certain DoD 
characteristics.  Military acquisition is characterized by high development costs and very 
long development cycles; therefore military procurements are forced to project future 
needs and purchase as many products or components as they think they will need.  
Furthermore, in light of unique military applications, the lengthy life cycles and the 5 to 7 
year technology refresh rate, DoD realizes that they presently have no control over 
product evolution, and therefore must compensate by staying aware of pending changes.  
This awareness is critical if the military is to expect any appreciable success in support of 
their weapon systems.  Operational and maintainability support is expected over the 
entire life cycle of the system.  This includes support for design and development efforts 
as well.  As mentioned previously, DoD design and development cycles spanning 10 to 
15 years, are expensive and often deploy out of date equipment.  These design and 
development activities must rely on commercial products to be available when the design 
goes into production.  Furthermore, production and manufacturing facilities must rely on 
the source of supply in producing the systems they were contracted for, which will 
include commercial products that contain their own supportability issues. 
The impacts of ineffectiveness to support our weapon systems throughout their 
life cycle will be realized in military readiness and capability.  When we consider the 
huge investments that DoD makes in getting technology to the warfighter and training 
our warfighter, support of our weapon systems should not be the weak link in 
maintaining high levels of combat readiness and personnel safety.  This weak link might 
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be the result of the ever-increasing pressure to reduce costs.  Very often we hear of cost 
as the independent variable in design and development efforts and that total ownership 
costs should be factored into the design process.  To do this the design activities must 
maintain a holistic perspective of the system to include life cycle support of technologies 
that have been selected for insertion into their weapon systems.[11) Osmundson]  With 
the challenge of reducing costs and effectively supporting the warfighter, today's systems 
architects for DoD systems must understand what drives cost in order to carefully 
consider alternatives for life cycle support. 
The cost associated with supporting weapon systems throughout their life cycle is 
perhaps most sensitive to the availability of components that are needed to maintain 
stability in the operational context.  As legacy systems age, their associated support and 
maintenance costs rise dramatically due to obsolescence, reliability and supportability 
problems while at the same time the performance of the system decreases.  As original 
equipment manufacturers synchronize their product lines with technology, products 
presently deployed in DoD weapon systems, as well as products intended for use in 
developmental systems, will be affected.  Alternate components or parts will need to be 
considered for acceptance or rejection.  There will be material shortages occurring 
because of the social, economic, and political environments.  In either case there will be 
costs associated with these decisions and cost must be managed effectively.  If the 
alternate part is accepted, an engineering change proposal will need to be initiated.  There 
is cost associated with preparation, coordination, scheduling and testing of the alternate 
part.  If the alternate part is unacceptable, large product buys will be needed to ensure 
operational integrity and support of the system over its life cycle.  There is cost with 
developing a new source of supply.  In these cases there are issues of where to buy, how 
much to buy, where to stock them, and how to manage the costs and logistical support to 
meet the needs of the customer.  
Understanding costs will help government activities meet the needs and desires of 
the customer, mainly in assuring life cycle support of COTS products.  More specifically, 
we need to extend the supportability of COTS since we know that the life cycle of many 
weapon systems exceed the life expectancy of the COTS used.  By addressing the 
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supportability issue we effectively address a much deeper need, that is warfighter 
readiness and capability.  By assuring COTS supportability through the system's life 
cycle we can consequently ensure reasonable combat readiness and capability status.  In 
essence we need to provide stability in terms of baseline configuration of the weapon 
systems that use COTS in order to support the periods of time between technology 
refresh cycles.  That is to say there is a compelling need to improve the supportability of 
fielded products for the period necessary to meet the user requirements.  In satisfying this 
need, the stabilizing solution/alternative must be cost effective at the initial procurement, 
over the life cycle of the system, and ultimately provide the lowest possible impact to 
Total Ownership Cost (TOC.)  The solution space will necessitate a predictable and 
sustainable process for support of fielded and developmental systems.  To be successful, 
this process will need to adequately identify risk, mitigate those risks, and provide 
resolution methods and planning.  Knowing now that a new architecture is needed to 
meet these needs we must conclude that a departure from traditional methods is necessary 
to meet the challenge of sound planning and careful tailoring of COTS acquisition at the 
lowest possible cost.  
Reduced government funding and manpower levels have further emphasized the 
need to improve life cycle management processes.  Perhaps the focal point for this effort 
is COTS risk mitigation during development and for fielded weapon systems.  This type 
of continual assessment is needed to offset the fast technology update cycle experienced 
in the commercial realm.  Continual systems assessment will provide system baseline 
configuration stability and supportability.  Key to success is the need to continually 
assess Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) and their COTS products.  This 
assessment should provide valuable insight to the vendor's stability, which in turn 
impacts the level of risk associated with specific products employed by DoD.  Such 
assessments would perhaps look at how limited a vendor's product line is and/or make 
judgments on the potential of specific products in that line to change or disappear.  To 
this end, it becomes important to determine the likelihood that a vendor will continue to 
provide DoD assets and the consistency of that product line.  The challenge is in the 
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architecting of a process that is proactive, disciplined and systematic, that will consider 
and address the needs of the customer.   
The customer in this case takes on many dimensions.  
The End User - Certainly the end user must be considered for it is the end user we 
depend on to operate our weapon systems and provide the expected defense as defined in 
our national strategic policies.  
The Program Management Offices (PMO) - This includes the initial acquisition 
community whose purpose is the acquisition of new systems.  They also support the in-
service engineering activities that must continue to procure parts as part of an alteration 
kit or on-going support for the warfighter, including repair and replacements of parts.  
The PMOs support the Integrated Logistical Support (ILS) functions, which must plan 
the long-term support of fielded equipment including changes to the equipment baseline.  
One of the PMOs primary responsibilities is budgetary support for personnel who must 
project the availability of products that extend over the 2-year Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM) cycle and the 3-5 year implementation cycle.  Additionally the 
PMOs must provide funding in support of field activities or service contractors who 
prepare Cost, Health, and Risk models, which quantify the availability and supportability 
of the fielded systems. 
Interoperability Support Activities - These activities must obtain and maintain a 
stabilized baseline in order to keep the certification of the system verifiable.  These 
support activities include not only the initial integration site but also the interoperability 
of fielded systems subsequent to changes (i.e. installation of replacement parts, firmware, 
software or hardware revisions, etc.). 
Design and Development Activities - These activities must rely on commercial 
products to be available when the design goes into production. 
Production/Manufacturing Facilities - These facilities must rely on the source of 
supply of component piece parts needed for producing the systems they were contracted 
for, which will include commercial products that contain supportability issues. 
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B. ECONOMIC PROBLEM 
The current DoD requirements include a scenario of increased operations while at 
the same time a continuous push for weapon system upgrades.  The easy solution would 
be to increase the defense budget, although not very likely.  Given the political pressures 
of today, DoD PMOs are challenged to search for more economical alternatives.  The 
challenge, in effect, is to maintain near-term weapon system readiness while at the same 
time planning for weapon system modernization efforts.  To add to this, DoD is 
undergoing a serious reduction in government infrastructure.  Given the current trend of 
increasing military operating tempos, the struggle to accomplish any sort of 
modernization effort is going to be difficult.  In fact, financial resources are likely to be 
used to maintain these levels of operations rather than conducting serious modernization 
efforts.  The Joint Aviation Logistics Board (JALB) June 1999 report on Commercial 
Support of Aviation Systems states that discretionary procurement accounts dropped 
by 53 percent since 1990, while operations and maintenance activity declined by only 15 
percent [12) JALB].  The implication of this statement is that replacement or upgrades 
to existing systems are effectively being delayed. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, in 
the May 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, observed that  Today, the 
Department is witnessing a gradual aging of the force. [13) QDR]  This lends credence 
to the statement in a 1994 issue of Army RD&A Bulletin: In actuality, our military 
hardware is now on a replacement cycle of about 54 years - this in a world where 
technology typically has a half-life from 2 to 10 years. [14) Augustine]  The end result 
to all of this is that, existing systems will have to be maintained at the required levels of 
availability and reliability for extended periods of time.  Therefore, traditional support 
strategies will have to be re-evaluated to address this phenomenon.  These traditional 
strategies typically expect total government ownership of support material and total 
government control over design changes.  What this has leaded to is known as the COTS 
initiative. The emphasis on COTS product usage was brought on by the fact that the DoD 
could conceivably take advantage of technology developments in the commercial sector 
at a reduced cost to development programs.  So given the fact that more and more of the 
defense budget is going to sustainment of operations, the financial resources needed to 
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modernize existing weapon systems is decreasing.  So to reiterate, support of existing 
fielded systems at a reduced financial burden is needed and one initiative meant to meet 
this challenge is the use of COTS products throughout DoD weapon and support systems.  
With COTS products come additional challenges in support, given the fast paced 
technology update cycles in the commercial sector as compared to the slow and 
methodical DoD acquisition process.  Thus, there is an anticipated increase in material or 
product obsolescence.  So the savings realized by implementing an aggressive COTS 
initiative could be offset by obsolescence and the need to redesign.  This is not to say that 
COTS products have not proved beneficial, on the contrary, but the overall process for 
incorporation and sustainment of COTS products continues to evolve and program 
managers continue to be confronted with certain challenges associated with this.  
Therefore, a solution alternative is needed to counteract the costs associated with the 
redesign of weapon and support systems due to obsolescence rather than performance. 
C. SUSTAINMENT PROBLEM 
The COTS initiative was brought about by the fact that the commercial sector 
essentially drives technology change at an extremely fast paced and that the DoD could 
take advantage of this while reducing life cycle costs.  The COTS initiative provided a 
potential path to infuse new technology into the military systems and at the same time 
avoid the developmental costs associated with grooming the new technology.  The rate at 
which private industry can develop and deliver new technologies is orders of magnitudes 
faster than traditional DoD acquisitions.  Take a look at computing power, which has 
appeared to double every eighteen months.  The same phenomenon has occurred across 
the spectrum of technology at different rates.  Market forces other than the DoD 
essentially drive this explosion of new capabilities.  DoD makes up approximately 0.4% 
of the market share; [7) Hartshorn] therefore; its not hard to see how commercial product 
lines are driven by the private sector vice the DoD.  There are two fundamental reasons 
for this fast pace.  One is the ever-increasing demand for new capabilities primarily in the 
private domain.  Second, the competitive drive to get technology to market first and gain 
the most lucrative share of the market.  In either case, DoD has little influence.  Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) routinely stop production on items that can no longer 
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be justified from a business perspective regardless of the impact to the DoD.  The typical 
length of time a product can be considered available is approximately 18 months.  That is 
to say, manufacturers are developing and releasing new capabilities every 18 months to 2 
years.  In contrast, DoD weapon system acquisitions typically take 10 to 15 years to 
develop and fully deploy.  At a very minimum, DoD can presently only hope to achieve 
technology-refresh cycles of 5 years, which is still not adequately aligned with 
commercial product updates.  See Figure 2 for a pictorial representation of this 
phenomenon.  
 
Figure 2: COTS vs NAVY Refresh Cycles 
When we say fully deploy, we mean that even though a weapon system is ready to 
be installed, each platform for installation must be scheduled to receive it.  Even if we 
consider an aggressive development effort within the Navy, the time to develop a new or 
enhanced capability could easily take 5 to 7 years.  Once the weapon system has been 
tested and deemed ready for deployment, it will take additional 5 to 10 years to fully 
deploy.  Every platform or ship that is to receive this weapon system must be scheduled 
and the work to install performed.  Ship deployment schedules and the length of 
availabilities (in-port period when the work is performed) add serious delays to installing 
the weapon system.  It is simply inconceivable to think that new technology, which is 
turning over every 18 months, can be infused consistently throughout the Fleet.  Of 
course, its possible to have different platforms upgraded to different levels of capability, 
but then we run the risk of incompatibility between platforms and a logistical nightmare 
in supporting various versions of the same weapon system.  What this all comes down to, 
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in terms of COTS, is a decrease in DoD control over weapon system design and 
subsequent support.  The purpose here is not to discredit the COTS Initiative as 
ineffective.  The COTS Initiative in conjunction with a well throughout open systems 
approach, will contribute greatly to DoDs effort to bring the latest technology and 
capability to the warfighter at the most cost effective levels and be able to sustain such 
affordably.  The fact of the matter is that, the DoD acquisition process is purposely 
constructed to take a conservative, thoughtful approach to implementing change, thereby 
introducing obstacles to the time elements necessary to keep pace with the commercial 
environment.  The most important point to understand here is the disconnect between the 
life cycle of commercial products (1.5 to 5 years) and the typical reaction time of the 
DoD for modernizing fielded weapon systems.  Traditionally, the support strategy has 
been to buy spares and store them based on a forecasted need over this period of time.  In 
reaction to the obsolescence announcement, the Program Office enters a planning period 
of between 2 and 3 years.  Following this is a 5 to 7 year expectation for actual 
implementation.  So we are looking at approximately 7 to 10 years between system 
upgrades or replacement at a minimum.  But now consider the fact that these systems are 
expected to be in service for 15 years or more and the supportability issues become 
apparent given the consistent 18-month to 2-year commercial technology life expectancy.  
In essence, when the DoD decides to use COTS products, they become obsolete during 
the planning phase.  Even a well-planned approach can push COTS technology insertion 
into the implementation phase only to become obsolete during this period as well.  This 
instability to systems design baselines is a major issue for maintaining appropriate 
readiness and availability.  Understanding the realities associated with implementing and 
supporting COTS products, an effort must be made to deal with stabilizing the systems 
design baselines so high performance in terms of support can be achieved.  
D. COTS PROBLEM 
The term COTS, Commercial-Off-The-Shelf, refers to the entire range of products 
and services procured by the DoD.  Nearly every weapon system and their basic repair 
items use commercial items to varying degrees.  Today, it is not a matter of all or 
nothing, but how much of the system is COTS based. Figure 3 is a notional interpretation 
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of COTS as described in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Subpart 2.1, 




An item for sale, lease or 
license to the general public
(2) 
An item that evolved from 
(1) that will be available in 
time 
(3) 
Items that are minor or 
standard modifications of (1) 
& (2) 
(4) 
Any combination of (1), (2), 
(3), or (5) customarily sold to 
the general public 
(5) 
Services procured for the 
support of (1), (2), (3) & 
(4) 
(6) 
Services offered and sold 
competitively in the 
commercial marketplace at 
catalog prices 
(8) 
An item sold competitively 
in large quantities to local 
and state governments 
(7) 
Any of (1) thru (6) that have 
been transferred from 






Any previously developed item 
used by federal, state, local, or 
allied governments 
(2) 
(1) that requires only 
minor modifications 
(3) 
Integration of NDI subsystems 
and components 
Figure 3: COTS Description  [15) FAR] 
The DoD mandate for COTS product use is driven by two important situations.  
First, that fact the commercial market leads the DoD in latest technology development; 
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therefore, in order for the DoD to access state-of-the-art technology they must come to 
the commercial sector.  In the past the DoD lead the way in research, development and 
application of technology for military weapon systems.  Today private industry leads the 
DoD in these areas.  Secondly, the present industrial base is very stable.  That is in the 
face of obsolescence, DoD suppliers struggle to stay in business due to reduced 
procurement by the DoD.  The larger companies have sufficient market share to remain 
stable through these periods of reduced DoD procurement.  Additionally, they can 
respond to a surge in requirements by the DoD.  
Given the widespread use of COTS products in military weapon and support 
systems, certain challenges have become evident in terms of ensuring long-term 
supportability.  The challenges stem from serious obsolescence issues and material 
shortages.  The challenge, in essence, is to provide life cycle support to fielded weapon 
systems that use COTS products.  Consider for a moment that many systems will have 
life cycles that exceed 20 or 30 years, and one can easily imagine the sustainment 
nightmare involved.  The slow acquisition process, the long life expectancies and 
traditional support methods are not consistent with commercial business practices.  In 
fact, there is little incentive for COTS manufacturers to continue to produce items in 
rather small quantities just for the sake of ensuring some system performance baselines.  
If DoD chose not to use COTS, there would be little impact to the commercial world.  
However, given the proliferation of COTS products throughout military weapon systems, 
when a product is no longer produced the impacts to the DoD are profound and severe.  
Even small changes to a product can have serious repercussions to weapon system 
performance and design baselines.  The fact of the matter is, there will be technology 
changes within the COTS arena and they will have direct impacts on military weapon 
systems, both fielded and under development.  Slight changes in COTS hardware could 
possibly impact interfaces with other equipment or systems that may not be so obvious.  
Subtle specification changes to COTS hardware (i.e., timing, execution) could have 
devastating ripple effects.  Furthermore, changes to hardware could, and often do, require 
changes in software code in the larger system.  A change in code translates into time and 
money.  Time to make the necessary changes, test the changes, and deploy the changes 
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and money to perform these tasks.  This is not hard to understand, when you realize that 
many systems are built around software (that is architectures that are dictated by 
software).  Software is a key enabler to achieving open systems architecture, as software 
is assumed easier to update than hardware.  Nevertheless, slight changes in software do 
have a cost associated with it and the impacts could be significant.  In the face of the 
rapid updates to software in the commercial domain, DoD re-integration efforts can be 
difficult and expensive.  To this end, the continue implementation of COTS products in 
the development of military weapon systems will lead to a situation where these systems 
will constantly fall prey to technology that will not last or forever changing. 
E. THE CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENT 
The DoD 5000 series documents require the contracting environment to maximize 
competition and considers it critical in providing innovation, product quality, 
affordability and reducing costs from both government and industry providers alike.  
Through the use of the systems engineering approach, an integrated acquisition and 
logistic process must focus on Total Ownership Cost (TOC) or the subordinate Life 
Cycle Cost (LCC); Identifying supportability as a key design and performance factors.  
The OMB Circular A-76 requires through policy statements, the use of competition to 
enhance quality, economy, and productivity.  These enhancements are possible by 
performing cost comparisons of commercial activities performed by the government, 
with contracted commercial activities from either within the government or from 
industry.  Circular A-76 is not designed to simply contract out.  Rather, it is designed to: 
(1) balance the interests of the parties to make or buy cost comparison, (2) provide a level 
playing field between public and private offerors to a competition, and (3) encourage 
competition and choice in the management and performance of commercial activities.  
The foundation documents, such as OMB Circular A-11 and A-76, were put in 
place to establish the performance based contracting methodology, identify this cost 
focus as the primary discriminating criteria.  Conversely the guidance documents put in 
place by Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) which are used to implement the 
methods, go beyond the cost criteria by adding additional caveats and restrictions, such as 
an all or nothing involvement, for functionally different but related portions of the 
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support effort.  Furthermore by dictating the allocation of certain functions to be 
accomplished by specific entities, the guidance documents constrain the cost focus of the 
foundational documents potentially yielding to sub-optimal results.  The NAVICP 
implementation documents define three baseline assumptions which mold the contracting 
environment: 1) awards a contract to a single supplier, 2) assess current in-house 
government activities/functions on past performance only, and 3) defines a government 
employee and/or activity as sub-contracting to a contractor.  The singular contract 
requirement cannot be implemented within the Organic activities due to built-in 
constraints defined by the Navys structure.  In identifying this as a pivotal requirement 
the implementation documents define a non-competitive environment with respect to the 
Organic activities.  The second implemented baseline assumption provides bias when 
performing cost comparisons.  Central to the decision making process regarding the 
potential use of a Performance Based Logistics (PBL) contract is the development of the 
Business Case Analysis (BCA).  The ground rules currently used in developing the 
baseline cost estimates for Organic support (i.e. in-house Navy support activity) uses 
historical performance data and compares this data with contractor proposed estimates in 
evaluating cost effectiveness of the contractors proposed cost.  Important to notice is that 
the Organic support costs rely solely on the past data and by doing the analysis in this 
manner three major assumptions are made: 1) the past performance data is accurate, 
applied in an appropriate manner, and the data reflects current and future performance of 
the Organic activities/functions, 2) there are no opportunities to reduce, streamline, or 
improve the Organic cost figures, and 3) the Organic activities/functions would not be 
affected by the competitive environment.  Applying historical costs to the Organic 
entities and comparing the cost estimates in a proposal from the contractor yields a bias 
in favor of the contractor.  Although this type of analysis is considered to foster a 
competitive environment where the lowest cost gets the contract, the process side steps 
many of the tenets of true competition.  The third baseline assumption appears to be in 
direct conflict with the foundational documents for functions/activities, which require the 
use of value judgments having long-term programmatic impacts.  The implementation 
methods employed in developing performance based contracts handicaps the Organic 
activity/function, identifies no method to input into the decision-making criteria, 
potentially places  Government employees in a position of having a conflict of interest, 
provides a non level playing field, and in no way assures the Navy receives the best 
possible value available in todays market place. 
The new emphasis in the contracting environment using PBL contracting 
methodologies presents challenges to the Organic activity/functions with respect to 
implementing the SSB system.  It appears evident that these challenges include: 1) a 
barrier to entry into the PBL contracting environment due to exclusionary policies at the 
contract implementation level (NAVICP level) although the upper level policies support 
the SSB systems concepts, 2) the current contracting methodologies establish scenarios in 
which there could be a conflict of interest for Government employees when providing 
sub-contracting services for a contractor, this potential could directly impact the SSB 
system applicable since it is performed by Organic activities/functions, and 3) no 
definition/designation is provided with regards to the DMSMS support function and its 
categorization as an inherently Governmental function or a commercial activity, 
without such an identification there exists an amount of uncertainty about who would be 
performing the SSB systems functions in the future.  The purpose of this section is to 
identify and describe the factors, which could influence the success of the SSB system in 
the current market place.  Responses, adjustments, and/or resolution to the challenges 
described above are addressed in the Marketing Plan. 
F. CURRENT STAKEHOLDER ASSESSMENT 
Program Management Office (PMO) - The PMO through its Integrated Logistics 
Support (ILS) group orders COTS assemblies through the normal support systems by 
contract, purchase order, or Navy supply system.  If an OEM no longer supports a 
product, then the PMO must look for another avenue to solve the issue, typically an 
engineering analysis and review is necessary yielding a variety of solutions most of 
which are very expensive.  If the PMO is lucky or just well informed (which is not 
always the case), the OEM will provide a notice stating an End Of Life (EOL) date 
after which the OEM will no longer support the specific COTS product.  At this point the 
Program Office must make some choices.  Regardless of the choices made, the Program 
Office incurs a significant amount of risk usually at a hefty price. 
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Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) -The OEM is usually a leading edge 
technology/design firm that is market driven and produces at high volume and cost 
reflective of commercial economies of scale.  The fast paced environment requires short-
lived products (~18-24 months) to keep up with the ever-changing technology.  The 
business case is just not there to cater to the DoD/governments needs and although the 
OEM wishes to keep this group of consumers, the momentum of the business cycle keeps 
the OEM focused elsewhere.  Under these circumstances supportability is limited to 
production run time (~18-24 months) with approximately a 12-month follow-on repair 
and test capability period. 
Small Business (SSB Supplier) - The SSB supplier is envisioned to come from the 
large base of smaller suppliers who, over the past three decades, have provided the 
DoD/government with high technology custom products.  Using this supplier base will 
reduce the risk caused during the technology transfer process because of the proven track 
record earned when dealing with other DoD/government products.  However, this will be 
a collaborative process and the final decision will reside with and between the OEM and 
the SSB supplier.  Here the OEM holds the trump card and must be willing to live with 
the choice.  The small business SSB supplier typically has extensive technical know how 
in the manufacturing area but lacks the expertise to accomplish proactive, predictive 
obsolescence management.  These companies are customer focused, agile, and seek long-
term relationships with their customers. 
DoD Navy Activities/Resources - Most, if not all, of the needed functions required 
by the SSB system are already accomplished by internal DoD/government resources; 
however they are done in an ad-hoc fashion without the collaborative environment, and 
with no defined, supportable, and repeatable process in place.  The expertise has always 
been available in the DoD/government but in a different form using a different process.  
Prior to Acquisition Reform, the MIL-Specs and Standards provided a requirements-rich 
environment with well-defined processes for implementation.  These processes and 
implementation methods required the same expertise needed today but applied in a 
different context.  Todays environment is requirements-poor, and the talented expertise 
must adjust to this performance-based versus MIL-Spec-based environment.  The context 
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in todays environment is relationship-based, not rule-base, and the survivability of this 
entire group of talented experts will depend on their adaptability to todays context.  
Acquisition Reform removed the barriers put in place by the MIL-Spec, rule-based 
environment, but it failed to provide an adequate substitute, which would provide a 
robust process that can meet the supportability requirements and needs of the end user. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The research methodology taken to develop the SSB system required the design 
and development of four independent documents coupled with implementation activities 
to exercise the concepts being incorporated into the system infrastructure.  The four 
documents (Appendixes A-D to this thesis paper) are as follows: 
• Appendix A  The Sunset Supply Base Architecture 
• Appendix B  The Systems Engineering Development and Implementation 
(SEDI) Plan 
• Appendix C  The Business Case Analysis (BCA) 
• Appendix D  The Marketing Plan 
Each of the four appendixes are written as standalone documents for use as 
independent ready reference materials for a specific area of interest.  The purpose of this 
segmentation of the systems development was to provide a meaningful resource to the 
functional groups, who will need the background information regarding the SSB system, 
in an encapsulated set of characteristics germane to a specific area.  For example, the 
SSB Systems Architecture will be of interest to PMO support groups like Integrated 
Logistics Support (ILS) groups, who will be interested in the relationship management 
areas between the OEM, the Sunset Supplier, procurement activities, and Navy support 
activities.  The Systems Architecture provides an outline of these relationships and the 
reasons/logic behind their development.  The SSB Architecture provides the initial 
structural elements and base relationships needed in development of the SSB system.  
The SEDI plan provides the How, Why, When, Where, What involved with the SSB 
system implementation process with the additional insight provided in the form of 
Lessons Learned.  The BCA presents a roadmap to assess the SSB implementation 
efforts and uses actual data from a Navy program to illustrate the utility of the analysis 
method and the expected outcome from the SSB implementation process.  The Marketing 
Plan describes strengths and weaknesses of the SSB system and provides useful graphical 
and tabular information to help examine the usability of the system to a current or 
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candidate program.  The SSB Systems Architecture and the SEDI Plan constitute the 
primary research methodologies used to develop the SSB system. The BCA and the 
Marketing Plan were developed as part of the analysis task of the SSB system and as such 
are covered in detail in the Data Analysis portion of this thesis paper.  However to 
assure complete coverage of the research methodologies employed a detailed description 
of the Systems Architecture and the SEDI Plan are provided below. 
B. APPROACH SUMMARY 
The development of the four documents parallels the sequential path that was 
followed in the SSB system development process.  The research methodology used in the 
SSB system development can be described at a very high level as:  
• Identifying current status regarding COTS supportability, defining up-stream 
and down stream system requirements, capturing customer 
needs/expectations, performing a gap analysis current status versus customer 
needs, then defining a Systems Architecture (Appendix A) to encompass the 
identified expectations and constraints. 
The output products of the Systems Architecture (SA) generation were then taken 
and implemented on three Navy programs.  Since the SA provided a roadmap on what 
needed to be accomplished but lacked the details on how to get the system functional, the 
implementation step proved invaluable in addressing these concerns.  The Systems 
Engineering Development and Implementation (SEDI) Plan (Appendix B) uses the 
Functional Flow Diagram- Figure 4  and the Informational/Data Flow Support 
Structure  Figure 5, as the primary outputs of the SA effort.  These output products 
were refined in the SEDI plan and renamed as the 17 Step Process and the 
Obsolescence Impact & Purchase Request Report respectively.  The SEDI plan 
identifies four primary implementation products and four major output products.  The 
implementation products provide insight to the implementing process as a risk 
management tool while the output products provide decision quality information for 
identifying the best value alternatives for the Navy. 
The data collected during the SEDI step, needed to be transformed into usable 
information and knowledge, this task was accomplished through development of the 
Business Case Analysis (BCA) (Appendix C).  As a primary input the BCA used the 
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Assembly Master & Cost Matrices output from the SEDI plan, which provided the raw 
data for analysis.  This raw data was embellished with resource modeling data provided 
by NSWC Cranes Cost Model.  The BCA in turn produced a series of tabular and 
graphical representations of the financial impact due to the SSB system implementation.  
An additional evaluation was performed describing non-financial impacts showing some 
of the emergent properties and opportunities produced through the SSB system. 
 Once the development roadmap, the implementing processes and products had 
been defined, the next logical step was to incorporate these elements of the SSB system 
in a package that could be easily disseminated through out the Navys using community.  
The Marketing Plan (Appendix D) evaluates the characteristics of the SSB system in term 
of its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, then provides a plan of action to 
capitalize on these attributes to provide best value to the Navy.  The SSB system 
represents a Systems Engineering approach to solving the COTS supportability risks and 
as such defines an overarching system instead of limited point solutions.  One of the 
major products produces in the Marketing plan is a graphical depiction, which compares 
COTS supportability point solutions to the attributes available through the SSB system.  
The point solution approach is currently the standard practice used by the PMO DMSMS 
support groups.  
C. APPROACH DETAILS FOR THE SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE AND 
SEDI PLAN DEVELOPMENT 
1. The SSB Systems Architecture (SA) 
The approach taken to develop the SSB System Architecture (SA) required a 
series of detailed evaluations to yield an understanding of the current environment and 
employed methods to address the COTS supportability issues.  The premise for this 
developmental effort was the expectation that the end result would be an immediately 
usable product/system for the Navy.  Therefore the developed system must work with and 
leverage as much as possible, the processes and practices used currently to support the 
Navys systems.  Detailed analysis is provided in Appendix A regarding the current status 
of COTS supportability for the Navys system and their cause and effect relationship to 
the warfighter.  The approach used to distill these independent support practices/methods 
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into a cohesive system required the use of some engineering judgments and the use of a 
set of well-established heuristics (base rules).  A list of the primary judgments/heuristics 
[11) Osmundson, 16) Maier-Richtin] used to guide the development process, are as 
follows: 
• Employ a holistic view. 
• A complex system will develop and evolve within an overall architecture 
much more rapidly if there are stable intermediate forms. 
• Using an evolutionary approach from current practices/methods as a baseline 
a spiral development process will assure the developed system answers the 
right problem. 
• The greatest dangers are at the interfaces. 
• Interoperable Systems of Systems will yield new and emergent properties 
which are greater than the sum of the independent systems. 
• Design the structure with good bones. 
• Consider a collaborative system a franchise. Always ask why the franchisees 
choose to join, and choose to remain. 
• The system is collaborative in the sense that the members are assembled and 
operate through the voluntary choices of the participants, not through the 
dictates of an individual client. 
• If the politics do not fly, the hardware never will. 
• The emergent capability is the whole point of the system; but the architect 
may only be able to influence the interfaces among the nearly independent 
parts, the components are outside the scope and control of an architect of the 
whole. 
• Members (Navy activities) participating in a collaborative system must 
understand that their efforts are not based on a zero sum end game that the 
gain of capabilities by one activity by using the collaborative system does not 
subtract capability from any other activity. The new emergent properties of 
the system provide a Win-Win scenario. 
a) Primary Output Products of the Systems Architecture 
The two primary output products from the Systems Architecture are 
provided below as - the Functional Flow Diagram- Figure 4  and the Informational/ 
Data Flow Support Structure  Figure 5.  The Functional Flow Diagram provides a 
high level sequential set of steps to follow in establishment of the SSB system.  The 
Informational/Data Flow Support Structure shows the necessary information flow and 
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associated relationships needed to support the SSB system once in place.  At the core of 
this collaborative approach is the management of interfaces.  The planned development 
of the standalone SSB system from the overarching system, comprised of existing key 
entities, constitutes a collaborative architecture.  Because the function and form of these 
existing entities is already defined and all operate as independent systems, interfaces 
between these entities become critical for effective collaboration.  Thus, interface 
management is an important discipline that must be implemented in order for the SSB 
system to be successful.  A means of effective interfacing is also crucial to the success of 
this system.  Therefore following the graphical representations (Figures 4 & 5) a textual 
description of current practices/methods and proposed practices/methods is provided 
from the different participants viewpoints.  These products provide the starting point and 
baseline from which the implementation efforts may begin. 
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Figure 5: Information/Data Flow Support Structure 
2. Impacts of SSB Implementation 
Program Management Office (PMO) 
Current:  The PMO through its Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) group orders 
COTS assemblies through the normal support systems by contract, purchase order, or 
Navy supply system.  If an OEM no longer supports a product, then the PMO must look 
for another avenue to solve the issue, typically an engineering analysis and review is 
necessary yielding a variety of solutions most of which are very expensive.  If the PMO 
is lucky or just well informed (which is not always the case), the OEM will provide a 
notice stating an End Of Life (EOL) date after which the OEM will no longer support 
the specific COTS product.  At this point the Program Office must make some choices.  
Regardless of the choices made, the PMO incurs a significant amount of risk usually at a 
hefty price.  
Proposed:  The collaborative process is illustrated using two notional graphic 
Figures (4 & 5) to show the relationship and informational interfaces between the PMO 
and the other identified players.  Figure 4 shows the process flow at a functional level 
delineating the relationship each player has to the others during the SSB development.  
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As a collaborator in this process, the Program Office provides the funding resources to 
internal government activities to facilitate, assess, and report.  Also, the PMO is agreeing 
to pay for the royalty and provide the Bill Of Material (BOM).  For their efforts the PMO 
receives: 1) an alternate long term supplier of the COTS product and a relationship with 
that supplier and their associated OEM that may be extended for other OEM discontinued 
items, 2) as identified in Figure 5, a continuous update to the risk identification and 
mitigation efforts, proactively adjudicating obsolescence issues seamlessly on behalf of 
the PMO, 3) provides the PMO with a corporate knowledge data base on which future 
decisions can leverage, 4) although not identified through the figures, the program gains 
reparability and testability attributes over the life cycle of the system defined by the 
Navys needs.  The method of communication being online is nearly in real time so the 
effort expended by the PMO is minimal.  Product ordering is done using current 
procurement methodologies. 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
Current:  The OEM is usually a leading edge technology/design firm that is 
market driven and produces at high volume and cost reflective of commercial economies 
of scale.  The fast paced environment requires short-lived products (~18-24 months) to 
keep up with the ever-changing technology.  The business case is just not there to cater to 
the DoD/governments needs and although the OEM wishes to keep this group of 
consumers, the momentum of the business cycle keeps the OEM focused elsewhere.  
Under these circumstances supportability is limited to production run time (~18-24 
months) with approximately a 12-month follow-on repair and test capability period. 
Proposed:  The OEM for their part in the collaboration effort has a lot to gain and 
little to lose.  There is a business case to be made for making a profit from their 
intellectual property they no longer find useful.  The 5-15% royalty is the incentive, but 
other non-tangible benefits enhance the business aspects in favor of the collaboration 
effort. Protection of their proprietary design is an inherent part of the SSB process 
through Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA) and contractual mechanisms.  Important 
to note is that the contractual arrangements are made with another company, the SSB 
supplier, not the government, which many OEMs find favorable since governmental red 
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tape would poison the business case.  This situation leaves the ownership and control of 
the commercial products in the hands of the industry.  Additionally, the government does 
not have to pay for the design only the product, a tenet of Acquisition Reform.  By 
participation in the collaborative system the OEM establishes a long-term relationship 
with the DoD/government without the ongoing supportability issues.  In turn these new 
emergent properties of the system can be used to enhance the ability of the OEM to 
market enhanced product supportability, not only to the DoD/government environment, 
but also any entity, which is configuration constrained due to the business constraints (i.e. 
refineries, paper mills, electrical power generation and control applications, etc.).  The 
OEM efforts are concentrated during the establishment of the SSB supplier and play a 
crucial part in assuring that the OEM reputation will be in safe hands when the SSB 
supplier delivers products.  The OEM however does agree to allow the internal Navy 
resources visibility into the products design by letting the SSB supplier share the parts list 
complete with associated component vendor information along with a top level assembly 
drawing.  This is information the government has not been privy to in the past but it is 
essential for accomplishment of risk analysis and yielding the desired emergent 
properties of the system. 
SSB Supplier 
Current:  The SSB supplier is envisioned to come from the large base of smaller 
suppliers who, over the past three decades, have provided the DoD/government with high 
tech. custom products.  Using this supplier base will reduce the risk caused during the 
technology transfer process because of the proven track record earned when dealing with 
other DoD/government products.  However, this will be a collaborative process and the 
final decision will reside with and between the OEM and the SSB supplier.  Here the 
OEM holds the trump card and must be willing to live with the choice.  The small 
business SSB supplier typically has extensive technical know how in the manufacturing 
area but lacks the expertise to accomplish proactive, predictive obsolescence 
management.  These companies are customer focused, agile, and seek long-term 
relationships with their customers. 
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Proposed:  As for their part in the collaboration process, the SSB supplier must be 
willing to be contractually bound by the agreement with the OEM and at the same time 
be willing to work the internal government resources to coordinate and facilitate 
supportability efforts while reducing risk to the program.  Actions required by the SSB 
supplier will include: 
• sharing the OEM parts list and drawings, 
• be the purchaser, stock handler, and storage facility for parts that have gone 
obsolete and are awaiting consumption once an assembly order is placed, 
• as requested by the program, be willing to stock all up assemblies (which have 
already been paid for) to enable immediate turnaround times of fielded 
assemblies which have failed,  
• accept all the responsibility for being the prime supplier of the subject 
assembly. 
In return for its efforts the SSB supplier is rewarded through:  
• a new relationship with a pre-eminent commercial firm,  
• a new product line,  
• new customers, DoD/government and non-government,  
• long term relationships with the new customers which enables long term 
business planning,  
• technical partnering with internal DoD/government resources not only for 
predictive obsolescence management but a whole host of other specialties. 
Internal DoD/Government Resource: 
Current:  Most, if not all, of the functions identified in Figure 4 are already 
accomplished by internal DoD/government resources; however they are done in an ad-
hoc fashion without the collaborative environment, and with no defined, supportable, and 
repeatable process in place.  The expertise has always been available in the 
DoD/government but in a different form using a different process.  Prior to Acquisition 
Reform, the MIL-Specs and Standards provided a requirements-rich environment with 
well-defined processes for implementation.  These processes and implementation 
methods required the same expertise needed today but applied in a different context. 
Todays environment is requirements-poor, and the talented expertise must adjust to this 
performance-based versus MIL-Spec-based environment.  The context in todays 
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environment is relationship-based, not rule-base, and the survivability of this entire group 
of talented experts will depend on their adaptability to todays context.  Acquisition 
Reform removed the barriers put in place by the MIL-Spec, rule-based environment, but 
it failed to provide an adequate substitute, which would provide a robust process that can 
meet the supportability requirements and needs of the end user. 
Proposed:  The internal DoD/government resources have a very crucial role to 
play regarding the supportability of all our systems from design to fielded systems.  
Supportability is an inherently governmental function for several reasons:  1) the 
motivation of our internal resources is in support of the end user needs; this perpetuates 
and enhances our positions and esteem, 2) due to the overarching scope and the long term 
broad based characteristics of supportability issues, no one prime contractor could, 
without conflict of interest, accomplish these functions, and 3) No entity has or even 
wishes to obtain the corporate knowledge maintained by our internal resource pool.  The 
collaborative environment as is evident in Figures 4 & 5 imbeds the talented expertise 
into the SSB process in a way, which leverages these resources and creates a value stream 
for the program.  The relationship building characteristics of our internal resources is 
very evident in Figure 5 where this crucial resource takes center stage in enabling the 
collaborative system.  Taking both figures (4 & 5) in concert it is easy to see how the 
resource can gain program equity and support by reducing Total Ownership Cost (TOC), 
extend supportability of systems, and reducing program risk. 
3. The Systems Engineering Development and Implementation (SEDI) 
Plan 
The SEDI plan is structured in three sections: Infrastructure, Implementation, and 
Measuring & Assessing.  The approach is intentionally focused on supporting the 
person(s) actually performing the implementation function.  Insight into the process is 
provided by specific examples called Implementation Experience and embellished by 
Lessons Learned to help enable the implementing process.  The tools, methods, and 
processes described are illustrated through actual examples where these practices were 
used to implement the SSB system on three Navy programs.  These tools, methods, and 
processes are provided in detail in the enclosures so that they may be used, not only for 
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guidance but also for a reusable template for future work.  A graphical depiction of the 
implementation process is provided in Figure 6  Implementation Process  and was put 
into practice to generate the implementation and output products of the SEDI plan.  
Description of these products, are shown below and are used as the input raw data to the 
Business Case Analysis (BCA) and Marketing Plan. 
The SSB system comprises several processes during the implementation of the 
concept.  As identified in Figure 6 Implementation Process, a relationship building 
process is established to obtain the COTS component information from the Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for analysis.  Arrangements are made at this time to 
involve a third party to continue manufacturing the products if the OEM chooses not to 
continue making the products.  However if the OEM wishes to participate by 
continuation of production of the COTS products and share the risk of stockpiling 
obsolete parts, then the dashed box in Figure 6 identifies the scope of their participation.  
The component information is then analyzed for obsolescence risk and an assessment is 
provided to the DMSMS support team to determine the appropriate action plan.  
Typically the number of high risk parts are defined along with an estimated quantity of 
each part needed to support the program fielded equipment for a prescribed period of 
time, usually until the next tech refresh/insertion.  These parts are then stocked on the 
OEM or third parties shelves until they are consumed to make the COTS assemblies 
needed in the Fleet.  Dependent on the programs needs this process provides long-term 
support for the end user, the Fleet. 
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Figure 6: Implementation Process 
4. Primary Output Products of the SEDI Plan 
The SSB system provides a structured set of processes, methods, and tools 
embedded in the System Architecture based on a collaborative framework.  Although the 
SSB system yields many sub-products, discussed below, the SEDI plan is focused on the 
SSB system as the product provided to the customer and as part of the system the sub-
products identified herein make up a portion of that system.  The SSB system employs 
information and risk sharing, relationship building, and long-term planning to yield 
definable, measurable, and reportable impacts to fielded systems. The customers (PMO 
and support teams) consider both the implementing of the SSB system and the report 
outputs of the SSB system as products.  As such, the implementing processes such as 
information and risk sharing directly impact the qualitative output assessments like the 
obsolescence risk of COTS products in fielded systems.  The customers expectations 
include visibility into the processes and qualitative/quantitative assessments that 
accurately define the subsequent output of the process. To meet these expectations we 
have developed the following implementation and output products: 
1) Implementation Products  
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a. Status Metrics on the 17 Step Process - Vendor Status Report 
b. Documented 17 Step Process 
c. Prioritized COTS List & Vendor Information 
2) Output Products  
a. Obsolescence Health Report 
b. High Risk (RED) Component List 
c. Obsolescence Impact & Purchase Request Report 
d. Assembly Master & Cost Matrices, with Definition Worksheet 
The implementation products provide the insight to the customer regarding the 
qualitative assessment of programmatic risk with respect to the relationship building, 
information sharing, and risk management practices employed.  The output products 
organize the data and information gathered then assesses the potential impacts and 
recommends proactive actions to mitigate programmatic risks.  These processes, methods 
and tools are quantitative in nature and are presented in a format to provide input directly 
into the business and program management processes.  Collectively these products 
represent new knowledge and options for the PMO and support team.  Furthermore the 
modeling and simulation tools give the decision makers the opportunity to make side-by-
side comparisons of different potential candidate recommendations prior to making the 
final decision. 
Implementation Products 
a) SEDI Context: Enclosure (17)  “17 Steps” – SSB 
Implementation Process 
The 17 Steps SSB system implementation process was first described in 
the System Architecture as a method to describe and document the list of sequential steps 
needed to implement the SSB system.  These steps provide a notional depiction of the 
SSB implementation process and are supplemented with a set of definitions.  These 
figures/definitions are also provided as enclosures for use by new implementers to assure 
consistency and repeatability of the process (see Enclosures (17) & (18)). 
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b) SEDI Context: Enclosure (23) Vendor Status Report 
The parts lists came in from the different OEMs at various times 
depending on the time of interface with the OEM and the response time from the OEM.  
The progression through this process was monitored through the use of a status matrix 
described in Enclosure (23)  Vendor Status Report.  This status matrix was updated on a 
weekly basis and reported to the program support IPT as requested. 
c) SEDI Context: Enclosure (15) SSDS MK 1&2 Prioritized, COTS 
List, Early Maturity 
  The activity in defining the priority for each item is a teaming function 
where all members must actively participate to yield an adequate product.  The 
dependence of hardware to software is of key concern in assigning the priority levels.  In 
some circumstances, some assemblies will be inherently linked to other assemblies such 
that a change to one impacts the other and therefore need to be grouped as like priority in 
the overall scheme of the list.  Enclosure (15) provides the combined SSDS MK 1&2 
prioritized, COTS list, in a state of maturity about half way through the process.  During 
the development of this workbook there were several spreadsheets that were used to 
develop the all-up list described in worksheet 4.  This worksheet illustrates the identified 
COTS OEMs, the configurations of interest, the points of contact at the OEM, the amount 
of assemblies needed for the next 10 years at a 50% and 99% confidence levels, and 
implementation notes; all arranged in prioritized order.  This worksheet was used 
extensively to communicate the what, who, how, and when regarding the SSB system 
implementation activities.  Enclosure (16) presents the same workbook at a much later 
time, a review of spreadsheet 4 shows how this communication tool has been modified to 
give an update of the implementation process and identify actions and recommendations 
to the budgeting planning activities.  Using these tools helps organize your efforts and 
aids in communication with the rest of the team. 
  The information regarding each company and all the configurations under 
consideration is extensive and will get confusing unless it is organized in a methodical 
way and the records are updated regularly and consistently.  The example provided in 
Enclosure (15)  - SSDS MK 1&2 prioritized, COTS list, illustrates the method that was 
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used during the implementation process for the SSDS programs.  Key information 
provided in this matrix is typically needed during almost every contact with the potential 
candidates.  The matrix also has columns to annotate information already gathered and 
actions yet to be taken.  In essence the matrix is used much like a sales persons contact 
list in providing important information that is continuously updated to reflect the ongoing 
communication with the customer. 
Output Products 
d) SEDI Context: Enclosure (24) Obsolescence Health Report 
  On an annual basis or as requested by the PMO, the detailed information 
on all assemblies in the SSB system pertaining to a specific program are assembled into a 
single document and provided to that program as a SSB system update.  Enclosure (24)  
Obsolescence Health Report is the SSDS example of such a report.  These reports are 
extensive since the following information is provided: the status of the SSB system 
implementation, the assemblies obsolescence health arranged per system indenture, a 
summary report of obsolete component piece parts (Red, high risk values), graphical 
depiction of the obsolescence health analysis, and executive summary for the system.  
The format and detail is dependent on the request or needs of the specific program, so 
before arbitrarily adopting the example format we suggest interfacing with your program 
before proceeding. 
  The following files are used to construct the Obsolescence Health Report 
and once assembled provide a complete obsolescence risk picture: 
• SSDS Obsolescence Report, main body w/o Graphics 
• Vendor Status 
• Cover Pages for Appendices A, B, C, D 
• Appendix A: MK1 Configuration List 
• Appendix B: MK2 Configuration List 
• Appendix C: MK1 Obsolescence Health, Graphical 
• Appendix D: MK2 Obsolescence Health, Graphical 
• Appendix E: SSB Implementation 
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e) SEDI Context: Enclosure (25)  SSDS Red Component List 
  One of the products of the preceding step is a list of red coded piece parts 
identifying them a high obsolescence risk items.  Enclosure (25)  SSDS Red Component 
List provides an example of such a list.  These specific parts have been discontinued and 
soon will not be available for purchase. 
f) SEDI Context: Enclosure (27)  Obsolescence Impact & Purchase 
Request Report 
  The purchase of Grey Market parts will continue to be an ongoing 
function as new high-risk parts are identified.  Depending on the impact both risk and 
financial, the purchase of obsolete parts may be as simple as an email form (see 
Enclosure (26)) or as formal as a detailed report.  Enclosure (27)  Analysis of Intels 
i680 obsolescence on OEM products  SSDS program  is a good example of how to 
structure a detailed impact and purchase request due to obsolescence.  It will be important 
to automate this process as much as possible because there will be a continuous stream of 
these requests over the years the programs system need to be supported. 
g) SEDI Context: Enclosure (28)  SSDS Assembly Master & Cost 
Matrices 
  The last area of measurement and assessments is the Capstone of the 
entire SSB systems implementation effort.  It brings together all the information and data 
collected and provides functionality previously unattainable without the SSB system - 
Systems Engineering approach.  The Capstone assessment tool is illustrated in 
Enclosure (28)  SSDS Assembly Master & Cost Matrices.  Every tool, method, and 
process developed to implement the SSB system is either directly or indirectly 
responsible for the numbers evident in the matrices.  Enclosure (29)  SSB Planning 
Excel Workbook & Data Item Description - provides detailed explanations for the 
descriptions of each cell along with the mathematical relationships and constraints 
implemented within the worksheet. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this section the potential financial and non-financial consequences will be 
presented along with specific areas of benefit to the business process.  An analysis of the 
cost data has been presented in the form of data summaries in Appendix C (The Business 
Case Analysis) for the SSDS MKI only.  The SSDS MKI program supplied the most 
compete package of reliable financial data among the systems currently implementing the 
SSB system.  In terms of non-financial, this document draws from all three programs 
(SSDS MI, SSDS MKII & AN/ASQ-20X).  The data in this section is offered in an 
objective and broad manner. Where details are needed, guidance to specific appendices is 
given. The financial data and their contribution to the SSB implementation are fairly 
straightforward.  Two separate model are used to estimate the costs to the program: The 
Resource Model and The Procurement Model.  The resource modeling is accomplished 
using the NSWC Crane cost model, which takes into account all the various aspects of 
implementing an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP).  This model covers over 128 
functions/activities and is tailored to meet the needs of the application under 
consideration.  The Procurement Model is provided in Enclosure (28) of the SEDI Plan 
and provides the ability to simulate various scenarios with what if procurement trade-
offs to identify Navy best value.  The  most optimal values resulting from the 
Procurement Model are fed into the Resource Model to estimate the total support costs to 
the program.  Between these two models and a few other tools used in the SSB system, 
the program can get the Big Picture view of the supportability requirements for their 
program.  Cost data is analyzed for various support scenarios under the SSDS MKI and 
alignment to specific goals is made.  We make the obvious assumption that cost data and 
the results derived from analysis would be consistent across the other programs.  Non-
financial impacts are derived from both the Business Case Analysis as well as the 
Marketing Plan.  As mentioned previously, the Marketing Plan includes the analysis of 
several environmental elements and effectively defines the strength and weakness of the 
SSB as well as potential opportunities or threats. 
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B. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
In this section we derive usable, decision quality information from the results 
detailed in each of the four appendices.  The results will be summarized and evaluated for 
their contribution to the business objectives.  This section will address both financial 
metrics as well as non-financial implications. 
1. Direct Financial Impacts 
The direct financial impacts were derived from SSB implementation on the SSDS 
MKI program.  The initial SSB implementation efforts were focused on the SSDS MKI 
program and therefore offered the most complete set of data.  A logical assumption is 
made that extends these impacts to other programs.  Detailed analysis is provided in 
Appendix C (The Business Case Analysis).  First we will focus on the direct financial 
impacts which are discussed with some brief background information.  To understand the 
full impact of SSB implementation several scenarios were considered.  There are three 
primary scenarios that are viewed as the most practical given the current state of the 
SSDS MKI program.  These three scenarios are considered the most feasible course of 





LTB (1)  This scenario is the likely track for COTS product support without 
any assistance from the SSB infrastructure.  The costs for this scenario are the 
estimated financial impacts that the SSDS Program Office must plan for.  The 
support methods are broken down into two methods: 1) Life of Type Buy 
(LTB), which is a bridge buy as described previously, and 2) OTHER. OTHER 
refers to redesign, spares utilization, reclamation from other Fleet assets or 
maintenance contracts. 
SSB (1)  This scenario is the most appropriate implementation of the SSB 
infrastructure as agreed upon by the SSDS COTS Working Group (SCWG).  
Three main support methods are employed: 1) SSB, 2) LTB and 3) OTHER as 
described above. 
SSB Optimized  This scenario implements the SSB method wherever possible. 
Certain support decisions were made for specific COTS products prior to the 
availability of the SSB infrastructure.  Some COTS products have already been 
slated for redesign or reclamation efforts.  
In addition to these scenarios, three additional scenarios are identified. These 
represent the What-If scenarios.  




SSB Only  This scenario uses the SSB support method for all COTS products. 
Complete Tech Refresh  In this scenario every COTS product within the 
SSDS is planned for redesign or technology refresh over the next ten-year 
period.  The refresh is planned and scheduled based on End of Production 
(EOP) dates provided from the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM). 
The financial aspects are summarized below for the six scenarios. 













$2,316 $71,342 $61,089 $0 $61,089 
LTB(1) $5,924 $9,639 $8,651 $701 $9,352 
SSB(1) $3,440 $8,415 $7,333 $701 $8,034 
SSB 
Optimized $2,858 $8,665 $7,321 $701 $8,022 
LTB Only $5,234 $8,970 $7,981 $0 $7,981 
SSB Only $1,727 $9,170 $7,539 $0 $7,539 
Table 1: Total Support Costs Scenarios ($K) 
The above table demonstrates the potential savings in the first year as well as the 
overall costs to support the SSDS program over the defined ten-year period.  
1) 
2) 
When the SSB process was implemented, regardless of degree, significant 
savings were realized.  See column NPV Adjusted Total in the above table. 
When the SSB process was implemented, the initial year costs were reduced 
indirectly proportional to the degree of SSB implementation.  See column First 
Year Costs in the above table. 
From the above table, a Complete Technology Refresh is the most cost 
prohibitive course of action, given a stabilized requirements baseline.  With that said, the 
following table provides the procurement costs for each scenario, excluding a Complete 
Tech Refresh given the cost and complexity of estimating such an effort.  Additionally, 
an adjustment has been made to the scenarios below as compared to the previous Table 1.  
Common to all scenarios in Table 2  Procurement Costs  is the cost to refresh 9 items 
which regardless of which method chosen to provide long-term support, these refresh 
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costs must be paid.  The 9 items for refresh were removed to present only the portion of 
each scenario impacted by the long-term support decision-making process.  The removal 
of the cost of the 9 refresh items explains the cost deferential between the two tables 1 & 
2.  For details concerning this adjustment see Appendix C: Business Case Analysis. 










LTB(1) $5,924 $7,069 $6,871 $701 $7,571 
SSB(1) $3,059 $6,854 $6,025 $701 $6,726 
SSB 
Optimized $2,477 $7,004 $6,012 $701 $6,712 
LTB Only $5,234 $6,400 $6,201 $0 $6,201 
SSB Only $1,346 $7,609 $6,231 $0 $6,231 
Table 2: Procurement Costs ($K) 
The above table demonstrates the potential procurement savings in the first year 
as well as the overall costs to support the SSDS program over the defined ten-year period.  
1) 
2) 
When the SSB process was implemented, regardless of degree, significant 
savings were realized. See column NPV Adjusted Total in the above table.  The 
figure for SSB Only is slightly larger than for LTB Only. The reason for this is 
because the SSB process requires a cost to purchase Red Parts each year, the 
first year being $534,011 and a total for all years of $828,426.  The LTB 
methods make the assumption that they can purchase all the required items 
upfront for usage throughout the ten-year period and that all item will be 
consumed.  There is risk involved with buying too many or not enough items in 
both the LTB and SSB cases.  However, the substantial difference between the 
two alternatives is the investment risk of the total assembly (the LTB case) at 
say $6500.00 versus the investment in component parts (the SSB case) at a 
mere $40.00 then buying the total assembly later when the Navy needs it. 
When the SSB process was implemented, the initial year costs were reduced 
indirectly proportional to the degree of SSB implementation.  See column First 
Year Costs in the above table. 
When we perform standard deviation calculations over the ten-year period we get 
the following.  
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 STD DEV LTB(1) LTB Only SSB(1) SSB Optimized SSB Only 
2003-2012 




100 102 55 61 111 
2004-2011 
Middle years 105 108 10 7 16 
Table 3: Procurement Costs STD DEV Year-Year ($K) 
1) When the SSB process is implemented, we experience a more stabilized 
funding profile for procurement, particularly for the middle eight years.  See the 
above table. 
When we look at total support costs for each scenario we get the following STD 
DEV Year-Year Total Costs.  Remember, for the LTB(1) and SSB(1) scenarios we had to 
take into account a redesign effort for nine COTS items.  This cost is incurred early in the 
ten-year period and affects the overall stability of the funding profile. 
STD DEV LTB(1) LTB Only SSB(1) SSB Optimized SSB Only 
2003-2012 




1068 508 1135 1131 111 
2004-2011 
Middle years 1056 526 1188 1186 16 
Table 4: Total Support Costs STD DEV Year-Year 
1) When SSB is implemented early enough we can effectively avoid any redesign 
costs that would be needed due to obsolescence during the ten-year period and 
therefore expect the greatest stability in the funding profile over the ten-year 
period. 
The percentage of overall initial costs associated with each scenario is given 
below. 
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LTB(1) LTB Only SSB(1) SSB Optimized SSB Only
 




When the SSB process was implemented, the initial cost as a percentage of the 
total cost to the program was significantly reduced depending on the degree of 
implementation.  This helps to reduce the risks associated with making large 
upfront investments because the costs are more evenly distributed over the 
entire ten years.  
When the SSB process was implemented, the costs are more evenly distributed 
over the ten-year period depending on the degree of implementation.  This is 
more desirable for planning and budgetary purposes. 
The following table provides the costs associated with having to redesign those 
COTS products that were targeted for redesign prior to SSB implementation.  These 
items were determined to become obsolete prior to the end of the support scenario, and 
unsupportable via traditional support mechanisms or with the SSB system. 
WBS Element Total ($K) 
Total 7063 
Configuration Management 126 
Hardware/Software Engineering 1684 
Testing And Documentation 944 
Procurement 3866 
ILS Planning and Management 337 
Installation 107 
Table 5: Re-design Cost Avoidance, 9 Items 
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1) The total cost that could have been potentially avoided if the SSB process had 
been implemented for those identified COTS products is approximately 
$7.063M. 
This $7.063M cost is considered the potential Avoided Costs when implementing 
the SSB process if applied immediately after the SSDS design was baselined and before 
irreversible obsolescence takes place.  The optimal time to implement the SSB system is 
the earliest point in the systems design process where a stabilized baseline can be 
identified. 
The following summaries show the savings in $K for procurement, resources and 
the total support costs between the two most practical scenarios (LTB(1) and SSB(1). 
LTB(1) Procurement Cost (Typical scenario) $6871 
SSB(1) Procurement Cost  (Actual SSB Implementation) $6025 
Procurement Savings ($K) $ 846 
LTB(1) Resource Cost $1780 
SSB(1) Resource Cost $1308 
Cost Savings ($K) $  472 
LTB(1) Total Support Cost $8651 
SSB(1) Total Support Cost $7333 
Cost Savings ($K) $1318 
Table 6: Cost Savings SSB(1) versus LTB(1) ($K) 
1) When the SSB process was implemented significant cost savings is realized. 
The following data illustrates the potential savings of the current typical support 
scenario of LTB and a required tech refresh of nine items and SSB for all COTS products 
upfront. 
LTB(1) $8651 
SSB Only $7539 
Potential Cost Savings ($K) $1112 
Cost Tech Refresh of 9 Items $7063 
Cost to SSB the 9 Items $669 
Avoided Cost Savings ($K) $6394 
Total Potential Cost + Avoided Savings $7506 
Table 7: Total Cost “Savings & Avoidance” Using the SSB ($K) 
1) If SSB was implemented for all COTS products early enough we can essentially 
avoid the cost associated with a required partial tech refresh. 
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The final summary of data looks at the extreme cases.  The following illustrates 
the total support cost savings between implementing SSB early in the acquisition cycle to 
affect all COTS products and redesigning all COTS products. 
Complete Tech Refresh $61089 
SSB Only $ 7539 
Procurement Savings ($K) $53550 
Table 8: Cost Savings: SSB only Versus Complete Tech Refresh ($K) 
In looking at the SSB portion of the first year procurement costs for each scenario 
we get the following table. 
Support Method Non SSB Costs SSB Costs SSB% of Total Costs 
LTB(1) $5,924 $      0 0.0% 
LTB Only $5,234 $      0 0.0% 
SSB(1) $2,097 $  962 31.4% 
SSB Optimized $1,321 $1,156 46.7% 
SSB Only $ 103 $1,243 92.3% 
Table 9: Initial (First Year) Procurement Costs Comparison: SSB Versus LTB 
For all but the SSB’ Only (scenario four), the majority of the initial 
procurement costs are associated with non-SSB support mechanisms.  
1) 
2) The greater degree of SSB implementation the lower the initial investment and 
thus lower program risk. 
In comparing the resource models for the traditional LTB methods and expected 
SSB  implementations we notice similar orders of magnitude for total costs. 
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WBS Element Actual ($K) Traditional ($K) 
Total 8415 9639 
     Configuration Management 0 57 
     Hardware/Software Engineering 0 0 
     Testing and Documentation 0 0 
     Procurement 10 7069 
     ILS Planning and Management 0 2354 
     Installation  158 
     Sunset Supply Costs 8404 - 
Table 10: Comparison of Total Resource Costs: SSB & LTB 
The SSB infrastructure absorbs nearly all the costs for supporting COTS products 
over the ten-year period.  
1) 
2) 
The expected scenario provides infrastructure to support the SSDS program, 
resulting in greater flexibility and manageability for the program manager. 
Implementation of the SSB infrastructure is possible at the same or lower cost 
to the program as traditional LTB methods. 
2. Non-Financial Impacts 
Certain non-financial impacts materialize based in part on financial consequences.  
In order to successfully evaluate the results of implementing the SSB process we must 
look at these non-financial aspects in light of the business objectives. But first we must 
clearly derive such impacts.  Since no clear financial metric can be applied to these 
impacts we will discuss them in broad terms and in ways that can be observed and 
verified.  The approach here will declare a financial outcome or business practice of 
implementing the SSB infrastructure, and explain in non-financial terms the tangible 
impact.  
a) Low Initial Expense  
By reducing the upfront costs for procuring expected spares, the SSB 
process brings improved flexibility to planning and budgeting.  If the initial costs are 
large then the PMO is forced to stay the course for the entire period in order to derive the 
maximum return on investment.  Changing program direction during the ten-year period 
would be difficult to argue given the number of spare COTS products that would become 
potentially useless.  Under the SSB infrastructure much of the initial costs are still 
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associated with non-SSB support mechanisms; therefore, these costs will be absorbed in 
the event the program did not make use of the assets that were procured.  In the All SSB 
scenario, nearly all, about 92%, of the upfront costs are for SSB support. The benefits 
associated with this cost are immediately realized, that is the procured COTS items are 
deployed to the Fleet for use upon purchase. Furthermore, in the event that performance 
requirements change, driving a change in system design, the risks are greatly reduced 
since less of an investment was made for spares that may not be needed.  So therefore the 
SSB process effectively reduces the risk of overspending early in the support cycle. 
Derived Benefits: 
• Cost Savings  
• Flexibility 
• Reduced risk 
• Stability 
b) Stable Funding Profile 
The SSB process spreads the procurement costs more evenly throughout 
the ten-year period.  This makes efficient use of funds and is easier to budget and 
manage.  The yearly costs are higher under the SSB, but thats because no investment in 
spares was made the first year.  Nevertheless, as before, the costs associated with these 
years are for forecasted replacements on an as need basis.  The costs are incurred at the 
moment a requisition is made for a replacement COTS item.  The benefit is immediately 
realized. Furthermore, by procuring COTS replacement products only on demand the 
program manager makes better use of funds.  Also, continual market surveillance is 
practiced throughout the support cycle providing real-time data in terms of obsolescence 
and diminishing materials.  In this way the program manager is better equipped to make 
effective decisions that benefit the overall program.  This environment creates a flexible 
process that by taking a proactive posture can react to changes in material availability.  
Derived Benefits: 
• Stability 
• Efficient use of funds 
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• Flexibility 
• Risk Mitigation & Management 
c) The Sunset Supplier Shares Risk 
One area of cost savings not addressed was the cost to the Navy for 
stockage, storage and issue of COTS spares and repair parts.  These are costs not directly 
borne by the SSDS program.  But in addition to the cost savings to the Navy for not 
having to house, manage and transport these COTS items, the Sunset Supplier now 
assumes the responsibility, and thus risk, of facilitating these functions and recoup the 
value added by adjusting the product purchase price by 5% on each COTS item procured. 
Derived Benefits: 
• Risk Mitigation & Management 
• Shared Risk 
• Shared responsibility 
• Collaborative Environment 
d) Extending COTS Supportability 
By implementing the SSB process early enough in the program, we can 
effectively extend supportability for these items.  And in fact we can extend the 
reparability of these items by identifying and procuring near-obsolete components (Red 
Parts).  In this particular case (SSDS MK 1), by the time the SSB infrastructure was in 
place, it was too late to mitigate the re-design cost on 9 items and the subsequent cost the 
program was an additional 7 million dollars.  The planning for redesign carries certain 
risks as well. DoD will almost certainly use COTS products for the commercial 
technology advantages, touched on earlier in this document, applying the technology to  
work towards specific warfighter performance requirements.  For the COTS products 
identified on the SSDS MK 1 program, the items were determined to be obsolete by 
2005-6 timeframe.  Now remember that there is a 2-3 year planning period and additional 
5-7 year implementation period for new designs.  If the period of concern starts in 2003, 
the COTS products will become completely unsupportable before the planning phase 
even ends.  By implementing the SSB process we effectively avoid this situation by 
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extending supportability of the COTS products so that warfighter requirements can 
continue to be met while plans are made to upgrade the system.  By stabilizing the system 
baseline in this way we mitigate the risks of not being able to support the warfighter to 
acceptable levels. 
Derived Benefits: 
• Extending COTS Supportability 
• Extend COTS Reparability 
• Cost Savings/Cost Avoidance 
• Stabilize System Baseline 
• Risk Mitigation & Management 
e) Initial Investment 
The initial cost for setting up the SSB infrastructure and making the initial 
COTS product assessments was approximately $380K (see Appendix C).  This is a 
minor investment considering that the realizable return is substantial depending on how 
early in the acquisition cycle SSB is implemented.  For example, the cost of support for 
the present SSDS before SSB was considered was estimated to be $8651K plus an 
additional partial tech refresh cost of $6394K (total of $15045K).  The estimated cost of 
implementing SSB early enough to affect all COTS products was $7539K.  The potential 
savings is roughly $7.5M.  That in itself, is a wonderful marketing element, however 
there is also another point to be made; and that is that this setup and assessment can be 
performed for any program.  Thus, the SSB process is transportable and repeatable.  And 
as the proliferation of COTS products increases throughout the military, there is a strong 
likelihood that commonality of COTS products across weapon systems will grow. Having 
a SSB process that maintains and continually updates a database of these COTS products 
for usage, obsolescence, and diminishing materials will provide a tremendous benefit 
whose value will grow exponentially.  Thus, the SSB process is also expandable.  This 
initial investment is made within the DoD, tasking Navy resources to perform 
supportability assessments and DMSMS/Obsolescence Management.  The reports 
generated become government property and distributed among the DoD Program Offices 
as well as commercial support entities (Sunset Supplier, OEMs, system integrators, etc.).  
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Therefore other programs can leverage the data and the relationships from the SSB 
infrastructure.  This initial investment is also used to fund the government facilitating 
activity for pursuing and coordinating potential OEM and Sunset Suppliers, a reusable  
collaborative resource.  
Derived Benefits: 
• Transportable, repeatable and expandable. 
• DMSMS/Obsolescence reporting 
• Collaborative Environment 
• Coordination 
Summary of Benefits 
Financial Non-Financial 
• Reduced Procurement Cost 
• Lower Upfront Costs 
• Significant Cost Avoidance 
• Stabilized Funding Profile 
• Overall Cost Savings to the Program 
 
• Flexibility  Planning & Budgeting 
• Reduced risk 
• Stability Funding Profile 
• Efficient use of funds 
• Risk Mitigation & Management 
• Shared Risk 
• Shared Responsibility 
• Collaborative Environment 
• Extending COTS Supportability 
• Extend COTS Reparability 
• Stabilize System Baseline 
• Transportable, repeatable and 
expandable. 
• DMSMS/Obsolescence reporting 
• Coordination 
Table 11: Summary of SSB Financial and Non-Financial Benefits 
SSB Specific Goal Derived Benefit 
Achieve significant and quantifiable cost 
savings over the product life cycle. 
 
• Reduced Procurement Cost 
• Lower Upfront Costs 
• Significant Cost Avoidance 
• Stabilized Funding Profile 
• Overall Life Cycle Cost Savings to the 
Program 
To be able to identify, quantify, and 
mitigate supportability risk to programs. 
• DMSMS/Obsolescence reporting 
• Reduced risk 
• Risk Mitigation & Management 
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SSB Specific Goal Derived Benefit 
• Shared Risk 
Extend the life cycle and supportability of 
COTS. 
 
• Extending COTS Supportability 
• Extending COTS Reparability 
Provide infrastructure to support existing 
platform/combat systems in support of the 
Program Office. 
• Transportable, repeatable and 
expandable. 
• Coordination 
• Collaborative Environment 
• Infrastructure support for existing 
weapon systems 
A reliable, affordable, repeatable, and 
expandable process that meets the 
customers performance expectations (e.g., 
accessible, transportable, maintainable, 
predictable). 
 
• DMSMS/Obsolescence reporting 
• Transportable, repeatable and 
expandable. 
• Stabilize System Baseline 
Institutionalize methods for proactive 
management of COTS including DMSMS 
issues. 
 
• DMSMS/Obsolescence reporting 
• Collaborative Environment 
A system that leverages Navy and 
commercial supportability assets and 
provides a networked solution. 
 
• Collaborative Environment 
• Shared Responsibility 
• Shared Risk 
• Coordination 
Leverage across government programs with 
extended applicability through contract 
strategies, methodologies, and incentives to 
entice commercial industry participation. 
 
• Flexibility  Planning & Budgeting 
• Transportable, repeatable and 
expandable 
• Collaborative Environment 
Forecast budget requirements in support of 
the programs/war fighter/consumer 
 
• Flexibility  Planning & Budgeting 
• Efficient use of funds 
• DMSMS/Obsolescence reporting 
Improve schedule flexibility and support 
options of system upgrades or new 
development initiatives. 
 
• Flexibility  Planning & Budgeting 
• Extending COTS Supportability 
• Stabilize System Baseline 
Table 12: Alignment with SSB Specific Goals to Derived Benefits 
C. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
From the above analysis we can make several convincing recommendations for 
SSB acceptance; however, we must also understand the environmental forces that 
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constrains SSB implementation in order to develop a clear picture of SSB viability and 
value.  Appendix D (The SSB Marketing Plan) provides a detailed analysis of customer, 
competitor and SSB system elements.  The outcome of which provides resource 
requirements, such as people, implementation control requirements, which provide 
criterion measures for SSB implementation success, and finally, likely evolutionary 
changes for future SSB implementations.  Together the above tabulated results and the 
Marketing Plan, the following results are provided in terms of strength, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats: 
1. Strengths 
Strength 1:  The SSB system provides an expandable, transportable, Life 
Cycle Cost (LCC) reducing processes, methods, and tools. 
The expandable characteristic of the SSB system allows it to be applicable to 
most any program regardless of size.  This scalability ensures that the SSB system will be 
able to keep pace with a programs growth and the addition of other COTS products as the 
programs system is modernized.  The transportability feature addresses the issue of long-
term support of the SSB system itself so if it was no longer viable to receive services 
from the current Organic activity providing the service then at the programs option the 
support function could be moved to another activity. Simply stated this feature assures 
the longevity of the SSB systems support.  The LCC reductions possible due to the 
implementation of the SSB system is the strongest driver for the SSB system acceptance.  
These reductions are one of the most unique characteristics of the SSB system and a clear 
differentiating attribute which impacts one of the most prominent metrics the PMOs 
success is judged against, Life Cycle Cost.  The documented processes, methods, and 
tools provide assurances to the customer that the service received through implementing 
the SSB system is repeatable, continuous, and reliable.  These documented practices have 
been delineated in the Systems Engineering Development and Implementation (SEDI) 
Plan (Appendix B) with detailed examples, instructions, templates, processes, etc. which 
can be immediately implemented. The LLC reductions are offered in the Business Case 
Analysis (Appendix C) with detailed financial metrics.  Generally speaking, the 
characteristics of the SSB process as described here, makes the SSB system an additional 
alternative to the PMOs in resolving obsolescence issues.  However it differs from the 
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dozen or so point solutions currently available in three distinct ways: 1) the collaborative 
architecture necessitates the use of close partnerships with the supply base and includes 
these entities in the resolution process and in the business planning, 2) the Systems 
Engineering approach embedded within the SSB system optimizes on the LCC and long-
term support providing a structure spanning all functional disciplines life cycle elements, 
this allows other point solutions to be incorporated where appropriate to achieve 
maximum utility, and 3) the SSB system when used at the appropriate time yields the 
lowest LCC and best value risk management process for COTS products.  All three of 
these attributes impact the programs ability to provide long-term support of COTS 
products and are reflected in the evaluation criteria used in assessing the PMOs 
accomplishments, as viewed from their sponsors.  
Strength 2:  The SSB system provides new supportability options to the 
PMOs. 
The SSB system reduces the amount of program investment, extends the 
repair/depot support, and establishes methods to reduce the mean logistic delay time for 
supplier supported COTS products.  The investment the program would need to make to 
cover the spares required over the supportability period will be drastically different when 
using the SSB systems methods and processes, as compared to usual method of support 
of Life of Type Buy (LTB) option.  Refer to Appendix C (Business Cass Analysis) for a 
detailed discussion and comparison of various support scenarios.  The potential savings 
on a specific item may seem minor, but when an aggregate of cost over all COTS 
products on a given program/system is rolled up, to quantify the immediate cost to the 
program, the amount is usually staggering.  Additionally, the SSB system support allows 
the PMO to meet budgetary constraints while providing long-term supportability 
requirements.  The close partnership with the supply base provides insight into not only 
the obsolescence issues but also gives the Navy the chance to negotiate for long-term 
supplier support of fielded products for repair and maintenance.  The experience gained 
during the implementation of the SSB system on three programs showed that every SSB 
participant was capable and willing to perform these needed depot functions.  The 
relationship building accomplished as part of the SSB implementation process also 
addressed another Fleet need, that is the suppliers would be capable and willing to help 
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with quick turnaround times for field returns.  Many of the suppliers are willing to keep a 
spare COTS item on their shelf to replace immediately a Fleet returned unit, this could 
bring the turnaround time to days instead of weeks or months.  The key to success here is 
partnering and collaboration.  The benefits of these are obvious and the SSB system is the 
only alternative that institutionalizes the Navy-supplier partnerships through a well-
defined infrastructure and set of implementation tools.  As part of the process the PMO 
(customer) defines the supportability boundary criteria, such as - How many years does 
the fielded system require support till the next tech refresh activity?  Only the SSB 
system allows the customer to choose the length of support desired, all other support 
methods are reactive and as such require the program to react with a point solution 
constraining the possible alternatives and associated time elements.  The structures set in 
place by the SSB system provides additional opportunities for the PMO to perform 
business planning such as PPBS, funding allocations, and equipment install scheduling.  
The System Engineering approach inherent in the SSB system provides these added 
benefits, which are not available through the use of point solutions. 
Strength 3: The SSB system provides a proactive COTS obsolescence risk 
management process. 
The customer has a need to support fielded systems for extended periods of no 
less than 5 years but support could be required up to 15-20 years.  Since COTS products 
generally have life spans of 2-5 years after which supportability is not an option without 
some type of intervention.  The SSB system is a planned intervention that is based on the 
support needs as identified by the customer.  The partnering and information sharing 
between the supply base and the Navy, provides insight to previously undisclosed 
potential obsolescence risks of COTS products.  Combining this new knowledge with the 
SSB infrastructures yields the risk management methods, processes, and tools for use by 
the PMO to proactively address the inherent COTS risk issues.  The SSB system was 
specifically designed to be the first alternative containing architectural elements capable 
of addressing the risk issues involved with COTS products.  The key to success in 
managing this risk is the use of a systemic, broad based, life cycle approach to deal with 
the entire fielded system.  These key elements are absent when using the point solution 
approach employed by the other alternatives.  The SSB system is the only practice, 
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known to the authors, which provides opportunities to the customer to address risks 
previously identified as large and open-ended programmatic risks. 
Strength 4: The SSB system provides the infrastructure to enable Business 
planning and Management system for fielded system containing COTS 
products. 
Management of fielded systems containing COTS products has historically been a 
very difficult and unsuccessful venture for PMOs.  Several characteristics of the COTS 
products compound the management efforts and make it exceedingly difficult to maintain 
control over these products, the major exacerbating attributes are: 1) the OEM controls 
the configuration of the product and may change it without notice, 2) the rate of change 
of the COTS products is measured in months (i.e. < 18-24 months product life cycle) 
whereas Fleet installation is measured in years, and 3) many COTS products do not have 
long-term support available.  The SSB system was specifically designed to address these 
issues  head on  with methods to gain the configuration knowledge and potentially 
freeze that configuration if needed, and finally the issue of long-term support and 
obsolescence management is addressed through processes and tools embedded within the 
system.  As an emergent new property of the SSB system due to the long-term planning 
and holistic view taken, the knowledge gained regarding the fielded systems, identifies 
the input data necessary to perform long-term business planning such as: estimated spares 
required each year of support, an estimated dollar value needed each year to extend the 
COTS life cycle, and the total amount of proposed budgetary requirements.  The SSB 
system provides the first system, which yields this type of knowledge that is based on 
justifiable detailed information used in predicting the estimates.  
With the designed-in and emergent properties of the SSB system the PMO 
(customer) can now control, manage, and plan; the physical support of the hardware 
along with the business support (i.e. the PPBS, resource allocations).  No point solution 
alternatives can produce these systemic characteristics and the PMOs have been 
requesting such a solution with no implement able practices identified until the SSB 
system was introduced. 
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2. Weaknesses 
Weakness 1:  The SSB system is a new system with a very small track record.  
The first issue that emerges due to the low level of implementation of the SSB 
system is a concern that, regardless of the outcome of the first implementation efforts, has 
the system been adequately tested out and found capable for every or most every 
application.  Like any new system - performance over time - will be the arbitrator for the 
inclusion and growth of the SSB system.  The lack of long standing track record will 
impact the acceptance of the system by well-established support teams, who are typically 
conservative and slow to incorporate new approaches.  Although the point solution 
alternatives lack many desirable characteristics obtained through the use of the SSB 
system, the point solutions have been used to support the existing fielded systems and 
therefore have a proven track record and an expected outcome.  A PMO or their support 
team will need to perform a trade-off analysis with regards to comparing existing 
methods and solution alternatives with the SSB systems attributes.  Depending on what 
criteria is used and who is making the decisions, the SSB system may or may not be 
considered as a potential alternative.  Possible roadblocks and constraints are described in 
the Competitive Forces section of the Marketing Plan and provide insights to the 
motivation behind some group or person wanting to exploit this weakness. 
 Weakness 2:  The SSB system necessitates the up-front PMO support and a 
long-term commitment on behalf of the PMO and the support team. 
The SSB system is built on a collaborative architecture that necessitates the 
voluntarily participation of its members.  As with most proactive methodologies the SSB 
system requires some up-front investment to initiate any kind of return.  Typically before 
the PMO will invest in a potential alternative they will want to know what kind of return 
can be expected and what kind of risk they are taking.  Compared to point solution 
alternatives, which are usually singular events, the SSB system requires continuous 
support over the life cycle of the fielded COTS products, in essence locking the PMO 
into a long-term commitment.  Both the up-front support and the long-term commitment 
present the PMO with a potential risk to the program with respect to funding and 
technical support issues.  The PMO or their support team will need to perform a trade-off 
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study, formally or informally, to identify the cost-benefit comparison in using or not 
using the SSB system on their specific program.  The approach taken in performing the 
trade-off study will be reflective of the outcome.  If the approach focuses mostly on the 
short-term results with little attention paid to the long-term outcome, then a point solution 
alternative may look the most promising.  However if the long-term view is taken and the 
focus is on LCC and reducing programmatic risk the most probable outcome will be 
implementing the SSB system. 
Weakness 3: The SSB system is not part of the mainstream contracting 
process implemented by NAVICP. 
When a PMO tasks NAVICP to contract for the program support functions, any 
Organic activity providing DMSMS/obsolescence support functions are specifically 
excluded from participating in the contracting process; this exclusionary policy includes 
the SSB system.  Unless the PMO has an awareness of the situation and interjects the 
desire to peruse the SSB system specifically, the SSB system will not even receive 
consideration as a possible alternative. As identified in the Marketing Plan under the 
section labeled  The Performance Based Contracting Environment  the 
implementation policies and guidelines imposed by NAVICP do not allow a competitive 
environment with a level playing field and constrain  Organic activities potential 
involvement to one in which places the government employee in a conflict of interest 
position.  These exclusionary policies directly hinders the PMO access to the SSB system 
and provides a contracting situation in which the Navy may not have the potential to 
receive the best value for services under contract. In the analysis thus far, various 
solution alternatives were compared to each other in competing for resources, however 
with the exclusion of all potential alternatives except as deemed appropriate by NAVICP 
the situation shifts the argument.  If the PMO tasks NAVICP to contact for the support 
functions, no competitive environment exists and no consideration can be made by the 
PMO regarding the utility and cost effectiveness of the SSB system. 
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Weakness 4:  Implementation of the SSB system will require a cultural shift 
from an independent competitive environment to a collaborative 
interdependency of diverse functional groups.  
The PMO support teams that have already been established to take care of the 
DMSMS issues and are quite diverse with respect to the teaming methodology while 
developing their current cultures.  Many of these teams use working group techniques 
where work is accomplished off line in functional silos then brought to the team for 
approval expecting only minor changes.  Some of the support teams accomplish their 
work as an IPT and leverage the cross functional aspects of the group.  Sometimes the 
PMO support comes from independent functional silos that have little use for the teaming 
atmosphere.  The variations of the support efforts are to numerous to mention although 
there seems to be an underlying base assumption that all activities and/or functions are 
vying for the same resource pool of funding.  The SSB system to be successful must 
foster an atmosphere of a win-win scenario and staying away from the zero sum 
game so prevalent in funding resource struggles.  The SSB system will need inputs from 
and provide outputs to, almost every function on the support team and therefore the 
interdependency relationships need to be established and matured.  The lack of a SSB 
system friendly environment does not spell out failure for the system but such an 
environment will impede implementation progress and constrain the potential benefits 
from the system.  The comparison between, the way support teams currently do business 
and the practices used in the SSB system will be evident over time and will be unique to 
each team.  The implementation of the SSB system will require a certain amount of 
cooperation and adjustment but these changes are usually possible within most groups 
established cultural norms.  From the perspective of the customer, the cultural shift is 
more of a challenge that should be eventually overcome instead of a better or worse 
attribute. 
3. Opportunities 
Opportunity 1: Meeting the PMO objectives in providing Life Cycle Cost 
(LCC) reductions of 50% or more on all systems. 
The LCC is one of the primary evaluation criteria placed on the PMO during their 
annual and semiannual reviews.  One of the biggest issues the PMO faces when 
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quantifying the LCC is in defining the parameters that need to be measured and tracked.  
The structure of the SSB system encapsulates these metrics into a reporting system that 
keeps the PMO abreast of the projected and actual costs incurred by the program with the 
added benefit of incorporating other non-SSB point solutions. In this way the PMO has 
an oversight view regarding the true cost of support of the programs systems.  With the 
results of the three pilot programs available to us, we can take these results and draw 
comparisons with other target programs, which have shown interest.  The three example 
programs were specifically chosen because each represents a specific part of the 
developmental cycle such as: the 20X Sonar Mine Detecting Set program is just finishing 
the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (E&MD) phase, the SSDS MK 2 is in 
the Production phase with less than one eight of the projected units fielded, the SSDS 
MK 1 is considered a legacy system with 17 fielded system that need to be support, as is, 
for the next 10 years.  The most complete data set we have compiled, at the time this 
paper was written is for the SSDS MK 1 systems although the data for the other systems 
are still being compiled and so far seem to reflect the same type of LCC reductions as 
experienced with the MK 1 systems.  With this implementation experience we can 
capitalize on the fact that we can address programs regardless of where in the 
developmental life cycle they are, and we can use the captured MK 1 data set to show 
expected reductions in LCC. 
Opportunity 2: The SSB system defines pro-active risk management methods 
for COTS products that provide the Fleet user with the assurance that their 
system will be supportable over time and available when needed. 
Risk management like LCC is an evaluation criterion for the PMO and carries 
considerable weight with their resource sponsors in obtaining and keeping their funding 
allocations.  The SSB system is the only post design pro-active method, known to the 
authors, that is capable of yielding a quantifiable COTS obsolescence risk management 
method.  The SSB system identifies the current risk state and a projected risk state in a 
measurable fashion so that it can be tracked and trended.  These metrics can then be used 
by the PMO as objective evidence in justification of the funding allocations. Since the 
risk management methods are an inherent part of the SSB system and reflected in the 
reporting processes and tools a direct analogy can be made with any new potential 
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program and the three programs successfully implemented.  The reporting products used 
on the three programs are by design simple graphical representations so they can be 
readily identifiable by the PMO representatives.  To gain the most leverage out of the 
work already accomplished, the previously prepared risk reports will be briefed to any 
new potential candidate programs making a direct comparison between the benefits 
received by the previous program and the candidate program.  
Opportunity 3: Growth and maturity of the SSB system provides greater 
opportunity for other Navy programs to leverage this unique internal 
resource expanding its value proposition to the Navy. 
The first programs that supported the implementation of the SSB system had no 
previous work to leverage from and therefore needed to pay for each relationship 
building effort and every configuration assessment.  However with over 40 OEM 
relationships established and analysis of over 100 configurations, the next programs to 
implement will more than likely use a portion of the previous efforts.  The expectation is 
that over the next 5-7 program implementations, the amount of reuse of previous work 
may be as much as 10-15% of the total effort.  The implementation efforts which follow 
are expected to have an increased percent of reuse perhaps eventually yielding as much as 
50% reuse in later implementation efforts.  As the SSB system is used, implemented, and 
matured the more utility the programs receive from it and the programs sponsors will 
look favorably upon the use of the system since it was their resources that are being 
reused instead of being spent on efforts which reinvent the wheel.  The actions that are 
being taken to exploit this reuse characteristic of the SSB system are to make available 
the list of OEM participants and the specific configurations that the SSB system was 
implemented on.  On a personal sell level we use the current listing as an example of the 
potential out come, then identify if any of the configurations appearing on the list or 
OEM names on the list are a match to the new potential candidate system.  If an exact 
configuration match takes place, we offer to share the obsolescence risk analysis with the 
new program.  If further interest is apparent and the program is willing to engage further 
analysis, we could work with program representatives to prepare risk mitigation report 
specific to the programs needs (i.e. part number obsolete, how many parts per assembly, 
how many assemblies per new system, how many new systems, how long is the expected 
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support window, etc.)  A quick demonstration of the SSB systems capabilities will 
illustrate to the program the real utility of the information and the subsequent knowledge 
gained through its use.  In order to reach a large or mass audience with this information, 
we have near term plans to post the information on a web site used by our target 
audience.  The GIDEP (Government Industry Data Exchange Program) web site 
(www.gidep.gov) has over 1,500 membership organizations boasting a user pool of over 
4,500 individual users.  During the mil speck era before Acquisition Reform, membership 
in this system was one of the acquisition requirements for all Navy programs and their 
prime contractors; therefore most of our potential new program candidates will have 
access to this system.  The GIDEP organization has agreed to host a list of OEM 
participants and the specific configurations contained in the current SSB system active 
participation lists.  All presentation materials and future announcements will 
subsequently be updated to reflect this reference whereby it can be tapped as a ready 
reference. 
Opportunity 4: The SSB system employees several simulation and modeling 
tools to optimize the business planning and future support requirements for 
fielded program systems.  
As part of the implementation effort regarding the SSB system, detailed resource 
and procurement models were prepared for the SSDS MK 1 system from which various 
scenarios can be simulated iteratively and recursively showing the possible outcomes.  It 
can easily be demonstrated that the structure of these tools allows modification and 
customization to be applicable to most any program.  Furthermore the results of running 
the various models using the SSDS MK 1 data provides a stunning real life example of 
the positive results attainable through SSB system implementation.  To the authors 
knowledge, no other system or method has identified a method to work within the PPBS 
funding system to support an overarching DMSMS support system.  These models are 
tailored to reflect the requirements of the PPBS system such that the outputs from the 
models could be directly transferred to the Funding Allocation Request (FAR) an input to 
the PPBS system.  The procurement models identify within the constraints leaved by the 
program, the expected level of support with regards to the hardware for each year of 
support.  These levels are predicted based on the actual failure rate exhibited in the Fleet.  
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The resource modeling is accomplished using the NSWC Crane cost model, which takes 
into account all the various aspects of implementing an Engineering Change Proposal 
(ECP).  This model covers over 128 functions/activities and is tailored to meet the needs 
of the application under consideration.  Between these two models and a few other tools 
used in the SSB system, the program can get the Big Picture view of the supportability 
requirements for their program.  Every program has a requirement to substantiate and 
justify their business planning (funding and allocation), support strategy, and risk 
management efforts.  Knowing these requirements and the inherent capabilities of the 
SSB system, which are designed into the system to meet the program needs must be 
communicated when presenting the system to a candidate program.  Again the use of the 
SSDS MK1 data set in the models then running simulations structured around the 
constraints of the candidate program can be an illustrative and convincing tool.  These 
simulations can be run quickly providing immediate results to show the new candidate 
program that the constraints presented by their program can fit within the modeling 
structure.  In showing the applicability of the tool and methods within the confines of the 
candidate program will provide them some assurance of potential success.  The 
confidence gained through these demonstrations may be enough to bridge the gap and 
provide a comfort level great enough to make the up-front commitment and provide 
adequate resources to implement the SSB system on their program. 
Opportunity 5: The Naval Audit Service (NAS) has recently released reports 
indicating that the implementation of the Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) 
contracting methodologies used by NAVSEA and SPAWAR lacks adequate 
visibility and metrics that would assure proper oversight. 
The NAS report numbers N2002-0049 [17) NAS NAVSEA] and N2002-0069 
[18) NAS SPAWAR] both identify a lack of a performance plan, strategy, or 
management control to implement the CLS acquisition reform initiative by NAVSEA and 
SPAWAR respectively.  The lack of controls and measurements to achieve the desired 
results of reduced cost and improve system availability was identified as an inadequacy 
in Program Management.  CLS can and many times does take into account the DMSMS 
support functions usually in the form of Performance Based Logistics (PBL) contracting 
methods.  As discussed earlier in this plan, PBL contracting methods do not provide the 
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most advantageous environment for the Organic field activities participation including 
the use of the SSB system.  Both SYSCOMs (NAVSEA & SPAWAR) need to develop 
reporting and management structures to overcome the identified shortcomings. 
The BCA prepared in support of the SSB system in conjunction with the reporting 
mechanisms inherent to the SSB system will meet these shortcomings reported by NAS.  
The reporting and management structures needed by the SYSCOMs, have already been 
set up and are functioning, available only if the programs choose to implement the SSB 
system.  The SYSCOMs management and the Program Managers need to be informed of 
the availability of the SSB system in order to leverage the currently available assets.  This 
additional attribute of the SSB system should be announced at the same time we 
communicate the potential negative impacts when CLS or PBL are implemented through 
NAVICP using their exclusionary implementation practices. 
Opportunity 6:  In early September 2002 Secretary of Defense office 
rescinded the existing DoD 5000 series documents with a memo that stated, 
the identified hard requirements – the “must do” – Systems Engineering 
methods will be replaced by a guidance document to provide more leeway to 
the Program Managers[19)DJSM]. 
The removal of requirements documents relaxes the discipline required by the 
implemented processes and inevitably produces larger risks to the Program Manager 
(PM) and the acquisition process.  To be successful in a requirements poor environment 
the PM must institute risk management methods and practices to maintain control or at 
least visibility into the program activities.  With this new change of direction from DoD 
the need for the risk management disciplines increases dramatically and must be 
instituted on a continuous ongoing basis. 
The communications with the customer base should identify the obsolescence risk 
management attributes of the SSB system and how these attributes provide the PM with 
the visibility into the program activities.  One of the keys to illustrating the utility of the 
system will be in displaying reporting products from previously assessed COTS products 
on other programs especially if they are also used on the PMs equipment.  The 
continuous and all encompassing insight provided through the reporting mechanisms as 
part of the SSB system are packaged and tailored to meet the needs of the program. 
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4. Threats 
Threat 1: Current contracting implementation policy regarding Performance 
Based Contracting (PBC) may curtail or eliminate the possibility of using the 
SSB system. 
As identified in the preceding material the implementation policies of NAVICP 
can preemptively exclude the participation of all Organic activities and therefore exclude 
the SSB system.  The PMO may unknowingly task NAVICP to subcontract out the 
DMSMS support functions believing that the best value for their program will result 
from a competitive environment.  As discussed in detail in the Marketing Plan, NAVICP 
does not provide a competitive environment nor do their processes assure best value, 
therefore without prior knowledge of the contracting environment or intimate knowledge 
of the capabilities of the SSB system the programs may never know of these 
shortcomings. NAVICPs exclusionary policies are either: 1) an unintended consequence 
of their goal to streamline their processes, or 2) a sub optimization that optimizes their 
processes while in the grander scheme of things does not provide the Navy with the best 
value.  Regardless of the reason or logic behind these policies the impact of them needs 
to address.  A three pronged approach is recommended in dealing with the current 
situation: 1) address NAVICP directly through a set of meeting with the decision makers 
to illustrate the impacts of the policies and show bottom line figures from implemented 
examples of the SSB system and show what the Navy is missing out on because of their 
policies, hopefully resulting in a change in policy direction, 2) since it has been shown 
(see Marketing Plan, Appendix D) that their policies are in conflict with the guidance 
documents and executive mandates, that a request for clarification be sent to Secretary of 
the Navy, Advocate for Competitive Environment and have NAVICP implementation 
policies reviewed for adequacy and possible revision, and 3) develop a mass broadcast to 
all PMO and provide them with intimate knowledge of the SSB system and specifically 
highlight the shortcomings of the NAVICP implementation policies.  All three of these 
approaches are being undertaken at this time.  With the completion of the Business Case 
Analysis (BCA) as a result of the SSB system implementation process for SSDS MK 1, 
we will have accurate real data to prove the viability of the SSB alternative and with that 
data we can approach NAVICP with a supportable and justifiable case in point.  A set of 
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clarification questions have been prepared and is being sent to the point of contact in the 
SECNAV office to review our interpretations of the cause and effect impacts due to the 
NAVICP implementation policies.  Articles are being prepared for three separate 
publications well read by our target audience: 1) The COTS Journal, 2) Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU)  Acquisition Review Quarterly, and 3) Defense 
Acquisition University  Program Manager, PM Magazine.  Additionally several 
conferences and workshops have been or will be presenting the SSB system during the 
event and the presented materials will be contained as part of the proceedings.  With 
regards to the long term mitigation of this treat, our plans are to: 1) Institutionalize the 
SSB system as a standard alternative by updating the DAU publication  Program 
Managers Handbook  to reflect the SSB system as the preferred practice, 2) keep 
vigilant with regard to the DMSMS community by providing presentations at future 
conferences/workshops, 3) provide face to face presentations to as many programs as 
possible, thus far over a dozen such presentations have been given, 4) present to the 
Program Executive Offices (PEO) and resource sponsors showing the bottom line 
benefits to get a top down endorsement/sponsorship. 
Threat 2: Subcontracting government DMSMS support personnel to 
contractors creates a “conflict of interest” situation for the government 
employee while yielding sub optimal results for the Navy. 
The primary purpose in implementing the SSB system is to provide the best 
value to the Navy through defining a process yielding manageable risks at the lowest 
LCC.  If a conflict of interest situation exists either within the contractor - the bottom 
line versus best value for the Navy  or with the government employee trying to 
balance the requirements of  their employer directives versus best value for the Navy 
 the lack of independence of DMSMS support function will most likely produce sub 
optimal results for the Navy. Since the NAVICP implementation policies have no counter 
acting force or change agent activists, contracting out this vital function appears 
inevitable.  Over time the internal Organic activities will become either the willing 
participants of the contractors directives or a non-participant whereby the internal Navy 
resources for DMSMS support will eventually disappear.  In the end the PMO (customer) 
will receive DMSMS support that will reflect the contractors  best bottom line  
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versus the Navys  best value.  The same action plan identified for Threat 1 is 
applicable with regard to the conflict of interest issues although a few actions will 
require modification. With a conflict of interest problem the issues take on more of a 
political overtone versus the straight business implications in arriving at the best value 
for the Navy, as identified in Treat 1.  Therefore it is important to work this issue in a 
low-key fashion up the chain of command instead of broadcasting it at every conference 
and workshop.   The preventative actions to mitigate this treat are to confront NAVICP 
directly and request interpretation and action from SECNAV. 
5. Contributions to Business Objectives 
a) Financial and Business Performance 
The implementation of the SSB process to the SSDS program has had 
positive impacts to both the financial and business performance requirements.  The SSB 
process essentially provides an architecture that specifically addresses the issue of 
obsolescence, diminishing manufacturing sources, and material shortages. In this way the 
risk to the program is significantly reduced.  The architecture provides effective 
coordination and networking leading to tremendous cost savings as well as the ability to 
ensure long-term supportability for COTS products.  From a financial perspective, the 
SSB process allows for the opportunity to significantly reduce the upfront costs and 
stabilize the funding profile over the period of support leading to a much more efficient 
use of funds.  This is in addition to sizeable cost savings and avoidance.  From a business 
perspective, the overall awareness of obsolescence and material shortages gives the 
program manager more information for making effective decisions.  Furthermore, the risk 
mitigation aspects of the SSB process come from establishing a collaborative 
environment where the responsibilities and risks are shared between the commercial and 
government activities.  Out of this environment come positive business impacts in terms 
supportability, program planning, program risk and Life Cycle Cost. 
b) Strategic Positioning and Ownership 
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The SSB infrastructure was implemented into the SSDS program. The 
overall environment is one of collaboration, coordination and trust.  The functions are 
coordinated across a network of commercial and government activities.  The expertise 
from both the private and public sectors is shared across this network.  This situation 
nurtures long-term relationships between the commercial entities and the DoD 
participating activities.  These relationships are consistent with present DoD and industry 
partnering initiatives.  This and the fact that the SSB process has provided tremendous 
cost savings to the SSDS program only strengthens the strategic position of the SSB 
system within the set of support alternative solutions presently available to the PMO. 
Furthermore, the mere fact that the PMO has discretion and authority to create an SSB 
environment, illustrates the control and ownership the PMO has in the face of COTS 
product proliferation.  Remember, the COTS initiative essentially reduces the control the 
DoD has historically had over system design and support.  The SSB process allows the 
Program Office to regain some control in that it extends supportability and maintains key 
technologies for stabilizing the system baseline. 
c) Operations and Functions 
Reviewing the benefits that are derived by implementing the SSB process, 
we immediately realize the positive effect it has on extending COTS product 
supportability for the SSDS program.  Recall, that commercial product life cycles are 
typically 18-months to 2-years, whereas DoD planning and implementation easily 
exceeds 5 years.  In this case the SSB process allowed the PMO to postpone likely 
redesigns that result from obsolescence.  By extending supportability, the SSB process 
gives the PMO the opportunity to better forecast and react to changes in warfighter 
requirements as well as in the market.  Overall management of the program is made more 
efficient given the extended timeframe for assessing technology trends and evolving 
warfighter requirements.  By extending COTS product supportability, the PMO can now 
align technology refresh cycles with product end-of-production dates.  In this case we are 
talking about the extended production of a specific COTS product by the Sunset Supplier.  
At the same time we can essentially compress the timeframe for delivering support to the 
warfighter. Sunset Suppliers take on the responsibility of stockage, storage, and issue of 
COTS replacement and repair parts. Improved delivery to the warfighter is expected 
since the Sunset Supplier can be contractually responsible for specific performance 
metrics if so stated in the appropriate documents.  
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d) Product and Services 
With the implementation of the SSB process, key enabling technologies 
are retained through extended supportability over a defined period of time.  The net result 
is a stabilized system performance baseline produces an overall improvement in terms of 
products and services.  The SSB process allows the program manager to match the COTS 
product update cycles with the programs technical roadmap or refresh effort.  
Furthermore, as a product, the SSB infrastructure becomes part of a toolset that provides 
obsolescence indicators and reports as well as the ability to mitigate maintenance and 
supportability issues at the assembly level.  This support strategy can now include a 
mechanism for establishing and managing the information obtained from the assessment 
and reporting activities, thus empowering the program manager with the knowledge 
necessary to deliver an improved customer service.  In the long run the system integrity is 
maintained, which has several implications in terms of Integrated Logistical Support  
(ILS) (i.e. training, manuals, configuration control, Fleet training) 
e) Image 
The financial and non-financial benefits derived and identified within this 
document prove the viability, effectiveness and value of the SSB system as an alternative 
to conventional support mechanisms such as Life of Type Buy (LTB).  Not necessarily 
as a replacement for these traditional methods the SSB system supplements them  as 
another option.  The SSB process does not intend to extend supportability for the sake of 
retaining old technology, but rather to stabilize the system performance baseline for 
periods that can be aligned with DoD acquisition cycles.  It offers an opportunity for the 
PMO to consider redesigns based on performance enhancements in response to evolving 
warfighter requirements rather than redesigns due to obsolescence.  This mere fact makes 
this an attractive scenario from a PMOs perspective for improving life cycle 
management.  And in conjunction with the significant cost savings the overall appeal of 
the SSB system should make it the alternative of choice for program managers seeking to 
optimize their support strategy. 
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6. Summary 
The results presented within this document clearly illustrate that the SSB 
implementation has the potential to offer significant benefits to DoD Weapon System 
acquisition programs.  Nevertheless, the results not only reflect an overall cost savings 
for the analysis period, they also provided further insight to other desirable benefits. In 
particular, risk mitigation and management was enhanced for the program manager.  The 
SSB method had an extremely low initial investment as well as a profoundly stable 
funding profile over the defined support period.  The low initial cost translated into less 
of upfront investment.  The more money that is invested upfront, the more you are locked 
into a situation in order to derive the greatest return.  For example, let us say that you 
purchase a million dollars worth of spares in the first year in an effort to support a 
particular product over ten years.  After the first two years you use up $200K of the 
spares when you are presented with an opportunity to improve product support, reduce 
costs and/or enhance system capabilities.  You still have $800K invested in spares. In this 
case you are unlikely to take advantage of this opportunity.  Subsequently, low initial cost 
reduces the risk of staying the course and fully optimizing program attributes.  
Furthermore, in the situation where you have made significant investment in spares 
upfront, you are calculating this amount based on a forecast of failures for a particular 
item.  There are two risks associated with this.  First, investing too much means making 
purchases in spares that will never be used.  Second, buying too little, runs the risk of not 
being able to support the weapon system for the prescribed period of support.  Along with 
the low initial costs, the SSB method allows for even expenditures of the remaining 
funds.  To whatever degree the SSB was implemented, the resulting funding profile was 
very stable.  This stability is important to the planning and budgeting process. Effective 
planning and budgeting is essentially a process in risk mitigation, and anything we can do 
to help the planning and budgeting process helps us to reduce risk.  Also, remember the 
very nature of the SSB infrastructure is a collaborative venture in which responsibility 
and thus risk is shared between the commercial and government entities, a further step in 
risk reduction.  Furthermore, by stabilizing the funding profile we can make efficient use 
of funds, which is a recurring mandate throughout government acquisition directives.  
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The effects of SSB implementation have clear financial impacts, which are aligned with 
Federal and DoD initiatives, regulations and guidelines.  
The financial aspects of SSB implementation are not enough to conclude it as a 
viable support solution alternative.  Just because we can save money, we have to ensure 
that it meets the requirements of the program and ultimately the warfighter as well.  The 
SSB process extends the supportability and reparability of COTS products.  By 
establishing arrangements between Navy Activities/Resources, the OEMs and third party 
small businesses (Sunset Suppliers), we can provide insurance to the Program Office that 
a particular COTS product will be sustained for a defined period of time.  In fact, delivery 
of the replacement spare is initiated at the time of failure in the Fleet.  The COTS item is 
purchased on demand rather than upfront, which is based on failure rate data.  If ten items 
fail over ten years, you will only purchase ten replacement items.  This approach again is 
flexible and provides a mechanism for improving the planning and budgeting in support 
of the next tech refresh point.  The extension of support stabilizes the system baseline so 
that a more focused approach is given to planning for future product or system redesign 
efforts.  By stabilizing the system baseline for a defined period of time, we again reduce 
risk to COTS obsolescence during this period.  In fact, the very SSB infrastructure 
facilitates effective obsolescence and material shortage assessment and reporting.  This 
assessment capability is a coordinated effort across the SSB infrastructure.  As the SSB is 
implemented on more programs membership in the SSB process grows allowing greater 
access to programs Navy-wide. In effect, the data collected in one program is likely 
valuable to other programs given the growing proliferation of COTS products in military 
applications.  Therefore we visualize a process that is transportable, repeatable and 
expandable for all DoD/Navy programs. 
As mentioned, certain strengths and weaknesses have been derived from actual 
implementation, business case analysis and environmental analysis.  These strengths and 
weaknesses as well as the opportunities and threats, give great insight and decision-
making power for focusing implementation activities into areas where the SSB is strong, 
and where the greatest opportunities lie.  The information presented above, is pulled 
directly from Appendix D (SSB Marketing Plan), which also provides a path for 
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matching SSB strengths to its opportunities for enhancing SSB system capabilities in 
supporting the DoD Program Management Offices.  This strategy improves the 
marketability as well as effectiveness of the SSB system.  Additionally, Appendix D 
offers a plan for converting its weaknesses into strengths and threats into opportunities.  
Overall, based on the analytical results and guidance provided, a strong marketing 
strategy has been developed that is focused on capturing 20% of the market share for 
Navy programs by clearly establishing an image for the SSB system, through 
substantiated benefits, as the preferred alternative for the PMOs in supporting weapon 
systems that use COTS products.  This strategy also emphasizes the ability of the SSB 
process to cost effectively insert technology into fielded Navy systems.  A key element 
considering the transition to, and growth of, COTS products.  
The results from the four deliverables have been melded together in this section in 
an effort to provide linkage and alignment across each step of the overall thesis approach.  
Many benefits have surfaced from each deliverable (see Appendix A  D) regardless of 
the approach taken.  Also, unique strengths or benefits have been extracted from the 
collection of all the deliverables that show emergent properties not necessarily evident 
from any one approach, thereby yielding an important property of a System of 
Systems.  To this end, we see that each deliverable is capable of standing alone as a 
valuable entity for use in the decision-making process for SSB system acceptance and 
execution, but together they form a complete offering for effective and successful SSB 
implementation. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. CONCLUSION 
1. General 
This paper has demonstrated that the SSB system is an affordable approach for 
managing and mitigating program supportability risk due to COTS products.  As a 
collaborative system, the information that is derived from the identification and 
mitigation of risk is quantifiable and will be readily accessible to all SSB team 
participants.  The process takes into account the fact that the supportability of fielded 
hardware is defined by the warfighter.  The SSB system extends the life cycle and 
supportability of COTS and ensures a late-life cycle supply source.  In so doing, the SSB 
permits DoD to be successful in leveraging commercial developments with appropriate 
economies of scale in order to reach its military performance goals while offsetting the 
problem of diminishing material. 
The SSB system assists the Program Management Office (PMO) by providing 
infrastructure support to existing platforms/combat systems.  When implemented early in 
the development process, the SSB process has been demonstrated to extend COTS 
products availability to support existing weapon systems; thus providing significant 
reductions in program risk related to COTS and life cycle management.  The SSB 
provides predictive, decision quality information for PMO decision-making processes.  
The outputs of trade-offs and assessments accomplished as part of the SSB system will 
gain the PMO a high level of confidence with the warfighter/customer.  The process is 
applicable to various DoD entities and their business, contract, and support strategies.  
When aggressively integrated across DoD, COTS product commonality will lead to 
flexible Integrated Logistical Support (ILS), thus providing incentives for the commercial 
industry to develop long-term relationships with the sponsors and users. 
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The SSB is sensitive to proprietary design rights and provides a proactive forum 
for contractual negotiations.  The method employed, improves the detection of product 
supportability problems and provides sufficient time for analysis of alternatives and 
solutions in the decision-making processes.  This technology assessment can be 
implemented at the piece part, lowest replaceable unit, subsystem or multiple platform 
level.  The SSB approach is to procure assemblies when the customer requires them.  In 
this way, it achieves significant and quantifiable cost savings over the product life cycle.  
The process provides cost structures that track and continually assess progress over the 
entire product life cycle.  This information permits informed decision-making 
contributing to life cycle cost savings without the need for Life of Type Buys at the 
assembly level. 
Use of the SSB system improves schedule flexibility by providing support options 
that can be tailored for the activities needed and the warfighter.  It reduces provisioning 
timeframes and places the responsibility for stockage, storage, and issue of COTS spares 
and repair parts on the supply contractor.  SSB enables many support activities and 
functions: immediate supportability for Fleet returned failures, elimination of government 
inventory stock levels, large commercial distribution systems, no source inspection, 
commercial packaging, fast and direct delivery to the warfighter, and warranty of 
components.  The SSB process has definable and repeatable characteristics that provide a 
comprehensive and flexible solution to supporting fielded hardware.  It provides 
programs with an independent utility for implementing COTS products and has minimal 
or no impact on system operational performance.  Once implemented, the SSB is an 
affordable, expandable, repeatable and reliable process that will meet the users 
performance expectations.  It provides the best of both worlds.  It leverages the inherently 
governmental functions of the Navy supply process and coordinates with commercial 
supportability assets through a thoroughly meshed and maintainable communication 
network solution. 
2. Impacts to Problem Statement 
The overall acquisition of military weapon systems is a challenging endeavor to 
say the least.  One thing that has been reported, and confirmed in the business case 
analysis, is that procurement costs make up more than half of the acquisition costs.  In 
fact, the procurement costs incurred after a system has been fielded still accounts for the 
majority of the life cycle costs.  This scenario has lead DoD to begin leveraging 
commercial standards, products and practices in an attempt to lower risk and life cycle 
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costs.  The use of COTS products has made great strides to reducing initial costs while 
transferring state-of-the-art technologies to the warfighter.  However, these gains have 
come with their own set of problems.  Given the mission criticality and software-
intensive architectures of present weapon systems, slight changes in COTS products are 
simply unacceptable.  Minor changes to a piece of COTS hardware can have serious 
implications to readiness and program costs, given their software intensive nature.  It 
typically takes a significant effort, in terms of time and money, to develop, test and 
deploy upgraded changes.  To further, complicate the issue, these weapon systems are 
developed and deployed in small quantities making them unattractive for typical 
commercial business interest.  The uniqueness of these systems makes them difficult to 
support affordably.  Given that commercial technology refresh cycles are around 18-24 
months where the DoD can barely hope to refresh every 5-7 years, there is little incentive 
for major equipment manufacturers to continue production of a product that no longer 
fulfills their business objectives just for the sake of accommodating the military, which 
makes up less than 0.4% of the market.  There is really only one of two ways to handle 
this dilemma.  Either accelerate the acquisition phase, which is highly unlikely given the 
conservative DoD acquisition approach, or extend the supportability of the COTS 
products.  Additionally, as the commercial content within military systems increase, the 
issue of COTS product supportability is complicated by orders of magnitude.  Consider 
for a moment the eventual increase in technology refreshes needed across the DoD/Navy 
program spectrum as a result of the tremendous proliferation of COTS in military 
applications.  This increase makes the issue of COTS supportability a major concern 
during acquisition and support strategy development.  For program planning and 
budgeting purposes a mechanism is needed to effectively assess the COTS product 
supportability position for a particular program.  To this end, the SSB system provides a 
support recommendation process for each COTS product in the weapon system under 
analysis.  This approach assists the program manager in making decisions that will 
impact life cycle costs of the weapon system while meeting technical design 
requirements.  From a planning and budgeting perspective it provides higher confidence 
in future program cost predictions.  The output of the SSB process helps program 
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managers map proposed technology updates to system deployment, operation and support 
plans. 
3. Impact to Acquisition Strategy 
SSB Implementation efforts and the subsequent Business Case Analysis have 
demonstrated that the SSB infrastructure is an affordable approach for mitigating 
program supportability risk due to COTS products.  The Marketing Plan emphasizes the 
collaborative nature of the SSB process to leverage the various areas of high performance 
and ability residing in the government, big business and the small businesses.  From an 
acquisition standpoint, the COTS product risks are quantifiable and shared across the 
infrastructure.  The SSB process was conceived for, and therefore sensitive to, the 
supportability of fielded COTS products as defined by the warfighter.  As an acquisition 
strategy it extends the life cycle and supportability of COTS and ensures late-life cycle 
supply support.  The SSB process essentially permits the DoD to be successful in 
leveraging commercial developments with appropriate economies of scale in order to 
reach its military performance goals while offsetting the problem of DMSMS.  
The SSB infrastructure directly supports existing combat/weapon systems. In this 
way it provides the Program Office an additional support solution alternative.  This 
alternative can be implemented early in the acquisition process to optimize the value and 
viability of COTS product usage.  The SSB process can also provide insight to the 
supportability of selected COTS products early enough in the acquisition process to 
significantly reduce program risk related to COTS and Life Cycle Management.  
Additionally, when applied to various DoD/Navy programs, COTS product commonality 
could lead to a flexible, ILS approach.  This scenario would likely have a ripple effect 
that provides incentives for the commercial industry to develop long-term relationships 
with the respective Program Offices. 
The essence of the SSB process lies in its ability to detect potential supportability 
problems.  By extending the supportability, it provides sufficient time for analysis of 
alternatives and solutions in the decision-making processes.  Furthermore, accurate 
assessment of COTS supportability can be accomplished at any level (subsystem, 
equipment, component, or piece part).  This approach not only extends supportability but 
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reparability as well.  The SSB approach is to procure assemblies when the customer 
requires them.  To this end, the SSB process is committed to continual assessment over 
the entire COTS product life cycle. Again, this approach breeds a more informed 
decision-making process translating to improved support performance and lower life 
cycle costs. 
Overall, the SSB process becomes an additional and likely the preferred support 
solution alternative for PMs who will welcome the schedule flexibility provided by the 
SSB process.  The flexibility comes from the fact that the SSB infrastructure can tailor 
the support options in terms of functions and expectations demanded by the warfighter.  
These functions include immediate supportability and fast, reliable and direct delivery to 
the warfighter.  The COTS product supportability assessments are critical to effective 
SSB implementation and therefore a great deal of emphasis is placed on the collection, 
maintenance and dissemination of the information and knowledge derived.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
DoD has recognized that product support solutions can be more effectively 
designed and implemented if the acquisition and logistics communities work in 
partnership.  Within the SSB infrastructure, integrated acquisition and logistics functions 
conduct supportability analysis as an integral element of the systems engineering process.  
This process (SSB) should occur at the beginning of program initiation to ensure 
designed in reliability and maintainability throughout the program life cycle.  This will 
also to ensure that the system performance baseline remains unchanged therefore 
continuing to meet the warfighter's supportability requirements.  Although applicable at 
any phase of the acquisition cycle, it is critical to consider the SSB implementation in the 
earliest possible stage to gain maximum benefit.  Consider the SSB Only support scenario 
developed in Appendix C (The Business Case Analysis).  This scenario essentially 
employs the SSB method for all COTS products.  The SSB Only method illustrates a 
situation where SSB was implemented prior to other support method choices and 
subsequent commitments.  In this case we saw the greatest stability in the funding profile 
and the lowest initial investment amount.  Together they result in the lowest risk to the 
program while providing more flexibility and sustainment capability.  
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The SSB process should be a continuous process. COTS product supportability 
assessments should be repeated frequently throughout the acquisition cycle.  This 
approach not only keeps the data stored on COTS products fresh, but also allows for 
some maturation of the process.  The idea is a continuous improvement environment that 
will ensure that the most cost-effective methods of support are being considered and 
subsequently offered to the PMOs.  
The program manager is expected per DoDD 5000 to use the most effective 
source of support that optimizes performance and lowest life cycle cost, consistent with 
military and statutory requirements.  The source of support may be organic or 
commercial, but its primary focus is to optimize customer support, achieve maximum 
weapon system availability at the lowest Total Ownership Cost.  At their disposal, the 
program manager has a set of support methods that can be used to achieve this objective, 
the SSB process, as proven in the Business Case Analysis to be a viable and effective 
support method, and should be included as an additional support solution alternative in 
the solution space 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The SSB system was developed as a contemporary solution in addressing the 
COTS supportability risks as used in the Navys combat and support systems.  The 
assumptions, which underpin the system are relevant today and may or may not be 
relevant in the future.  These assumptions are linked to many facets of the Naval support 
structures, such as: the supply system, current guidance and mandatory policies, business 
and programmatic infrastructures (i.e. PPBS, ORDALT scheduling, etc.)  When changes 
occur in any of these support structures a direct or indirect impact to the SSB system may 
occur.  Therefore it would be prudent to revisit the utility and viability of the SSB system 
in its entirety as a future research area. 
The SSB system development process has matured to a point where emergent 
properties and new capabilities are evident and available for exploitation, however the 
system development process stopped short from optimizing the processes.  The SSB 
system is developing into a stable process and producing standard data sets.  We 
recommend that a systems optimization process be attempted for future researched as a 
continual improvement to the current SSB system practices. 
Time will be arbitrator in evaluating the adequacy of the SSB system 
development process and the products produced by that system.  Providing that the 
system exists long enough to produce an adequate amount of information and products, it 
is recommended that an independent review and analysis be accomplished to provide a 
critical review of the entire system to assess the value proposition as claimed by the 
system provides the Navy the best value alternative for COTS supportability and if the 
system could use some improvement or if the system has outlived its usefulness.  
The SSB system was specifically developed to address COTS products that are 
microprocessor based products.  Many of the base tools, practices, methods, and 
algorithms used in the system are based on the electrical commodities group, which is 
appropriate when addressing the combat weapon and associated support systems.  
However, other commodity groups such as mechanical, plastics, chemical, optical, and 
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ceramics groups have the same issues of obsolescence and DMSMS as does the electrical 
commodity.  We recommend that future research be done to evaluate the transportability 
of the SSB system processes, methods, and approach to meeting the Navys needs in 
obsolescence and DMSMS created from other commodity groups. 
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 VII. ENCLOSURES: 
The nature of the SSB thesis topic and the approach taken by the authors necessitated the 
use of examples, templates, tools, methods, and practices.  These implementation tools 
and deliverable products are illustrated through a set of enclosures referenced in the 
thesis and its appendices.  Most of the enclosures are static examples generated during 
the implementation of the SSB system on three Navy programs.  However, other 
enclosures are not static and are therefore provided on a web site (URL: 
http://www.anavision.org/ssb.htm ) in the Excel format to provide a dynamic model for 




















Enclosure (1)  Introduction to the Sunset Supply Base (SSB) System, initial 
presentation 
Enclosure (2)  Executive Summary - one page high-level summary 
Enclosure (3)  Article from the COTS Journal, Volume 2, Number 7, 
January/February  2000, page 33 
Enclosure (4)  An example of a Statement of Work (SOW) 
Enclosure (5)  Provides a general fill-in-the blank template NDA form.  
Enclosure (6)  An example of the PMS 461 - SSDS COTS Working Group 
Charter 
Enclosure (7)  An example of the PMS 461 - SSDS COTS Working Group 
Management Plan 
Enclosure (8)  An example of a Membership: Roles & Responsibilities 
Presentation on the programmatic support team. 
Enclosure (9)  Tasking Documentation 
Enclosure (10)  Conference Paper -Reducing the Cost of Ownership of Todays 
Weapon Systems Through the Extension of the Availability of COTS Electronics 
by M Barkenhagen, S Cecil, R Cox, R Tadros 
Enclosure (11)  SSDS Project Plan - Sunset Supply Base Concept 
Enclosure (12)  SSB IPT Mission & Vision 
Enclosure (13)  SSB IPT Roles & Responsibilities 
Enclosure (14)  SSB IPT Norms & Ground Rules 
Enclosure (15)  SSDS MK 1&2 prioritized, COTS list, early maturity 
Enclosure (16)  SSDS MK 1&2 prioritized, COTS list, Budget support 
Enclosure (17)  17 Steps - SSB Implementation Process 














Enclosure (19)  Failure Rate Comparison Table, SSDS MK1 
Enclosure (20)  Number Of Spare Parts - Cost Justification Matrix 
Enclosure (21)  Technology Refresh Cost Model Demo 
Enclosure (22)  Requested Format for Parts Lists 
Enclosure (23)  Vendor Status Report 
Enclosure (24)  Obsolescence Health Report 
Enclosure (25)  SSDS Red Component List 
Enclosure (26)  Obsolescence Purchase Request email form 
Enclosure (27)  Obsolescence Impact & Purchase Request Report 
Enclosure (28)  SSDS Assembly Master & Cost Matrices 
Enclosure (29)  SSB Planning Excel Workbook & Data Item Description 
Enclosure (30)  Resource Cost Models 
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ABSTRACT 
Acquisition reform and the policies that it invoked brought about the 
implementation of COTS.  In analyzing the current situation, this paper reviews why the 
use of COTS was implemented, what the expected positive outcome was, how COTS fits 
into our national defense strategy, and what obstacles they pose in the context of 
warfighter supportability. Technology advances pose greater problems to Navy 
procurements than for consumer products.  Components, sub-systems, and systems 
developed for the military have far longer lifecycles than their commercial and consumer 
equivalents.  This paper provides a potential architectural solution to the obsolescence 
issues involving Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) equipment and Diminishing 
Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS).  The focus of this paper is for 
Navy implementation of the Sunset Supply Base (SSB) architecture.  The SSB supplier is 
envisioned to come from the smaller suppliers who, over the last three decades, have 
provided the DoD/government with high technology in custom products.  Their role in 
this architecture will allow the DoD to extend the life cycle and supportability of COTS 
products and ensure a late-life cycle supply source.  In so doing the SSB permits the DoD 
to be successful in leveraging commercial developments with appropriate economies of 
scale in order to reach its military performance goals while offsetting the problem of 
diminishing sources and material.  Understanding that the end game of the system is to 
provide extended supportability of COTS products, the concept for this architecture can 
be stated quite simply:  Provide appropriate incentives for the Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) to transfer their intellectual property rights to an SSB supplier for 
extended production in support of the Navy Program Management Office (PMO), and 
collaborate with the internal Navy resources to identify and mitigate risk.  The 
architecture of the system is collaborative in nature and is defined such that it could be 
used by any DoD entity or associated allied / foreign military sales system.  This paper 
demonstrates how the SSB architecture is an affordable approach for mitigating program 
supportability risk and details how the overall purpose is to provide dependable, cost 
effective supportability insurance for COTS based weapon systems. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper provides a potential architectural solution to the obsolescence issues 
involving Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) equipment and their associated 
Diminishing Manufacturing Sources, and Material Shortages (DMSMS) risks.  In 
analyzing the current situation, we reviewed why the use of COTS was implemented, 
what the expected positive outcome was, and how COTS fits with todays issues.  The 
DoD design cycle tends to be long -- historically 10-15 years although todays goal is 5-7 
years [4) McDermott]-- expensive, and usually resulted in out-of-date designs by the time 
production began.  COTS products are driven by Market Forces and world wide 
competition, provide the DoD customer with several enticing advantages which were not 
previously available.  The commercial world provides a quick response to changing 
needs, applications, and technology, while at the same time paying for development costs 
as part of doing business.  COTS therefore provided DoD with a way to keep up with 
technology using the cost effective methods of large commercial entities (i.e., economies 
of scale, volume rate production, etc.) and implementing these new technologies in a 
timely manner.  The flip side to the positive attributes is the fact that even slight changes 
to COTS hardware/software can adversely affect interfaces to other equipment.  Fleet 
support for fielded systems raises problems in configuration control, and hardware and 
software compatibility.  The associated ripple effects at the system level are major risks 
in maintaining Fleet capability and readiness. 
There are many different strategies that could be used to solve availability 
problems, thus ensuring Fleet readiness.  Which one makes the most sense depends upon 
a variety of factors.  These factors are the results of the obsolescence risk health analysis, 
the plans and desires and schedule of the customer, engineering analysis, risk analysis, 
and a cost analysis (a cost for the solution scenarios using cost models). 
The types of solutions to choose from can include one or more of the following:  
• Bridge buys 
• Spares utilization 
• Maintenance Contracts with Vendors 
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 • COTS/Non Development Items (NDI) replacement 
• After-market 
A bridge buy is a short-term buy solution to an availability problem.  Items are 
purchased to bridge the time from some point before product obsolescence to a known 
point in time when a refresh/upgrade is planned. Often a bridge buy is performed while 
the logistics of the agreed-upon long-term solution become finalized for execution.  In 
essence, a bridge buy should provide the customer some time by solving the immediate 
availability problem for a period of six months to three years.  Bridge buys may be 
desired for many reasons: 1) inability to accurately assess and predict the lifetime 
demand, 2) inabilities to acquire funding for a Life-of-Type (3 to 10 year) Buy, (LTB) 
and 3) a redesign is the desired long-term solution, but budget constraints may delay the 
effort for a finite term.  Guidelines for making the repair/replace decision should be as 
follows:  
• If considering a bridge buy solution, high price items should be investigated 
for repair as opposed to a bridge buy 
• If considering a repair concept, bridge buys should be estimated when the cost 
to repair is equal to or greater than the cost to replace. 
Spares utilization may be an option to support the equipment until a 
refresh/redesign is planned. Typically such spares come from supplies maintained from 
the prime contractor, from the In-Service Support Activity, or from decommissioned 
assets tracked by Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP).  
Maintenance contracts with vendors are utilized to deal with obsolescence instead 
of bridge buying an item.  This method can be used to support products until a 
technology refresh and/or end of system life methods can be employed.  This concept 
allows the delay of a technology refresh due to the repair capability after product 
obsolescence.  In most cases, it allows the Program Manager to lower his support cost 
due to the cost of repair being less than the replacement costs.  This philosophy contains 
some inherent risk associated with vendor's capability to repair and the repair support 
period the vendor is willing to sign-up for. 
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 Two approaches can be taken for COTS/NDI replacement.  For a minor impact 
solution approach, it is possible that the problem product is replaced by a newer revision 
of the same product or an entirely new product of the same family.  The major impact 
solution approach consists of a technology upgrade change from the same vendor - or an 
entirely new product and vendor.  Low complexity and cost products (Type A) will 
usually fall into the first solution approach category (newer version of the same product).  
This type of replacement produces a minimum impact on the system.  Moderate 
complexity and cost products (Type B) can cause a minimal impact and need to be 
investigated on a case per case basis.  Both A and B types require an Engineering Change 
Proposal (ECP) Type II; however, the additional costs incurred by the ECP process 
should be taken into account.  High cost and complexity products (Type C) will usually 
cause a major impact, requiring a class I ECP with associated processes, approvals, and 
costs.  The program has the associated risk of impacting the interoperability of the system 
using either solution. 
The after market approach, referred to in this paper as the Sunset Supply Base 
(SSB), extends the supportability of COTS products and items of material shortage 
predicated on the needs of the Navy programs.  The SSB is an extension of product 
availability, beyond the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) assigned date to drop 
the products as obsolete items.  This approach provides stability to the system baseline 
configuration over a defined period of time between scheduled Technical Refresh/ 
Insertion points.  The goal of the SSB architecture is to define an arrangement where the 
Navy leverages large businesses in their strong suit of technology, market leader, and 
quantity in manufacturing, and utilize the small businesses for their strong suit, namely: 
agility, small run production, and long term partnership.  To bridge the gap between the 
commercial worlds OEM business planning and the Navys need for long term support, 
a third party is brought in: the Sunset Supplier.  The Sunset Supplier is usually a small 
business unit.  The Sunset Supplier establishes a contractual relationship with the OEM to 
produce the obsolete products for the OEM customer base, in this case the Navy and its 
associated contractors.  The OEM transfers the intellectual property and assembly 
expertise to the Sunset Supplier, and for this, the OEM receives royalty on the sale of all 
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 products produced.  Internal to the Navy are support infrastructures to ensure 
supportability of Sunset products by mitigating any component part obsolescence or 
shortages issues if they exist on those products.  The infrastructure and support of the 
SSB process yields not only significant cost savings, but also provides other benefits, 
such as: 
• Supportability of products defined by customer needs over 5, 10, 15, or 20 
years. 
• Life Cycle cost savings, due to no lifetime buy at the assembly level is 
needed, so the assemblies are procured, as the customer requires them. 
• Reparability of assemblies over the designated Life Cycle (5, 10, 15, 20 
years). 
• Hardware/Software/Firmware stability between Technology Refresh/Insertion 
Cycles. 
• Significant reduction in Program risk as related to COTS and life cycle 
management. 
• Improved schedule flexibility and support options that can be tailored for 
Fleet needs. 
• Minimal or no impact on system operational performance and the user. The 
performance will remain constant using exactly the same part: form, fit, and 
function replacement, which have been made by the alternate manufacturer, 
the Sunset Supplier.  
The proposed COTS SSB system provides an opportunity for a triple win 
situation involving all entities.  The COTS OEM wins because they can claim long-term 
life-cycle support of fielded products at lower costs and less impact during 
implementation on current and future systems.  The OEM may also ask for 
compensation/royalties for each item sold.  The COTS Sunset Supplier wins in terms of 
new customers, new product lines, and building long-term relationships with the user 
community.  The Navy wins by obtaining long-term supportability, maintainability and 
operational readiness.  Program Management (PM) can optimize upgrades, re-designs, 
technology refresh intervals, etc.  Program management can also help expose piece part 
obsolescence problems and shortages before they affect the COTS Sunset Supplier 
through the use of a qualified independent third party manager and COTS cross-
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 functional technical support team.  Defining the role of the DoD community will be 
critical in assuring the long-term objectives in Fleet operational support. 
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II. SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS 
A. NEED 
Acquisition Reform and the policies that it invoked brought about the 
implementation of COTS.  Those policies encouraged the avoidance of unique 
requirements, restrictive statements of need, and detailed specifications.  Together with 
DoD 5000.2 and the Federal Acquisition Regulations, DoD hoped to leverage the large 
businesses in terms of state-of-the-art technologies and quantity of manufacturing in 
order to provide state-of-the-art technology at lower costs.  COTS technologies are driven 
by industry, and the COTS manufacturers are driven by their customer base of which the 
DoD only makes up approximately 0.4%.[1) Glum, 2) Robinson, 3) Hartshorn]  To hold a 
place in their market, COTS manufacturers must remaine competitive, which means a 
continual push in the development and use of technology.  It is this intense competition 
that drives the fast technical update cycles and ultimately influences technology change 
and direction.  To this end, the COTS manufacturer's position in the marketplace is 
dependent on the company size and its technology edge.  These factors impact the 
direction and update cycles of technology and the products that employ them. Therefore 
the COTS manufacturers hold a significant place in weapon system development and 
manufacturing because they can effectively facilitate the quick response to DoD changing 
needs. 
Typically the DoD design and develop cycles span 5 to 7 years (10-15 years 
historically)[4) McDermott] and are expensive and often deploy out of date equipment.  
COTS manufacturers on the other hand take a big business approach in offsetting 
development costs through economies of scale and volume rate productions.  Therefore, 
they can effectively implement technology change in a much timelier manner.  Through 
the Acquisition Reform Initiatives, DoD is encouraged to capitalize on these big business 
characteristics and allow industry to be burdened with the technology development costs.  
The expected result for the DoD is lower overall developmental investments and an 
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 opportunity to be able to synchronize their design efforts with state-of-the-art 
technologies.   
The widespread use of COTS in military weapon systems does however bring 
certain challenges.  Nothing is as easy as it looks.  There are serious obsolescence issues 
associated with the use of COTS, as well as other material shortages issue.  The challenge 
is to provide life cycle support of fielded systems that use COTS products as part of the 
systems critical components.  The life cycle for some military weapon systems may 
exceed 20 or 30 years.  This is not at all consistent with big business timelines, and there 
is presently no incentive for COTS manufacturers to continue production of DoD COTS 
products on a small scale.  The driving force here is the market driven rate of technology 
change in the commercial world.  In the commercial world technology updates occur over 
an 18-month to 2 year cycle.[1) Glum, 2) Robinson, 4) McDermott]  By contrast, the 
DoD experiences technology refresh cycles between 5 and 7 years.[ 4) McDermott]  This 
cycle is impacted not only by software and hardware updates but by programmatic 
schedule changes as well.  The challenge is further exacerbated by how the military will 
continue to develop weapon systems that do not fall prey to technology that will not last 
or technology that will undergo significant change. 
Technology changes will occur in the COTS arena and will have direct impacts 
on military weapon systems existing and even those under development.  Slight changes 
in software could have devastating effects.  Quite often systems are built around software 
which means systems architectures are dictated by software and slight software changes 
will likely have significant cost impacts.  Relatively small software changes could have 
very expensive consequences.  To expound on the implication of software change 
impacts, we need to understand that software may not only dictate certain standards, but 
that software changes occur fairly regularly in the commercial world and re-integration is 
difficult and expensive.  The DoD has to be aware of the impacts to hardware due to 
software changes. Likewise, slight changes in COTS hardware may impact software 
applications.  Additionally, there could likely be impacts in terms of interfaces with other 
equipment or systems that may not be so apparent.  Subtle specification changes to COTS 
hardware (i.e. timing, execution) could have devastating ripple effects.  These negative 
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 effects will be at the system level and will substantially increase the risks associated with 
using COTS in the future.  
Since military weapon systems are typically unique, the use of COTS becomes a 
tricky business in terms of dictating system design and ultimately life cycle support.  In 
terms of software, military applications tend to be very specific, and the weapon system 
cannot tolerate or support changes.  Compatibility and configuration-control become 
crucial elements for both software and hardware.  Support activities are pressured to 
maintain stabilized baselines in order to keep the certification of the system verifiable.  
These include not only the initial integration site but also the interoperability of fielded 
systems subsequent to changes (i.e. installation of replacement parts, firmware, software 
or hardware revisions, etc). 
To fully understand this issue of support, we must revisit certain DoD 
characteristics. Military acquisition is characterized by high development costs and very 
long development cycles; therefore military procurements are forced to project future 
needs and purchase as many products or components as they think they will need.  
Furthermore, in light of unique military applications, the lengthy life cycles and the 5 to 7 
year technology refresh rate, the DoD realizes that they presently have no control over 
product evolution, and therefore must compensate by staying aware of pending changes.  
This is critical if the military is to expect any appreciable success in support of their 
weapon systems.  Operational and maintainability support is expected over the entire life 
cycle of the system.  This includes support for design and development efforts as well.  
As mentioned previously, DoD design and development cycles spanning 10 to 15 years, 
are expensive and often deploy out of date equipment.  These design and development 
activities must rely on commercial products to be available when the design goes into 
production.  Furthermore, production and manufacturing facilities must rely on the source 
of supply in producing the systems they were contracted for, which will include 
commercial products that contain their own supportability issues. 
The impacts of ineffectiveness to support our weapon systems throughout their 
life cycle will be realized in military readiness and capability.  When we consider the 
huge investments that DoD makes in getting technology to the warfighter and training 
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 our warfighter, support of our weapon systems should not be the weak link in 
maintaining high levels of combat readiness and personnel safety.  This weak link might 
be the result of the ever-increasing pressure to reduce costs.  Very often we hear of cost 
as the independent variable in design and development efforts and that total ownership 
costs should be factored into the design process.  To do this the design activities must 
maintain a holistic perspective of the system to include life cycle support of technologies 
that have been selected for insertion into their weapon systems.[5) Osmundson]  With the 
challenge of reducing costs and effectively supporting the warfighter, today's systems 
architects for DoD systems must understand what drives cost in order to carefully 
consider alternatives for life cycle support. 
The cost associated with supporting weapon systems throughout their life cycle is 
perhaps most sensitive to the availability of components that are needed to maintain 
stability in the operational context.  As legacy systems age, their associated support and 
maintenance costs rise dramatically due to obsolescence, reliability and supportability 
problems while at the same time the performance of the system decreases.  As original 
equipment manufacturers synchronize their product lines with technology, products 
presently deployed in DoD weapon systems, as well as products intended for use in 
developmental systems, will be affected.  Alternate components or parts will need to be 
considered for acceptance or rejection.  There will be material shortages occurring 
because of the social, economic, and political environments.  In either case there will be 
costs associated with these decisions and cost must be managed effectively.  If the 
alternate part is accepted, an engineering change proposal will need to be initiated.  There 
is cost associated with preparation, coordination, scheduling and testing of the alternate 
part.  If the alternate part is unacceptable, large product buys will be needed to ensure 
operational integrity and support of the system over its life cycle.  There is cost with 
developing a new source of supply.  In these cases there are issues of where to buy, how 
much to buy, where to stock them, and how to manage the costs and logistical support to 
meet the needs of the customer.  
Understanding costs will help government activities meet the needs and desires of 
the customer, mainly in assuring life cycle support of COTS.  More specifically, we need 
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 to extend the supportability of COTS since we know that the life cycle of many weapon 
systems exceed the life expectancy of the COTS used.  By addressing the supportability 
issue we effectively address a much deeper need, that is warfighter readiness and 
capability.  By assuring COTS supportability through the system's life cycle we can 
consequently ensure reasonable combat readiness and capability status.  In essence we 
need to provide stability in terms of baseline configuration of the weapon systems that 
use COTS in order to support the periods of time between technology refresh cycles.  
That is to say there is a compelling need to improve the supportability of fielded products 
for the period necessary to meet the user requirements.  In satisfying this, it must be cost 
effective at the initial procurement, over the life cycle of the system, and ultimately 
provide the lowest possible impact to Total Ownership Cost (TOC).  This will involve a 
predictable and sustainable process for support of fielded and developmental systems.  To 
be successful, this process will need to adequately identify risk, mitigate those risks, and 
provide resolution methods and planning.  Knowing now that a new architecture is 
needed to meet these needs we must conclude that a departure from traditional methods is 
necessary to meet the challenge of sound planning and careful tailoring of COTS 
acquisition at the lowest possible cost.  
Reduced government funding and manpower levels have further emphasized the 
need to improve life cycle management processes.  Perhaps the focal point for this effort 
is COTS risk mitigation during development and for fielded weapon systems.  This type 
of continual assessment is needed to offset the fast technology update cycle experienced 
in the commercial realm.  This will provide system baseline configuration stability and 
supportability.  Key to this is the need to continually assess original equipment 
manufacturers.  This assessment should provide valuable insight to the vendor's stability, 
which in turn impacts the level of risk associated with specific components employed by 
the DoD.  Such assessments would perhaps look at how limited a vendor's product line is 
and/or make judgments on the potential of specific products in that line to change or 
disappear.  To this end, it becomes important to determine the likelihood that a vendor 
will continue to provide DoD assets and the consistency of that product line.  The 
challenge is in the architecting of a process that is proactive, disciplined and systematic, 
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 and will consider and address the needs as discussed here for the intended audience.  The 
audience being those customers or stakeholders whose needs must be fulfilled. 
The customer in this case takes on many dimensions.  
The End User - Certainly the end user must be considered for it is the end user we 
depend on to operate our weapon systems and provide the expected defense as defined in 
our national strategic policies.  
The Program Management Offices (PMO) - This includes the initial acquisition 
community whose purpose is the acquisition of new systems.  They also support the in-
service engineering activities that must continue to procure parts as part of an alteration 
kit or on-going support for the warfighter, including repair and replacements of parts.  
They support the integrated logistical support functions, which must plan the long-term 
support of fielded equipment and must support equipment between changes to the 
equipment base line.  One of the PMOs primary responsibilities is budgetary support for 
personnel who must project the availability of products that extend over the 2-year 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle and the 3-5 year implementation cycle.  
Additionally they must fund support military field activities or service contractors who 
prepare Cost, Health, and Risk models which quantify the availability and supportability 
of the fielded systems. 
Interoperability Support Activities - These activities must obtain and maintain a 
stabilized baseline in order to keep the certification of the system verifiable. These 
support activities include not only the initial integration site but also the interoperability 
of fielded systems subsequent to changes (i.e. installation of replacement parts, firmware, 
software or hardware revisions, etc.). 
Design and Development Activities - These activities must rely on commercial 
products to be available when the design goes into production. 
Production/Manufacturing Facilities - These facilities must rely on the source of 
supply in producing the systems they were contracted for, which will include commercial 
products that contain supportability issues. 
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 B. PURPOSE 
The overall purpose of the SSB system is to provide dependable, cost effective 
supportability insurance for COTS based weapon systems.  The result will provide a 
solution to COTS obsolescence issues, material shortages issues, and extend the 
supportability of COTS components.  The architecture should address COTS technology 
obsolescence management through product and technology obsolescence forecasting 
methodologies and provide a new process for managing changes with COTS based 
systems.  The final architecture should respond to the voice of the customer, who is 
demanding credible combat power through design and supportability, by putting speed 




Understanding the needs of the customers we must now derive specific goals to 
meet those needs.  In establishing these goals we must also relate them to our national 
defense strategy and acquisition policies.  Therefore we understand the necessity for 
effective collaboration between the warfighter, the program offices, and private industry.  
To this end, we expect the architectural form of such a process will exhibit the 
characteristics of a collaborative system, which necessitates voluntary participation.  
Figure 1 depicts a conceptual illustration of such a collaborative system within the Navy 
for the Sunset Supply Base.  This voluntary participation is needed for the assemblage 
and maintenance of such a system and is crucial to its success.  Success will be measured 
continuously for those properties that emerge, against how well they fulfill the purpose 
and how well they are managed to accomplish their specified tasks.  Through abstraction 
we can visualize a system that has very distinct elements that work together for mutual 
gain and to satisfy a common need.  Therefore, we can expect that such a system should 
evolve from existing capabilities or systems.  A complex system will develop and evolve 
within an overall architecture much more rapidly if there are stable intermediate 
forms.[6) Maier-Rechtin]  Therefore, we can expect a period of time when 
experimentation is performed during which collaborative requirements are identified and 
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 refined, and systems modified and/or interfaces developed to allow the required 
collaboration.  By allowing the system to develop using such an evolutionary method we 
are taking, what some consider a spiral approach to system maturation, we can eliminate 
the need for development of high-level coordination, thus streamlining the process and 
insuring that the system fits the problem appropriately.  This streamlining should provide 
stable intermediate forms that will be self-supportive technically, economically, and 
politically.  By taking this approach all participants should derive some benefit that will 













Concept Generation for Sunset Supply Base




1 Assessment Activity:  Provides COTS Life-
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Supports SSB System & Infrastructure.
2 Program Support:  Provides Cost & Health
Modeling & Procurement Support to meet specific









Appendix A Figure 1: Concept Generation for Sunset Supply Base 
2. Objectives 
The DoD is looking to improve program supportability and extend COTS 
reparability for 5-7 years and beyond.  They would like the ability to match COTS update 
cycles with program's technical roadmap/refresh efforts.  To do this they will need insight 
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 to potential obsolescence issues through predictive tools and be able to mitigate 
maintenance and supportability issues at the assembly level. 
The COTS manufacturer needs to be aware of the enhanced product 
supportability benefits that will mean continued profits for their stakeholders.  Their 
willingness to develop long-term relationships with the DoD is paramount for success.  
The DoD must encourage such teaming and still be able to offer protection for the COTS 
manufacturers' proprietary design rights. 
One of the main objectives in developing such long-term relationships is to clarify 
the roles of all participants in the process.  By doing this we need to establish specific 
interfaces, and these interfaces will have to be effectively managed to achieve efficiency 
and success.  The greatest dangers are at the interfaces.[5) Osmundson, 6) Maier-Rechtin]  
Therefore we must pay close attention to the interfaces and understand why each entity 
participates and continue to provide incentives for continued involvement. 
3. Specific Goals 
The systems architecture shall have the following goals: 
a) To Be Able to Identify, Quantify, and Mitigate Supportability 
Risk to Programs. 
This process must be affordable and be able to successfully assess the cost 
savings attributed to the process.  The information derived from identification and 
mitigation of supportability risk shall be quantifiable and readily accessible by 
participants. 
b) Extend the Life Cycle and Supportability of COTS. 
Supportability of fielded hardware shall be defined by the warfighter.  The 
process shall take this into account as it defines the metrics for assuring late-life cycle 
supply source.  To be successful the DoD shall continue to leverage commercial 
developments with appropriate economies of scale in order to reach expected military 
performance goals and still offset the problem of diminishing material. 
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 c) Provide Infrastructure to Support Existing Platform/Combat 
Systems in Support of the Program Office. 
This goal is to provide infrastructure earlier in the development process to 
demonstrate and prove COTS components and to support existing weapon systems.  This 
will provide significant reduction in program risk as related to COTS and life cycle 
management. 
d) Achieve Significant and Quantifiable Cost Savings over the 
Product Life Cycle. 
Cost structures shall be tracked and continually assessed over the entire 
product life cycle.  This will significantly impact the effectiveness of informed decision-
making that is needed for success.  The up front cost assessments will contribute to the 
life cycle cost savings, due to NO lifetime buys at the assembly level.  The assemblies 
would be procured, as the customer requires them. 
e) A Reliable, Affordable, Repeatable, and Expandable Process that 
meets the Customer’s Performance Expectations (e.g., 
Accessible, Transportable, Maintainable, Predictable). 
The process shall have definable and repeatable characteristics in order to 
provide a comprehensive and flexible solution to supporting fielded hardware.  It shall 
provide an independent utility (an alternative option for DMSMS/Obsolescence 
Management) for programs when implementing COTS products and whose solutions will 
have minimal or no impact on system operational performance. 
f) Institutionalize Methods for Proactive Management of COTS 
Including DMSMS Issues. 
The institutionalization of these methods will require the development of 
non-standard Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) and contract strategies and imple-
mentation methodologies that will access the commercial support base.  In doing this, the 
process must be sensitive to proprietary design rights and provide a forum for appropriate 
negotiations.  The methods employed shall improve product supportability problem 
detection and provide sufficient time for appropriate decision-making processes to 
implement analysis for alternatives and solutions.  Overall it shall provide aid to the 
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 decision-maker by providing technology assessment and management guidance at 
various levels - piece parts, lowest replaceable units, units, subsystems and multiple 
platforms. 
g) A System that Leverages Navy and Commercial Supportability 
Assets and Provides a Networked Solution. 
The process must take advantage of inherently governmental functions for 
DMSMS Management at the various field activities and coordinate with the commercial 
supportability assets.  This coordination must be embraced through a thoroughly meshed 
and maintainable communication network. 
h) Leverage across Government Programs with Extended 
Applicability through Contract Strategies, Methodologies, and 
Incentives to Entice Commercial Industry Participation. 
The process must be transportable in terms of its applicability to various 
DoD entities and their contract strategies.  Aggressive integration of common 
components across DoD entities should lead to flexible integrated logistical support of 
COTS products and should provide incentive for the commercial industry to develop 
long-term relationships.  
i) Forecast Budget Requirements in Support of the Programs/War 
Fighter/Consumer. 
The process shall provide predictive information for the decision-making 
components of the DoD program offices.  In forecasting budget requirements in support 
of programs/warfighter/customer the outputs from trade-offs and assessments must 
achieve a high level of confidence to the program office. 
j)  Improve Schedule Flexibility and Support Options of System 
Upgrades or New Development Initiatives.  
The process should incorporate improved schedule flexibility and support 
options that can be tailored for the warfighter and the support activities needs.  One of the 
main objectives shall be the compression of provisioning timeframes.  To this end, 
increased responsibility on the contractor's part is assumed in terms of stockage, storage 
and issue of COTS spares and repair parts.  The benefits that we will strive to achieve 
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 shall include immediate supportability, elimination of government levels of inventory 
stock, large commercial distribution systems, no source inspection, commercial 
packaging, fast and direct delivery to the warfighter, and warranty of components. 
B. CONCEPT 
The utility in the development of a concept in the architecting process is to guide 
the transformation of the function of a proposed system into a usable, realizable form.[5) 
Osmundson]  An understanding of the customer base and their needs identified in 
previous paragraphs helps in molding the conceptual model as shown in Figure 1.  
However, it does not enable a designer to realize the complete vision.  Most of the 
functional pieces identified in the conceptual model already exist, but what is missing is a 
method to tie the independent systems into an interoperable Systems of Systems that 
will yield new and emergent properties which are greater than the sum of the independent 
systems capabilities.  Additionally, the concept for a new independent system will be 
developed and folded into the Systems of Systems concept architecture.  This new 
system is being developed to meet previously unmet needs and goals, identified in the 
customer needs and analysis.  The co-development of these two entities (i.e., the new 
system and the Systems of Systems) will be shown to be symbiotic in producing the 
desired emergent properties.  Taking a holistic view of the concept development we (the 
Architects) employ the heuristic, which states  Design the structure with good bones [6) 
Maier-Rechtin] and from our vantage point it means at least the minimum collection of 
bones to provide the new emergent properties. 
Core to the conceptual development of our two separate systems is the method of 
planned development, which does not rely on a centralized design entity.  Instead, the 
planned development of our systems will use a collaborative approach where its 
functions, emergent properties and even the way in which it is used will evolve over time.  
So, What is a collaborative system? Maier & Rechtin [6) Maier-Rechtin] define a 
system as a collaborative system when its components exhibit the following 
characteristics:  
• Fulfill valid purpose in their own right, and continue to operate to fulfill those 
purposes if disassembled from the overall system. 
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 • Are managed (at least in part) for their own purposes rather than the purposes 
of the whole; the component systems are separately acquired and integrated 
but maintain a continuing operational existence independent of the 
collaborative system. 
Examples of collaborative systems include the Internet, electrical power systems, 
multinational defense systems, joint military operations and intelligent transportation 
systems.  Maier & Rechtin [6) Maier-Rechtin] articulate the above systems are 
collaborative in the sense that they are assembled and operate through the voluntary 
choices of the participants, not through the dictates of an individual client.   
The collaborative development method was chosen to meet several of the needs 
and goals identified through our analysis.  A major consideration impacting the 
developmental approach was the political environment with respect to the use and 
leverage of Navy assets in the performance of inherently governmental functions.  The 
politics permeate through all our systems:  from the top as The Corporate Thrust, to the 
local politics at the field activities as  The Rice Bowl Mentality.  In looking at the Big 
Picture our team uses the following heuristic as a guiding principal:  If the politics 
dont fly, the hardware never will.[5) Osmundson]  Although we are architecting 
processes and methods, the statement holds equally true.  Two heuristics that apply 
specifically to collaborative systems were added to keep the concept development on 
track: 
• The emergent capability is the whole point of the system; but the architect 
may only be able to influence the interfaces among the nearly independent 
parts, the components are outside the scope and control of an architect of the 
whole.[6) Maier-Rechtin] 
• Consider a collaborative system a franchise. Always ask why the franchisees 
choose to join, and choose to remain.[6) Maier-Rechtin] 
The concept model (Figure 1) illustrates the System of Systems developmental 
approach, which focuses primarily on the interfaces and the interoperability of the final 
system.  The World Wide Web (WWW) provides the interconnection and connectivity 
between all available resources offering a broad scope of possibilities including Navy 
business that is carried out in the public domain.  The Navy-Marine Corps Intranet 
(NMCI) provides another venue for the Navy assets to leverage each others resources, 
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 share sensitive data, and accomplish inherently governmental functions in a secure 
environment.  One very important point to be made regarding collaborative efforts 
between the Navy Field Activities, the Fleet, and other Navy resources is that these 
efforts are not based on a zero sum end game.  Specifically, the gain of capabilities by 
one field activity by using the collaborative system does not subtract capability from any 
other field activity, but rather what is really the gain is due to the emergent properties of 
the overarching collaborative system.  The word capability is used as an example, we 
could just as easily substituted many other words such as funding, core equities, or 
resource allocation and the logic still applies.  The system with its new emergent 
properties is meant to provide a Win-Win scenario.  
The design of the new standalone system will also use the collaborative 
developmental methods, but the context is somewhat different.  The context for the new 
system is the incorporation of the supplier base in the collaborative environment to 
design into the system long-term product supportability as an emergent property.  As is 
apparent in Figure 2, the collaboration environment includes the following entities: 
• Navy resource manager - Typically a PMO responsible for a system or 
systems that have supportability requirements over the equipments life cycle. 
• The Original Equipment Manufacture (OEM) providing state-of-the-art, high 
volume, short life cycle (~ 18 months), Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 
products used in the Navy systems. 
• The Sunset Supplier Base, which is a group of small, agile, customer- 
orientated companies with a proven track record in manufacturing 
performance in producing DoD products. 
• The Assessment / Reporting / Facilitating activity whose primary role is in the 
development of the collaborative environment between all the entities, using 
networking, teaming, and partnering to stabilize the relationships. 
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 Program Office COTS Original EquipmentManufacturer (OEM) Sunset Supplier
Assessment/Reporting/
Facilitating Activity
Appendix A Figure 2: The COTS Collaborative Environment 
C. FUNCTION & FORM, A COLLABORATIVE SYSTEM 
1. Overarching System 
The collaborative approach identified in the Concept section provides the 
planned development based on the connectivity of existing systems with the addition of 
another independent system.  In providing the connectivity, the relationship of Function 
to Form will identify the dependency and/or communication paths between various 
entities (Form) necessary in accomplishment of the tasks (Function).  The primary 
differentiating or emergent property acquired through use of the new Systems of 
Systems construct is the leverage gained through information sharing.  The functional 
decomposition as shown in Figure 3, identifies the primary functions of the overarching 
system, then details important sub-functions and identifies the relationship to entities, 
which currently perform those functions.  Table 1 is a mapping of Function to Form and 
graphically illustrates the leverage to be gained through collaborative information sharing 
(an emergent property).  Currently, very few of these entities are linked together, and no 
method or system is defined to accomplish this function.  This relationship (Table 1) is 
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 the first intermediate stable form for our Systems of Systems which will be added-on 
to, modified, and evolved over time.  The overarching system once complimented by the 
SSB system must be compared to the initial goals to access the adequacy of the 
architecture in meeting the customer needs.  Table 2 attempts to do just that, by 
graphically showing a link between the functions designed into the system and the goals 
of the customer described in Table 3.  
2. SSB Standalone System 
The planned development of the standalone SSB system, as stated earlier, is a 
collaborative architecture, and as shown in Figure 2 consists of several primary players. 
The Function and Form of each of these entities is already defined and all operate as an 
independent system unto themselves.  Each entity may need to voluntarily adjust their 
functions slightly to accommodate the collaborative architecture, however most of the 
impacting change will be accomplished through the use of interfaces to each other and 
the interfaces to the overarching support system.  The adjustments in function to make 
the system obtain its objectives and purpose are modest, and the interfaces between the 
entities are of the greatest concern.  To explain each players accommodation and how 
the interfaces work, we will look at the proposed new system from the viewpoint of each 
player.  Understanding that the end game of the system is to provide extended 
supportability of COTS products, the concept can be stated quite simply:  Reward, 
through royalties, the OEM for transferring their intellectual property rights to an SSB for 
extended production in support of the Navy PMO, and collaborate with the internal Navy 
resources to identify and mitigate risk. 
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 • Facilitation 
− Field Activities MOU 
− Navy/OEM/SSB MOU
− Teaming/Partnering 
• Supportability (on-going 
support) 
• Quality Assessment 
• Technology 
Roadmapping 
• Purchase Requests 
• Coordinate across DoD 
Dependable & Cost Effective 
Supportability Insurance for Fielded 
Hardware 
Designing & Developing 
Products (Contractor, Subs, 
Govt. Activities) 






(OEM, SSB) & select 
Govt. Activities) 
Business Planning & 
Facilitating (Navy 
Assets) 
Interfacing:  Methods & 
Management 
Performing Risk Analysis Performance Assessment Product Usage (Fleet, 
Shore, Integration Site, 
Contractor) 
• Parts ID 
• SSB/Alternate Parts ID 
• Contracting 
− SSB Incentivizing
• Planning & 
Budgeting 
• ILS Planning 
• Trade Studies 
• Vendor  Surveying/ 
Selection 
−  SSB Incentivizing
• Reporting Analysis 
− Health Analysis 
− Cost Analysis 
− Risk Analysis 
• Purchase Ordering 




• Technical Data 
Exchange 
− GIDEP 
• On-line Accessing 
- WWW 
- NMCI 




• Identify & Classify Risk 
− Program Issues 
− Product/DMSMS 
Issues 
− Business Issues 
− Health Analysis 
− Cost Analysis 
− DMSMS Analysis 
• Report Risk 
− Obsolescence 
Reporting 
• Recommend Purchase 






Appendix A Figure 3: Concept Generation & Functional Decomposition 
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 CONCEPT






(Designer/Devel.) (OEM) (SSB Contractor) (NAVY) (NAVY) (NAVY) (NAVY)
Design/Develop X X X X
Parts ID o o o o o
SSB/Alternative Parts ID o o o o o
Acquisition X
Contracting o o o
Planning & Budgeting o o
ILS Planning o o
Trade Studies o o
Vendor Surveying/ Selection o o o








Business Planning X X X
Facilitation o o o o o
Supportability (on-going support) o o
Quality Assessment o o
Technology Roadmapping o o o o o o o
Purchase Requests o o o
Coordinate across DoD o o o o o o
Interface:  Methods & 
Management X X
Technical Data Exchange o o o o o o o
On-line Accessing o o o o o o o
Specific Requests o o o o o o o
Risk Analysis X
Identify & Classify Risk o o o o o o
Report Risk o o




Measures of Effectiveness o o o o o






 Appendix A Table 1: Mapping Function to Form 
 
The addendum contains the data dictionary for this table.
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1. X                      X X X X X X X  X X X X
2. X                        X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X
3.                          X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
4.                          X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
5.                          X X X X X X  X X X
6. X                         X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
7.                          X X X X X X X X X X  X X
8.                          X X X X X X X X X X X  X
9.    X     X      X          X  
10. X                          X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Appendix A Table 2: Linking Goals to Functions
 1 Identify, Quantify, & Mitigate Supportability Risk to Program 
2 Extend the life cycle and supportability of COTS 
3 Provide infrastructure to support existing platform/combat systems in support of 
the Program Office 
4 Achieve significant and quantifiable cost savings over the product life cycle 
5 A reliable, affordable, repeatable, and expandable process that meets the 
customers performance expectations (e.g., accessible, transportable, maintainable, 
predictable) 
6 Institutionalize methods for proactive management of COTS including DMSMS 
issues 
7 A system that leverages Navy and commercial supportability assets and provides a 
networked solution 
8 Leverage across government programs with extended applicability through 
contract strategies, methodologies, and incentives to entice commercial industry 
participation 
9 Forecast budget requirements in support of the programs/war fighter/consumer 
10 Improve schedule flexibility and support options of system upgrades or new 
development initiatives  
Appendix A Table 3: Goals (Requirements) 
D. INTERFACE MANAGEMENT 
1. Program Management Office 
Currently:  The PMO through its Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) group 
orders COTS assemblies through the normal support systems by contract, purchase order, 
or Navy supply system.  If an OEM no longer supports a product, then the Program 
Office must look for another avenue to solve the issue, typically an engineering analysis 
and review is necessary yielding a variety of solutions most of which are very expensive.  
If the program office is lucky or just well informed (which is not always the case), the 
OEM will provide a notice stating an End Of Life (EOL) date after which the OEM 
will no longer support the specific COTS product.  At this point the PMO must make 
some choices.  Regardless of the choices made, the Program Office incurs a significant 
amount of risk usually at a hefty price.  
Proposed:  The collaborative process is illustrated using two notional graphics, 
Figures 4 & 5, to show the relationship and informational interfaces between the Program 
Office and the other identified players.  Figure 4 shows the process flow at a functional 
level delineating the relationship each player has to the others during the SSB 
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 development.  As a collaborator in this process, the PMO provides the funding resources 
to internal government activities to facilitate, assess, and report.  Also, the PMO is 
agreeing to pay for the royalty and provide the Bill Of Material (BOM).  For their efforts 
the PMO receives:  1) an alternate long term supplier of the COTS product and a 
relationship with that supplier and their associated OEM that may be extended for other 
OEM discontinued items, 2) as identified in Figure 5, a continuous update to the risk 
identification and mitigation efforts, proactively adjudicating obsolescence issues 
seamlessly on behalf of the PMO, 3) provides the PMO with a corporate knowledge data 
base on which future decisions can leverage, 4) although not identified through the 
figures, the program gains reparability and testability attributes over the life cycle of the 
system defined by the Navys needs.  The method of communication being online is 
nearly in real time so the effort expended by the Program Office is minimal.  Product 
ordering is done using current procurement methodologies.  
Program Request Check/Filter
SSB Database
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Appendix A Figure 5: Information/Data Flow Support Structure 
2. Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
Currently:  The OEM is usually a leading edge technology/design firm that is 
market driven and produces at high volume and cost reflective of commercial economies 
of scale.  The fast paced environment requires short-lived products (~18-24 months) to 
keep up with the ever-changing technology.  The business case is just not there to cater to 
the DoD/governments needs and although the OEM wishes to keep this group of 
consumers, the momentum of the business cycle keeps the OEM focused elsewhere.  
Under these circumstances supportability is limited to production run time (~18-24 
months) with approximately a 12-month follow-on repair and test capability period. 
Proposed:  The OEM for their part in the collaboration effort has a lot to gain and 
little to lose.  There is a business case to be made for making a profit from their 
intellectual property they no longer find useful.  The 5-15% royalty is the incentive, but 
other non-tangible benefits enhance the business aspects in favor of the collaboration 
effort. Protection of their proprietary design is an inherent part of the SSB process 
through Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA) and contractual mechanisms.  Important 
to note is that the contractual arrangements are made with another company, the SSB 
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 supplier, not the government, which many OEMs find favorable since governmental red 
tape would poison the business case.  This situation leaves the ownership and control of 
the commercial products in the hands of the industry.  Additionally, the government does 
not have to pay for the design only the product, a tenet of Acquisition Reform.  By 
participation in the collaborative system the OEM establishes a long-term relationship 
with the DoD/government without the ongoing supportability issues.  In turn these new 
emergent properties of the system can be used to enhance the ability of the OEM to 
market enhanced product supportability, not only to the DoD/government environment, 
but also any entity, which is configuration constrained due to the business constraints (i.e. 
refineries, paper mills, electrical power generation and control applications, etc.).  The 
OEM efforts are concentrated during the establishment of the SSB supplier and play a 
crucial part in assuring that the OEM reputation will be in safe hands when the SSB 
supplier delivers products.  The OEM however does agree to allow the internal Navy 
resources visibility into the products design by letting the SSB supplier share the parts list 
complete with associated component vendor information along with a top level assembly 
drawing.  This is information the government has not been privy to in the past but it is 
essential for accomplishment of risk analysis and yielding the desired emergent 
properties of the system. 
3. SSB Supplier 
Currently:  The SSB supplier is envisioned to come from the large base of 
smaller suppliers who, over the past three decades, have provided the DoD/government 
with high tech. custom products.  Using this supplier base will reduce the risk caused 
during the technology transfer process because of the proven track record earned when 
dealing with other DoD/government products.  However, this will be a collaborative 
process and the final decision will reside with and between the OEM and the SSB 
supplier.  Here the OEM holds the trump card and must be willing to live with the choice.  
The small business SSB supplier typically has extensive technical know how in the 
manufacturing area but lacks the expertise to accomplish proactive, predictive 
obsolescence management.  These companies are customer focused, agile, and seek long-
term relationships with their customers. 
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 Proposed:  As for their part in the collaboration process, the SSB supplier must 
be willing to be contractually bound by the agreement with the OEM and at the same 
time be willing to work the internal government resources to coordinate and facilitate 
supportability efforts while reducing risk to the program.  Actions required by the SSB 
supplier will include: 
• sharing the OEM parts list and drawings, 
• be the purchaser, stock handler, and storage facility for parts that have gone 
obsolete and are awaiting consumption once an assembly order is placed, 
• as requested by the program, be willing to stock all up assemblies (which have 
already been paid for) to enable immediate turnaround times of fielded 
assemblies which have failed,  
• accept all the responsibility for being the prime supplier of the subject 
assembly. 
In return for its efforts the SSB supplier is rewarded through:  
• a new relationship with a pre-eminent commercial firm,  
• a new product line,  
• new customers, DoD/government and non-government,  
• long term relationships with the new customers which enables long term 
business planning,  
• technical partnering with internal DoD/government resources not only for 
predictive obsolescence management but a whole host of other specialties. 
4. Internal DoD/Government Resource 
Currently:  Most, if not all, of the functions identified in Figure 4 are already 
accomplished by internal DoD/government resources; however they are done in an ad-
hoc fashion without the collaborative environment, and with no defined, supportable, and 
repeatable process in place.  The expertise has always been available in the 
DoD/government but in a different form using a different process.  Prior to Acquisition 
Reform, the MIL-Specs and Standards provided a requirements-rich environment with 
well-defined processes for implementation.  These processes and implementation 
methods required the same expertise needed today but applied in a different context. 
Todays environment is requirements-poor, and the talented expertise must adjust to this 
performance-based versus MIL-Spec-based environment.  The context in todays 
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 environment is relationship-based, not rule-base, and the survivability of this entire group 
of talented experts will depend on their adaptability to todays context.  Acquisition 
Reform removed the barriers put in place by the MIL-Spec, rule-based environment, but 
it failed to provide an adequate substitute, which would provide a robust process that can 
meet the supportability requirements and needs of the end user. 
Proposed:  The internal DoD/government resources have a very crucial role to 
play regarding the supportability of all our systems from design to fielded systems. 
Supportability is an inherently governmental function for several reasons:  1) the 
motivation of our internal resources is in support of the end user needs; this perpetuates 
and enhances our positions and esteem, 2) due to the overarching scope and the long term 
broad based characteristics of supportability issues, no one prime contractor could, 
without conflict of interest, accomplish these functions, and 3) No entity has or even 
wishes to obtain the corporate knowledge maintained by our internal resource pool.  The 
collaborative environment as is evident in Figures 5 & 6 embeds the talented expertise 
into the SSB process in a way, which leverages these resources and creates a value stream 
for the program.  The relationship building characteristics of our internal resources is 
very evident in Figure 6 where this crucial resource takes center stage in enabling the 
collaborative system.  Taking both figures (5 & 6) in concert it is easy to see how the 
resource can gain program equity and support by reducing Total Ownership Cost (TOC), 
extend supportability of systems, and reducing program risk. 
5. Summary:  Interface Management 
At the core of this collaborative approach is the management of interfaces.  The 
planned development of the standalone SSB system from the overarching system, 
comprised of existing key entities, constitutes a collaborative architecture.  Because the 
function and form of these existing entities is already defined and all operate as 
independent systems, interfaces between these entities become critical for effective 
collaboration.  Thus, interface management is an important discipline that must be 
implemented in order for the SSB system to be successful.  A means of effective 
interfacing is also crucial to the success of this system.  A primary mode of 
communication between the entities will be the World Wide Web and Navy & Marine 
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 Corp. Intranet (NMCI).  Current Navy assets, such as GIDEP, Cost, Health & Risk 
Models, DMSMS notifications, technical data packages, supportability procurements & 
decisions, etc., will be shared via electronic means.  The designated Assessment Activity, 
as part of the Business Planning & Facilitating function, will perform interface 
management and facilitate communication/data-sharing methods in support of the 
Program Office.   
E. TIMING 
Technology advances pose greater problems to Navy procurements than for 
consumer products.  Components, sub-systems, and systems developed for the military 
have far longer life cycles than their commercial and customer equivalents.  The Navy is 
a low volume consumer compared to the other markets.  We need to leverage commercial 
and consumer development due to their economies of scale to reach our performance 
goals.  This process leaves a significant gap in the product timeline when the 
commercial/consumer life cycles are over and suppliers move on to next-generation 
technology. 
Appendix A Figure 6: Technology Refresh Cycles 
As indicated in Figure 6, 
approximately five years goes into 
planning, scheduling alterations, 
building, testing, refreshing 
technology and performing software 
updates for military equipment.  In 
contrast, the consumer market is 
characterized by low development costs
months.  These costs are recovered by t
with high volume production and sales. 
on the size of the manufacturing run.
characterized by high development costs
cannot afford to expend redesign costs e
to eighteen months.  Military developm and very rapid development cycles, usually 18 
he manufacturer over the short product lifetime 
 Costs are often less than pennies per unit based 
  In contrast, the Navy procurement cycle is 
 over a far lower volume production.  The Navy 
very five or ten years  not to mention every six 
ent costs are usually many thousands of dollars 
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 per unit and may in a number of cases be more than the cost of the hardware itself.  It is 
not just a matter of replacing one piece of COTS equipment or making slight changes; 
software and interfaces to other equipment can be affected or the entire systems may 
require redesign all the way down the affected line. 
The SSB does not shorten the production cycle time for military applications.  It 
establishes a process to maintain government inventories until a lifecycle change or 
product improvement is desired.  In this sense, SSB permits program management and 
ultimately the end user the flexibility to determine the time and path to take to 
incorporate system improvements.  It provides manufacturing / production capabilities 
that meet the needs of a fielded systems life cycle.  This not only includes initial fielding 
and spares but long-term replacement parts, repairs, logistical support and testing 
capabilities over the entire life cycle of the product.  Additionally, it provides leveraging 
of small run productions and rapid ramp-ups attributed to smaller businesses. 
A SSB team will necessitate collaborative participation from the program manger, 
the SSB assessment and reporting activity, the design activity, in-service 
engineering/procuring agency, the prime contractor Original Equipment Manufacturer 
(OEM), the supply contractor, and the Fleet.  For a best-case scenario, a SSB process 
could be executed in less than one quarter of a Fiscal Year (FY).  However, the worse 
case cycle could take more than 2¼ FYs.  The significant delays in this extended cycle 
hinge on legal, technology transfer, supplier start-up, and branding issues.  These two 
paths are shown in the Figure 8 below.  While the first attempt at establishing a SSB 
cannot realistically be completed in only one quarter, it similarly should not typically take 
2¼ FYs.  These timelines imply consideration should be given to the establishment of a 
SSB based on program milestones.  Until systems enter at least a limited production 
phase, the efforts associated with creating a SSB may not be warranted.  For systems that 
are in full production and expecting at least a five-year run the SSB process should be 
strongly considered.  A minimum three-month to 1½ FYs should be the anticipated 
processing time to create a SSB relationship, depending on regulations and complexity.  
Each individual program and each OEM and SSB supplier team is likely to have an 
independent timeline that cannot be identified until the process is in place. 
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 #1 * Part Number assembly level Already SSB
#2 * Not part # but SSB relationship
#3 * No SSB Relationship – Filter parts Microelectronics only
Event Block Descriptions:
1) Program Request
2) Check/Filter SSB Database
3) Health Analysis of #3 Red, Yellow, Green
4) Prepare an Obsolescence Risk Report #1, #2 & #3
5) Program Office Review & Approval of Obsolete 
Component Parts Purchase Request
6) NAVY Procurement Support Prepares Purchase 
Order Component Parts 
7) Identify SSB Potential from List - OEM candidates
8) Contact OEM & SSB Supplier
9) Business & Legal Documentation in place
10) Transfer Technology to SSB & OEM 
Perform pre-production readiness review 
- May team with NAVY
11) SSB Production 1st Piece
12) OEM Quality Verification Testing
13) Update SSB Database
14) SSB Full Scale Production 
15) Order for SSB Assembly NAVY Procurement System 
(NAVICP) using Alternate Cage Code for SSB Supplier 
16) Report NAVY Assets on hand: Component Parts, 
COTS Assy.




17Worse Case 2 3 47 128 9 10 11
1513 16
14
Best Case 23 5 64 17
15 16
14
Appendix A Figure 7: SSB Process Timeline 
Once in place, the SSB process would typically be expected to follow this 







COTS manufacturer identifying a drop-in replacement part is available,  
ECP and other documentation/database reviews are prepared, coordinated, 
scheduled,  
Legal verification, sharing of technical data, and configuration review,  
Developing, executing test and QA of new COTS hardware,  
Updating drawing package and completing ECP/documentation, and  
Performing technical manual updates and providing operator training. 
F. USER 
The focus of this paper is for Navy implementation of the SSB architecture.  That 
does not preclude other services, government agencies, or the commercial world from 
implementing this process, and in some commercial sectors, they already have.[7) 
Plotkin]  While we believe the SSB can improve both processes and products across DoD 
entities, there can be many users of the SSB process.  The architecture of the system is 
defined such that it could be used by any DoD entity or associated allied / Foreign 
Military Sales system.  It has the ability to be customized to meet the needs of nearly any 
end user or decision-maker.  The key to the SSB is to always remember that it is a 
collaborative effort. 
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 Collaborative systems are assembled and operate through the voluntary choices of 
the users, not through the mandates of an individual.  Problems arise when the developers 
believe they have greater control over the evolution of a collaborative system than they 
actually do.  They may fail to ensure that critical properties or elements will be 
incorporated by failing to provide a mechanism matched to the problem.[6) Maier-
Rechtin]  The SSB architecture takes into its design a robust collaboration where direct 
control is impossible or inadvisable.  This Systems-of-Systems approach possesses the 
following emergent properties defining the characteristic of a collaborative system: 
• SSB fulfills valid purposes in its own right, and will continue to operate to 
fulfill those purposes if disassembled from the overall system. 
• SSB is managed for its own purposes rather than the purposes of the whole. 
The SSB collaborative systems architecture teams the program manger, the SSB 
assessment and reporting activity, the design activity, in-service engineering/procurement 
agent, the prime contractor, OEM, the sunset supply contractor and their related parts 
support, and the Fleet.  The tactical intent of the SSB is to ensure that parts replacement 
is transparent to the operators/Fleet and that the parts are available in the supply chain in 
a timely fashion.  Form / Fit / Function / Features, the four Fs of the supply chain, must 
be one-to-one with the original product. 
As a management tool, program offices can use the SSB in the acquisition of new 
systems and in conjunction with in-service engineering activities that must continue to 
procure, repair, and replace parts for the Fleet.  The SSB can support integrated logistical 
support functions, which must account for the long-term support of fielded equipment, 
and must support equipment between changes to the equipment base line.  SSB will help 
program offices project the availability of products that extend beyond the 2-year POM 
cycle and the 3-5 year implementation cycle by making use of health / cost/ risk models 
which quantify the availability, supportability and obsolescence of fielded systems.  It 
provides the program office a tool to optimize its upgrades, re-designs, technology 
refresh intervals, and other product enhancement cycles.  Additionally, program risk is 
reduced through the use of the SSB. 
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 The assessment / reporting activity will use the SSB to obtain and maintain a 
stabilized baseline and retain system certification.  Use of the SSB can be implemented at 
various phases of development such as: during the initial integration and continued 
support, the interoperability support of fielded systems subsequent to changes (i.e. 
installation of replacement parts, firmware, software or hardware revisions, etc.).  Also 
the design and development activities can use the SSB to define commercial product 
availability before a design goes into production. 
The OEM supplier will use the SSB system to claim long-term life cycle support 
of fielded products at lower costs and less impact during implementation on current and 
future systems.  Through the sunset supplier the OEM associates their name with a long-
standing relationship with the users.  Concurrently the OEM could use the SSB system to 
obtain compensation/royalties for each item sold. 
The SSB supplier uses the process to obtain new customers, new product lines, 
and builds long term relationships with the using community.  Through collaborative 
efforts with the assessment / reporting activity the SSB supplier can be assured of a 
source of supply for component piece parts needed in producing the systems they were 
contracted for, while reducing the supportability issues associated with commercial 
products. 
The user who derives the most benefit from the SSB is the Fleet.  It is this end 
user who must operate our weapon systems and provide the expected defense as defined 
in our national strategic policies.  The SSB system provides long term stability to all 
support tools, methods, and processes such as: technical manuals, testing procedures and 
methods, drawings, trouble shooting information, parts lists, parts availability, parts 
replacement and other needed support.  The process improves system / hardware / 
software consistency across the Fleet by striving to provide better weapon system 
configuration control leading to improved system compatibility between platforms or 
ships.  The SSB system will improve interoperability while reducing interoperability 
defects. 
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 The outbound marketing approach for sales and distribution is to provide the end-
user (i.e., the Fleet) with a continuous supply of the required product, at a lower cost, 
while providing enhancements when and where appropriate.  Following the original 
procurement a secondary source provides the product and distributes it via normal supply 
chain (i.e., same P/N, form, fit, function and features).  In so doing the Navy gains long 
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 III. CONCLUSION 
This paper has demonstrated that the SSB architecture is an affordable approach 
for mitigating program supportability risk.  As a collaborative system, the information 
that is derived from the identification and mitigation of risk is quantifiable and will be 
readily accessible to all SSB team participants.  The process takes into account the fact 
that the supportability of fielded hardware is defined by the warfighter.  It extends the life 
cycle and supportability of COTS and ensures a late-life cycle supply source.   In so 
doing, the SSB permits the DoD to be successful in leveraging commercial developments 
with appropriate economies of scale in order to reach its military performance goals 
while offsetting the problem of diminishing material. 
The SSB system will assist the Program Management Office (PMO) by providing 
infrastructure support to existing platforms / combat systems.  If chosen, this support can 
be provided early in the development process, providing objective evidence in 
demonstrating COTS components ability to support existing weapon systems; thus 
providing significant reductions in program risk related to COTS and life cycle 
management.  The SSB provides predictive information for PMO decision-making 
process.  The outputs of these trade-offs and assessments will gain the PMO a high level 
of confidence with the warfighter/customer.  The process is applicable to various DoD 
entities and their contract strategies.  If aggressively integrated across DoD, component 
commonality could lead to flexible integrated logistical support, thus incentivizing the 
commercial industry to develop long-term relationships with the sponsors and users. 
The SSB is sensitive to proprietary design rights and provides a proactive forum 
for contractual negotiations.  The methods employed improve the detection of product 
supportability problems and provide sufficient time for analysis of alternatives and 
solutions in the decision-making processes.  This technology assessment can be 
implemented at the piece part, lowest replaceable unit, subsystem or multiple platform 
level.  The SSB approach is to procure assemblies when the customer requires them.  In 
this way, it achieves significant and quantifiable cost savings over the product life cycle.  
The process provides cost structures that track and continually assess progress over the 
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 entire product life cycle.  This information permits informed decision-making 
contributing to life cycle cost savings without the need for Life of Type Buys (LTB) at 
the assembly level. 
Use of the SSB will improve schedule flexibility by providing support options 
that can be tailored for the activities needed and the warfighter.  It will reduce 
provisioning timeframes and place the responsibility for stockage, storage, and issue of 
COTS spares and repair parts on the supply contractor.  The SSB system enables many 
activities and functions: immediate supportability, elimination of government inventory 
stock levels, utilizes large commercial distribution systems, no source inspection, 
commercial packaging, fast and direct delivery to the warfighter, and warranty of 
components.  The SSB process has definable and repeatable characteristics that provide a 
comprehensive and flexible solution to supporting fielded hardware.  It provides 
programs with an independent utility for implementing COTS products and has minimal 
or no impact on system operational performance.  Once implemented, the SSB is an 
affordable, expandable, repeatable and reliable process that will meet the users 
performance expectations.  It provides the best of both worlds.  It leverages the inherently 
governmental functions of the Navy supply process and coordinates with commercial 
supportability assets through a thoroughly meshed and maintainable communication 
network solution. 
160 
 IV. LIST OF REFERENCES 
1) Glum, Ted (2000). Support for the Warfighter.  In the Proceedings of 2000 
NSWC PHD SMS Workshop, NSWC Port Hueneme CA, 7-8 November 2000.  
Retrieved August 3, 2002 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.gidep.corona.navy.mil/  
2) Robinson, David G. (2000). DSCC DMSMS Management.  In the Proceedings 
of 2000 NSWC PHD SMS Workshop, NSWC Port Hueneme CA, 7-8 
November 2000.  Retrieved August 3, 2002 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.gidep.corona.navy.mil/  
3) Hartshorn, W.T. (2000). Obsolescence Management Process as a Best Practice.  
In the Proceedings of 2000 NSWC PHD SMS Workshop, NSWC Port 
Hueneme CA, 7-8 November 2000.  Retrieved August 3, 2002 from the World 
Wide Web: http://www.gidep.corona.navy.mil/  
4) McDermott, John T. (2002). Reducing the Impact of Obsolescence in Military 
Systems.  In the Proceedings of the DMSMS 2002 Conference, New Orleans 





Osmundson (2001)  PD-21 Systems Architecture, Spring Quarter 2001,  
Prof. John Osmundsons Lecture Notes 
Maier-Rechtin (2000) Maier & Rechtin, The Art Of Systems Architecting, 
2nd Edition, CRC Press, copyright 2000 
Plotkin, Martin S. (2000), A New Industry  the Emerging DMS Market, COTS 
Journal, Volume 2 Number 7, pages 33-35 
161 
 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
162 
 V. ADDENDUM 
A. DATA DICTIONARY (FOR TABLE 1) 
1. Designing & Developing Products:  
Function:  It is during the product development process that the need for 
dependable & cost effective supportability insurance for fielded hardware must be 
planned for and implemented providing for a proactive approach to obsolescence and 
material shortages issues involving Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) equipment.  
Primary sub-functions consist of  and SSB/Alternate Parts 
Identification whereby parts and assemblies, which are at risk for obsolescence/shortages, 
are identified early and alternate parts or SSB parts are found for a solution.       
Parts Identification
Form:  This function may be performed by Contractor, Subcontractor, or Government 
Activity.   
 
2. Acquiring:  Acquisition Program Support:   
Function:  It consists of a number of key program management sub-functions 
including Contracting, Planning & Budgeting, ILS Planning, Vendor 
Selection/Surveying, Trade-Off Studies, and Health, Cost, and Risk Analyses Reporting.  
This function provides the final decision making authority for all decisions relating to 
planning and risk mitigation efforts for equipment obsolescence, obsolescence 
management, and material shortages.  The Contracting sub-function will emphasize the 
use of contract incentives for effective obsolescence management and participation in the 
SSB process.  The vendor source selection sub-function will also focus on good 
obsolescence management practices and participation in SSB.  The Health, Cost, and 
Risk Analyses Reporting activity is part of this Acquiring function.   
Form:  This function is performed by the Navy PMO with the support of Navy 
Field Activities, government support Contractors and Laboratories as directed.  Health, 
Cost, and Risk Analyses will be conducted by designated Navy Field Activities in 
support of the PMO to determine the extent of current or potential obsolescence or 
material shortages issues and to establish mitigation priorities.  Results will be delivered 
to the PMO for subsequent reporting.  The Assessment Activity will perform the Risk 
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 Analysis and the Program Support Activity will perform the Health & Cost Analyses.  
Field Activities will collaborate to develop the results of the Analyses to ensure a 
complete assessment.        
3. Manufacturing/Producing Product:   
Function:   Primary sub-functions associated with Obsolescence Management 
and Material Shortages include Purchase Ordering, Parts Stockage/Storage, and 
Manufacturing/Production.  The Manufacturing/Producing process requires a supply of 
components and assemblies.  The Manufacturer routinely orders parts and stocks them 
prior to issuance of a work order or bill of materials.  Parts are kitted and processed 
through assembly and test operations producing a final product in the end.  The SSB 
process identifies and procures obsolete parts that may be used by the Manufacturer in 
cases where parts are no longer available due to Diminishing Manufacturing Sources 
Material Shortages (DMSMS) issues.   
Form:  The function is performed by the Prime Contractor, associated 
subcontractors, the Original Equipment Manufacturer of a components & assemblies, and 
Sunset Suppliers. 
4. Business Planning & Facilitating:   
Function:  This function utilizes current Navy assets operating in a collaborative 
environment (system) with a single focus on supportability.  These assets must be 
included to develop relationships for the SSB system.  This function consists of the 
following tasks, many which are considered inherently governmental: 
• Technology Roadmapping  
• System Health Modeling 
• System Cost Modeling 
• Fleet Failure Database 
• Material Support 
• Procurement 
• Stores (shore/Fleet) 
• ILS Planning 
• Fleet Support 
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 • Integration Sites 
• Supply Base Management 
• Sunset Supply Base Development/Management 
Form:  The responsibility for this function is shared by various Navy assets and 
activities (see Table 1).  The first critical sub-function is Facilitation.  This refers to the 
teaming and partnering function required to enter into business and teaming relationships 
with both Navy and Contractor organizations to establish a framework and process for a 
proactive management of COTS including DMSMS issues.  These relationships are 
codified through the generation of Memorandums of Agreement/Understanding 
(MOA/U) among the Navy, OEM, and Sunset Suppliers.  The end game of this process is 
to provide on-going Supportability for fielded hardware.  The Assessment Activity, i.e., 
the Navy Field Activity designated this role by the PMO, will provide Quality 
Assessment to ensure the objectives of the process are met.  All team members will 
periodically perform Technology Roadmapping and assessment to ensure the most 
affordable and reliable solution.  As part of the partnering arrangements among prime 
contractor, OEMs, and Sunset Suppliers, Purchase Requests will be generated which 
ensure a reliable supply of sunset parts and assemblies.  Finally, these Business Planning 
and Facilitation functions will institutionalize methods for proactive obsolescence and 
material shortages management across DoN and DoD (i.e., Coordinate across DoD). 
5. Interfacing:  Methods & Management:   
Function:  One of the most important functions is the manner in which 
information is shared among the Navy and Contractor organizations.  This also includes 
effective communications methods.  The information technology revolution has provided 
a number of effective tools, which facilitate the process of mitigating obsolescence and 
material shortages issues and providing viable solutions.  Figure 1 illustrates how the 
World Wide Web (Internet) and the Naval & Marine Corp Intranet (NMCI) provide 
convenient On-Line Accessing and are used to network Navy and commercial activities 
to provide quick and reliable solutions.   
Form:  Technical Data Exchange is performed among participating entities for 
early indication of obsolescence and shortage issues through DMSMS Alerts.  The 
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 Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) maintained by NSWC Corona 
Division contains a large repository of DMSMS Notices.  GIDEP has approximately 
1600 participants throughout Government and industry who share DMSMS information 
and solutions.  Finally, ad hoc or Specific Requests for DMSMS information can occur 
via email, fax or phone from and to all participating entities in this process.        
6. Performing Risk Analysis:   
Function:  One of the first tasks will be the performance of a risk analysis to 
determine whether or not there is significant supportability risk for program/hardware 
under review.  This should be done in conjunction with the Health and Cost Analysis 
performed by the Program Support Activity (Health Modeling Activity).  The Risk 
Analysis function involves the Identification and Classification of Risk.  Classification 
refers to assigning a risk level to the identified risk based on some set of qualitative or 
quantitative criteria.  Risk levels are generally Low, Moderate, and High.  For all 
Moderate and High risks, risk mitigation strategies must be planned and implemented.  In 
addition to health and cost issues, program issues, product/DMSMS issues, and business 
issues can also be identified as risks.  The final two steps consist of Reporting Risk and 
Mitigating Risk.  Risk will be reported to the PMO to support the Risk Reporting sub-
function in the Acquiring function.  The end goal is to put in place strategies and 
solutions that will mitigate the DMSMS risk to a program.      
Form:  This is a key function performed by the Field Activity designated as the 
Assessment Activity.   
7. Performance Assessment: 
Function:  This function consists of two critical sub-functions.  After gathering 
much supporting data, a Purchase Recommendation is made which will hopefully 
mitigate the obsolescence or material shortage risk.  This function will evaluate the 
effectiveness of the recommendation prior to final decision-making by the decision-
making authority (i.e., the PMO).  In addition, Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) or 
metrics will be established and tracked to ensure the SSB collaborative system is 
providing best value to the Fleet.  MOEs will be used to manage the process effectively 
and to continuously improve the process.        
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 Form:  The Assessment Activity will have the responsibility for performance 
assessment.  This will include providing inputs to the purchasing recommendation or 
evaluating the purchasing recommendation made by another entity.  The Assessment 
Activity will take the lead on metrics generation and tracking.  They will have the 
responsibility for reporting metrics to the SSB process community on a periodic basis.   
8. Product Usage: 
Function:  This is the act of using an alternate source of supply or Sunset 
part/component resulting from the SSB process. 
Form:  Using entities can include the Fleet, Shore Activities, Integration Sites, 
and Contractors. 
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The Systems Engineering Development and Implementation (SEDI) plan is one of 
four foundational documents prepared in support of the thesis: The Sunset Supply Base: 
Long Term COTS Supportability, Implementing Affordable Methods and Processes.  
The SEDI plan defines a roadmap for implementation of the supportability concept and 
when combined with the other three foundational documents: The Sunset Supply Base 
Systems Architecture, The Sunset Supply Base Business Case Analysis, and The Sunset 
Supply Base Marketing Plan, establishes a transportable, transferable, and repeatable 
supportability system for Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) products. The SEDI plan is 
structured in three sections: Infrastructure, Implementation, and Measuring & Assessing.  
The approach is intentionally focused on supporting the person(s) actually performing the 
implementation function.  Insight into the process is provided by specific examples called 
Implementation Experience and embellished by Lessons Learned to help enable the 
implementing process.  The tools, methods, and processes described are illustrated 
through actual examples where these practices were used to implement the SSB system 
on three Navy programs.  These tools, methods, and processes are provided in detail in 
the enclosures so that they may be used, not only for guidance but also for a reusable 
template for future work. Read on and Enjoy! 
 
The nature of the SSB thesis topic and the approach taken by the authors necessitated the 
use of examples, templates, tools, methods, and practices.  These implementation tools 
and deliverable products are illustrated through a set of enclosures referenced in the 
thesis and its appendices.  Most of the enclosures are static examples generated during 
the implementation of the SSB system on three Navy programs.  However, other 
enclosures are not static and are therefore provided on a web site (URL: 
http://www.anavision.org/ssb.htm ) in the Excel format to provide a dynamic model for 
use by an implementer of the SSB system. 
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 I. THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT AND 
IMPLEMENTATION (SEDI) PLAN 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this plan is to put into perspective the processes, methods and 
tools needed to implement the Sunset Supply Base (SSB) system.  This document is 
presented as a stand-alone prescriptive set of actions, which can be taken in the 
establishment of an SSB system.  However, this document does not portend that it is the 
only process or method to establish such a system but instead is the method the authors 
have chosen to implement the SSB system.  The document is constructed in three major 
sections, which follow a brief introduction to the SSB system concept.  The primary 
issues grappled with in the SEDI plan are those faced during implementation and 
encountered primarily when bringing the idea into reality.  The first section of the plan 
addresses introduction to the program and the infrastructure needed to support the effort, 
such areas as: teaming structure, computer resources, communication methods, interface 
with the programs, data structure requirements, management participation, etc.  The 
second section of the plan covers the implementation of the SSB system and, in turn, 
presents many challenges to overcome in realizing the SSB system.  Examples of some of 
these challenges include: identification of the Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEM), interface methods with the OEMs, interface with the 
Program Management Office (PMO), understanding the Programs needs and 
requirements, building relationships between the OEMs and the Navy, identifying 
suitable partnerships between the OEMs and small build-to-print suppliers where 
applicable.  The final section of the plan identifies methods and metrics to measure the 
impact of implementing a SSB system, thereby providing adequate indicators for the 
programs to assess the effectiveness and value proposition in using the system. 
B. INTRODUCTION 
The SSB concept is a unique After-Market approach to extend the supportability 
of COTS products predicated on the needs of Navy Programs.  The extension of product 
availability, beyond the OEM assigned date to drop the products as obsolete items, 
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 provides stability to the system baseline configuration, during periods of time between 
installation and scheduled Technical Refresh/ Insertion.  The uniqueness of the SSB 
concept is evident through how it is structured.  The OEMs are: a) market driven, b) high 
volume and high technology, c) their business plan is driven by their commercial 
customer base, with only about 0.4 % of their business going to Department of Defense 
(DoD) [1) Glum, 2) Robinson, 3) Hartshorn] and d) experience fast update cycles (< 18 
months)[1) Glum, 2) Robinson, 4) McDermott]. In contrast to these OEM attributes, DoD 
has: 1) unique applications with lengthy life cycles (20-40 years), 2) requires a minimum 
technology refresh or update cycle of not less than 5 years [4) McDermott], and 3) have 
operational readiness and maintainability support issue that span the entire Life Cycle.  
To bridge the gap between the OEM business planning and the Navys need for long term 
support a third party is brought in if applicable.  This is the Sunset Supplier.  The Sunset 
Supplier makes a contractual relationship with the OEM to produce the obsolete products 
for the OEM customer base.  The OEM transfers the intellectual property and assembly 
know-how to the Sunset Supplier and for this the OEM receives royalty on the sale of all 
products produced.  Internal to the Navy are support infrastructures to ensure 
supportability of Sunset products by mitigating any component part obsolescence issues 
if they exist on those products.  The infrastructure and support of the SSB process yields, 








Supportability of products defined by customer need (5, 10, 15, 20 years.) 
Life Cycle Cost (LCC) savings, due to no life-time buy at the assembly level is 
needed, so the assemblies are procured as the customer requires them. 
Reparability of assemblies over the designated life cycle(5, 10, 15, 20 years) 
Hardware/Software/Firmware stability between Technology Refresh/Insertion 
Cycles. 
Significant reduction in program risk as related to COTS and life cycle 
Management. 
Improved schedule flexibility and support options that can be tailored for Fleet 
needs. 
Minimal or no impact on system operational performance.  The performance 
will remain constant through the use of exactly the same part: form, fit, and 
function replacement, which has been made by the alternate manufacturer, the 
Sunset Supplier.
176 
 II. INITIATION AND MANAGEMENT OF A SSB SYSTEM 
A. GETTING STARTED  
The key in beginning a successful implementation effort is in choosing an 
appropriate application where the benefits of the SSB system can be realized.  Although 
not limited to addressing the issues germane to COTS product supportability issues, this 
area was identified as an unresolved and potentially ripe candidate to yield a large 
Return On Investment (ROI) from implementing the SSB system.  The funding for such 
an effort must come from some entity, such as institutional sponsors, PMO, local field 
activities, or through some kind of initiative.  Since the effort is designed to solve 
supportability issues of fielded hardware it seems only natural to identify a Program 
which is having problems in supporting their fielded COTS products.  From our 
experience with Programs, making the switch from products built using military 
specifications to COTS products, the differential in the life cycle management between 
the two approaches is profound, so much so that to our knowledge every COTS 
implementation brings with it a whole set of unresolved risks.  Resolution or management 
of these risks is the primary purpose of implementing the SSB system.  Therefore one of 
the prime targets in obtaining support and funding resides in the PMO since it is the 
Program Manager (PM) who is ultimately responsible for the life cycle support of the 
products delivered to the Fleet.  
The SSB system being a collaborative effort will require extensive teaming and 
partnering both within your local organization and external to your local functions.  The 
subject of teaming and partnering is so important to the success in initiating and 
management of the SSB system that each step of the process described below will 
illustrate certain external interfaces that demand participation in these activities.  These 
external activities must be supported through an internal local teaming effort since the 
implementation effort is broad in scope and cross functional in nature.  Establishment of 
a local support team is described in the last portion of this section and is intentionally 
placed after the SSB system requirements so that the uninitiated, new implementer can 
scope the task.  Although the local teaming effort description is provided after the 
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 description of other implementation actions, the actual sequence of events should take 
place with the local teaming effort being performed first.  The local support team is the 
enabler, which allows successful accomplishment of all other activities.  The external 
interfacing requirements are provided first to establish the boundaries, goals, scope, 
objectives, and purpose as background for formation of an internal local team.  The 
reader is advised to study the SSB system requirements prior to establishment of a 
support team.  
B. DEFINE THE CHALLENGES  
The SSB system is built on a collaborative System Architecture (SA), which 
means that an entity must choose to join the system and stay with the system.  The 
agreement to implement such a system must have compelling logic and be substantiated 
through some track record or justifying data.  Even with pilot program examples and an 
implementation track record, a program without experience with the SSB system will 
want to know: How will this apply to my Program?, What will be the impact in our 
unique situation?, What assurances can you give me that the SSB system will be 
appropriate for my program?, etc.  The questions go on and on but are focused on one 
primary issue: Is this the right thing for our program?   To answer any of these questions, 
you as the implementer will need to do your homework.  If this is not already a program 
you are working on, you will need to make it your program by finding out as much 
information as possible about it.  The immediate goal should be gathering information 
regarding the Program; below is a starter list of important areas or documents which may 







What is the program scope and hardware application? 
Is the system certified: certified combat weapon system, safety certified, etc.? 
Review of reference documentation: Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD), Mission Profile, Operational Requirements, etc.? 
What organizationally driven policies and requirements regarding COTS are 
impacting the Program? 
Contractual arrangements: Performance Based Logistics, Organic Maintenance, 
Full Service Contract, etc. 













COTS issues and/or support efforts attempted or on-going 
What type of Configuration Management process is implemented in support of 
the Program? 
System Software impacts due to COTS 
Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) approach 
What stage in the life cycle is the Program hardware that needs to be supported: 
legacy, Engineering & Manufacturing Development (E&MD), new design, 
etc.? 
What is the fielding schedule and how many platforms, for how long? 
Are there any intentions or planned tech refresh/insertion points (i.e. years 
between tech refreshes)? 
Program organizational structure 
Current COTS efforts 
Points Of Contact for primary responsibility in the area of COTS management, 
ILS, refresh issues, etc. 
C. APPROACHING THE PROGRAM OFFICE OR DESIGNATED 
REPRESENTATIVES 
Each program opportunity will be different and a customized approach must be 
developed to support the unique program needs.  Even though the program requirements 
will be unique, the basic needs can be met through modification of documentation used 
on other previously successful programs because the basic needs of most programs are 
similar.  In this portion of the SEDI, the subject matter is decomposed by functional 
activities that need to be addressed to implement an SSB effort.  The functional activities 
are supplemented with examples, illustrated through documentation from successful 
implementation efforts on three pilot programs.  The list of these functional activities 
includes: initial contact, defining Points of Contact (POC), establishing roles and 
responsibilities, and initial estimates regarding the effort.  Important to note is that the 
SSB system is a departure from the traditional government oversight approach and 
requires dedicated involvement in all aspects of the implementation effort.  Buy-in of the 
effort at the highest levels in the program is of utmost importance.  As a new and 
different method in solving the COTS supportability challenges, there will be push-back 
from many individuals in the program organization, who will find it easier to say no, than 
to take the risk of an innovative concept.  
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 Implementation Experience:  
In the case of SSDS MK-1, the lead engineer responsible for the long term 
supportability of the system, during the kick-off meeting, noticed push-back and 
questioning by the Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) community of the proposed SSB 
effort.  He then stepped in, to emphasize that the program has chosen the SSB system 
direction.  After receiving the blessing of the Captain of the program with regard to the 
approach, the lead engineer stressed, that regardless of the perceived risks the SSB 
system has been chosen because the decision was based on the long term value 
proposition to the program, so overcome the resistance to the idea and support the effort. 
The AN/AQS-20X Assistant Program Manager (APM) had tasked the SSB effort directly 
and assembled a team to work on the ILS support for the program.  The team in general 
expressed apprehension and skepticism about the probability of success of the SSB 
system.   The APM was frank and explicit in his demands that the program direction is to 
implement the SSB system on COTS products. 
Lessons Learned from this Experience: 
Your best bet as an implementer of the SSB system is to receive the highest level 
of buy-in within the program and to have that supporter understand the value added 
proposition in using the system.  At the various organizational levels in the program, it is 
easier to say no and retrace the steps that were used in previous times, then it is to try 
new methods with their associated risks.  The importance of Top-Down roll out of the 
SSB effort, although not absolutely necessary, is one of your best avenues to success. 
Like all first impressions, the initial contact with the Program Office or their 
chosen representatives in introducing the SSB system will have a great impact on your 
ability to enlist their support and obtain their sponsorship.  Although there exists a 
multitude of independent attributes that contribute to making a good first impression, our 
inclination is to focus on three predominate factors.  First and most important from the 
programs perspective will be the professionalism and knowledge of the person providing 
the presentation.  As will be evident during the implementation of the SSB system, an in-
depth knowledge of many of the characteristics of Systems Engineering must be 
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 exercised to have an effective implementation effort.  An understanding of the following 








Good, people skills including teaming skills 
Knowledge of contracting methodologies, constraints, and impacts 
The ability to build relationships and partnerships 
Understanding the design, development, deployment, testing, and support 
processes employed by the program 
The ability to learn the specific manufacturing processes used to make the 
COTS products 
Be able to develop and implement a project plan specifically for the 
implementation of the SSB system 
Well practiced negotiations skills 
The next factor that will help or hinder your initial efforts relies on what you are 
presenting to your focused audience.  Available in Enclosure (1) is a presentation used in 
briefing PMO, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM), and potential SSB suppliers.  
The presentation provides a general conceptual view on how the SSB functions, 
introduces the primary players, and the expected outcomes.  This presentation has been 
used as an initial calling card to introduce the idea and has been met with success in 
illustrating the potential value proposition provided through use of the system.  As the 
implementer, your focus must be to understand each and every slide presented because 
the ideas are identified through pictures, notional representations, diagrams, etc. without 
a lot of wordy explanations that would clutter up the presentation.  The building of a 
common foundation about the SSB system is the objective of the presentation and details 
with long explanations can be provided later.  Additional information in support of the 
presentation are typically used to add certain details which improves the understanding of 
the SSB systems goals.  Enclosure (2) is an executive summary which provides a concise 
high level description of the system.  Enclosure (3) is an article from the COTS 
Journal, [5) Plotkin].  This article identifies the use of a system almost exactly like the 
SSB system, as an industrial best practice where it is implemented to support certain 
industries that are capitally intensive and configuration constrained (i.e. paper mills, 
power generation facilities, petroleum distillate plants, etc.) 
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 The second focus area that must be addressed very early on is the uniqueness of 
the effort and that the SSB effort is not a duplication of other activities currently being 
funded.  The SSB Systems Architecture (SA) is specifically designed to leverage the 
traditional sustainment engineering functions/activities by adding additional 
functionality; that when, taken in concert with the traditional methods yields new 
capabilities not provided by either approach used independently.  The SSB system was 
designed specifically to address open issues, which bring undefined large risks to the 
program.  Through implementing the SSB system, new previously undisclosed 
information regarding details about the components which make up the COTS products is 
obtained through a collaborative effort: between you as the representative of the program 
and the COTS OEM or SSB supplier.  Since by the very nature of the procurement 
process for COTS products, only the product is purchased with minimal supporting 
information.  In contrast to the nominal methods of interfacing with the suppliers of 
COTS, usually through purchase orders, the SSB system invokes the exchange of product 
details typically by entering into a Non Disclosure Agreement (NDA).  Enacting an NDA 
allows you, as the program representative, visibility regarding the component make up of 
the COTS assembly and it is this knowledge, which allows you to identify, quantify, and 
manage the obsolescence risk.  It is the combination of the collaboration, the commitment 
through the NDA, knowledgeable assessment of risk, and teamwork that defines the 
uniqueness of the SSB efforts.  To our knowledge no other system has been successfully 
implemented to meet these objectives.  Enclosure (4) is an example of a Statement of 
Work (SOW) depicting statements in support of the unique attributes of the SSB system.  
To help the new implementer who may need an example in crafting an agreement with 
the OEM or SSB supplier, a fill in the blank NDA is provided in Enclosure (5). 
Implementation Experience: 
In both MK-1 & MK-2 Ships Self Defense Systems (SSDS) programs, the idea of 
having this kind of visibility was very difficult for the ILS community to accept because it 
was not part of the normal interfacing routine.  The engineering community on the other 
hand had typically signed NDAs previously, usually for design evaluations, and 
understood the significance and utility of having access to the detailed information.  The 
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 ILS community was confused with the difference in roles between NSWC Crane – the 
sustainment support activity which identified the obsolescence code (red, yellow, green), 
on the piece part components level – and NSWC Corona – the activity signing the NDAs 
and obtaining the component parts lists for each COTS assembly.  It took hours of 
explaining before the ILS community was able to identify the uniqueness of each function 
and assure themselves there were no duplication of efforts. 
On the 20X program the ILS community had much the same issues with much the 
same resolutions.  Although in the case of the 20X program an additional issue of 
justifying cost effectiveness of the SSB efforts exacerbated the situation.  The cost 
effectiveness of using the SSB system will be dealt with later in this implementation plan 
but the issue is brought forth here to illustrate how various issues can be compounded 
and if not handled appropriately may derail the process. 
Lessons Learned: 
The teams you will be working with will have members that have various levels of 
understanding and responsibility resulting in different perspectives of your endeavors.  
The key to success is to take the time, be patient, and where possible develop a tight 
relationship with other team members doing the obsolescence assessments.  The ILS 
community may be harder to reach at first although they will eventually be very 
supportive of the SSB efforts.  The engineering community seems to catch on to the idea 
quickly but also brings to the table a lot of skepticism.   
As a result of the information gathering process you accomplished in learning 
about the program, several Points of Contact (POC) probably have emerged.  Some of 
these POCs are within the PMO while others are part of the organizational structure that 
support the program.  Typically there are one or more PMO individuals who provide 
guidance to the group members that implement the required functions.  The members that 
perform the functional support for the program are as important to enabling the SSB 
system as the PMO is in sponsorship of it.  Close working relationships need to be 
cultivated with other activities to yield the most optimum outcome.   
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 Field activities tasked by the PMO to provide the needed aspects of support must 
be interfaced with smoothly or at least non-confrontationally.  For example, the activity 
that supports the software design and maintenance will be impacted by the SSB system 
due to the stabilization of the equipment baseline provided as part of the system.  On the 
other hand, not all answers will be found through the hardware and in some instances a 
small software change can mitigate the impact of the changes in the COTS hardware 
products.  Due to the interactive nature of COTS hardware/software it will be most 
productive to work as a team and to include the activity supporting the programs system 
software. 
Many programs will have their Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) functions 
accomplished through one of the field activities and therefore another important activity 
to work with in enabling the SSB system.  The engineering support efforts (i.e. In-Service 
Engineering Agent (ISEA), Technical Design Agent (TDA), Software Support Agent 
(SSA), Design Agent (DA), etc. ) must be considered an integral part of the long term 
supportability solution thereby directly impacting the SSB efforts.  Depending on the 
situation, many and in some cases, most of the important POCs you as the SSB system 
implementer will need to work with will reside at the prime contractor.   These contractor 
POCs may include design engineering, logistics, purchasing, configuration management, 
reliability engineering, manufacturing, and others, but their involvement will depend on 
what was written into the contract.  Again, the homework you did early on will come in 
handy, in understanding the contract requirements. 
Implementation Experience: 
One of the primary documents used to implement the SSB system is a complete list 
of the COTS items used in the program’s system.  In the SSDS MK-1 system we interfaced 
with the ISEA and the prime contractor to develop a complete list of COTS products.  
Although this task does not seem difficult it was more complicated than initially 
envisioned because certain items were purchased as COTS products then modified by the 
prime resulting in a prime generated part number on the Bill of Materials (BOM).  
Tracing down all the COTS products required the teamwork of the prime contractor, the 
ISEA, and the ILS functions.  We experienced the same situation when dealing with the 
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 MK-2 system, however in this case the prime contractor was the primary source with 
minor inputs from other functional areas.  As an important side note, the list of COTS 
products and OEMs is a living document, which will change as more information is 
gathered and the knowledge of the Program’s system increases. 
Lessons Learned: 
Implementing the SSB system requires the implementer to take a Systems 
Engineering approach in dealing with all aspects of the Program, and the POCs you will 
interface with may come from almost any area, such as contracts, logistics, engineering, 
financial business management, procurement, ISEA & TDA support, legal, etc..  
Regardless of which functional area the POC you interface with comes from, the key to 
success will be effective communication to achieve understanding about the goals and 
objectives of the Program encompassing the long term supportability issues at hand.  
Since each community (i.e. contracts, legal, financial) has a language or unique 
meanings to concepts and words, it is important to learn how to appropriately address 
each subject to achieve a common understanding of your implementation efforts.  This is 
not an easy task so do not take it for granted, that “what you meant to say is what they 
heard”, ask for feedback and address concerns. 
The knowledge obtained thus far in initiating a SSB system implementation effort 
will be helpful in formally documenting the roles and responsibilities of all groups and 
functions working as a team in support of the program.  Each programs organizational 
structure and their approach and teaming membership may be quite different, therefore 
these aspect necessitate a unique and customized documentation package.  From our 
implementation experience, most efforts require the development of a team charter and a 
management plan which is approved through the Program Management Office (PMO).  
The charter identifies at a very high level the goals and objectives for the group as 
perceived by the approving PMO authority.  These high level guidelines provide the 
overarching objectives and constraints the working group must achieve.  Enclosure (6) 
provides an example of the PMS 461 - SSDS COTS Working Group Charter.  Since most 
of the requirements and objectives identified in this charter are at such a high level, they 
can apply to most any similar working group and can therefore provide a starting point 
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 for your next implementation effort.  Enclosure (7) is the SSDS COTS Working Group 
Management Plan, it identifies how the high level requirements were translated into 
specific structures, processes, and reporting requirements.   These documents will take 
time and effort to prepare and once complete are available as a reference to the team, 
however the real value of this documented approach is when changes in team structure or 
membership take place.  Having the documented guidelines, roles and responsibilities, 
processes, and requirements in this way identifies a constant baseline upon which a team 
can function during periods of disruption or change.  In some circumstances it may be 
necessary to start at the very beginning, that is; each member must provide their 
perception of their position on the team and identify from their perception other 
members positions along with every members interface requirement.  As each member 
briefs the team, the information and knowledge exchanged will help solidify functional 
and practical reasons for inclusion of each member.  Sometimes there will be conflicts or 
duplication of effort but you are at the beginning of the effort and this is the best time to 
find out about those kinds of issues.  Enclosure (8) is an example of a Membership: 
Roles & Responsibilities Presentation that was used during the formation of the 20X 
working group.   
The efforts thus far have dealt with getting to know the Program environment, the 
people, and the interfaces, now you, as the implementer, must answer the question, How 
much will this cost?.  There is no way to avoid the question so answer it as honestly as 
possible.  The issue in answering this question at the beginning is that you probably do 
not have enough information to provide a reasonable estimate because it depends on so 
many independent variables.  These independent variables may include but are not 
limited to: 1) the age of the design, 2) the life cycle phase of the COTS products, 3) how 
many OEMs are involved, 4) how many COTS configurations, 5) how much support will 
you receive from the rest of the working group teaming members, 6) how long must the 
COTS items support the system, 7) what level of funding does the PMO consider 
appropriate, etc. So back to the sticky question - How much?  in the Implementation 
Experience section below are some rules of thumb used previously and these may prove 
valuable in constraining the boundaries of the cost risk as perceived by the PMO.  For 
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 example, the initial estimate, provided to each of the three programs we implemented the 
SSB system, was 1 ½ man years; 1 man year for programmatic interface and ½ man year 
for infrastructure.  Although this estimate should not be used across the board it was 
acceptable to the programs for an initial estimate.  Important to note is that our estimates 
were based on some in-depth knowledge of the programs we chose and the willingness of 
our local management to support us if it became necessary.  Another approach to 
answering the How much?  question is to identify an incremental time period to 
research some of the driving factors then to develop realistic estimates and propose them 
back to the Program.  From our implementation experience, a three month exploration 
period will yield the most important information which will be useful to the support team, 
if the PMO decides to fund you or not, this makes the task value added to the program 
regardless of the decision.  Later on in this document will be examples of data collected 
that show a Return-On-Investment (ROI) proving the value added proposition of 
implementing the SSB system, these values should be used to provide a notional but 
realistic expected outcome of the effort. 
 Implementation Experience: 
To initiate our implementation efforts we cheated as much as we could by 
assessing the programs we were already doing work for and by doing this we avoided a 
lot of uncertainty with regards to the people and the programmatic details.  With this 
jump-start of information we still had much to find out about the COTS products.  To put 
the problem into perspective the task to find the specific information that would be useful 
in future work included identifying:  which configuration of the COTS items were being 
used, who were the manufacturers, how many of each configuration were in the system, 
and where the manufacturers are located.  This was a mundane but daunting task.  The 
SSDS MK1 system for example has a Bill of Materials (BOM) that is over 12,600 lines 
long and out of all these items, we identified 274 instances where COTS items were used.  
Because of multiple uses of a configuration, the 274 instances boiled down to only 49 
significant items.  We then evaluated the configurations and found that only 34 OEMs 
were involved.  This evaluation and grouping effort required inputs from almost every 
team member and it was a critical element in making the overall implementation feasible 
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 and the estimating process for future work possible.   It took a little over a month to nail 
down a reasonable list that received consensus by the entire team. If we were to start 
from scratch to accomplish the same task we would probably ask for three months to 
produce a reasonable estimate. 
Lessons Learned: 
You will find out that, unless your program is extremely unique in this area, no 
one person, no single documentation package, or even a cross functional IPT will know 
all the COTS used within a medium size system.  One of the prevalent problems is that in 
many instances COTS products are modified in hardware or software by the prime 
contractor to meet the systems requirements.  Once modified, these products will receive 
a unique number assigned usually by the prime contractor, this action hides the COTS 
product in such a way that it is nearly impossible to extract usable information using 
automated methods.  It is important for the program to identify these instances so that the 
risk of using the COTS products can be managed and even though the product has been 
modified it is based on the COTS product, which carries with it an inherent obsolescence 
risk.  When developing a list of COTS items used in your system, dig deep and be ruthless 
in identifying every instance. 
D. INFRASTRUCTURE: THE BACKDROP FOR SUCCESSFUL 
IMPLEMENTATION  
Planning a successful implementation of the SSB system requires more than 
merely obtaining your Programs support, it will require a supportive infrastructure that is 
well thought out and structured in a way to allow future growth capability.  The design of 
an infrastructure must support and reflect the goals for the SSB system.  These goals are 






To be able to identify, quantify, and mitigate supportability risks to the 
program. 
Extend the life cycle and supportability of COTS 
Provide infrastructure to support existing platforms/systems in support of the 
PMO 
Achieve significant and quantifiable cost savings over the product life cycle 
A reliable, affordable, repeatable and expandable process that meets the 










Institutionalized methods for proactive COTS management and DMSMS 
issues. 
Leverage Navy and commercial supportability assets and provide a networked 
solution. 
Leverage across Navy programs with extended applicability through contract 
strategies, methodologies and incentives to entice commercial industry 
participation. 
Forecast budget requirements in support of the programs, warfighters, and 
consumer. 
Improve schedule flexibility and support options of system upgrades or 
development initiatives. 
The objectives of the SSB system are to provide long term relationships, preserve 
and protect intellectual property rights, and provide the interface management resulting in 
a long term COTS supportability solution.  All of these goals and objectives must be 
supported through the infrastructure, that when developed may be completely transparent 
to the identified attributes.  To develop such an infrastructure we have found it useful to 
partition these attributes into functional areas or tasks. 
The support infrastructure, we have found useful, is composed of two functional 
areas: programmatic support and, for lack of a better word, infrastructure support.  The 
programmatic support consists of three global functions accomplished through seven 
primary tasks identified below: 
Programmatic Functions: 
Interface with the Program Office & Infrastructure Team 
Details pertaining to specific program characteristics -  
a. Number of systems 
b. Number of COTS assemblies used and location 
c. Insight into the prime contractors assembly call out 
d. Reliability numbers (i.e. failure rates, MTBF, etc.) 
e. Fielded systems concept of deployment and operation 
Provide Recommendations 
a. Buy quantities 
b. Technology refresh intervals and interim support strategies. 
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Provide purchase recommendations 
Interface with OEM, SSB supplier and Program Office support teams 
Involvement in applicable program activities 
Identify and implement program specific flow-down requirements 
Address quality issues (hardware/software, documentation, etc.) and interface 
with the OEM, SSB supplier, Program Office, prime contractor, etc. 
Cost assessment based on Life Cycle Costs (LCC) and the unique opportunity 
to impact these costs through implementation of the SSB system. 
The tasks and functions of the programmatic support point of contact (POC), have 
been and will continue to be, the focus of this SEDI model.  Almost all the 
Implementation Experience and Lessons Learned documented in the SEDI model are to 
provide insight for the practitioner to ease the implementation burden.  The examples 
provided in the enclosures may be used with minor modifications or in some cases 
directly applied by the programmatic POC.  Even though the programmatic POC is 
critical throughout the SSB implementation process, this POC must rely on supportive 
structures provided by an infrastructure team.  The inherent interdependency of the 
relationship between these two entities is crucial in providing the SSB systems 
functionality.  Although both functions (programmatic and infrastructure) are of a 
technical nature, the programmatic POC handles the business and program issues while 
the infrastructure team deals mainly with engineering and configuration management 
issues. 
The infrastructure team provides many of the capabilities identified in the goals 
and objectives for the SSB system, such as expandability, transportability, reusability, 
leveraging capability, configuration management and control, affordability and Life 
Cycle Cost assessments.  The characteristics embedded within the infrastructure team 
incorporate traditional Sustainment Engineering, Integrated Logistic Support, and 
Configuration Management functions by employing a Systems Engineering approach as 
illustrated below.  These functions are embedded within the approach but not duplicated 
by the approach, an important distinction that must not be overlooked.  To illustrate this 
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 point we will use the Sustainment Engineering function as an example.  The Sustainment 
Engineering function, for all three programs we implemented the SSB system on, was 
performed by other field activities.  In particular, the obsolescence analysis, at the piece 
part or assembly level, was performed by NSWC Crane; since this field activity has the 
in-house expertise, appropriate tools/methods and a successful track record of 
performance.  By teaming with the Sustainment Engineering function at NSWC Crane 
we did not need to develop such a capability but instead we were able to leverage this 
Navy asset for the good of the programs.  In performing our function in implementing the 
SSB system we brought the piece part or component list of the COTS assemblies to 
NSWC Crane for analysis.  These lists provided insight into the COTS assemblies 
obsolescence issues whereby identification, assessment, and management of the 
obsolescence risk to the programs could be evaluated.  The risk management capability is 
a new characteristic, which emerges through the combined efforts of Sustainment 
Engineering and implementation of the SSB system and unachievable using either or both 
systems independently.  The scope and breath of the infrastructure team will depend on 
how you intend to execute the needed functionality.  It will also depend on if the needed 
functions are performed in-house or provided through a teaming relationship as described 
above.  Regardless of the type of structure you design into the infrastructure team the 









Interface with the programmatic POCs 
Establish and maintain the OEM/SSB supplier relationships 
Develop a database with appropriate controls and access rights 
a. Creation of the database structure 
b. Define methods for updating data and controlling access rights 
c. Provide mechanisms for continuous maintenance 
Provide a central site to enable open and private communication (i.e. specific 
server location, web site, bulletin board, etc.) 
Perform analysis on the data gathered 
Coordinate with all support activities where applicable through programmatic 
POC (ISEA, TDA, SSA, DA, etc.) 







Coordinate with other programmatic POCs that could be affected by the 
reporting results 
Perform on-site reviews at the SSB suppliers to assure schedule, cost and 
quality performance is maintained. 
Infrastructure Tasks: 
Database Management 
a. Program generated, prioritized, COTS lists, at the assembly level 
b. OEM provided, component piece parts lists and drawings detailing the 
make-up of the assembly level: Cautionary Note  These parts lists and 
drawings supplied through the OEM are obtained through entering a Non-
Disclosure Agreement (NDA) and therefore necessitates special handling 
along with restricted access. 
c. Development of a relational database; Design, Management, and 
Maintenance 
d. Informational query and data extraction 
Obsolescence Risk Management 
a. Receive COTS assemblies list from programmatic POC 
b. Perform assembly level obsolescence health/risk at that level 
c. Retrieve from the COTS OEMs the component piece parts list for each 
assembly. 
d. Filter the component piece parts list and condense list to active 
components for which predictive obsolescence tool are readily available 
and used as industry standards. Exceptions to this filtering process are 
handled on a case-by-case basis.  
e. Perform a piece part level obsolescence health/risk analysis at the 
component piece part level. 
f. Prepare an Obsolescence Risk Report for the program in an agreed upon 
format, by working with the programmatic POC 
g. Perform continuous monitoring of the component piece parts by reviewing 
impact of ongoing obsolescence notices posted by the component piece 
part manufacturers. 
Interface with OEMs and programmatic POCs 
a. Initiate the relationship with the Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(OEM) and act as the primary interface with them throughout the life of 
the SSB system. 
b.  Initiate the relationship with the SSB suppliers and act as the primary 
interface with them throughout the life of the SSB system and perform on-
site reviews of SSB suppliers using an IEEE 1722 type evaluation. 
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 c. Interface as required with other program support activities (i.e. ISEA, ILS, 
TDA, etc.) 
d.  Teaming with the programmatic POC and the other program support 
activities, define and document the expectations and required support from 
the infrastructure team.  Typically these expectations and requirements are 
embedded in a Statement of Work (SOW), a tasking document, or in a 
Memorandum of Agreement/Understanding (MOA/U) between the 
implementing activity and the Program Office.  Examples of these types of 
documents are available in Enclosure (9)  Tasking Documentation. 
e. As opportunities emerge, the infrastructure team is responsible for the 
interface with other activities such as other field activities, professional 
societies, government initiatives, industry working or focus groups, etc. 
that provide potential improvements or impacts to the SSB system and its 
implementation.  
 
E. TEAMING: THE ENGINE OF IMPLEMENTATION    
The functions and tasks described in the preceding portions of this document 
identify some of the primary areas your internal local team must accomplish and even 
though the list is extensive it is not an all-inclusive list.  There are many approaches to 
teaming (i.e. Tiger teams, working groups, functional teams, project teams, etc.) that may 
provide the needed mechanisms to support the SSB system.  However, because the 
objective in initiating the SSB system will require development of tools, methods, and 
processes to implement the system, an Integrated Product Development (IPT) 
environment is recommended.  During our implementation experience we found the IPT 
approach established a firm foundation that structured the resources and leveraged the 
available assets.  Most of the individuals on our local team had previous IPT experience 
so we did not need to start out with teaching them basic IPT skills.  For the few members 
with no previous experience it was  Trial by Fire  through On-the-Job training; an 
experience less than optimum but still doable.  If this will be your first encounter with 
functioning in an IPT environment we recommend formal training as a way to expedite 
the learning process.  As identified in the functions and tasks descriptions provided 
earlier, every functional position on the IPT relies on all the other positions and must be 
worked simultaneously and with a high degree of coordination, to keep the tasks on track. 
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 Formation of the SSB IPT was done only after buy-in from the local management 
had been received.  To receive this buy-in, required several steps that are briefly outlined 





Initial presentation of the SSB system, see Enclosure (1) 
Provide additional reading material, see Enclosures (2), (3), & (10) 
Develop a project plan for SSB system Implementation, see Enclosure (11) 
An informal request for resources to stand up the proposed IPT 
Establishment of the SSB system IPT was initiated by gathering up the requested 
candidates and presenting all the materials provided to the management to gain 
endorsement then receive each members buy-in.  The next steps in forming the IPT was 
to develop the Mission & Vision statements (see Enclosure (12)), a set of roles and 
responsibilities (i.e. secretary, Leader, etc.) (see Enclosure (13)), and define the team 
norms and ground rules (see Enclosure (14)).  With these baseline documents in place the 
team then defined our internal structure to meet the functional and tasking requirements.  
This led to the formation of two sub-teams: the Programmatic Team and the 
Infrastructure Team. The sub-teams formed along these functional boundaries helped in 
providing communications paths in the functional area, however each sub-team was 
given the caveat that the entire SSB system implementation is the primary focus of the 
IPT and sub-IPTs must support that overarching goal. 
Implementation Experience:  
Our IPT chose to have identified positions within the team (leader, secretary, etc.) 
and split or decompose the functions into two teams.  The group was a small team 
composed of four team members on the infrastructure team that were local plus four 
remote members from another field activity (NSWC Crane), also there were three 
members on the programmatic team.  Something to think about is the issue of conflict 
resolution.  In our case the usual manner of handling conflict took place within the 
context of the norms or ground rules for the IPT but not always.  The primary architect of 
the SSB system, took the team lead of the IPT and was asked to mediate or provide 
guidance in some situations thereby acting as the “final word” or “last stop”.  This 
“final word” acted as a process control typically used to remove a “stumbling block” or 
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 “break a log jam” whereby the process could keep moving forward.  Most of these 
instances required a short term decision that would have long term impacts therefore in 
our unique situation it seemed natural to depend on the lead architect.  When setting up 
an SSB system it may prove useful to designate an individual to act in this primary 
architect or team lead position because your implementation will also be unique in its 
own way. 
Lessons Learned: 
Working within an IPT environment where tasks are highly coupled and 
inherently dependent on one another, it is important to keep a vigilant, watchful eye out 
for the team’s response when errors occur.  When mistakes or errors occur the 
perturbations are felt in almost every team product and team members are real sensitive 
about the impacts to their work.  There will be no way to avoid the domino effect of a 
mistake and therefore the entire team must put extra effort into placing a positive spin or 
positive challenge to the remedy of these errors.  The IPT environment encourages its 
members to share risks and in taking risks, some mistakes will be made, expect them, 
over come them as a team, and the result will be a creative robust teaming environment.   
F. SUMMARY: 
Lets take a minute and summarize what your implementation efforts, so far, have 
addressed and assess how these steps will help your future efforts in bringing the SSB 
system to life.  Thus far we have defined the purpose, objectives, expectations and 
approach in implementing the SSB system.  We have discussed various methods and 
approaches in obtaining buy-in from both the local management and the target 
program(s).  The function and task descriptions have been identified for an infrastructure 
to support an SSB implementation along with development of the tools and methods to 
enable the IPT environment including: Mission & Vision, Roles & Responsibilities, and 
Norms & Ground Rules.  All the aforementioned materials lay the ground work for the 
actual implementation efforts covered in Section 2: The Practitioners Manual.  It is 
important to understand that the actual implementation efforts, can and often do, happen 
concurrently with development of the foundational activities described in Section 1: 
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 Initiating and Management of an SSB system, the impact of the of your foundational 
work will be evident during the actual implementation process. 
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 III. SECTION 2: THE PRACTITIONERS MANUAL: 
This section of the SEDI was prepared to provide implementation details 
regarding the SSB system and the unique value added tasks.  This description will 
illustrate, that when combined with Sustainment Engineering, ILS, procurement, and 
other program support function, the new support system yields a risk management 
method for long term supportability of COTS products contained in Navy systems in all 
phases of their life cycle, from design to fielded systems.  The Practitioners Manual is 
partitioned into two major subject areas: Defining the COTS assembly list and 
prioritizing it with respect to programmatic impact, and the 17 Steps  SSB 
Implementation Process identifying concurrent and sequential activities.  The following 
methods, tools and processes are embedded within these subject areas: Reporting Status 
of the COTS prioritized list and the 17 Step Process, Obsolescence Health/Risk 
Reporting, Purchase Recommendation for Obsolete components, and database 
management requirements.  These implementation tools, processes and methods, can and 
usually are, concurrent activities with the events described in section 1  Initiation and 
Management of a SSB system.  The programmatic POC is the active participant using 
The Practitioners Manual as a roadmap during the implementation process.  The 
functions and tasks of the programmatic POC are outlined in section 1 of the SEDI and 
will require the POC to focus on communication, teaming, negotiating, and partnering 
skills to yield a successful SSB system implementation.  
A. DEFINING THE COTS ASSEMBLIES LIST 
The path to a successful SSB system implementation begins with knowing what 
to implement the system on and what impact the process will have on the program(s).  
This process will require coordination with every major player in the PMO and all the 
support activities and functions.  The importance in defining an accurate comprehensive 
COTS assembly list cannot be overstated because it will be the basis for defining how all 
other SSB system implementation activities and plans are to be accomplished.  Since the 
definition of COTS will vary from application to application the process of identifying 
those items that fit into the COTS category, will be an iterative and recursive learning 
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 process.  During this process, as the COTS list matures and becomes more accurate and 
complete, it provides a communication tool that further refines the understanding of the 
implementation task from the perspective of the team and from your perspective.  This 
process will help identify the SSB system participation with respect to the overall support 
efforts. 
The best starting point in developing an adequate COTS list will depend on the 
program, the application, and the customers expectations.  Typically a program will have 
several different kinds of lists of hardware and software, at various stages of indenture 
and description.  It will be necessary to understand the meaning of the list and how it fits 
within the overall system being studied.  Some of the more common types of lists 
include: the Configuration Management List, the As-built Configuration List, and the Bill 
of Material (BOM).  For our purposes we will refer to the main source in developing the 
COTS list as the BOM even though it is only one of the potential sources of data.  In 
some cases you will receive several lists that together should make up most or all items of 
interest.  It may appear that this part of the process should be straight forward, but on the 
contrary; collection of this data may take quite a lot of effort and absorb significant 
amount of time.  The key in keeping the task manageable is to immediately start the 
iterative and recursive review and buy-in process.  Usually what will happen is a list will 
be provided to you and will contain either too little or too much data.  Your first effort is 
to assess and understand what information you now have and how it applies to the system 
under consideration.  In the case of being supplied with too much data, you will need to 
filter out extraneous data whereby producing a condensed list of just COTS items. During 
this filtering process, interface with the primary team members (i.e. prime contractor, the 
design agent, the ISEA, procurement, and ILS) is very helpful.  Regardless of how you 
accomplish the task or how careful you are, the list you create will be wrong.  Dont 
worry about it but deal with it through communication.  Use the first cut at the list as a 
communication device to all other team members requesting feedback and any additional 
information they (the team members) could provide.  It will be enlightening to your 
efforts to find out that no two people agree on what should be on your list, its level of 
detail or indenture, and the differing view points on the need to generate such a list.  This 
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 is the time to exert your leadership role in getting the SSB system off to a strong start so 
distribute the filtered list to the team and when you receive feedback  immediately 
revise and re-issue the list.  This process, like many others in the SSB system, is iterative 
and recursive, so if you are waiting for the final-final product before initiating the next 
step in the process  dont - because youll never get to the next step; be willing to deal 
with some data that is incomplete.  The data you are collecting will continue to change 
throughout the process, however one saving grace is that there will be a subset of data 
(i.e. the predominate COTS items) that do not change; and this fact allows for the next 
step in the process to be initiated.  In the case of too little data such as a particular item 
chosen because of the programmatic risks if limited to the singular item it may be a 
potential start to an implementation effort. However, unless a more encompassing task 
can be developed there will be no assurances, that the SSB system can effectively attain 
its full potential.  It is important to remember that the purpose of the SSB system is to 
provide COTS long term supportability for the fielded hardware and incomplete 
implementation will yield an undetermined risk to the programs supportability plans for 
those COTS not identified on the COTS list and therefore not covered by the SSB 
system. As the SSB system implementer, you probably will not be able to drastically 
influence the approach the program support team will start with  too much or too little 
information  but your primary task at this point is to understand what youve received 
and what implication that data has on the SSB system effort. 
Implementation Experience: 
To illustrate the large differences, an implementer may expect, in generating a 
COTS list, a high level description of how lists were generated for the SSDS programs 
and the AN/AQS-20X program are discussed.  The SSDS MK1 COTS list generation 
process started with evaluating the as-built configuration list (referred to as the BOM) 
that was provided as a 12,600 line excel worksheet.  This was too much data and 
therefore required filtering, a time consuming process.  About 2 days of work reduced the 
list to about 200 potential candidates for the first COTS list.  During this process we 
realized that the MK1 and MK2 SSDS systems shared many of the same COTS Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and some of the exact configurations.  It seemed 
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 logical that a combined list could yield some leverage in subsequent process steps.  In an 
effort to define the combined list we distributed the MK1 list to both program teams 
(SSDS MK1 & SSDS MK2) and requested feedback.  The amount of feedback was almost 
overwhelming and the effort took about 12 revision/re-issue cycles.  The result of the 
effort produced a combined list of about 115 configurations from 34 OEMs.  The SSB 
systems implementation effort now seemed doable and reasonable with the additional 
advantage that these boundaries received both teams buy-in and consensus.  In contrast 
to the SSDS program method in generating the COTS list, the 20X program was much 
different.  During the first team meeting for the 20X support team, the prime contractor 
provided a list of COTS configurations and the associated OEMs.  Although the list was 
small, about 20 configurations from 5 OEMs, it represented the majority of the COTS 
electronic products in the 20X system and received immediate buy-in from the team.  It is 
important to note that this list was the initial list produced from drawing of the 20X 
system prior to baseline configuration for production, therefore this list was considered a 
“soft list” expected to change in support of the production baseline. 
Lessons Learned: 
Development of the COTS list for a program of interest is an important task, 
which lays the foundation for the subsequent SSB system’s implementation efforts.  This 
task is never complete and will require continuous monitoring and updating.  The key to 
success during this development process is the iterative and recursive approach, which 
uses the list generating process (revise and re-issue cycles) as a communication tool to 
cultivate consensus within the team. 
Defining the COTS list through consensus of the program support team should be 
complimented with an effort by the entire team to prioritize the list.  This prioritization 
provides an implementation roadmap of appropriate sequential steps to guide the 
implementers activities.  Additionally, the priority identification provides guidelines that 
can be very useful during budgeting and funding activities.  The prioritization activity 
typically takes place once the COTS list has reached some level of maturity where the 
changes in the list produce minor impacts.  By this point in time the entire team is 
familiar with the contents of the list and some of the interrelationship that exists between 
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 the items on the list and with the system in general.  The activity in defining the priority 
for each item is a teaming function where all members must actively participate to yield 
an adequate product.  The dependence of hardware to software is of key concern in 
assigning the priority levels.  In some circumstances, some assemblies will be inherently 
linked to other assemblies such that a change to one impacts the other and therefore need 
to be grouped as like priority in the overall scheme of the list. Enclosure (15) provides the 
combined SSDS MK 1&2 prioritized, COTS list, in a state of maturity about half way 
through the process.  During the development of this workbook there were several 
spreadsheets that were used to develop the all-up list described in worksheet 4.  This 
worksheet illustrates the identified COTS OEMs, the configurations of interest, the points 
of contact at the OEM, the amount of assemblies needed for the next 10 years at a 50% 
and 99% confidence levels to show the potential buy quantities range, and 
implementation notes; all arranged in prioritized order.  This worksheet was used 
extensively to communicate the what, who, how, and when regarding the SSB system 
implementation activities.  Enclosure (16) presents the same workbook at a much later 
time, a review of spreadsheet 4 shows how this communication tool has been modified to 
give an update of the implementation process and identify actions and recommendations 
to the budgeting planning activities.  Using these tools helps organize your efforts and 
aids in communication with the rest of the team. 
B. THE “17 STEPS” – SSB SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS    
The 17 Steps SSB system implementation process was first described in the 
System Architecture as a method to describe and document the list of sequential steps 
needed to implement the SSB system.  The 17 Steps process is not meant to be a stand 
alone process; instead the process is intended to have the support of the tools, methods, 
and processes, identified in section 1 of the SEDI and preempted by a well defined 
prioritized COTS list.  The 17 Steps are used by the programmatic POC as the 
implementation roadmap and each step will require interactive participation with the 
program support team and the internal infrastructure team to produce the desired result.  
The prioritized COTS list becomes pivotal in starting the steps, due to the reliance on the 
list for identification of which OEMs are involved and the associated lower level of 
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 configurations encompassed.  The process is designed to be applicable to each 
configuration of assembly whereby the applicable steps are addressed independently for 
each step and each configuration.  There are natural groupings such as all configurations 
from a particular OEM, in which, if the OEM chooses not to participate then all 
configurations are by default excluded.  Barring unusual constraints on the 
implementation process implementation of the process steps takes place at the assembly 
configuration level and are independent of all other configurations.  Figure 1  17 Steps 
 SSB Implementation Process, provides a notional depiction of the process steps and is 
supplemented with  step definition.  This figure and definitions are also provided as 
enclosures for use by new implementers to assure consistency and repeatability of the 
process (see Enclosures (17) & (18)).  The purpose, objective and resulting output of each 
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Appendix B Figure 1: “17 Steps” - SSB Implementation Process 
1. Case Open  
The 17 Step process flow begins with an initial statement  - Case Open  to 
designate that there is a need to do some preliminary work before starting the process.  
The Case Open descriptor is dependent on first being able to define the COTS list and 
preferably having it prioritized before implementation.  As identified in proceeding 
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 paragraphs, the COTS list does not need to be finalized, only mature enough to be stable 
as a prerequisite in beginning the 17 Steps.  Other concurrent activities will most likely 
take place during the process step initiation, these other activities may include: 
infrastructure development, team formation activities, and program support team 
interfacing. 
2. Step 1.0 – Check/Filter SSB Database  
Steps 1.0 through Step 5.0 are handling the COTS items at the assembly level and 
the configurations are grouped by OEM.  In this first step the new list of COTS 
assemblies are checked against the current COTS database to see if any leverage can be 
obtained due to previously accomplished work.  The objective for this step is to identify 
the scope of work that still needs to be accomplished.  The final result of this process step 
is to define the candidate list of COTS assemblies for further investigation.  The resultant 
output from this step will fall into one of three categories: 1) the specific configuration 
and by default the OEM are already in the database whereby most of the work has been 
done the only remaining issue is to extend the current application to the new program of 
interest, 2) the specific configuration of interest has not been a sunset candidate however, 
the OEM has participated in the SSB system and a SSB relationship has been set up, 
leaving the next action in this instance would be to explore the possibility of the OEM to 
consider additional configurations, and 3) the OEM has not participated in the SSB 
system and by default no configurations have been considered.  
3. Step 2.0 – Supportability Analysis Acquired (EOP, EOS dates, MTBF, 
etc.) 
The purpose of this step is to identify at the assembly level supportability criteria 
that will help quantify the obsolescence risk presented by each assembly.  The data 
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Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF), this is an OEM supplied number, this 
number is necessary in calculating the required number of spares to support the 
system under consideration for a given length of time. 
Cost of the assembly 
End of Production (EOP) date, this date identifies the last date an assembly can 
be manufactured and therefore define the last time buy date 
End of Service (EOS) date, this date identifies the last date an assembly can be 
repaired and identifies support risks, which may require additional procurement 
needs. 
Forecasted number of assemblies needed to be available (purchased, in stock, 
etc.) in order to support the system under consideration for a specified length of 
time. 
 Number of years the system under consideration must be supported, this value 
is usually defined by the PMO or by the program support team. 
The characteristics described in elements 1,2, and 4 (see above) and in some cases 
element 3, are extracted from the COTS list.  The elements described in 5, 6, 7, & 8 are 
provided by the OEMs and require direct interface to obtain the information.  Item 9 
describes values which are calculated and are based on the normal exponential 
distribution of failure rates expected over a period of time and therefore can be translated 
into the number of item that need to be replaced over that period.  The last item, element 
10, describes the number of years the fielded system is expected to require support and is 
usually defined by the PMO as the interval until the next tech refresh date.  
Implementation Experience: 
For all three SSB implementation efforts we partnered with NSWC Crane and 
they (Crane) were responsible for collecting and providing the above data elements.  The 
data elements collected through the interfacing with the OEMs presented some 
limitations and constraints that we later addressed.  The two elements we found 
inadequate in addressing the programs requirements were: 1) the MTBF numbers were 
based on a calculated value and did not reflect our systems fielded environment, and 2) 
the forecasted quantity identified only the mean numbers of failures or 50% confidence 
level whereas the program support team desired to have a larger variety of choices, such 
as 75% and 99% confidence levels identifying the associated replacement buy quantities.  
To address the MTBF issue we obtained the actual MTBF exhibited by our fielded 
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 systems.  This data was provided from the Material Readiness Data Base (MRDB) at 
NSWC Corona. However, because the description of the assemblies and inconsistencies 
in reported indenture levels, our data request did not correspond with the data entered 
into the database, it therefore took several iterations to achieve realistic MTBF numbers.  
Since the MTBF number defines the amounts of funding and budgeting recourses to be 
used in future years it is critical to have the most accurate information available.  To 
provide the most accurate data possible we teamed with the In Service Engineering Agent 
(ISEA) to evaluate the MRDB MTBF numbers then provide the program with 
recommendations.   Enclosure (19) – Failure Rate Comparison Table, SSDS MK1 – 
provides an example in which we were able to compare the various databases with the 
exhibited failure rate seen by the ISEA when servicing the fielded equipment. 
Lessons Learned: 
The PMO will need a complete description of how the assembly quantities were 
derived and the distribution of those forecasted quantities, along with their relationship 
to meeting the support the fielded systems.  The method used to calculate these forecasted 
quantities and the expected distribution over a given time period is defined in Enclosure 
(20) – Number of Spare Parts - Cost Justification Matrix – in a word document and the 
equations are embedded in the Failure Rate Comparison Table, Enclosure (19).  These 
definitions and equations provide the logical methods that will help substantiate 
forecasted quantities which the PMO’s decisions will based on.  Your understanding of 
the these tools and adequate justification for the use of the MTBF numbers that are used 
will be pivotal in the PMO’s decision making process.  
4. Step 3.0 – Prepare Supportability Risk Report 
The purpose and objective of this step in the process is to summarize and report to 
the program support team and the PMO, the supportability risk due to COTS products as 
evident at the assembly level.  This high level summary is based on inputs from the 
OEMs and is retrieved through phone calls to the Marketing and Sales functions.  Due to 
the methods in acquiring the data, the data has limited value due the capricious nature of 
the COTS industry.  Although the data is not as solid as we wish it could be, the 
information gathered can help in planning at a high level, particularly if the data reflects 
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 the current technology trends.  Usually the program support team and the PMO will want 
to review and buy-in to the COTS list at this stage of maturity.   Enclosure (21)  
Technology Refresh Cost Model Demo  provides an example that identifies and reports 
the COTS expected life cycle and potential obsolescence risk at the assembly level.  This 
presentation was prepared by NSWC Crane and is one of the services they supplied in 
evaluating technology trends.  One of the most useful aspects of the assembly level report 
is the identification of the time line for specific assembly that shows that the product is 
scheduled to be obsolete in a particular time frame.  These identified assemblies are 
potential candidates for the SSB system implementation. 
5. Step 4.0 – Identify COTS Assemblies That are Appropriate for the 
SSB System  
At this stage in the process, an extensive list of all different types of COTS 
products may be incorporated in the COTS list.  Since the primary characteristic we focus 
our efforts on deals with microcircuits due to the high obsolescence risk involved, other 
non-microelectronic based products can be eliminated from the list.  The filtered list will 
then be assessed for potential SSB system implementation candidates.  Typically all 
assemblies are considered potential candidates for at least the first steps of 
implementation that involves establishing a working relationship.  Removal from the 
candidate list at this point in the process is accomplished by exception only basis, 
examples of such exceptions include: the company is in financial trouble such as  
Chapter 11, the assembly under consideration has a direct replacement that has been 
tested and verified, the assembly is performing poorly in the application and under 
investigation.  Notional consideration is given to the potential OEM candidates and if an 
appropriate SSB supplier exists to partner with them or if the OEM already has partnered 
with an SSB supplier. 
6. Step 5.0 – Contact OEM & SSB Supplier Candidates –  
Initial contact with the OEMs and interfacing with the SSB supplier candidates is 
perhaps one of the most unique aspects embedded within the SSB system because the 
interchange of information between yourself and the OEM can be extensive.  From the 
implementers perspective it is important that the OEM understands the basic concepts 
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 behind the SSB system and the critical nature of the OEMs participation in the system.  
As a receiver of information from the OEM the implementer must get an understanding 
of the OEMs business environment, current policies and practices, and how the SSB 
system can be implemented through the OEM.  The OEM will need to receive some 
logical reasons to peruse the potential implementation and have some kind of business 
case to justify such an effort.  In most cases we found that initial contact over the phone, 
required follow-up actions such as emails documenting the concept and eventually a visit 
to the OEMs facility to present the concept in detail.  The information regarding each 
company and all the configurations under consideration is extensive and will get 
confusing unless it is organized in a methodical way and the records are updated 
regularly and consistently.  The example provided in Enclosure (15)  - SSDS MK 1&2 
prioritized, COTS list, illustrates the method that was used during the implementation 
process for the SSDS programs.  Key information provided in this matrix is typically 
needed during almost every contact with the potential candidates.  The matrix also has 
columns to annotate information already gathered and actions yet to be taken. In essence 
the matrix is used much like a sales persons contact list in providing important 
information that is continuously updated to reflect the ongoing communication with the 
customer.  The objective in this step is to orchestrate the situation such that the 
representatives of the OEM, gain a comfort level with the SSB system concepts so that 
they feel they can endorse the companys involvement.  If this level of comfort is 
achieved and if the decision makers were the ones you had presented to, the next steps in 
the process are usually completed immediately.  However, if the decision makers were 
not present and the receiving individuals must check with their proper authority, they 
may act as your ambassador or ask you to return and present to the actual decision 
makers. If asked to return and present to the decision makers, our experience shows us 
that in every instance of a return visit, the company will chose to participate. 
Implementation Experience: 
During implementation we found this step was a people orientated and 
communication intensive where the discussions were very interactive requiring us to 
“think our way through” conversations instead of pre-planed responses.  In contrast to 
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 the conversations, the travel arrangements and meeting appointments, at times, required 
artful mastery of visiting 4 states in 4 days, attempting to keep within the closest 
geographical areas as possible.  What made the arrangements so interesting is that the 
availability of the OEMs personnel dictated the planning and each OEM would make 
visit arrangements based on their constraints.  The scheduling and planning skill to 
optimize the travel required to the OEMs constraints while meeting the programmatic 
constraints placed on anyone implementing this step of the process will be challenging.   
Lessons Learned: 
An excellent tool to help with producing productive communication to enable 
success for this step of the process is to leverage off of past conversations by keeping a 
running log of previously asked questions and answers.  This log will never be complete 
but its use is to provide consistency and completeness.  In arranging visits to the OEMs it 
is very helpful to group the OEMs by geographical area then prioritize within that area 
each OEM.  This type of grouping will help coordinate the decision making process for 
travel arrangements. 
7. Step 6.0 – Parts List from OEM Received – Analysis & Obsolescence 
Report 
Receiving the assembly component piece part lists represents one of the most 
significant steps in the entire process.  Establishing the relationship between the OEMs 
and the program needs, can now show tangible results through sharing of the OEMs 
intellectual property.  It is important to review why these piece part lists are so essential 
to the obsolescence risk management process used in the SSB system.  The COTS 
products are designed into our fielded systems based solely on their performance 
characteristics at the assembly level.  The prime contractor/PMO does not pay for the 
intellectual data rights for the COTS products.  The developmental cost associated with 
these products, are paid for by the OEMs and they control the configuration management 
and manufacturing processes.  Only at the assembly level will the OEM be responsible to 
the customer (the prime contractor/PMO) in assuring repeatable performance in systems 
designed with the COTS product.  Given this scenario the obsolescence risk experienced 
by the PMO is at the assembly level where interoperability and integration impacts can be 
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 complex and expensive to resolve.  In receiving insight into the assembly through the 
component piece part lists, we have for the first time the ability to mitigate the 
obsolescence risk at the piece part level.  In resolving the risk at this lower level, the 
remedy cost will be much less due to the cheaper cost of the piece parts and 
circumventing the potential impacts to integration and interoperability.  Therefore by 
obtaining the component piece part lists we are now able to manage the PMOs risk at the 
most cost effective and efficient level. In working through this part of the process a Non 
Disclosure Agreement (NDA) is usually signed by both parties to protect the intellectual 
property from distribution beyond the intended application as part of the SSB system.  
Enclosure (5) provides a general fill-in-the blank template NDA form however most 
companies already have a standard NDA form that they prefer to use.  The NDA 
formalizes the OEMs buy-in of the SSB system and has prepared the way for the transfer 
of the intellectual property. 
Once received, the component piece part lists must be translated into usable 
information before analysis, evaluation, and recommendations can be accomplished.  The 
transfer process of the component piece part lists (hereafter referred to as  the parts list) 
will take many forms and be dependent on the OEMs business practices.  The parts list 
may be provided via a web site, a fax, an email, or in paper hard copy form. In an effort 
to reduce the amount of work necessary to handle these parts lists we developed a 
preferred format that is supplied to potential OEMs.  Enclosure (22)  Requested Format 
for Parts Lists  identifies this preferred format but cannot be required since we need to 
work within the OEMs standard business practices.  Regardless of which format the 
parts lists are received in, we will need to filter out non microelectronic parts and 
specially format it so that it can be downloaded to the server database.  When the 
formatting and filtering is complete the parts lists will need to be evaluated for 
obsolescence risk of each component piece part on the list.  Although there are many 
commercial services and industry standard tools to perform this function we chose to 
partner with another field activity who performed this task.  Our method for handling the 
parts lists at this stage in the process was to email the list to NSWC Crane and once the 
evaluation and analysis was complete it was emailed back to NSWC Corona. NSWC 
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 Crane provided excellent service and when problems occurred, they worked with us to 
resolve every issue.  The parts lists came in from the different OEMs at various times 
depending on the time of interface with the OEM and the response time from the OEM.  
The progression through this process was monitored through the use of a status matrix 
described in Enclosure (23)  Vendor Status Report.  This status matrix was updated on a 
weekly basis and reported to the program support IPT as requested.  On an annual basis 
or as requested by the PMO, the detailed information on all assemblies in the SSB system 
pertaining to a specific program are assembled into a single document and provided to 
that program as a SSB system update.  Enclosure (24)  Obsolescence Health Report is 
the SSDS example of such a report.  These reports are extensive since the following 
information is provided: the status of the SSB system implementation, the assemblies 
obsolescence health arranged per system indenture, a summary report of obsolete 
component piece parts (Red, high risk values), graphical depiction of the obsolescence 
health analysis, and executive summary for the system.  The format and detail is 
dependent on the request or needs of the specific program, so before arbitrarily adopting 
the example format we suggest interfacing with your program before proceeding. 
8. Step 7.0 & 8 – PMO Review & Approval of Obsolete Component 
Parts Purchase Request / Procurement Support Prepares Purchase 
Order of Obsolete Component Parts -  
One of the products of the preceding step is a list of red coded piece parts 
identifying them a high obsolescence risk items.  Enclosure (25)  SSDS Red Component 
List provides an example of such a list.  These specific parts have been discontinued and 
soon will not be available for purchase.  Our experience has shown that the availability of 
a part in the open market after the production has stopped is about 8 to 12 months, this 
time lag before all parts are bought up is referred to as the Grey Market.  It is important 
to purchase the obsolete parts while still in the early stages of the Grey Market because a 
$20.00 part can raise in value to a $2500.00 part as the component becomes scarce.  The 
purchase of Grey Market parts will continue to be an ongoing function as new high-risk 
parts are identified.  Depending on the impact, both risk and financial, the purchase of 
obsolete parts may be as simple as an email form (see Enclosure (26)) or as formal as a 
detailed report. Enclosure (27)  Analysis of Intels i680 obsolescence on OEM products 
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  SSDS program  is a good example of how to structure a detailed impact and purchase 
request due to obsolescence.  It will be important to automate this process as much as 
possible because there will be a continuous stream of these requests over the years the 
programs system need to be supported.  Step 8 is included with step 7 because after the 
approval for the request is given (step 7) the approved request is passed onto the 
procurement activity to translate it into a Purchase Order to the SSB supplier.  In turn the 
SSB supplier will receive the Purchase Order and go out to the open market and procure 
the obsolete parts subsequently storing them at their facility. This action of storing parts 
on the SSB suppliers shelves can take place immediately if the OEM agrees to take on the 
role of being its own SSB supplier. Our experience has shown that over 90% of the 
OEMs wish to implement using this method. With the in-house SSB relationship at the 
OEM, technology transfer is not an issue and there is no real impact to current 
procurement arrangements. However if the OEM chooses to transfer their technology to a 
third party SSB supplier, storage of procured part will usually need to take place after 
steps 9.0-13.0 are completed. 
9. Steps 9.0 – 13.0 – Technology Transfer Roadmap –  
Each of the steps described below are for the general case and of notional value 
only.  However the process flow is provided as a guideline of major stages in the 
technology transfer process and can be used by the SSB system implementer as the 
identifiable stages to monitor.  All five of these stages are accomplished by the OEM and 
the SSB supplier when intellectual property is transferred.  This process is formalized 
through a binding contract between the OEM and the SSB supplier and completion of the 
process is as agreed upon by these two entities.  The role the SSB system implementer 
plays in this process is to monitor the progress to assure availability of parts when needed 
by the program.  A note of caution with regard to the technology transfer process: if you 
as the implementer have not had experience performing the tasks described below and are 
asked to help implement the transfer process be extremely careful because this process is 
tricky and very difficult to perform successfully.  There are internal Navy assets (NSWC 
Corona & NSWC Crane) to help you accomplish this task and mentor you through the 
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 process, so if you need the help ask for it.  Short descriptions of each of the major 
technology transfer stages are as follows: 
a. 9.0 Business & Legal Documentation in Place 
Development of the contract language, terms and conditions, methods and 
processes for reporting, payment of royalties, expectation of business structures and 
handling of Intellectual Property rights are some of the more important issues covered.  
The only input the SSB implementer should have in this stage is to ask that a clause be 
placed in the contract to allow a third party to obtain a component piece parts list of each 
assembly to assess the obsolescence risk. 
b. 10.0 Transfer Technology to SSB Supplier from OEM 
Typically the two companies will handle this process between themselves 
however on occasion to enhance communication or facilitate the transfer one or both 
companies will ask for participation from the SSB implementer.  If this happens be 
careful if you become involved, you carry no contractual weight and must stay at a 
distance if a dispute occurs.  A good implementer is invaluable during this process so if 
you need help ask for it.  During this stage the implementer is there to monitor progress 
and enable the process but not become embroiled in disputes between the primary parties. 
c. 11.0 – Perform Pre-Production Readiness Review 
This function will be performed by the OEM with the possibility of the 
SSB implementer present as a casual observer.  The implementers function here is to 
monitor and observe. 
d. 12.0 – SSB Supplier Production of First Piece 
Evaluation of first piece production is a standard industry practice to 
assure the quality of the production processes, methods and practices have been 
adequately transferred.  This quality function is performed by the OEM.  The 
implementers function here is to monitor and observe. 
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 e. 13.0 – OEM Performs Quality Verification Testing of First Piece 
The verification testing of the first piece of production is different from 
the previous evaluation in that it is a process control for the adequacy of the testing 
methods and equipment.  When possible the OEM will use the original test equipment at 
their facility to cross check the SSB suppliers test set up.  Again, the implementers 
function here is to monitor and observe.  
10. Steps 14.0 & 15.0 – SSB Supplier Full-Scale Production / Assess 
Government Assets–  
Although there are two primary paths to get to this point in the process  to sunset 
the technology within the OEMs facility or to transfer the technology to a third party 
SSB supplier  the end result should be the same.  Once the SSB system is in place 
within a production facility there will be three ongoing requirements for which the SSB 
system implementer will participate in.  The first of these requirements is the ongoing 
evaluation of the component piece part obsolescence risk assessment and the subsequent 
purchase requests for new obsolete parts.  The second function in which the SSB 
implementer participates in is the independent assessment and reporting of Navy assets 
on hand at the SSB supplier.  This assessment, required is by the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) to be done annually at a minimum.  The third function is actually 
performed by the SSB implementer or a designee, and requires them to assess the health 
of the SSB supplier using tools similar to the IEEE 1722 evaluation matrix which is an 
industry Best Practice evaluation tool.  This annual assessment will focus on the overall 
health of the SSB supplier covering the following major areas: financial, technical 
capability, technical support, materials and configuration controls, past performance data 
and cost containment or growth. 
11. Steps 16.0 & 17.0 – Ordering and Shipping of Assemblies –  
The SSB system has been designed to work within current Navy procurement 
structures in support of the Navy Procurement System (NAVICP) and directly to the end 
user if that path has been already defined.  The one issue the SSB implementer must 
address is that if a third party SSB supplier has been brought into the situation, then an 
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 alternate cage code for the sunset item needs to be generated.  This alternate cage code 
allows the procurement system to purchase directly from the new source. 
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 IV. SECTION 3:  MEASURING & ASSESSING THE SSB 
SYSTEM: 
This final section of the SEDI plan identifies methods and metrics to measure the 
impact of implementing a SSB system, thereby providing adequate indicators for the 
programs to assess the effectiveness and value proposition in using the system.  
Implementation and establishment of a SSB system can be partitioned into three separate 
measurement areas that necessitate the use of different measurement or assessment tools 
in each area.  The first measurement area involves the assessment of the relationship 
between the OEMs/SSB suppliers and the implementing program.  The second set of 
measurements, deals with the data extraction and information transfer tasks such items as 
transfer of component piece part lists  transferring and assessment.  The final area of 
interest for measurement and assessment is the transformation of the collected data into 
support criteria directly applicable to the PMO supportability planning. Each of these 
areas requires different types of metrics and all areas are measured concurrently to 
achieve a robust assessment of the COTS obsolescence risk.  Continuous and/or periodic 
monitoring in all three areas is encapsulated as part of the SSB system design. 
 Relationship building and partnering with the supplier base is a value added 
function for the PMO in defining opportunity and managing risk.  The risk management 
aspects of effort extend beyond just obsolescence, many other types of risks must be 
evaluated such as: financial risk  is the supplier financially solvent, business risk  how 
are mergers going to effect the support efforts, business planning risks  what do future 
business opportunities look like and with that knowledge is the company willing to 
support the PMOs program, perception risk  is the company perceived as supportive or 
are there negative connotations associated with the company.  Identifying and assessing 
these kinds of risks are part of the relationship building process and these types of issues 
need to documented and reported.  The program will want to know this information and 
also the subjective risk assessment as perceived by the SSB system implementer and 
potential impacts to the program.  During our implementation efforts we instituted two 
standard methods to document the relationship and partnering information we gathered.  
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 In an effort to document the information obtained through interfacing with the OEM/SSB 
suppliers we instituted the SSDS MK 1&2 prioritized, COTS list.  Enclosure (15) 
provides an example of the list in the early stages of maturity.  The list contains basic 
information about the OEM, points of contact, assembly configurations of interest, and 
approximate quantities.  The utility of the list is greatly enhanced by the additional 
columns that describe implementation details, company and product information, and the 
ongoing list of actions to be taken by the company and by the implementer.  The 
information documented in this manner was extremely useful during program reviews in 
addressing or raising risk issues.  We continually shared this contact list with the entire 
program support team.  Although not quantitative in nature, this risk reporting devise 
received the teams endorsement as a good communication tool.  Another use for the list 
was developed to communicate the most current state of the relationship building efforts 
and then provide recommendations to the PMO in support of a Funding Allocation 
Review (FAR) decision-making process. Enclosure (16) - SSDS MK 1&2 prioritized, 
COTS list, Budget support: illustrates how the various descriptions and assessment of 
risk are combined in support of a recommendation to the PMO.  In conjunction with the 
contact list another tool was developed to provide the program support team and the 
PMO with insight to the SSB system implementation process.  This insight was 
documented in a matrix that related the specific OEM assembly configurations to the 17 
Step implementation process.  This matrix provides an implementation assessment in 
easily interpreted graphical format that represents a snapshot of work in progress.  
Enclosure (23)   Vendor Status Report  is an example of a status report, which was 
generated for the SSDS MK1 program.  This report was very useful in communicating to 
all involved parties the progress of the implementation efforts.  Another assessment tool 
currently under development is an assessment tool for evaluating the SSB supplier ability 
to maintain continued support year to year.  The tool is based on the IEEE 1722 
assessment matrix, which is an industry standard for performing these types of 
evaluations. 
The second set of measurements involves the transferred information gathered 
from the OEMs and subsequent evaluation and analysis of that information, as a result of 
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 the implementation process.  This set of tools yields objective and quantifiable 
obsolescence risk assessment of the COTS products used in the fielded hardware.  
Individual assembly assessments are combined in an indentured approach modeling the 
fielded systems configuration.  The assessments are then rolled up to the next level of 
indenture and finally to the system level.  An obsolescence health assessment is identified 
at each level of indenture.  Other salient data/information is provided to provide context 
to the analysis being reported.  Enclosure (24)  Obsolescence Health Report  is a report 
submitted for the SSDS MK1 program and provides an example on how to illustrate the 
combined analysis efforts to communicate to the PMO the assessed system obsolescence 
risk due to COTS products.  An extract from this report identifies the component piece 
parts that represent a high obsolescence risk  RED Coded parts. Enclosure (25)  SSDS 
Red Component List  is an extract from both MK1 & MK2 systems and provides an 
example to illustrate the immediate treat to the programs ability to support the fielded 
systems.  The format and content of these types of reports are highly dependent on the 
PMOs needs and desires therefore the subject should be negotiated prior to the 
development of the report. 
The last area of measurement and assessments is the Capstone of the entire SSB 
systems implementation effort.  It brings together all the information and data collected 
and provides functionality previously unattainable without the SSB system - Systems 
Engineering approach.  The Capstone assessment tool is illustrated in Enclosure (28)  
SSDS Assembly Master & Cost Matrices. Every tool, method, and process developed to 
implement the SSB system is either directly or indirectly responsible for the numbers 
evident in the matrices.  Enclosure (29)  SSB Planning Excel Workbook & Data Item 
Description - provides detailed explanations for the descriptions of each cell along with 
the mathematical relationships and constraints implemented within the worksheet.  
Important to understand that without implementing the SSB system the options are 
limited to Life of Type Buy (LTB) or Other - an identifier for options which are typically 
resource intensive, cause changes to the configuration baseline that cause perturbations in 
the support structures, or are limited in scope to specific situations unique to the 
application.  Only the SSB system provides a systematic process to adjust to budget 
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 constraints while providing the highest level of supportability possible.  The matrices are 
defined with built in algorithms that allow the user to perform What if scenarios so that 
the most optimum practical support approach can be developed.  The most important 
metrics from the PMO perspective are the cost numbers given different alternatives and 
the inherent risk associated with those figures.  The cost matrices tool gives the PMO the 
capability to model and simulate prior to making decisions and when combined with new 
support options available through the SSB system increases the probability of success in 
long term supportability of the fielded systems.  
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This Business Case Analysis (BCA) is one of the four foundational documents 
created to establish the Sunset Supply Base system as a Commercial off the Shelf 
(COTS) supportability alternative for Navy fielded systems containing COTS products.  
This BCA focuses on the Sunset Supply Base system for supporting Commercial Off The 
Shelf (COTS) products as they are used in the Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS) MKI.  
The Sunset Supply Base (SSB) concept is intended to extend the supportability of COTS 
products used in Navy weapon system programs.  This BCA will consider the 
consequences of implementing the SSB infrastructure for providing COTS support for 
the SSDS program.  These consequences, which will include both tangible and intangible 
results, will be analyzed for conformance to DoD policy, program requirements and 
overall cost/benefit.  Furthermore, it will look at how well the actual implementation 
relates to the goals and objectives of the SSB.  In short, this business case will examine 
the likely costs and benefits that will result in implementing the SSB system for 
supporting the SSDS program. 
 
 
The nature of the SSB thesis topic and the approach taken by the authors necessitated the 
use of examples, templates, tools, methods, and practices.  These implementation tools 
and deliverable products are illustrated through a set of enclosures referenced in the 
thesis and its appendices.  Most of the enclosures are static examples generated during 
the implementation of the SSB system on three Navy programs.  However, other 
enclosures are not static and are therefore provided on a web site (URL: 
http://www.anavision.org/ssb.htm ) in the Excel format to provide a dynamic model for 
use by an implementer of the SSB system. 
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 I.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This Business Case Analysis (BCA) focuses on the Sunset Supply Base concept for 
supporting Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) products as they are used in the Ship Self-Defense 
System (SSDS) MKI.  The Sunset Supply Base (SSB) concept is intended to extend the 
supportability of COTS products used in Navy weapon system programs.  The concept is unique 
in that it takes an After Market approach to supporting COTS due to Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) discontinuation of items presently or planned to be used in Navy weapon 
systems.  The Sunset Supply Base concept offers a support infrastructure, which may include 
third party support to bridge the gap between industry business objectives and the Navys 
requirement for long-term system support.  
The current DoD requirements include a scenario of increased operations while at the 
same time a continuous push for weapon system upgrades.  Given the present pressures for 
reducing costs, DoD Program Management Offices (PMO) are challenged to search for more 
economical alternatives.  The challenge, in effect, is to maintain near-term weapon system 
readiness while at the same time planning for weapon system modernization efforts.  
Furthermore, technology evolution is being driven by the commercial sector and no longer by the 
DoD.  The DoD looks to the commercial sector for technology concepts to transfer to their 
warfighter.  As a result, the DoD has established a COTS initiative to deliver state-of-the-art 
technology to the warfighter faster and cheaper.  The emphasis on COTS product usage was 
brought on by the fact that the DoD could conceivably take advantage of technology 
developments in the commercial sector at a reduced cost to development programs.  With COTS 
products come additional challenges in support, given the fast paced technology update cycles in 
the commercial sector as compared to the slow and methodical DoD acquisition processes.  Thus, 
there is an anticipated increase in material or product obsolescence.  Presently, the commercial 
sector has technology refresh cycles of 18-24 months[1) Glum, 2) Robinson, 3) McDermott], 
after which time the product is typically discontinued.  The DoD on the other hand takes a 
purposely conservative and methodical approach in terms of planning and budgeting.  
Additionally, the DoD design, develop and implementation process typically exceeds 5 years.[3) 
McDermott]  This misalignment has lead to significant challenges in maintaining system baseline 
stability.  There is also little incentive for the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) to 
accommodate the DoD requirements since the DoD only makes up roughly 0.4% of the market 
share.[1) Glum, 2) Robinson, 4) Hartshorn] 
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 To address these issues, this document establishes specific goals and objectives for the 
SSB system and then through careful and thorough analysis, derives benefits for alignment with 
current Naval business needs.  Based on this alignment we advocate the implementation of the 
SSB architecture to provide dependable, cost effective supportability insurance for COTS based 
weapon systems.  The SSB process focuses on obsolescence issues and material shortages 
associated with COTS usage in military weapon and support systems.  Addressing these specific 
areas, the SSB provides an opportunity to extend COTS supportability in an effort to stabilize the 
weapon system baseline.  Generally speaking, the purpose here is to show how the SSB system 
meets the needs and expectations of the Navys acquisition process by evaluating its 
implementation on the SSDS MKI program.  The period of analysis is between fiscal year 2003 
and 2012.  The data obtained for this case study was collected in FY 2002 and applies to SSDS 
MKI program execution beginning in FY2003. 
The results presented in the Analysis section of this document illustrate how the SSB 
implementation provides significant cost savings to the SSDS MKI program in terms of total 
support.  Furthermore, this Business Case Analysis also demonstrates how the SSB infrastructure 
is an affordable approach for mitigating program supportability risk and can directly support 
other existing combat/weapon systems.  To this end, it provides the PMO an additional support 
solution alternative for meeting the challenge of maintaining weapon system readiness and 
warfighter requirements in the most cost effective method possible. 
 
The nature of the SSB thesis topic and the approach taken by the authors necessitated the 
use of examples, templates, tools, methods, and practices.  These implementation tools 
and deliverable products are illustrated through a set of enclosures referenced in the 
thesis and its appendices.  Most of the enclosures are static examples generated during 
the implementation of the SSB system on three Navy programs.  However, other 
enclosures are not static and are therefore provided on a web site (URL: 
http://www.anavision.org/ssb.htm ) in the Excel format to provide a dynamic model for 




 II.  OVERVIEW 
A. SUBJECT STATEMENT 
1. The Sunset Supply Base System 
This Business Case Analysis (BCA) focuses on the Sunset Supply Base concept 
for supporting Navy hardware that incorporates the use of Commercial Off The Shelf  
(COTS) products.  The Sunset Supply Base (SSB) concept is intended to extend the 
supportability of COTS products used in Navy weapon system programs.  The concept is 
unique in that, it takes an After Market approach to supporting COTS due to Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) discontinuation of items presently or planned to be used 
in Navy weapon systems.  OEMs routinely drop a product line or significantly modify a 
product as technology moves forward.  Discontinuation or revision to a product is based 
solely on the business case for that product and when the business case can no longer 
support production the product is discontinued, regardless of the impact to the DoD/Navy 
(the DoD makes up only .4% of the market.[1) Glum, 2) Robinson, 4) Hartshorn])  
Typically this occurs at approximately 18-months to 2-year intervals.[3) McDermott],   
As these COTS items become obsolete, the DoD/Navy weapon system baseline 
configuration becomes unstable during periods of time between scheduled technical 
refresh and insertion.  This BCA will provide greater detail as to why this occurs but for 
the immediate discussion it would serve to briefly describe the circumstances 
surrounding this phenomenon. 
The OEMs are market driven enterprises.  They rely on high technology, high 
volume and their ability to get their products to market faster than their competitors.  
Typically, their product update cycles are less than 18 months.  Their business objectives 
are centered on their existing and potential customer base.  These attributes do not fit 
very well with Navy system support needs.  The DoD has very unique applications and 
very low volume.  Furthermore, the life cycles for these weapon systems are lengthy, 
easily exceeding 20-years, and because of the policy, procedures and guidance provided 
by DoD 5000, the Navy requires, and can only expect, minimum technology refresh or 
updates of not less than 5 years. [3) McDermott]  The challenge for the DoD and the 
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 Navy is to provide adequate operational readiness and maintainability support for the 
entire weapon system life cycle. 
The SSB system offers a support infrastructure, which may include third party 
support to bridge the gap between industry business objectives and the Navys 
requirement for long-term system support.  The Sunset Supply Base concept advocates 
building partnerships between the OEMs and third party technical firms (Sunset 
Suppliers) via contractual relationships where appropriate.  These Sunset Suppliers, 
although could quite possibly be the OEM, would typically be a small build-to-print 
assembly company that has the capability to manufacture the OEMs product.  Certain 
agreements are expected on both sides(OEM and Sunset Supplier) that provide both 
benefit and security to their respective businesses.  The OEM, who can no longer justify 
the business case to make certain items and must discontinue the product as a business 
decision, agrees to transfer the intellectual property and assemblage knowledge for a 
near-obsolete product to the Sunset Supplier.  The Sunset Supplier agrees to manage this 
knowledge respectfully in continuing to produce these products.  For this the OEM will 
receive royalties on the sale of all products produced while the Sunset Supplier benefits 
by gaining exposure and sales to the Navy.  Perhaps the cornerstone to this arrangement 
is the Navy internal process that ensures supportability of these Sunset products by 
mitigating any component part obsolescence issues that may exist.  The obsolescence 
reporting is accomplished by the Navy and is delivered to both the Program Management 
Office (PMO) as well as the OEM.  Based on this information the PMO can now decide 
the most appropriate course of action to take in supporting their respective programs.  
Figure 1, The COTS Collaborative Environment, illustrates the SSB process.  Presently, 
the Navy is guided through DoD 5000 and the Performance Based Logistics Initiative on 
how to maximize their investments for supporting present and developmental systems 
long-term.  
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 Program Office COTS Original EquipmentManufacturer (OEM) Sunset Supplier
Assessment/Reporting/
Facilitating Activity  
Appendix C Figure 1: The COTS Collaborative Environment 
The Sunset Supply Base system uses system engineering tools, methods, and 
processes to provide proactive activities that manage the obsolescence risk inherent to 
COTS use.  The Sunset Supply Base concept is not intended to replace traditional support 
practices but rather work in conjunction with them to yield a robust infrastructure that 
provides the PMO with cost effective solution alternatives in the face of obsolescence.  
The net result is greater confidence in producing the lowest Life Cycle Costs (LLC) while 
meeting the Navys supportability requirements.  The key to the SSB implementation is 
to present to the OEMs an alternative business case that is favorable to their business 
requirements.  The flexibility of the SSB system offers an opportunity for the OEM to 
gain additional revenue for nothing more than sharing the intellectual property rights to a 
third party SSB supplier that has the ability to manufacture and repair the OEMs 
product.  In effect this arrangement accommodates the OEM business requirements. 
As previously described, the SSB provides a mechanism for extending product 
availability beyond the OEM assigned date to discontinue as obsolete.  At this point it is 
important to understand that the SSB is not advocating delivering obsolete technology to 
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 the Navys weapon and support systems, but given the constraints of DoD 5000, 
Acquisition Policies and Procedures, and the fact that weapon system development, at 
best, exceeds 5 years, the SSB system infuses stability into the system baseline 
configurations over a defined period of time.  These periods, time scheduled between 
technical refresh and insertion, can be between 5 and 15 years depending on the programs 
expectations.  Nevertheless, the SSB concept will ensure supportability during this period 
by establishing an arrangement where the DoD/Navy can leverage large businesses in 
their strong suit of technology, market leadership, and quantity in manufacturing, while at 
the same time take advantage of the capabilities of the small businesses in terms of their 
agility, small production run capabilities, and their desire for long-term partnerships. 
Under an SSB environment, a triple-win situation arises for all parties.  The Navy 
wins by getting the long-term supportability, maintainability, and operational readiness at 
reduced life-cycle costs.  With this the PMO can in effect optimize their technology 
refresh cycles, upgrades or redesigns.  Furthermore, they also can expose and manage 
obsolescence or shortage issues associated with piece parts used in COTS deployed 
throughout all participating Navy programs.  This function or information and risk 
sharing, will not only benefit the Sunset Supplier in fulfilling their contractual obligations 
but will serve the Navy in a much broader sense by offering the derived obsolescence and 
shortage data to the Navy as a whole.  In managing the obsolescence risk in this fashion 
the Navy avoids costly redesigns and the resulting perturbations to the logistic, 
maintenance, and other support functions. 
The OEM benefits through compensation or royalties for each item procured by 
the Navy.  In addition, they get to claim long-term life-cycle support for fielded COTS at 
lower costs and minimal impact to current and future weapon systems.  All of this by 
simply transferring the intellectual property rights to the Sunset Supplier.  Of course, the 
OEM could easily decide to perform the role of the Sunset Supplier themselves if they 
determine that the benefits derived are aligned with their business strategies. 
The Sunset Supplier wins in terms of defining a new market; that is, new 
customers and new product lines.  They also receive valuable obsolescence knowledge 
through sustainment engineering expertise from the SSB infrastructure.  To this end, they 
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 are able to develop long-term relationships with their user community (OEMs and the 
Navy), thereby increasing revenues, establishing security for their business, improving 
their position for future opportunities and gaining the ability to have long-term business 
planning. 
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 III.  THE BUSINESS CASE 
This document serves as a tool that supports the planning and decision-making 
with respect to implementing the Sunset Supply Base system.  Of course, it could not be 
expected that the SSB system would be the solution for all Navy programs nor is it 
intended to replace traditional support practices, but as mentioned previously its true 
value is realized when its implementation is in conjunction with current processes.  In 
fact, the acceptance of the SSB system only provides the PM with additional cost 
effective solution scenarios in terms of weapon system support, maintainability and 
operational readiness.  Therefore, this document focuses on the SSB as a viable solution 
alternative for the Navy PMOs to consider in their decision-making efforts with respect 
to optimizing return-on-investment (ROI).  The phrase return-on-investment is not 
necessarily used in the strict sense here, but rather alludes to the challenge of reducing 
life-cycle costs while maintaining adequate support levels and system baseline stability 
over predefined periods of time.  However, since ROI is in effect a measure of a 
companys performance, it is appropriate in this case since the task of the PMOs is to get 
the most bang for the buck so to speak, which is in essence a measure of their 
performance.  With that said, the analysis presented within this document will consider 
several financial metrics to be discussed in more detail later in this document.  For now it 
is important to understand the value of this business case in the selection process of 
solution alternatives within a solution space.  This business case analysis will detail the 
likely financial results and business consequences of implementing the SSB system so 
that the proposed benefits and risks are succinctly documented and understood.  
This Business Case Analysis (BCA) looks at the implementation of the SSB 
system on the Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS) Mk1.  It will consider the consequences 
of implementing the SSB infrastructure for providing COTS support for the SSDS 
program.  These consequences, which will include both tangible and intangible results, 
will be analyzed for conformance to DoD policy, program requirements and overall 
cost/benefit.  Furthermore, it will look at how well the actual implementation relates to 
the goals and objectives of the SSB.  In short, this business case will examine the likely 
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 costs and benefits that will result in implementing the SSB system for supporting the 
SSDS program.  In considering SSB implementation this analysis will report on four 
scenarios: 
• Traditional support practices.  
• Full SSB implementation in which all COTS components are support via 
Sunset Supply Base infrastructure. 
• Partial SSB, where only those COTS components are supported in which the 
OEM and Sunset Supplier have agreed to enter into a contractual relationship.  
• Modified SSB implementation, where the use of the SSB system is only used 
where it makes sense.  The SSDS Cots Working Group, which is responsible 
for overall execution and management of the SSB system for a particular 
program, makes these decisions. 
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 IV.  SUNSET SUPPLY BASE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
In establishing specific goals and objectives, it is important to understand the 
DoD/Navy needs and expectations.  In general, the DoD/Navy is focused on improving 
program supportability and extending the reparability of COTS for 5 years and beyond.  
Furthermore, they are looking for a mechanism that will align COTS update cycles with 
program technology refresh and insertion cycles.  The SSB accomplishes this by 
providing valuable insight to potential obsolescence issues through available predictive 
toolsets.  Additionally, the SSB will mitigate maintenance and supportability issues at the 
assembly level.  Having this capability is only part of the solution though; success will 
depend on productive and effective partnering between government and private sector 
entities.  Moreover, this partnering must be met with a willingness to develop long-term 
relationships.  Therefore, one of the objectives of the DoD/Navy within the SSB 
environment is to encourage such teaming while ensuring desirable benefits for all 
participants while protecting individual interests (i.e. COTS OEMs proprietary design 
rights).  In developing these long-term relationships, the DoD/Navy must precisely 
identify the roles and responsibilities of all participants in the SSB process.  A first step is 
to define the interfaces and establish how these interfaces will be managed to achieve 
efficiency and success.  Continued success will depend on constant awareness and 
assessment as to why each entity chooses to participate and to provide incentives for 
continued involvement. 
As described, the main objective of the SSB is to provide an alternative solution 
to the PMs for supporting COTS products over a predefined period of time at an 
affordable and even reduced cost to the program.  There are also specific goals of 
implementing the SSB.  These goals are listed below.  In reviewing this list, keep in mind 
that the overarching objective is to be able to reach these goals while reducing Life Cycle 
Costs (LCC).  In each case, achieving the respective goal becomes a valuable asset in 
itself and the investment needed to reach each goal must be appropriate for the value 
derived. 
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 A. SSB SPECIFIC GOALS: 
 Achieve significant and quantifiable cost savings over the product life cycle. 
The SSB process makes upfront cost assessments that will provide valuable 
knowledge needed for effective decision-making.  Cost structures will be tracked and 
continually assessed over the product life cycle resulting in the capability of procuring 
products at the point of customer demand vice Life of Type Buys (LTB) at the assembly 
level based on traditional predictive models. 
To be able to identify, quantify, and mitigate supportability risk to programs. 
The SSB process must methodically and adequately derive the risks associated 
with obsolescence.  These risks identified must be measurable in order to successfully 
mitigate them.  Furthermore, the information and knowledge gained through this process 
must be accessible by all participants.  
Extend the life cycle and supportability of COTS. 
In defining the metrics for ensuring long-term COTS supportability, the SSB 
process must consider the war-fighter supportability requirements.  The challenge is to 
meet expected military performance goals by continuing to leverage commercial 
technology developments while at the same time being able to offset the problem of 
diminishing material.  
Provide infrastructure to support existing platform/combat systems in support of the 
PMO. 
The SSB must focus on the PMO objectives for developing and sustaining 
weapon systems.  To this end, the SSB must be capable of effectively identifying 
program risk and then mitigate these risks as they relate to COTS and life cycle 
management.  Success will hinge on providing an infrastructure as early as possible in the 
development process in order to establish the supportability of COTS components. 
A reliable, affordable, repeatable, and expandable process that meets the customers 
performance expectations (e.g., accessible, transportable, maintainable, predictable). 
The SSB process must be flexible.  To this end, the characteristics of such a 
process must be definable and repeatable.  In effect, the SSB process must provide an 
additional option to supporting fielded COTS hardware as well as an alternative solution 
to DMSMS/Obsolescence Management for the overall program.  This utility must have 
minimal to no impact on system performance. 
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 Institutionalize methods for proactive management of COTS including DMSMS issues. 
The institutionalization of these methods will require the development of non-
standard Integrated Logistic Support (ILS), contract strategies and implementation 
methodologies that will access the commercial support base.  In doing this, the process 
must be sensitive to proprietary design rights and provide a forum for appropriate 
negotiations.  The methods employed shall improve product supportability problem 
detection and provide sufficient time for appropriate decision-making processes to 
implement the recommendations of the analysis for alternatives and solutions.  Overall it 
shall provide aid to the decision-maker by producing technology assessment and 
management guidance at various levels - piece parts, lowest replaceable units, units, 
subsystems and multiple platforms. 
A system that leverages Navy and commercial supportability assets and provides a 
networked solution. 
The key to achieving this goal is for the SSB process to effectively coordinate the 
existing governmental functions that currently perform DMSMS/Obsolescence 
Management.  By taking advantage of the various agencies that provide such functions, 
the SSB process leverages this information or knowledge on behalf of the PMO as well 
as participating commercial supportability assets.  Success will depend on a robust and 
effective communication scheme that is both maintainable and fully meshed across the 
SSB entities. 
Leverage across government programs with extended applicability through contract 
strategies, methodologies, and incentives to entice commercial industry participation. 
The process must be transportable in terms of its applicability to various DoD 
entities and their contract strategies.  The SSB process will attempt to identify and 
integrate common functions across DoD/Navy agencies that deal with integrated 
logistical support.  To this end, a more focused effort towards COTS supportability is 
realized that should also provide greater flexibility in dealing with the commercial sector.  
This scenario should be capable of providing incentives for the commercial industry into 
develop long-term relationships with the DoD/Navy. 
Forecast budget requirements in support of the programs/war fighter/consumer. 
Key to meeting this goal is the level of confidence achieved in presenting the 
outputs from obsolescence assessments and supportability method trade-offs.  This 
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 confidence should be realized at the PMO level and provide them with predictive 
information that will empower them to make the most appropriate programmatic 
decisions. 
Improve schedule flexibility and support options of system upgrades or new development 
initiatives.  
Schedule flexibility refers to optimizing the provisioning timeframes.  
Optimization will be accomplished by providing alternative support options for system 
upgrades or new development efforts.  These alternatives should be tailored for the 
warfighter and the support activities needs.  The benefits that the SSB will strive for are 
immediate supportability, elimination of government levels of inventory stock, 
expeditious and reliable delivery to the warfighter, and commercial warranty of 
components. 
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 V.  SUNSET SUPPLY BASE OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of the SSB process provide the rational for deciding the 
applicability of the SSB infrastructure.  By formally stating the overall objectives of this 
subject, we essentially establish a basis by which the analysis can assign values to 
specific benefits and ultimately guide this effort into making a reasonable conclusion 
statement and provide realistic recommendations.  These objectives are categorized and 
discussed below. 
B. FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS PERFORMANCE 
The overall objective mandated by the current Department of Defense (DoD) 
Systems Acquisition Process (DoD 5000) is to improve performance, including quality, 
at lower costs.  This process focuses on delivering advanced or at least current 
technology to the warfighter faster.  Program Management Offices (PMO) are challenged 
to offer rapid acquisition of reliable and supportable technology while also reducing Total 
Ownership Costs and improved affordability.  In meeting this challenge, we see a 
proliferation of interoperable systems using COTS products.  Also, we see quite often the 
use of similar COTS across weapon systems that are separate and distinct and have no 
physical or logical dependence on each other.  The use of COTS in itself brings a certain 
risk with regards to the ability to support them long-term due to Diminishing 
Manufacturing Sources, and Material Shortages (DMSMS) and obsolescence, and the 
fact that many different programs or weapon systems are using the same COTS products, 
only increases the risks and threats to system sustainability across these programs.  
Therefore, the SSB process attacks these two areas, risk and costs, by providing a 
potential architectural solution that specifically addresses the issue of obsolescence and 
DMSMS, thereby reducing both risk and costs to the program.  In answering the mail on 
this, so to speak, the SSB process strives to compress the provisioning timeframes, by 
partnering with private industry and providing them with incentives (as previously 
mentioned) to assume some of the risk (i.e. immediate supportability and warranty) and 
costs (i.e. stockage, storage and issue of COTS spares and repair parts).  Establishing 
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 these characteristics will have positive impacts in terms of supportability, program 
planning, program risk and TOC. 
C. STRATEGIC POSITION AND OWNERSHIP 
Partnering with the private sector to take advantage of commercial technology 
advances as well as support and maintenance are firmly established mechanisms used by 
the DoD/Navy.  The potential cost savings that the DoD determined would be possible by 
pooling the expertise and capabilities found in private industry brought about this 
situation.  Partnering takes on many forms (i.e. teaming, procurement/sales, work-share 
arrangements); but the important point here is that they exist and are being utilized more 
and more by the PMOs.[5) OSD]  Furthermore, the Program Manager (PM) as part of the 
acquisition strategy must establish a support strategy (PM Toolkit).  In fact, this plan 
must address life-cycle sustainment and continuous improvement of product 
affordability,  and supportability, while sustaining readiness. [6) OSD] To this end, 
the PM has at their disposal a set of tools used to help in the decision-making process for 
determining the most cost effective alternative for supporting the system.  The SSB 
architecture is challenged to position itself within this toolset as a viable alternative.  A 
strategy for positioning the SSB architecture within the supportability analysis repertoire 
would include establishment or improvement of strategic alliances.  The SSB architecture 
has already been implemented on three Navy programs (Ship Self Defense System 
(SSDS) MKI, SSDS MKII, and Sonar Mine Detecting Set (AN/ASQ-20X)) The 
relationships developed between the participating commercial entities and the Navy 
agencies should lobby the DoD executive offices with sufficient detail as to the benefits 
of implementing the SSB architecture on the respective programs.  Since the SSB 
architecture was built on existing expertise and functions within the Navy, the SSB 
process is in fact owned and therefore managed by the DoD/Navy.  Additionally, the 
long-term relationships that will be realized through the SSB environment should further 
emphasis and influence the policy-making office within the DoD as to the potential gains 
not only in the performance of supportability and sustainability functions, but in 
maintaining key core government technologies as well. 
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 D. OPERATIONS AND FUNCTIONS 
The objective here is simple  to improve program supportability by extending 
COTS reparability for 5 years and beyond.  Why 5 years? Typically, the development of 
military systems has been 10 to 15 years, and the DoD/Navy have experienced 
approximately 5 to 7 year efforts for technology refresh or insertion.  The reason for this 
is primarily due to the inherent nature of DoD to take a purposely conservative and 
thoughtful approach to implementing change.  The DoD have constructed very well-
defined controls for managing the acquisition process, which have in effect created 
obstacles for keeping pace with commercial product development.  This conservative 
approach has resulted in a disconnect between the life cycle of COTS products and the 
typical reaction time of the DoD/Navy to field new equipment.  The life cycle for COTS 
products are approximately 18 months to as much as 5 years (although rare), whereas the 
DoD typically takes 2 to 3 years in planning and an additional 5 to 7 years for 
implementation.  The problem of supporting these weapon systems is further 
compounded when these weapon systems are expected to perform over an extended life 
cycle  possibly greater than 15 years.  Given this situation, the SSB process has 
identified as an objective to support the product development cycle and ultimately the 
system life cycle.  For weapon systems that have deployed COTS, the SSB architecture 
offers an opportunity for supporting existing technologies.  Success in these areas will 
fulfill the SSB architectures commitment to improving operations and functions within 
the PMO since they are the ones who must manage the program over its lifetime.  
E. PRODUCT AND SERVICES 
In terms of product and service, the SSB architecture offers a truly unique and 
effective process for improving customer satisfaction.  The customer in this case is the 
warfighter who use and maintain the system.  The PMO must ensure that they deliver key 
enabling technologies that must also be supportable for fixed periods of time.  The SSB 
architecture offers an additional alternative for the PMO to consider as part of their 
support strategy.  Furthermore, the SSB process allows the PM to match the COTS 
update cycles with the programs technical roadmap or refresh effort.  The product is 
essentially a set of well-defined tools that provide obsolescence indicators and reports as 
well as the ability to mitigate maintenance and supportability issues at the assembly level.  
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 By establishing and managing this information, the PMO becomes empowered with the 
knowledge necessary to deliver an improved customer service.  In the long run the 
system integrity is maintained, which has several implications in terms of Integrated 
Logistical Support (ILS) - i.e. training, manuals, configuration control 
F. IMAGE 
This is an unusual area since we are not talking about the image of a specific 
entity like an agency or company.  The objective here is to promote the idea of the SSB 
architecture as a viable, effective and valuable alternative based on costs and benefits.  At 
first glance, it may appear to some that the SSB process is trying to hold onto older 
technology.  Old, meaning technology associated with COTS products that have been 
discontinued.  The fact of the matter is that the DoD/Navy has not been able to keep up 
with commercial product update cycles as earlier mentioned.  In a perfect world, it would 
be great to be able to transfer commercial state-of-the-art technology to the warfighter the 
moment it was deemed ready or at least when it hit the market.  But as described 
previously, the acquisition process institutionalized by the DoD offers too many obstacles 
to achieve this.  Although Acquisition Reform has yielded great gains in streamlining the 
acquisition process, it is still purposely conservative, deliberate and methodical, which 
translates to slow when compared to the current commercial development cycles.  So as 
the military acquisition community is pushed by DoD 5000 to use COTS products as the 
preferred alternative for use in its weapon systems, the obsolescence issues are slowly 
getting worse.  Also, extending the service life of currently fielded systems has been the 
norm for many years.  The B-52 platform is probably the most notable and perhaps worst 
case.  Its been in service since 1955, and is not expected to be phased-out until 2040 
(94+ years).  The 1994 issue of Army RD&A Bulletin highlighted this fact by stating how 
many current military systems are generally on a 54-year replacement cycle while 
technology has a half-life from 2 to 10 years. [7) Augustine]  Most systems dont 
have such a life expectancy, but 15 to 30 years is fairly common.  And when you realize 
that the fast pace nature of the OEM often take their products off the market regardless of 
the impact to the Navy, its not hard to understand the need for a process that is designed 
to provide real solutions to this obsolescence issue.  This is not news to the PMOs as they 
have been force to deal with DMSMS, which is why they routinely fund and support 
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 DMSMS activities to meet the Navys ever increasing need.  The SSB system is designed 
to specifically address these risks, but more importantly, it is expected to work with 
existing support systems as an interfacing method to optimize solutions in managing the 
obsolescence risk on COTS products.  Furthermore, not only does the SSB system offer 
significant supportability and cost benefits to the PMOs, it also strives to be recognized 
as a contributor in Navy/Industry cooperation, a major initiative underway particularly in 
the Navy.  Getting this point across is one of the objectives of this business case.  
Therefore a case will be made based on both tangible and intangible benefits and the 
costs to achieve them, hopefully leading to a department wide adoption of the SSB 
concept.  So promoting the image of the SSB is a challenging yet important objective for 
this business case. 
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 VI.  BUSINESS NEEDS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Over the years the Department of Defense (DoD) has been plagued with 
development programs that have experienced significant cost overruns and schedules that 
have slid to the right all too often.  In the end, the delivered weapon systems prove to be 
of little value due to the enormous delay of deploying them.  The challenge to design, 
develop and implement processes to address these issues is an ongoing initiative.  Making 
government more efficient has been a continuous theme for years now.  In fact, as early 
as 1980 Congress passed the Paperwork Reduction Act in a step towards improving 
government performance.  In 1993 the Government Performance and Results Act, which 
required government agencies to set strategic goals, measure performance, and reported 
on the degree to which goals were met.[8) GAO]  More recently, in 1996, Congress 
passed the Information Technology Management and Reform Act (Clinger-Cohen Act).  
This act essentially required government agencies to improve the way they selected and 
managed Information Technology (IT) projects.[9) Clinger-Cohen] Soon after, the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) established circular A-130, Management of Federal 
Information Resources.  The purpose of this circular was to further establish a policy for 
managing Federal Information Resources. [10) OMB]  The result of the Clinger-Cohen 
Act and OMB Circular A-130 was the establishment of a comprehensive approach by 
individual federal agencies to improve the acquisition and management of their IT 
development efforts.  Working within this new process, PMOs began aligning their 
resources in support of their respective strategic missions.  To be effective they began to 
implement investment management strategies that established control mechanisms that 
would align the appropriation of funds to their strategic mission.  In effect, they improved 
the way they selected, planned and managed their development programs by restructuring 
the way they allocated their resources before any initial investment was made in a 
particular program.  One of the ways these agencies achieved this was rethinking the 
selection process.  Traditionally, priorities were given to their programs and subsequent 
decisions on which programs would be funded were made based on this.  Under this new 
way of thinking, the selection process was centered on a programs cost, benefit and risk 
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 assessments.  These three elements would be quantified and analyzed prior to any release 
of funds.  In essence, a Business Case Analysis was performed as part of the selection 
process.  
In terms of the Sunset Supply Base concept, a Business Case Analysis (BCA) is 
presented in this document to reflect its benefits and importance to the DoD/Navys 
mission.  Therefore, this document includes information on scope, alternatives, costs, 
benefits, risk and acquisition strategy.  An overview of the SSB process has already been 
given, as well as its goals and objectives.  As part of this analysis we must align these 
with the DoD/Navy objectives for product support.  At this point it is important to 
address these DoD/Navy objectives in broad terms as identified below.  
B. BUSINESS CASE 
In todays environment, PMs are guided to make program technical decisions 
based on the business objectives of their agency.  In terms of product support solutions, 
system baseline assessments are made, which form the basis for conducting the business 
case analysis.  The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics) describes the business 
case as a tool used to manage business process improvement activities from inception 
through implementation.  A business case is a document that identifies functional 
alternatives and presents economical and technical arguments for carrying out 
alternatives over the life cycle to achieve stated business objectives or imperatives." [11) 
DUSDL] Business Cases are created all the time for Performance Based Logistics (PBL) 
tasking.  PBL is a NAVICP initiative that focuses on improving supportability as well as 
cost of ownership reduction efforts.  We will cover PBL in more detail later on in this 
document, but for now it is important to understand that a Business Case Analysis is 
conducted for PBL in which alternative support solutions are assessed in terms of their 
ability to meet the logistics performance objectives of the warfighter.  To this end, there 
are guidelines under DoD 5000 [12) DoD] for cost/benefit analysis used specifically for 
making business trade-offs decisions with regards to the most cost effective product 
support solution(s).  So to recap, the Navy looks to the Business Case for making 
decisions on support strategies in an effort to provide the best supportability scenario at 
the most affordable level. 
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C. PRODUCT SUPPORT 
Product support is a package of logistical support functions necessary to maintain 
the readiness and operational capability of a system.  To achieve the appropriate level of 
readiness and operational capability of a system, a system must be designed to be 
reliable, maintainable, interoperable, and provide internal diagnostics and prognostics.  
But just as important is the logistical support functions which include supply chain 
integration, sustainment engineering, obsolescence management, distributed training, and 
a manageable integrated weapon system data environment.  These functions all play an 
important role in supporting military capability.  Military capability is defined by four 
major components: [13) DAU] 
Force Structure  Refers to the capability of a military force based on its structure.  
A force structure must be robust, capable, equipped, trained, organized, and optimized in 
order to succeed on the battlefield.  Product support is a crucial element to meeting the 
required level of capability. 
Modernization  Refers to the task of a military force to modernize its forces and 
the weapon systems that they deploy.  It is a key element to military superiority over 
present and future adversaries. 
Readiness  Refers to the capability of a military force to accomplish the expected 
mission for which they were designed.  Although military readiness is difficult to 
adequately quantify as a whole, the support component is not.  Without proper support, 
weapon system sustainment and ultimately warfighter capability are severely 
compromised. 
Sustainability  Refers to the capability of a military force to maintain the 
necessary level and duration of operations to achieve military objectives.  Sustainability 
depends on ready forces, materiel, and consumables in enough quantities and working 
order to support military efforts. 
With respect to each of these four components, product support plays a crucial 
role.  In terms of force structure, by increasing system availability levels through 
261 
 improved product support mechanisms we can also minimize the support requirements 
for military manpower.  Reducing manpower requirements in the support area translates 
to a reallocation of these resources to core warfighting missions.  With respect to 
modernization, support strategies that result in lower support costs means that these funds 
can be redirected to achieve the Navys re-capitalization and modernization objectives.  
Readiness is improved when support strategies are designed and executed to meet 
military performance requirements.  And finally, if the support strategy are designed and 
executed to accurately assess support requirements, then the weapon systems themselves 
become more sustainable.  To optimize readiness and sustainability, a product support 
process must be capable of anticipating vulnerabilities in the supply chain and provide 
resources at the moment they are needed.  In fact, per NAVAIR’s Contracting for 
Supportability Guide, PMs are directed to a strategy that procures these items when they 
are required. [14) NAVAIR] 
In the end, the Navys objective for product support in a rather broad sense is to 
migrate to a product support strategy that is based on output measures such as availability 
of weapon system equipment.  In fact, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for logistics and Material Readiness had chaired a joint service/defense agency 
team in preparing a comprehensive product support strategy, titled Product Support for 
the 21st Century, which advocates a more customer-focused product support environment. 
[15) DUSD]  An environment that offers a best value approach to fulfilling warfighter 
demands.  
D. LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT 
One of the main objectives of our military today is to continuously improve the 
operational effectiveness of its weapon systems resulting in a more capable warfighter.  
To this end, life-cycle support plays a critical role in ensuring that the warfighters 
requirements are met throughout the life cycle of the weapon system.  Since many of the 
Navys weapon systems can expect life cycles that exceed 10 and even 20 years, the DoD 
as part of their Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 have identified logistics as a crucial element 
for warfighter operational effectiveness.  The weapon system support infrastructure must 
be capable of providing immediate support in a crisis situation.  These product support 
strategies must be tailored in order to provide appropriate levels of readiness and 
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 sustainment to all elements of the strategic and tactical operational forces.[16) DoD]  By 
promoting a tailored product support environment, the warfighter will benefit in terms of 
responsiveness.  A more tailored approach translates to more flexibility and ultimately 
greater effectiveness in life-cycle support.  Needless to say, the acquisition community is 
constrained by very institutionalized policies and procedures; nevertheless, there are still 
opportunities for innovative and collaborative strategies that infuse flexibility into the 
support process.  Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 places more focus on logistics and 
challenge the acquisition community to expose these opportunities in meeting the 
demands of the warfighter. [17) DoD]  This challenge is continuous and is focused on 
meeting the needs of evolving warfighter requirements.  So to effectively meet the 
product support demands over the life cycle of the weapon system the PMO must also 
manage the warfighters requirements as well.  Part of this responsibility includes 
identification and insertion of technology.  A planned approach for technology insertion 
must match warfighter requirements.  Based on these requirements and the available 
technology, the Program Manager (PM) must decide on an appropriate technology 
refresh cycle.  These tech refresh cycles should be determined around technology, 
warfighter requirements, and potential enhancements.  They should not be based on 
material shortages or obsolescence.  With that said, the PM should have at their disposal 
a set of product support alternatives to optimize this effort over the life cycle of the 
weapon system. 
1. Cost 
Per DoD 5000.1, Departments are expected to integrate the acquisition and 
logistics processes that are focused on Total Ownership Costs (TOC).[12) DoD]  
Furthermore, the directive identifies supportability as a key performance factor.  In effect, 
the support strategy becomes a part of the Systems Engineering process.  In this way, the 
PM can gain better control of the costs associated with supporting the weapon system.  
Cost has become an even greater concern in the DoDs current fiscal environment.  The 
military is challenged to continue an aggressive modernization program in light of 
increased operations.  Additionally, modernization efforts are further threatened due to 
expectations of near-term readiness levels of existing systems and reductions in 
infrastructure.  The days of simply increasing the defense budget are gone.  Given the 
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 tempo of military operations over the years, it is easy to conclude that these operations 
take precedence over future modernization efforts.  In fact, according to the Joint 
Aviation Logistics Board (JALB) June 1999 report on Commercial Support of Aviation 
Systems, since 1990 procurement activities have dropped by 53 percent where operations 
and maintenance efforts have decreased by only 15 percent. [18) McIlvaine]  From this it 
is easy to see that replacement of existing systems are being delayed as well as a likely 
lengthening in the technology refresh cycles.  In the May 1997 Report of the Quadrennial 
Defense Review, then Secretary of Defense William Cohen highlighted this fact by 
stating that we are facing a gradual aging of military force. [19) DoD]  As a result of this 
environment, current political pressures have driven the PMOs to explore more 
economical alternatives to supporting warfighter requirements. 
2. DoD Supportability Goals 
As stated earlier, the Department of Defense Directive 5000 series directs the 
PMOs to focus on TOC as a key element of measure for acquisition performance while 
meeting warfighter requirements.  The challenge is to meet warfighter demands, in terms 
of overall capability, at an affordable cost.  Since there is an obvious cost delta from one 
support method to the next, we conclude that the support strategy directly impacts both 
warfighter capability and cost.  Therefore, DoDD 5000.1 defines supportability as a key 
performance variable in the systems engineering process and it further emphasizes the 
importance of supportability in light of a continual evolving logistics state that is striving 
to support joint operational forces.  In an effort to gain control over the impacts that 
supportability has on cost and warfighter capability, DoDD 5000 instructs the PMs to 
consider logistics as part of the design process leading to a support strategy that is applied 
throughout the weapon system life-cycle.  The ultimate objective being the delivery of 
reliable weapon systems that can be cost-effectively supported.  This demand for full-
life-cycle support management pushes the PMs to plan for initial procurement, re-
procurement, and post-production support.  In planning to support existing as well as 
weapon systems under development, the following goals have been derived from the 







Integrate supply chains to achieve cross-functional efficiencies and provide 
improved customer service through performance-based arrangements or 
contracts. 
The PM should take advantage of the existing functions that exist within the DoD 
as well as the contractor base.  Consideration given to these entities should lead to an 
integration of these elements through traditional contracting arrangements.  In this way 
the PM can optimize the support process.  By integrating the expertise from these cross-
functional elements the PM can expect greater performance and improve customer 
service. 
Segment support by system or subsystem and delineate agreements to meet 
specific customer needs. 
In terms of meeting warfighter support requirements the PM should consider 
applying support methods specific to the needs of the system or subsystem.  One method 
clearly should not be applied across the board.  The PM should consider the various 
alternatives and perform analysis to determine the best approach in terms of meeting 
warfighter demands as well as cost.  In determining specific support solutions for a 
system or subsystem, contractual agreements can then be put in place to effectively 
manage that particular system or subsystem. 
Maintain relationship with warfighter to the extent that system readiness can be 
continually assessed and maintained. 
In the face of evolving warfighter capabilities and subsequently new development 
efforts as well as service extension of existing weapon systems, the PM must strive to 
keep abreast of current and future support requirements.  Success will depend on 
continual communication with the warfighter in addition to establishing effective support 
strategies.  
Select best-value, long-term product support strategies. 
In an effort to provide the best performance at an affordable cost, the PM must 
consider all available support options and attempt to coordinate these alternatives into a 
comprehensive strategy that exhibits best-value over predefined periods of time. 
Measure support performance based on availability of mission capable systems, 
instead of on distinct elements such as parts, maintenance and data. 
Support performance directly impacts mission capability.  The support strategy 
should address the impact of support on mission capability.  To this end, availability 
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 requirements address the readiness of the system.  Overall system availability is 
dependent on the distinct elements of parts, maintenance and data; but the specifics of 
these are not adequate for clear assessment of mission capability.  That is, the 
mechanisms of the support alternatives are transparent to the overall objective of 
supporting the warfighter.  The support options are considered based on overall 
effectiveness in meeting customer capability and cost expectations.  
6) Improve product supportability, system reliability, maintainability, and 
supportability via continuous, dedicated investment in technology refreshment 
through adoption of performance specifications, commercial standards, non-
developmental items, and commercial-off-the-shelf items where feasible, in 
both the initial acquisition design phase and in all subsequent modification and 
re-procurement actions.  
This goal is aimed at providing the warfighter with the latest supportable 
technology in an effort to improve weapon system performance.  This is perhaps the 
greatest challenge the PM faces.  The misalignment of DoD acquisition technology 
refresh cycles and the commercial technology update cycles, as alluded to previously in 
this document, pushes the PM to be innovative in terms of supporting COTS/NDI 
systems.  Ideally, the PM would like to redesign or refresh a system in order to provide 
greater capabilities to the warfighter rather than due to obsolescence or diminishing 
material.  This situation must be dealt with for all phases of the system life cycle. 
The overarching theme of DoDD 5000, with respect to supportability, is that 
product support is part of the Systems Engineering process.  And a key component of this 
process is supportability analysis.  Furthermore, this analysis is to be executed throughout 
the weapon system life cycle and not simply confined to post-deployment.  The analysis 
should consider reliability, availability and maintainability (RAM).  The RAM system 
requirements cover both product support and training aspects.  These elements are 
derived from the warfighter readiness requirements and shall be documented in a well-
planned support strategy. [21) DoD]  The support strategy should be tailored to the 
specific weapon system and its unique characteristics in terms of COTS, NDI, and MIL-
Spec mix as well as the feasibility of particular support alternatives.  In the end, the 
ultimate goal is to provide the warfighter with the level of capability readiness they 
demand in the most cost-effective manner.  And since supportability is a major 
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 component in meeting this requirement, the supportability strategy should consider all 
supportability solution alternatives in an effort to deliver a best-value approach. 
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 VII.  ALIGNMENT OF STRATEGIC BUSINESS OBJECTIVES 
AND GOALS 
In this section we attempt to align the objectives and goals of the Sunset Supply 
Base (SSB) system with DoD objectives and goals.  The purpose here is to see how the 
SSB system meets the needs and expectations of the Navys acquisition process.  Prior to 
any analysis it is important to ensure that the system under study is appropriately 
addressing the concerns or deficiencies found within the targeted environment.  In this 
case we are looking at how the SSB objectives fits into the Navy acquisition process and 
what goals it can help fulfill.  Since we cannot expect a one-for-one alignment, the 
approach here is to consider how each objective or goal of the SSB fulfills, in some part, 
the objectives and goals determined for the agency (DoD/Navy). 
A.       ALIGNMENT OF OBJECTIVES 
1. Business Case 
As discussed earlier the Navy looks to the Business Case for making decisions on 
support strategies in an effort to provide the best supportability scenario at the most 
affordable level.  This document itself serves to fulfill this objective.  A business case 
analysis of the SSB concept is to be performed to give the reader an understanding of the 
benefits offered and at what costs.  Based on the outcome of this analysis, one of the 
objectives of this effort is to promote the idea of the SSB architecture as a viable, 
effective and valuable alternative based on costs and benefits.  Therefore, keeping in line 
with the Navys expectation of a business case approach to determining acceptance of an 
alternative, a case will be made for the SSB system based on both tangible and intangible 
benefits and the costs to achieve them, hopefully leading to a department wide adoption 
of the SSB concept. 
2. Product Support 
The Navys objective for product support is to migrate to a product support 
strategy that is based on output measures such as availability of weapon system 
equipment, an environment that offers a best value approach to fulfilling warfighter 
demands.  In essence, the Navy is looking for ways to improve performance.  
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 Performance is defined by how well a support strategy meets warfighter supportability 
requirements and at what cost.  Of course there is always a trade-off between 
performance and cost, and the Program Managers (PM) are given a set of tools to manage 
this performance/cost relationship.  In terms of product support, the PMs have at their 
disposal a collection of alternatives to optimize their support strategy.  As part of its 
Strategic Positioning objective, the SSB architecture is challenged to position itself 
within this toolset as a viable alternative.  Furthermore the support strategy is to be 
applied throughout the weapon system life cycle; the ultimate objective being the 
delivery of reliable weapon systems that can be cost-effectively supported.  This includes 
plans for initial procurement, re-procurement, and post-production support.  
Understanding these demands, the PM is challenged to deliver key enabling technologies 
that must be supportable for fixed periods of time.  The SSB infrastructure is driven to 
provide this long-term supportability insurance.  In fact, as part of its objective to 
positively impact Navy supportability functions, the SSB process is geared towards 
improving program supportability by extending COTS support during the initial 
procurement, re-procurement, and post-production phases.  In the end, for weapon 
systems that have deployed COTS, the SSB architecture offers an opportunity for 
supporting these existing or key enabling technologies.  In the end, both the Navy 
acquisition community and the SSB process are driven not only to optimize the 
performance of supportability and sustainability functions, but also in maintaining key 
technologies.  So in terms of product support, the SSB objectives concur with the Navys 
acquisition expectations with respect to supporting the products and weapon systems in 
the most proficient and cost effective manner. 
3. Life-Cycle Management 
DoDD 5000 emphasizes how life-cycle support plays a critical role in ensuring 
that the warfighters requirements are met throughout the life cycle of the weapon 
system.  As mentioned previously, the PM should have at their disposal a set of product 
support alternatives to optimize this effort over the life cycle of the weapon system.  
Again, the SSB infrastructure as part of its Strategic Positioning objective hopes to make 
a case for the DoD acquisition policy makers as to the benefits of including this process 
as part of the PMs toolset of supportability solution alternatives.  In terms of enhancing 
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 the operations and functions of DoD supportability process, the SSB process has 
identified as an objective to support the product development cycle and ultimately the 
system life cycle.  In particular, the SSB process focuses on maintaining system baseline 
stability between technology refresh dates over the entire life of the weapon system.  To 
this end, the SSB process was designed to have positive impacts in terms of 
supportability, program planning, and program risk, with the objective of influencing 
improvements in the life cycle management of the program. 
4. Cost 
The Program Management Offices (PMO) are guided by DoDD 5000 to explore 
more economical alternatives to supporting warfighter requirements with the overall 
objective of meeting warfighter demands, in terms of overall capability, at an affordable 
cost.  Again, one of the objectives of the SSB concept is to offer an additional 
supportability solution alternative for improving performance in supporting the weapon 
system, including quality, at lower costs.  So in architecting the SSB system, the intent 
was to not only have positive impacts to supportability, program planning, and program 
risk, but to also introduce significant reductions in Total Ownership Costs (TOC). 
B. ALIGNMENT OF GOALS 




1.  Integrate supply chains to achieve cross-functional efficiencies and provide improved 
customer service through performance-based arrangements or contracts 
7 A system that leverages Navy and commercial supportability assets and provides a networked solution. 
8 
Leverage across government programs with extended applicability through 
contract strategies, methodologies, and incentives to entice commercial 
industry participation. 
2.  Segment support by system or subsystem and delineate agreements to meet specific 
customer needs. 
4 Provide infrastructure to support existing platform/combat systems in support of the PMO 
5 
A reliable, affordable, repeatable, and expandable process that meets the 
customers performance expectations (e.g., accessible, transportable, 
maintainable, predictable). 
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 Agency SSB Goal(s) 
Goal # 
3.  Maintain relationship with warfighter to the extent that system readiness can be 
continually assessed and maintained. 
4 Provide infrastructure to support existing platform/combat systems in support of the PMO 
5 
A reliable, affordable, repeatable, and expandable process that meets the 
customers performance expectations (e.g., accessible, transportable, 
maintainable, predictable). 
4.  Select best-value, long-term product support strategies. 
1 Achieve significant and quantifiable cost savings over the product life cycle 
3 Extend the life cycle and supportability of COTS. 
9 Forecast budget requirements in support of the programs/war fighter/consumer. 
5.  Measure support performance based on availability of mission capable systems, 
instead of on distinct elements such as parts, maintenance and data. 
5 
A reliable, affordable, repeatable, and expandable process that meets the 
customers performance expectations (e.g., accessible, transportable, 
maintainable, predictable). 
6 Institutionalize methods for proactive management of COTS including DMSMS issues 
6.  Improve product supportability, system reliability, maintainability, and supportability 
via continuous, dedicated investment in technology refreshment through adoption of 
performance specifications, commercial standards, non-developmental items, and 
commercial-off-the-shelf items where feasible, in both the initial acquisition design phase 
and in all subsequent modification and re-procurement actions 
3 Extend the life cycle and supportability of COTS. 
6 Institutionalize methods for proactive management of COTS including DMSMS issues 
9 Forecast budget requirements in support of the programs/war fighter/consumer. 
10 Improve schedule flexibility and support options of system upgrades or new development initiatives 
Appendix C Table 1: Agency and SSB Goal Alignment 
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 VIII.  SSB PURPOSE 
By defining and aligning the SSB objectives and goal with the objectives and 
goals of the DoD/Navy, PMOs we can better focus on the most critical aspects of the 
SSB process and formulate a general purpose for its implementation.  Based on this 
alignment we conclude that the overall purpose of the SSB architecture is to provide 
dependable, cost effective supportability insurance for COTS based weapon and support 
systems.  The SSB process focuses on obsolescence issues and material shortages 
associated with COTS usage in military weapon and support systems.  Addressing these 
specific areas, the SSB provides an opportunity to extend COTS supportability in an 
effort to stabilize the weapon system baseline.  Success is driven by the effectiveness of 
the SSB process to assess and manage COTS technology obsolescence.  The key to 
achieving this lies with the ability of the SSB process to effectively address these issues 
via technology obsolescence forecasting methodologies.  In effect, the SSB architecture 
provides a process for managing changes to COTS based systems.  Figure 2 illustrates the 
17-Step Implementation Process and when combined with other supportive SSB 
infrastructure tools, methods and processes, provides a continuous review/mitigation of 
DMSMS issues.  Ultimately, the SSB architecture exists to respond to the demands of the 
warfighter.  The warfighter requirements are communicated to the PMO, and the PMO is 
tasked to develop and support systems that provide the expected combat power.  As part 
of the Systems Engineering process the PMs develop a support strategy that 
accommodates the warfighter requirements.  The SSB architecture offers a support 
alternative that when implemented as part of the support strategy, adds speed and agility 
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 IX.  GENERAL APPROACH 
In this Business Case Analysis (BCA) we will address various supportability 
scenarios in terms of overall support costs.  This cost is comprised of procurement costs 
and the resource dollars needed to implement the respective scenario.  Cost data will be 
considered over a ten-year support period for the Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS).  
Each scenario will be evaluated in terms of overall cost, benefit and risk.  We will then 
focus on the SSB implementation and how it compares to the other scenarios as well as 
how well it fulfills the objectives and goals stated within this document.  In terms of 
evaluation criteria, we will look at funding profiles, initial investments, program 
flexibility and risk.  The actual costs will be weighed against the benefits and evaluated 
for consistency to overall DoD guidance.  This process will establish clearly defined 
financial and non-financial benefits of the SSB implementation.  These benefits will be 
matched to specific SSB process goals.  The goals will then be used to discuss the 
contributions to the SSB objectives. 
A. INTRODUCTION: SITUATION AND MOTIVATION 
1. Background 
In this section we will identify the situation and motivation factors that lead to the 
formulation of the SSB concept.  With the subject and purpose clearly defined, it is 
important at this point to understand the context of this BCA.  This section will explore 
the realities associated with the DoD/Navy acquisition process in terms of supportability.  
By understanding the full context of this environment, this BCA can then articulate the 
results and recommendations with respect to the main points presented in this section.  
2. Program Management 
Per the guidelines set forth in DoDD 5000, the Program Manager (PM) is 
challenged to develop a support plan that takes advantage of the most effective methods 
in supportability while meeting specific military and statutory requirements.  In this way, 
the PMs can optimize both performance as well as life cycle cost.  The PM has the 
flexibility and authority to choose from a set of solution alternatives (to be covered later 
in this document).  Additionally, the PM has the opportunity to choose between Organic, 
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 internal Navy resources, or commercial sources of supply.  The important thing to 
understand is that the PM has reasonable flexibility in the effort to optimize warfighter 
support.  The primary objective is to achieve maximum weapon system availability at the 
lowest Total Ownership Cost (TOC).  One initiative to achieve these objectives is the 
DoD COTS initiative.  The general inclination is that in both the private and public 
sectors, COTS has been able to reduce costs while delivering the latest technology.  
Unfortunately, the use of COTS products does not come without its share of problems (to 
be discussed in greater detail later in this document).  Nevertheless, the PMs are pushed 
to consider COTS products.  The primary emphasis behind the push for the COTS 
initiative is the speed at which the market forces can deliver the latest technology.  
Subsequently, many Request for Proposals (RFPs) issued by the Program Management 
Offices (PMO) demand a certain level of COTS usage in the system. [17) Carney-
Oberndorf]  This expectation is echoed by DoD policy makers who have instituted 
policies for using COTS products as much as possible.  Needless to say, the proliferation 
of COTS products in military systems has increased over the years.  This increase has 
also lead to an increase in the number of required product upgrades and technical 
refreshes within a system.  Some of the problems that the PMOs have had to manage 
include obsolescence, meeting new performance requirements, and implementation of 
more cost effective support strategies.  Typically, these problems are met with 
engineering changes that tend to be costly.  In reality, what is needed is a more phased 
technology management approach.  An approach which provides three main elements: 
• The ability to assess the technical and supportability status of current 
equipment.  This includes equipment selected in the design phase as well. 
• The ability to recognize potential supportability problems and recommend 
support solution alternatives. 
• The ability to determine the costs of implementing these support-solutions 
over a specific period of time. 
This process of technology assessment should play a critical part of the overall 
life cycle management of military weapon systems.  The information and knowledge 
derived from this process will ultimately improve system integration, product 
replacement, upgrades, and technology insertions of weapon systems that are comprised 
of both military build-to-print equipment and COTS products.  Given the variability of 
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 Mil-Spec and COTS product usage, the PM has options as to source of support, organic 
or commercial.  Armed with the knowledge derived from the technology assessment 
process, the PM can make better decisions on source of support selection that effectively 
optimizes supportability performance and Life Cycle Costs (LCC).  In this way, the PMs 
actions are consistent with military and statutory requirements for using the most 
effective means available for providing maximum weapon system availability at the 
lowest TOC.  
3. Production / Sustaining Support 
With regards to supporting COTS products, two concepts are important to 
understand that have motivated the inception of the SSB concept.  They are Sustainment 
Engineering and producibility.  
Sustainment Engineering  This refers to the ability of sustaining a system for its 
entire life.  Currently sustainment engineering focuses on design for test and reliability, 
and the ability to repair in order to meet availability requirements.  With the onset of 
COTS products in military weapon systems, the task of exercising these functions 
becomes difficult.  Typically, addressing supportability issues associated with COTS 
products takes on a reactive stance.  Re-designs are initiated reactively upon receipt of 
obsolescence or the End of Life (EOL), End of Production (EOP) notice.  That is, little is 
done in terms of re-design until the COTS product has been officially labeled obsolete.  
Therefore, traditional sustainment engineering efforts have become incredibly difficult to 
perform without some insight into future technology trends.  The DoD Acquisition 
Deskbook provides the Flexibile Sustainment Guide, which provides guidance to PMs for 
translating mission needs into stable, affordable and well-managed acquisition 
programs[23) DoD]  The guide strongly urges the use of an open architecture 
approach to designing future weapon systems.  The idea being, that future upgrades could 
be easily and cost effectively implemented if adherence to performance-based standards 
are maintained.  The approach is a tremendous leap in managing DoD programs and its 
complete fruition should be realized years from now.  But many current efforts are still 
struggling with implementing open-system architectures due to the unique requirements 
of the military.  Suffice it to say COTS products have provided some benefit in terms of 
delivering technology affordably, but the supportability issues that come with trying to 
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 sustain a COTS-based system, between periods of technology refresh, have not been 
completely solved. 
Producibility  In the traditional sense, producibility is a measure of the relative 
ease of manufacturing a product.  Typically, this means how easy is the item produced 
from a technical standpoint.  In terms of sustainment, we use producibility to refer to a 
companys commitment and capability in manufacturing a product in an acceptable 
quantity with an expected high degree of quality and reliability.  In looking at major 
weapon systems, one can only imagine the diversity of MIL-Spec and COTS products 
used within a particular system.  From the PMs perspective, support budget 
appropriations and control is profoundly complicated.  Additionally, support engineering 
management is difficult as well, when one considers the likeliness that a program in the 
design phase will be supported from several different sources.  To further complicate the 
situation, the various sources of supply are autonomous groups.  This situation usually 
leads to poor communication between the sources of supply and DoD/Navy on support 
issues.  The PM must rely on engineering support activities to pull the issues of support 
and producibility together in order to accurately assess program direction.  This function 
is important given the interdependence of items in a system.  In general terms, if a change 
is made to one item, due to upgrade or obsolescence, the PM needs to understand the 
impact this will have to other MIL-Spec or COTS items.  The problem grows when we 
consider the chance that impacted items may not be easily producible.  So we see that 
producibility is important because we have to make sure that whatever changes take 
place, we fully understand the impacts, and that we can maintain producibility of the 
system.  Presently, producibility efforts remain largely unorganized.  Given this situation 
a supportability assessment mechanism is needed in order to help PMs stabilize their 
system baselines.  The critical information derived from such assessment will provide 
cost and schedule impact, and availability of critical material and equipment.  The present 
situation is one of minimal producibility engineering activities.  Typically, support issues 
are managed by the respective engineering or support organization.  In effect what occurs 
is that the burden to ensure the system is producible or supportable is on the In-service 
Engineering Agent (ISEA) for that system.  A daunting task to say the least, given the 
necessity for numerous Engineering Change Proposals (ECP) associated with 
278 
 obsolescence.  One should realize that ECPs lead to re-designs, which typically translates 
to increased costs and delays in schedule.  This environment is a driving element for 
conceptualizing a process that can mitigate the risk of having to re-design for reasons of 
obsolescence.  In the end, some attention must be given to maintaining production of 
certain key products for the duration between scheduled technology refresh dates. 
4. Interoperability and Configuration Control 
Interoperability through open systems architecture is not something that has come 
to full fruition with respect to military weapon system implementation.  Military systems 
typically have very unique or stringent requirements that only very specific products can 
fulfill.  To add to this, the systems or subsystems are so sensitive to change that an open-
systems architecture is presently difficult to implement.  If every system and subsystem 
could be redesigned using an open-systems approach, true interoperability could perhaps 
be achieved.  Unfortunately, this is not the case.  In fact, open-system architectures, 
although established as a goal for many DoD programs, will experience an extremely 
slow transition primarily due to funding.  In the mean time, fielded systems as well as 
those presently under development that are using COTS products must be assured of 
supporting these items leading to a stabilized system baseline between periods of update 
or technology refresh.  The importance of this cannot be understated, given the 
certification requirements that every system must meet before it is put into operation.  
The hope of true interoperability is a lofty goal, considering how tightly software and 
hardware are grown dependent over the years.  Given this situation, it is not hard to see 
how a simple hardware change could easily require changes to system software code.  
COTS hardware changes regardless of impact to military applications.  Remember, 
COTS product changes are driven by the market in which the DoD only maintains 
approximately a 0.4% market share.  Additionally, the proliferation of COTS throughout 
military weapon and support systems results in a lack of control over the configuration of 
these products.  By not possessing the design or having access to a design disclosure, the 
PMOs cannot provide insurance to the warfighter that the present system design will be 
stabilized or can effectively be supported for some pre-determined period of time.  
Without this control, the PM will unlikely be aware of changes in manufacturers product 
specifications.  For commercial customers it may be adequate to simply define the inputs 
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 and outputs in product specifications.  However, military applications have been built 
around closely coupled software -- minor changes to a piece of hardware using embedded 
firmware could conceivably result in thousands of hours of software engineering, testing 
and re-certification.  This further emphasizes the need for control over the configuration 
management of COTS products.  The present situation, in terms of interoperability and 
configuration control, assumes or depends on the openness or robustness of these systems 
to handle potential changes to COTS products.  Nevertheless, the sensitivity of presently 
fielded weapon systems to minor changes illustrates the importance of stable COTS 
product configurations for effective support of these military systems. 
5. Performance Based Logistics 
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) is an initiative undertaken by the Naval 
Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) in an effort to improve support as well as 
infrastructure and TOC for Navy weapon and support systems.  The focus is on 
improving customer support and total LCC management where customer input initiates a 
network of sources for delivering best value products and services.  The primary 
objective is to improve the availability and reliability of products that are provided to the 
warfighter. 
Concept  Contracts are awarded to specific suppliers that are then responsible for 
delivering products directly to the warfighter.  All material is managed and stored by the 
supplier with little government intervention.  This situation reduces the associated costs 
to the government.  Each contract is unique depending on products and services that are 
required by the DoD and offered by the supplier.  The contracts are for specific periods of 
time in which the product and services are needed.  Each potential arrangement is 
evaluated through a BCA in order to determine the full value of the PBL contract.  Each 
case is considered for its cost reduction and/or cost avoidance measures.  The basis of 
PBL is in establishing logistics performance requirements and contractual incentives to 
mitigate obsolescence and lower the LCC. 
Process  PBL proposes that all logistical support be incorporated into a 
performance-based business environment.  An environment where commercial and 
Organic (government) capabilities are assessed and compared to specific logistical 
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 requirements of the Navy for determining best value.  The PBL concept incorporates 
direct vendor delivery, technology insertion, reliability-centered maintenance, process 
improvement, business reengineering, public/private partnering and teaming.  The PBL 
concept is applied to both fielded weapon systems as well as new acquisitions.  In this 
process a single supplier provides all of the required products and services to the 
warfighter.  All material management, storage, and handling is accomplished by this one 
supplier with little or no government intervention.  These contractual arrangements 
promise to improve availability at lower TOC.  To what degree, depends again on the 
preferred arrangement.  Figure 3 offers typical PBL arrangements. [24) NAVICP] 
Typical PBL Arrangements 
PBL-Mini-Stock Point (PBL-MSP).  Navy owns the inventorycontractor 
receives, stores, issues, and may also repair, the material MSP-Plus includes a 
negotiated level of requirements determination (MIN/MAX). 
PBL-Organic (PBL-O).  An arrangement with an organic activity (normally via 
MOA) to procure, repair, stock and issue material. 
PBL-Commercial (PBL-C).  An arrangement where a contractor supplies 
commercial items.  Customer requisitions are automatically routed through ITIMP 
directly to the contractor as a delivery order. 
PBL-Partnership (PBL-P).  An arrangement between a contractor and Navy 
such that the Navy performs a portion of support required by and for the contractor.  For 
example, the contractor may sub-contract the Navy to perform maintenance support at an 
organic depot.  This can be highly beneficial when addressing Core maintenance issues, 
in that the Navy is able to retain Core capability while acting as a sub to the contractor. 
“Full” PBL.  A contractual arrangement where the contractor manages (and may 
also own) the inventory, determines stockage levels, typically repairs NRFI material, and 
is required to meet specific performance metrics.  Requisitions still flow through ICP, 
and ICP pays the contractor for performance but bills customers traditionally.  Reliability 
improvements, technology insertion and reduced obsolescence may be some of the 
inherent benefits of a Full PBL.  The contractor usually is given Class II ECP authority 
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 and in some cases may also have configuration control.  Additionally, Logistics 
Engineering Change Proposal (LECP) arrangements will be considered a subset of this 
category if they contain supply support clauses that fall under the definition noted above. 
Total Logistics Support.  A most robust form of PBL (typically referred to as 
Contractor Logistics Support (CLS)), where the contractor manages most or all facets of 
logistic support (i.e. ILS elements), including inventory levels, maintenance philosophy, 
training manuals, PHS&T, full configuration control, support equipment, etc. 
 
Appendix C Figure 3: Typical PBL Arrangements 
Characteristics  As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the contractor, through 
a PBL arrangement, performs selected government functions such as supply support, 
repair, sparing, obsolescence management, etc.  In effect, the supplier has assumed some 
of the risks traditionally borne entirely by the DoD.  Under the PBL process the 
contractor guarantees improved availability and reliability.  Contractors are given more 
flexibility and control in configuration management.  In the end, life cycle costs are 
expected to be reduced by initiating fixed price contracts that have incentives for the 
contractor to show cost savings while improving reliability and availability.  Fixed price 
contracting is arranged to support a forecasted demand over a specific period of time, 
usually five years.  During this period, the contractor is primarily accountable for 
performance.  This assumption of risk on the part of the contractor means a letting go 
of some control by the DoD. 
6. Sunset Supply Concept 
Presently, the Sunset Supply Base concept is being implemented on three 
programs: 
• Ship-Self Defense System Mk1 (NAVSEA) 
• Ship-Self Defense System Mk 2 (NAVSEA) 
• AN/AQS-20X Sonar Mine Detecting Set (NAVSEA) 
The PMs for each of these programs have entered into this collaborative 
environment for ensuring long-term product support and the potential cost savings that 
this process offers.  This process requires involvement between government (PMOs and 
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 Navy field activities) and industry (DoD system integrators, COTS OEM vendors, and - 
where applicable  Sunset Suppliers).  The broad objective of this process is a proactive 
planning and coordination effort that is focused on extending the life of high quality, 
complex COTS products.  This is achieved by essentially extending the capability to 
build the product for defined periods of time.  The net result is a reduction in cost in 
terms of system sustainment.  The key to success is the proactive planning that goes into 
establishing reasonable product support timelines rather than reacting to changes to the 
COTS product.  By implementing the SSB infrastructure, the PMs are seeking the 
following: 
• Supportability of products defined by customer need, (5, 10, 15, 20 years) 
• Life cycle cost savings, due to no lifetime buy at the assembly level.  The 
assemblies are procured, as the customer requires them. 
• Reparability of assemblies over the designated life cycle (5, 10, 15, 20 years) 
• Hardware/Software/Firmware stability between technology refresh dates. 
• Significant reduction in program risk as related to COTS and life cycle 
management 
• Improved schedule flexibility and support options that can be tailored around 
warfighter requirements.  
• Minimal or no impact on system operational performance.  Since the product 
will continue to be supported in its original form, fit, and function, there 
should be no impact to performance.  These products will continue to be 
produced by the Sunset Supplier. 
The infrastructure for the SSB process is well thought out and structured in such a 
way as to allow for growth capability.  A Systems Engineering Development and 
Implementation (SEDI) Plan for the SSB infrastructure has been developed to put into 
perspective the processes, methods and tool needed to implement the Sunset Supply Base 
(SSB) system.  The resulting infrastructure is designed to fulfill the objectives and goals 
previously described.  The essence of the process is to provide the interface management 
for long-term COTS supportability.  In doing so, long-term relationships are established 
in an environment that preserves and protects the intellectual property rights of the OEM 
and business objectives of the Sunset Supplier.  The infrastructure presented in the SEDI 
plan is composed of two functional areas; (1) programmatic support, and (2) 
infrastructure support.  A brief outline of the functions and tasks taken from the SEDI 
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 plan is provided in Figures 4 and 5.  Implementation of the SSB infrastructure essentially 
establishes and empowers a support team that strives to meet the goals and objectives 
previously stated.  Based on these goals, the team is responsible for ensuring 
expandability, transportability, reusability, leveraging capability, configuration manage-
ment and control, affordability and LCC assessments.  Important to understand is that 
these functions are embedded within the SSB process and are not duplicated anywhere 












Interface with the PMO & Infrastructure Team 
1.1. Details pertaining to specific program characteristics   
1.1.1. Number of systems 
1.1.2. Number of COTS assemblies used and where 
1.1.3. Insight into the prime contractors assembly call out 
1.1.4. Reliability numbers (i.e. failure rates, MTBF, etc.) 
1.1.5. Fielded systems concept of deployment and operation 
Provide Recommendations 
2.1. Buy quantities 
2.2. Technology refresh intervals and interim support strategies. 
Programmatic Tasks: 
Obsolescence reporting 
Provide purchase recommendations 
Interface with OEM, SSB supplier and PMO support teams 
Involvement in applicable program activities 
Identify and implement program specific flow-down requirements 
Address quality issues (hardware/software, documentation, etc.) and interface 
with the OEM, SSB supplier, PMO, prime contractor, etc. 
Cost assessment based on LCC and the unique opportunity to impact these costs 
through implementation of the SSB system. 














Interface with the programmatic POCs 
Establish and maintain the OEM/SSB supplier relationships 
Develop a database with appropriate controls and access rights 
12.1. Creation of the database structure 
12.2. Define methods for updating data and controlling access rights 
12.3. Provide mechanisms for continuous maintenance 
Provide a central site to enable open and private communication (i.e. specific 
server location, web site, bulletin board, etc.) 
Perform analysis on the data gathered 
Coordinate with all support activities where applicable (ISEA, TDA, etc.) 
Report findings or status 
Coordinate with other programs that could be affected by the reporting results 
Perform on-site reviews at the SSB suppliers to assure schedule, cost and quality 





19.1. Program generated, prioritized, Costs lists, at the assembly level 
19.2. OEM provided, component piece parts lists and drawings detailing the 
make-up of the assembly level: Cautionary Note  These parts lists and 
drawings supplied through the OEM are obtained through entering a Non-
Disclosure Agreement (NDA) and therefore necessitates special handling 
along with restricted access. 
19.3. Development of a relational database; Design, Management, and 
Maintenance 
19.4. Informational query and data extraction 
Obsolescence Risk Management 
20.1. Receive COTS assemblies list from programmatic POC 
20.2. Perform assembly level obsolescence health/risk at that level 
20.3. Retrieve from the COTS OEMs the component piece parts list for each 
assembly. 
20.4. Filter the component piece parts list and condense list to active 
components for which predictive obsolescence tool are readily available and 
used as industry standards. Exceptions to this filtering process are handled on 
a case-by-case basis.  
20.5. Perform a piece part level obsolescence health/risk analysis at the 
component piece part level. 
20.6. Prepare an Obsolescence Risk Report for the program in an agreed upon 
format, by working with the programmatic POC 
20.7. Perform continuous monitoring of the component piece parts by reviewing 
impact of ongoing obsolescence notices posted by the component piece part 
manufacturers.  
Initiate the relationship with the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) and 21. 
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 Infrastructure Support 





 Initiate the relationship with the SSB suppliers and act as the primary interface 
with them throughout the life of the SSB system and perform on-site reviews of 
SSB suppliers using an IEEE 1722 type evaluation. 
Interface as required with other program support activities (i.e. ISEA, ILS, TDA, 
etc.) 
Teaming with the programmatic POC and the other program support activities, 
define and document the expectations and required support from the 
infrastructure team. Typically these expectations and requirements are embedded 
in a Statement of Work (SOW), a tasking document, or in a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between the implementing activity and the PMO. 
Examples of these types of documents are available in Enclosure (9)  Tasking 
Documentation. 
As opportunities emerge, the infrastructure team is responsible for the interface 
with other activities such as other field activities, professional societies, 
government initiatives, industry working or focus groups, etc. that provide 
potential improvements or impacts to the SSB system and its implementation. 
Appendix C Figure 5: Infrastructure Support 
 
C. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
This section will describe the problem of supporting COTS products within the 
context detailed in the previous section.  A thorough understanding of the problem to 
which the SSB concept applies, will help in evaluating the overall effectiveness of 
implementing the SSB infrastructure.  
1. Economic Problem 
The current DoD requirements include a scenario of increased operations while at 
the same time a continuous push for weapon system upgrades.  The easy solution would 
be to increase the defense budget, although not very likely.  Given the political pressures 
of today, DoD PMOs are challenged to search for more economical alternatives.  The 
challenge, in effect, is to maintain near-term weapon system readiness while at the same 
time planning for weapon system modernization efforts.  To add to this, the DoD is 
undergoing a serious reduction in government infrastructure.  Given the current trend of 
increasing military operating tempos, the struggle to accomplish any sort of 
modernization effort is going to be difficult.  In fact, financial resources are likely to be 
used to maintain these levels of operations rather than conducting serious modernization 
efforts.  The Joint Aviation Logistics Board (JALB) June 1999 report on Commercial 
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 Support of Aviation Systems states that discretionary procurement accounts dropped 
by 53 percent since 1990, while operations and maintenance activity declined by only 15 
percent. [25) JALB]  The implication of this statement is that replacement or upgrades 
to existing systems are effectively being delayed. [26) JACG]  Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen, in the May 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, observed 
that Today, the Department is witnessing a gradual aging of the force. [19) DoD]  This 
lends credence to the statement in a 1994 issue of Army RD&A Bulletin: In actuality, our 
military hardware is now on a replacement cycle of about 54 years - this in a world where 
technology typically has a half-life from 2 to 10 years. [7) Augustine]  The end result is 
that existing systems will have to be maintained at the required levels of availability and 
reliability for extended periods of time.  Therefore, traditional support strategies will have 
to be re-evaluated to address this phenomenon.  These traditional strategies typically 
expect total government ownership of support material and total government control over 
design changes.  What this has leaded to is known as the COTS initiative.  The emphasis 
on COTS product usage was brought on by the fact that the DoD could conceivably take 
advantage of technology developments in the commercial sector at a reduced cost to 
development programs.  So given the fact that more and more of the defense budget is 
going to sustainment of operations, the financial resources needed to modernize existing 
weapon systems is decreasing.  So to reiterate, more economical solutions to supporting 
these systems is needed and one initiative is the growing use of COTS products 
throughout DoD weapon and support systems.  With COTS products come additional 
challenges in support, given the fast paced technology update cycles in the commercial 
sector as compared to the slow and methodical DoD acquisition process.  Thus, there is 
an anticipated increase in material or product obsolescence.  So the savings realized by 
implementing an aggressive COTS initiative could be offset by obsolescence and the 
need to redesign.  This is not to say that COTS products have not proved beneficial, on 
the contrary, but the overall process for incorporation and sustainment of COTS products 
continues to evolve and PMs continue to be confronted with certain challenges associated 
with this.  Therefore, a solution alternative is needed to counteract the costs associated 
with the redesign of weapon and support systems due to obsolescence rather than 
performance. 
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 2. Sustainment Problem 
The COTS initiative was brought about by the fact that the commercial sector 
essentially drives technology change at an extremely fast pace and that the DoD could 
take advantage of this while reducing life cycle costs.  The COTS initiative provided a 
potential path to infuse new technology into the military systems and at the same time 
avoid the developmental costs associated with grooming the new technology.  The rate at 
which private industry can develop and deliver new technologies is orders of magnitudes 
faster than traditional DoD acquisitions.  Take a look at computing power, which has 
appeared to double every eighteen months.  The same phenomenon has occurred across 
the spectrum of technology at different rates.  Market forces other than the DoD 
essentially drive this explosion of new capabilities.  The DoD makes up approximately 
0.4% of the market share [4) Hartshorn]; therefore; its not hard to see how commercial 
product lines are driven by the private sector vice the DoD.  There are two fundamental 
reasons for this fast pace.  One is the ever-increasing demand for new capabilities 
primarily in the private domain.  Second, the competitive drive to get technology to 
market first and gain the most lucrative share of the market.  In either case, the DoD has 
little influence.  Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) routinely stop production on 
items that can no longer be justified from a business perspective regardless of the impact 
to the DoD.  The typical length of time a product can be considered available is 
approximately 18-24 months.  That is to say, manufacturers are developing and releasing 
new capabilities every 18 months to 2 years.  In contrast, DoD weapon system 
acquisitions typically take 10 to 15 years to develop and fully deploy.  At a very 
minimum, the DoD can presently only hope to achieve technology-refresh cycles of 5 
years, which is still not adequately aligned with commercial product updates.  See Figure 
6 for a pictorial representation of this phenomenon.  
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Appendix C Figure 6: Technology Refresh Timing 
When we say fully deploy, we mean that even though a weapon system is ready to 
be installed, each platform for installation must be scheduled to receive it.  Even if we 
consider an aggressive development effort within the Navy, the time to develop a new or 
enhanced capability could easily take 5 to 7 years.  Once the weapon system has been 
tested and deemed ready for deployment, it will take additional 5 to 10 years to fully 
deploy.  Every platform or ship that is to receive this weapon system must be scheduled 
and the work to install performed.  Ship deployment schedules and the length of 
availabilities (in-port period when the work is performed) add serious delays to installing 
the weapon system.  It is simply inconceivable to think that new technology, which is 
turning over every 18 months, can be infused consistently throughout the fleet.  Of 
course, its possible to have different platforms upgraded to different levels of capability, 
but then we run the risk of incompatibility between platforms and a logistical nightmare 
in supporting various versions of the same weapon system.  What this all comes down to, 
in terms of COTS, is a decrease in DoD control over weapon system design and 
subsequent support.  The purpose here is not to discredit the COTS initiative as 
ineffective.  The COTS initiative in conjunction with a well thought out open systems 
approach, will contribute greatly to DoDs effort to bring the latest technology and 
capability to the warfighter at the most cost effective levels and be able to sustain such 
affordably.  However, the COTS initiative has been ongoing for over 10 years and the 
DoD continues to struggle with COTS supportability.  The initiative is deeply imbedded 
in policy, reviewing criteria and procurement methodologies for dealing with unforeseen 
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 difficulties in implementing COTS.  However, given the long development cycles and the 
time-consuming implementation efforts of military weapon systems, the DoD is finally 
realizing the cause and effect relationship between COTS products and perturbations 
evident in fielded systems.  One only needs to visit the Defense Acquisition Deskbook 
(DAD) web site and search for documents that address COTS implementation.  At the 
time of this writing, there were over 230 listings that addressed policy, planning, 
designing, fielding, costing, and supporting COTS.  DoD 5000.2-R provides guidance 
lessons learned for PMs in dealing with COTS.  The fact of the matter is that the DoD 
acquisition process is purposely constructed to take a conservative, thoughtful approach 
to implementing change, thereby introducing obstacles to the time elements necessary to 
keep pace with the commercial environment.  The most important point to understand 
here is the disconnect between the life cycle of commercial products (1.5 to 5 years) and 
the typical reaction time of the DoD for modernizing fielded weapon systems.  
Remember from our discussion on Performance Based Logistics that system support is 
provided in whole via contracts of typically 5 years.  During these 5 years the contractor 
or supplier is responsible for ensuring defined levels of system readiness and availability.  
During this period sustainment is continuously assessed.  Upon notice of any 
obsolescence issues, the PMO has to decide on future plans for support or redesign.  
Traditionally, spares are bought and stored based on a forecasted need over this period of 
time.  In reaction to the obsolescence announcement, the PMO enters a planning period 
of between 2 and 3 years.  Following this is a 5 to 7 year expectation for actual 
implementation.  So we are looking at approximately 7 to 10 years between system 
upgrades or replacement at a minimum.  But now consider the fact that these systems are 
expected to be in service for 15 years or more and the supportability issues become 
apparent given the consistent 18-month to 2-year commercial technology life expectancy. 
(See Figure 3)  In essence, when the DoD decides to use COTS products, they become 
obsolete during the planning phase.  Even a well-planned approach can push COTS 
technology insertion into the implementation phase only to become obsolete during this 
period as well.  This instability to systems design baselines is a major issue for 
maintaining appropriate readiness and availability.  Understanding the realities associated 
with implementing and supporting COTS products, an effort must be made to deal with 
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 stabilizing the systems design baselines so high performance in terms of support can be 
achieved 
3. COTS Problem 
The term COTS, Commercial-Off-The-Shelf, refers to the entire range of products 
and services procured by the DoD.  Nearly every weapon system and their basic repair 
items use commercial items to varying degrees.  Today, it is not a matter of all or 
nothing, but how much of the system is COTS based.  Figure 7 is a notional interpretation 
of COTS as is defined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 2.1, Section 





An item for sale, lease or 
license to the general public
(2) 
An item that evolved from 
(1) that will be available in 
time 
(3) 
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standard modifications of (1) 
& (2) 
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Any combination of (1), (2), 
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Any of (1) thru (6) that have 
been transferred from 






Any previously developed item 
used by federal, state, local, or 
allied governments 
(2) 
(1) that requires only 
minor modifications 
(3) 
Integration of NDI subsystems 
and components 
Appendix C Figure 7: Notional depiction of FAR COTS/NDI Definition 
The DoD mandate for COTS product use is driven by two important situations.  
First, the fact that the commercial market leads the DoD in latest technology 
development; therefore, in order for the DoD to access state-of-the-art technology they 
must come to the commercial sector.  In the past the DoD lead the way in research, 
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 development and application of technology for military weapon systems.  Today private 
industry leads the DoD in these areas.  Secondly, the present industrial base is very 
stable.  That is in the face of obsolescence, DoD suppliers struggle to stay in business due 
to reduced procurement by the DoD.  The larger companies have sufficient market share 
to remain stable through these periods of reduced DoD procurement.  Additionally, they 
can respond to a surge in requirements by the DoD.  
Given the widespread use of COTS products in military weapon and support 
systems, certain challenges are being faced in terms of ensuring long-term supportability. 
The challenges stem from serious obsolescence issues and material shortages.  The 
challenge, in essence, is to provide life cycle support to fielded weapon systems that use 
COTS products.  Consider for a moment that many systems will have life cycles that 
exceed 20 or 30 years, and one can easily imagine the sustainment nightmare involved.  
The slow acquisition process, the long life expectancies and traditional support methods 
are not consistent with commercial business practices.  In fact, there is little incentive for 
COTS manufacturers to continue to produce items in rather small quantities just for the 
sake of ensuring some system performance baselines.  If the DoD chose not to use COTS, 
there would be little impact to the commercial world.  However, given the proliferation of 
COTS products throughout military weapon systems, when a product is no longer 
produced the impact to the DoD is profound and severe.  Even small changes to a product 
can have serious repercussions to weapon system performance and design baselines.  The 
fact of the matter is, there will be technology changes within the COTS arena and they 
will have direct impacts on military weapon systems, both fielded and under 
development.  Slight changes in COTS hardware could possibly impact interfaces with 
other equipment or systems that may not be so obvious.  Subtle specification changes to 
COTS hardware (i.e. timing, execution) could have devastating ripple effects.  
Furthermore, changes to hardware could, and often do, require changes in software code 
in the larger system.  A change in code translates into time and money.  Time to make the 
necessary changes, test the changes, and deploy the changes and money to perform these 
tasks.  This is not hard to understand, when you realize that many systems are built 
around software (architectures dictated by software).  Software is a key enabler to 
achieving open systems architecture, as software is assumed easier to update than 
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 hardware.  Nevertheless, slight changes in software do have a cost associated with it and 
the impacts could be significant.  In face of the rapid updates to software in the 
commercial domain, DoD re-integration efforts can be difficult and expensive.  To this 
end, the continue implementation of COTS products in the development of military 
weapon systems will lead to a situation where these systems will constantly fall prey to 
technology that will not last and forever changing. 
4. Conclusion 
The use of COTS products in military weapon systems is a reality.  DoD 5000.2 
and the Federal Acquisition Regulations have both advocated the use of COTS products 
due to the potential benefits associated with leveraging big business capabilities.  These 
capabilities include developing state-of-the-art technologies and delivering them in 
products that are produced in quantities that reduce cost.  To this end, the COTS 
manufacturers position in the marketplace, the company size and its technology edge 
impact the direction and update cycles of technology and the products that employ them.  
Therefore, COTS products hold a significant place in weapon system development and 
manufacturing because they can effectively facilitate the quick response to DoD changing 
needs.  The net result to the DoD is a reduction in sustainment costs for COTS products 
as well as improved reliability and availability of the weapon system.  However, since 
military weapon systems are typically unique, the use of COTS becomes a tricky business 
in terms of dictating system design and ultimately life cycle support.  In terms of 
software, military applications tend to be very specific, and the weapon system cannot 
tolerate or support changes.  Compatibility and configuration-control become crucial 
elements for both software and hardware.  Support activities are pressured to maintain 
stabilized baselines in order to keep the certification of the system verifiable.  These 
include not only the initial integration site but also the interoperability of fielded systems 
subsequent to changes (i.e. installation of replacement parts, firmware, software or 
hardware revisions, etc).  Needless to say there are significant risks associated with 
COTS and therefore managing these risks is a crucial element for success.  For weapon 
systems that do use COTS products some of the more identifiable risks are: [28) DoD] 
• Engineering changes, increased costs, and potential schedule delays due to 
poor supportability late in the development or after fielding the system. 
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 • Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimates for COTS product usage is inaccurate due to 
poor logistical support analysis. 
• Poor sustainability due to not considering supportability during the design 
phase. 
Understanding these risks helps us to better define where the problem lies.  With 
the problem description provided above, we can conclude that additional supportability 
solution alternatives are needed to address the shortcomings of the present COTS 
environment.  A proactive position must be taken to include these alternatives in strategic 
supportability planning that will effectively mitigate the risks associated with COTS 
product usage in military weapon systems. 
D. LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
This section provides some further contextual information that limits or constrains 
the implementation of the Sunset Supply Base concept.  Specifically, this section will 
address DoD policy, reviewing criteria, and methodologies that will be needed to 
evaluate the business case results.  This section is not intended to provide detailed 
information on the specific topics; rather a general understanding is expected in order to 
realize how the benefits fit within the limits of governmental policy and regulation.  
Furthermore, each topic will be discussed in terms of COTS products, their deployment 
in military weapon systems, and their relation to supportability performance. 
1. DoDD 5000  
The major objective of DoDD 5000 [24) DoD] is to provide a model to the 
acquisition community for reducing cost and cycle times while delivering improved 
performance.  The DoD 5000 process is a carefully constructed methodical approach for 
rapidly delivering demonstrated technology to the warfighter.  This purposely, 
conservative approach is intended to optimize the acquisition cycle for time-phased 
requirements and evolutionary development.  Essentially, the DoD acquisition style is 
moving closer to commercial practices.  This movement advocates the use of COTS 
products for achieving rapid technology insertion and overall constraining life cycle 
costs.  In fact, DoD 5000 recommends that cost should drive design, procurement and 
support.  We mention DoDD 5000 here not as an attempt to educate the reader on the 
details of the directive, but to emphasis the boundaries to which the SSB infrastructure 
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 must work within.  Below are brief descriptions of DoD 5000 acquisition guidance and 
general expectation. 
Overview  The Defense Acquisition system exists to ensure that the DoDs 
investments in technologies and product support is protected throughout the entire life 
cycle.  An approach must be taken to make sure that demonstrated technologies could 
effectively make their way to systems that enhance warfighter capabilities.  And 
additionally, that these systems can be supported to meet readiness and availability 
demands. 
Policies and Principles  DoDD 5000.1 mandates several policies and principles 
for managing the Defense Acquisition process.  In broad terms, these policies and 
principles cover the following are: 
• Rapid and effective transitioning of science and technology to products that 
enhance warfighter capabilities. 
• Rapid and effective transitioning through the various phases of the life cycle 
(Acquisition => Deployment/Fielding) 
• Integrated and effective operational support throughout the entire life cycle.  
That is during development, installation and operation. 
• Effective program management throughout the entire life cycle. 
Operational Support  The PMOs are mandated to make any appropriate 
measures for integrating acquisition and support functions.  To this end, they are 
expected to focus on TOC and supportability as a key element in the design phase of the 
acquisition cycle.  Supportability is to be used as a performance indicator essential to the 
systems engineering process.  DoDD 5000.1 essentially advocates a transformation in 
logistical support as a whole.  Specific to operational support the PMOs are challenged to 
provide strategies that reduce logistical response cycle times and integrate DoD and 
commercial expertise all in an effort to provide the optimal customer service and system 
readiness levels.  To realize the full benefit from these tasks, PMs are directed to focus on 
support issues as early as possible in the design process.  The end result is the delivery of 
reliable systems that can be cost-effectively supported.  
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 2. United States Code 10  
USC Title 10 [29) USHR] provides regulatory elements for DoD behavior.  
Within Title 10 there are at least two statues that specifically address product support 
solutions that the DoD PMOs must comply with. 
a. Statue 2462 
(a) In General. - Except as otherwise provided by law, the 
Secretary of Defense shall procure each supply or service necessary for or 
beneficial to the accomplishment of the authorized functions of the Department of 
Defense (other than functions which the Secretary of Defense determines must be 
performed by military or Government personnel) from a source in the private 
sector if such a source can provide such supply or service to the Department at a 
cost that is lower (after including any cost differential required by law, Executive 
order, or regulation) than the cost at which the Department can provide the same 
supply or service.  (b) Realistic and Fair Cost Comparisons. - For the purpose of 
determining whether to contract with a source in the private sector for the 
performance of a Department of Defense function on the basis of a comparison of 
the costs of procuring supplies or services from such a source with the costs of 
providing the same supplies or services by the Department of Defense, the 
Secretary of Defense shall ensure that all costs considered (including the costs of 
quality assurance, technical monitoring of the performance of such function, 
liability insurance, employee retirement and disability benefits, and all other 
overhead costs) are realistic and fair. 
b. Statute-2464 
        (a) Necessity for Core Logistics Capabilities. - (1) It is essential for 
the national defense that the Department of Defense maintain a core logistics 
capability that is Government-owned and Government-operated (including 
Government personnel and Government-owned and Government-operated 
equipment and facilities) to ensure a ready and controlled source of technical 
competence and resources necessary to ensure effective and timely response to a 
mobilization, national defense contingency situations, and other emergency 
requirements.  (2) The Secretary of Defense shall identify the core logistics 
capabilities described in paragraph (1) and the workload required to maintain 
those capabilities.  (3) The core logistics capabilities identified under paragraphs 
(1) and (2) shall include those capabilities that are necessary to    maintain and 
repair the weapon systems and other military equipment (including mission-
essential weapon systems or materiel not later than four years after achieving 
initial operational capability, but excluding systems and equipment under special 
access programs, nuclear aircraft carriers, and commercial items described in 
paragraph (5)) that are identified by the Secretary, in consultation with the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as necessary to enable the armed forces to 
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 fulfill the strategic and contingency plans prepared by the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff under section 153 (a) of this title. 
c. Federal Acquisition Regulations 
Federal Acquisition Regulations [27) FAR] are a set of codified and 
published uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all executive agencies.  
With respect to acquiring COTS products, FAR Subpart 12.2 addresses the Special 
Requirements for the Acquisition of Commercial Items.  There are 13 sections to this 
subpart.  Each section addresses a specific issue for the acquisition of COTS items.  The 
section titles are listed below to give the reader a sense of what areas this regulation 
covers. 
• Market research and description of agency need 
• Procedures for solicitation, evaluation, and award 
• Solicitation/contract form 
• Offers 
• Use of past performance 
• Contract Type 
• Contract quality assurance 
• Determination of price reasonableness 
• Contract Financing 
• Technical Data 
• Computer Software 
• Other commercial practices 
• Cost Accounting Standards 
The SSB infrastructure must comply with the regulations set forth in the 
Federal Acquisition Regulations specifically Subpart 12.2 and its policies for acquiring 
COTS products.  Generally speaking, the Federal Acquisition Regulation in terms of 
COTS implementation has guided government agencies toward a more commercial 
approach.  The individual government agencies should try to achieve a balance between 
public and private resources that uniquely fit their respective needs.  Furthermore, the 
PMOs within the various agencies should seek appropriate commercial practices for 
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 acquisition and support of commercial items.  The contractual arrangements should also 
reflect this migration to commercial practices to the point that government interests are 
preserved.  Appropriate commercial practices should be actively sought out that proves to 
be satisfactory to both commercial and government entities and not otherwise precluded 
by law or Executive Order. 
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 X.  ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODS 
This section describes the origin and use of the data and the methodologies 
employed which translates the data into final results.  That is how the data was obtained 
and the methods use convert this data to information.  This is crucial for understanding 
the BCA results and leading to better use for decision-making purposes.  
A. SCOPE AND BOUNDARIES 
Case  This Business Case Analysis is performed for the Navys Ship Self-
Defense System MKI (SSDS).  Below is a brief description of the system. [30) Raytheon] 
Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS) 
The SSDS is a combat system that is used to integrate and coordinate all of the 
existing sensors and weapon systems aboard a ship. Its purpose is to provide an 
automated and integrated self-defense capability for U.S. Naval surface ships. 
The system provides a quick response, multi-target engagement capability 
against close-in threats. The goal of SSDS is to coordinate existing shipboard 
resources so that the overall ability of the ship to defend itself is enhanced with 
respect to the independent, uncoordinated operation of the systems currently 
installed. To do this, SSDS produces a composite track picture using data from 
the various sensors on the ship. 
The system will eventually be installed aboard most classes of non-Aegis ships. 





Time  The period of analysis is between fiscal year 2003 and 2012.  The data 
obtained for this case study was collected in FY 2002 and applies to SSDS program 
execution beginning in FY2003. 
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 Organization/Function  The ultimate goal is to satisfy warfighter requirements; 
however, there are many stakeholders within the SSB infrastructure.  To follow are brief 
descriptions of the major stakeholders 
The End User - Certainly warfighter must be considered for it is the end user we 
depend on to operate our weapon systems and provide the expected defense as defined in 
our national strategic policies.  
The Program Management Offices - This includes the initial acquisition 
community whose purpose is the acquisition of new systems.  They also support the In-
Service Engineering Activities (ISEA) that must continue to procure parts as part of an 
alteration kit or on-going support for the warfighter, that is repair and replacements of 
parts.  They support the Integrated Logistical Support (ILS) functions, which must plan 
the long-term support of fielded equipment and must support equipment between changes 
to the equipment baseline.  One of their primary responsibilities is budgetary support for 
personnel who must plan the availability of products that extend over the 2-year Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle and the 3-5 year implementation cycle.  
Additionally they must fund Field Activities or service contractors who prepare Cost, 
Health, and Risk models, which quantify the availability and supportability of the fielded 
systems. 
Interoperability Support Activities - These activities must obtain and maintain a 
stabilized baseline in order to keep the certification of the system verifiable.  These 
support activities include not only the initial integration site but also the interoperability 
of fielded systems subsequent to changes (i.e. installation of replacement parts, firmware, 
software or hardware revisions, etc.). 
Design and Development Activities - These activities must rely on commercial 
products to be available when the design goes into production. 
Production/Manufacturing Facilities - These facilities must rely on the source of 
supply in producing the systems they were contracted for, which will include commercial 
products that contain supportability issues 
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 B. SSDS COTS WORKING GROUP 
The Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) and 
Non-Developmental Item (NDI) Working Group (SCWG) is established to review, 
evaluate and recommend resolution for COTS and NDI obsolete parts design, 
technology, application, availability/procurement, and process issues in a timely and 
efficient manner.  The SCWG assists the Program Manager (PM) with identification of 
COTS, obsolete parts, and technology requirements, clarification of contractual concerns, 
and compliance with acquisition reform initiatives involving COTS.  The SCWG Charter 
is provided as Enclosure 6. 
C. COST MODEL 
The cost modeling was accomplished through the use of two unique models 
combined into one.  NSWC Crane provided a traditional Sustainment Engineering cost 
model (here after referred to as the resource model), which focused on upper level 
assembly procurement costs and associated resource requirement costs.  NSWC Corona 
developed a procurement cost model (here after referred to as the procurement model) 
reflecting granularity down to the component piece part level (i.e. below the assembly 
level) to identify obsolescence issues and their associated cost.  The resource model 
provided a well-established structure and process to perform simulation and evaluation 
on What if scenarios using various support methodologies. However, the resource 
model lacked the insight to component piece part obsolescence and the capability to 
quantify their cost impacts or a resolution method addressing this low level. Used 
independently the resource model addresses obsolescence at the assembly level whereby 
the potential resolutions were limited to assembly level mitigation resolutions.  The 
procurement model provided initial costs of component piece part obsolescence and 
projected future year costs at this low level.  The procurement model is intricately tied to 
the SSB system for generation of the necessary data and as part of the SSB system risk 
mitigation resolution methods are available for component piece part obsolescence.  This 
visibility into the low level obsolescence and associated cost provides new knowledge 
and resolution methods previously unavailable.  Used independently the procurement 
model can show impacts on procurement costs given various scenarios, however lacks 
the overarching view to identify impacts to resource costs.  Combining the two models 
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 allows the user to leverage the structure and simulation of both the procurement costs and 
the associated resources available through the resource model while having the visibility 
of low level obsolescence costs combined with alternative resolution methods.  The 
models were combined by first running the procurement model using a specific scenario 
then using its output as an input to the resource model subsection of the Work 
Breakdown Structure (WBS) labeled  Procurement.  Additionally, cost figures were 
developed to reflect the cost to implement the SSB system, these in-turn were identified 
in the WBS as SSB resource costs.  
1. The Resource Model (Enclosure (30)) 
Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Crane Division has developed a 
Technology Planning and Management Cost Model, which accurately and efficiently 
calculates the estimated cost of most support strategies required by Navy PMOs.  Their 
focus is on COTS products in military applications.  They act as a consultant to PMs and 
work in conjunction with both government and commercial system designers and 
integrators, in the life cycle management of systems that incorporate COTS products.  
NSWC Crane provides technology assessments that help PMs with commercial 
technology management.  The mission of NSWC Crane is to provide low cost, 
quality, and responsive acquisition, engineering, logistics, and maintenance for the Fleet's 
weapon and electronic systems, ordnance, and associated equipment and components. 
They accomplish this through partnerships with industry, academia, and government 
activities. [31) NSWC/Crane] 
The model was designed based on the cost breakdown structure (CBS) required 
for proper preparation and submittal of engineering change under DOD-STD-480, 
whereby it reflects the resources and requirements for a given alternative.  Estimating 
methodology for each category of costs was developed in accordance with accepted and 
anticipated practices within a specific program community for a technology refresh 
engineering change, from proposal submittal and approval to installation of the change.  
Both these costs and activity categories were combined into a high-level breakdown 
structure and are submitted with a total work breakdown structure (WBS) containing over 
120 categories.  The high-level WBS is as follows: 
• Configuration Management  
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 • Hardware/Software Engineering  
• Testing and Documentation  
• Procurement  
• ILS Planning and Management  
• Installation 
In order to design a cost model that accurately reflects the cost of a supportability 
option, the cost analyst had to understand the processes (and associated costs) that are a 
part of each of the areas listed above.  The Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) on the 
technology assessment team for the program played a key role in assisting the analyst to 
capture those processes.  The NSWC Crane cost model is designed with variables that 
can be used to describe changes made to the system under a chosen supportability option. 
Certain decisions made in the various support scenarios were guided by input 
from NSWC Crane Division.  They prepare a COTS Availability Risk Assessment 
(CARA) that provides in-depth knowledge of the availability of each COTS item used in 
the combat/weapon system.  Some of the basic availability questions that it answers are: 
• Is the manufacturer still making it? 
• If not, can we still buy it? 
• Can the manufacturer still repair it? 
• Is there an after-market supplier for the product? 
• Where does this product fit in the companys product roadmap? 
• Is the technology (or technologies) used in the design of the product state-  of-
the-art and widely used in industry? 
NAVSEA Crane Division provided the data presented in Enclosure (30).  The 
cost data found in this enclosure was based on cost models generated and used by NSWC 
Crane in support of the decision making process at the program office level for COTS 
applications.  The information contained in this spreadsheet used COTS specific data for 
populating the various resource fields.  This data includes item failure rate, purchasing 
price and repair costs.  Also, any program-specific information that impacts the support 
decision is considered and documented in the CARA, such as government sources of 
supply, system procurement and installation schedules, and quantities of items used in 
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 system design.  The actual algorithms are not accessible within this file but are consistent 
across all applications of its use. 
The resource model is designed to offer several methods of supporting a particular 
component over its life cycle.  These different support alternatives are implemented at the 
assembly level in a typical application however another alternative  After Market 
(Sunset Supply Base)  has been added which provides low level visibility and resolution 
of obsolescence.  Below are descriptions of the typical methods and the SSB alternative. 
Bridge Buys - A bridge buy, referred to as a Life of Type Buy (LTB) in this BCA, 
is a short-term buy solution to an availability problem.  Items are purchased to bridge the 
time from some point before product obsolescence to a known point in time when a 
refresh/upgrade is planned.  Often a bridge buy is performed while the logistics of the 
agreed-upon long-term solution become finalized for execution.  In essence, a bridge buy 
should provide the customer some time by solving the immediate availability problem for 
a period of six months to three years.  Bridge buys may be desired for many reasons: 1) 
inability to accurately assess and predict the lifetime demand, 2) inabilities to acquire 
funding for a Life-of-Type (3 to 10 year) buy, and 3) a redesign is the desired long-term 
solution, but budget constraints may delay the effort for a finite term.  Guidelines for 
making the repair/replace decision should be as follows:  
• If considering a bridge buy solution, high price items should be 
 investigated for repair as opposed to a bridge buy 
 
• If considering a repair concept, bridge buys should be estimated when the 
 cost to repair is equal to or greater than the cost to replace. 
Spares Utilization - Spares utilization may be an option to support the equipment 
until a refresh/redesign is planned.  Typically such spares come from supplies maintained 
from the prime contractor, from the In-Service Support Activity, or from 
decommissioned assets tracked by Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP).  
Maintenance Contracts - Maintenance contracts with vendors are utilized to deal 
with obsolescence instead of bridge buying an item.  This method can be used to support 
products until a technology refresh and/or end of system life.  This concept allows the 
delay of a technology refresh due to the repair capability after product obsolescence.  In 
most cases, it allows the Program Manager to lower his support cost due to the cost of 
306 
 repair being less than the replacement costs.  This philosophy contains some inherent risk 
associated with vendor's capability to repair and the repair support period the vendor is 
willing to sign-up for. 
COTS/NDI replacement - Two approaches can be taken for COTS/NDI 
replacement.  For a minor impact solution approach, it is possible that the problem 
product is replaced by a newer revision of the same product, an entirely new product of 
the same family.  The major impact solution approach consists of a technology upgrade 
change from the same vendor - or an entirely new product and vendor.  Low complexity 
and cost products will usually fall into the first solution approach category (newer version 
of the same product).  This type of replacement produces a minimum impact on the 
system.  Moderate complexity and cost products can cause a minimal impact and need to 
be investigated on a case per case basis.  Both A and B types require an Engineering 
Change Proposal (ECP); however, the additional costs incurred by the ECP process are 
not taken into account.  High cost and complexity products will usually cause a major 
impact, requiring a class I ECP with associated processes, approvals, and costs.  The 
program has the associated risk of impacting the interoperability of the system using 
either solution.   
After Market (Sunset Supply Base) -The after market approach, referred to in this 
paper as the Sunset Supply Base (SSB), extends the supportability of COTS products and 
items of material shortage predicated on the needs of the Navy programs.  The SSB is an 
extension of product availability, beyond the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
assigned date to drop the products as obsolete items, which provides stability to the 
system baseline configuration over a defined period of time between scheduled Technical 
Refresh/ Insertion points.  
2. Procurement Cost Matrices  
The Procurement Cost Matrices in this BCA is actually the combined product of 
two enclosures that are identified and described below at a high level: 
• Enclosure (28)  SSDS Assembly Master & Cost Matrices 
• Enclosure (29) - SSB Planning Excel Workbook & Data Item Description 
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 The area of measurement and assessments is the Capstone of the entire SSB 
systems implementation effort.  It brings together all the information and data collected 
and provides functionality previously unattainable without the SSB system - Systems 
Engineering approach.  The Capstone assessment tool is illustrated in Enclosure (28)  
SSDS Assembly Master & Cost Matrices.  Every tool, method, and process developed to 
implement the SSB system is either directly or indirectly responsible for the numbers 
evident in the matrices.  Enclosure (29)  SSB Planning Excel Workbook & Data Item 
Description - provides detailed explanations for the descriptions of each cell along with 
the mathematical relationships and constraints implemented within the worksheet.  
Enclosure (29a)  SSB Program Workbook Template  provides a ready to use template 
with embedded algorithms for immediate application using data generated from another 
new program.  Enclosure (29b)  Formula Helper  identifies in succinct form the 
equations/relationships embedded within the SSB Program Workbook Template so that at 
any time the user can check the integrity of the embedded algorithms. 
This enclosure (28) provides the procurement cost data for supporting COTS 
products on the SSDS program under different scenarios.  The information is presented in 
Microsoft Excel@ spreadsheet format.  The information has been created to support the 
analysis of the year-to-year cost and corresponding total cost of supportability options for 
assemblies in a system.  The data used corresponds to the SSDS MK I.  Given the 
complexities of the algorithms and the interrelationships designed into the workbook, 
explanation of these relationships and manipulation of the data is best accomplished 
through reading Enclosure (29) in its entirety.  A brief description identified below 
illustrates the primary information and data considered in developing any given solution 
set. 
The Excel Workbook 
The Excel Workbook contains several spreadsheets as listed below: 
Global Information:  
This data relates to all parts in the system(s) and is used by the calculations of the 
number of spare parts required and as stopping criteria for the cost matrices.  The global 
information is: 
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 Mission Years: The total years of the Mission life. 
Hours per year: The MTBF is given in hours so this is simply the total number of 
hours in a year. 
Percent utilization: The expected percent of time that the system is expected to be 
operational. 
Total Mission Hours: Mission Years * Hours per Year * Pct Utilization 
Number of MK I Systems, MK II Systems: This spreadsheet has been seeded with 
data that relates to the SSDS MK I & MK II Systems.  These values represent the 
number of fielded systems that the data is being generated to support. 
Program Year Names and corresponding integer year into Mission:  These values 
are used to display the chosen start year and subsequent years in series on the 
Cost Matrix spreadsheets. 
 
SSDS Master Assembly List: 
Each record in this worksheet is for a particular assembly in the SSDS system.  
The data is collected from the manufacturers and Navy database information and 
generated based on the global information and statistical functions based on an 
Exponential Life Testing model.  For an explanation of this model see the section at the 
end of this section.  The Assembly Master information is: 
1) Individual Assembly Information: 
Unique ID: This is used for ease of reference to an assembly and also for sorting 
after the data has been imported to a system specific worksheet (i.e. MK I 
Subset.) 
Company: The name of the manufacturer or supplier of the assembly. 
# Parts for vendor: This is used for a subtotal calculation to logically separate the 
assemblies by vendor and show the number of assemblies this supplier is 
providing. 
Supplier Part #s: As given by the manufacturer. 
2) Pricing Information: 
Price per part: The price for each assembly as given by the manufacturer. 
Adjusted price per part: This value is the price per part shown above plus 5%.  
This percentage is in payment for holding, storing and maintaining stock 
levels of Red Parts (see below) for the Sunset Supply Base (SSB) 
supportability option calculations. 
Non-reoccurring Engineering Cost (NRE): This value is provided by the 
manufacturer and represents the cost to set up the infrastructure associated 
with implementing the SSB for this assembly. 
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 Red Parts Price: If the SSB supportability option is used, this cost reflects the 
price quoted for the parts that are the obsolete parts purchased and stored 
while still available from the manufacturer or in the gray market. 
Non SSB Support Cost: At present this column is not being used. 
3) MTBF Information:  
Mean Time between Failure (MTBF) given in hours. 
MTBF:  MTBF is provided from the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
either calculated or demonstrated. 
MRDB MTBF:  Represents the actual MTBF exhibited in the equipment fielded 
in Navy applications. 
Adjusted MTBF:  The most appropriate MTBF from the two listed above or 
additional adjustment due to performance experience.  This value is used 
for the calculation of the failure rate used in the Exponential Life Testing 
Model yielding the required Number of Parts to Purchase in Advance. 
4) Important Dates: 
Used to determine the number of parts to buy in any given year is dependent on 
the availability of the part and the service time for the part.   
EOP:  End of Production.  The last date that the assembly can be procured. 
Years remaining to Buy: Based on the EOP date.  The corresponding number of 
years remaining to buy the part.  Used to determine purchase schedule. 
EOS:  End of Service.  The last date that the assembly can be serviced. 
5) System Part Information: 
Enumerated value: If the assemblies listed are used on one or both systems, a key 
value can be entered here.  These values are used to extract data for an 
individual system by sorting. 
# Parts on each System (1):  Each Mark I System has this quantity of parts 
installed. 
Total parts for all Systems (1):  Uses the total number of MK I Systems from the 
Global Information worksheet 
# Parts on each System (2): 
Total parts for all Systems (2): 
# Parts for all Systems:  The combined total number of installed assemblies for all 
systems. 
6) SSB Information 
Support Method: Currently there are 3 supportability options implemented: 
SSB: Use the SSB model for product support, purchase schedule and cost data. 
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 LTB: Life Time Buy.  Dependent on the Years remaining to Buy in the 
Important Dates section.  The quantity of parts calculated for purchase in 
any given year may vary based on the ability to purchase.  Also, the entire 
assembly is purchased.  It is implied that this option is for parts that are 
not expected to have any obsolescence issues. 
OTHER: Costs estimates for alternative OTHER are based on engineering 
judgment in the cases involving proposed ECPs were prepared by NSWC 
Port Hueneme, the In-Service Engineering Activity (ISEA) for the SSDS.  
In some cases, estimates were provided by NSWC Crane based on 
reasonable redesign estimates extracted from their cost-modeling tool. 
Confidence Interval: The Upper Confidence Limit, , allows the calculation of 
the MINIMUM MTBF that would occur in the given Probability Confidence Interval.  
Using this value, we can calculate the MAXIMUM number of parts that would be needed 
to remain within this confidence interval.  The value of F (below) used is the Expected 
Mean Failure calculated with the given MTBF. 
µλ
Expected Mean Failures (F): Based on the MTBF and the Global Information of 
Mission Time Hours.  Calculates the Expected Mean number of assemblies that will fail 
over the Mission life cycle.  Where:  
λ = Failure rate over Time = reciprocal of MTBF 
n = Number of Parts for all systems 
T = Total Hours of Mission Time 
F = Expected Mean Failures = λ*n*T 
Number of Parts to Purchase in Advance: From the information for Exponential 
Life Testing, the number of parts to purchase in advance represents the maximum amount 
that may be needed based on the % confidence interval.  
Average Parts Per Year: Simply divides the total number of parts calculated for 
the corresponding confidence interval by the Mission Time in years.  Used to determine 
the minimum number of parts to purchase in the earlier years of the Mission. 
System (1) Subset: 
This worksheet is created by taking a subset of the Master Assembly worksheet 
and using the Past Link function available in Excel.  This allows for the values to reflect 
exactly the corresponding values from the Master.  
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 System (1) Cost Matrix (1):  
This worksheet contains the individual formulas to calculate the number of parts 
to buy in a given Program Year and the associated cost.  Each Fiscal Year has six 
columns, two, which are visible, and the other four, which are Grouped and Closed.  The 
first two columns are for the supportability option of SSB.  The second two columns are 
for the supportability option of LTB.  The supportability option of OTHER is imported 
from the final worksheet, which has rows for each assembly and will contain assembly 
specific information. This information was provided by the ISEA and the information 
corresponded to the sum total of parts purchased and resources consumed. 
 
Use of the Exponential Life Testing Model gives: 
F = Failures occurring in the system over the accumulated time T0 







MLE is the Maximum Likelihood Estimator and 
MVUE is the Minimum Variance Unbiased Estimator 














α = 1  Probability, i.e. 99% Probability gives α = 0.01 
Reliability R (t) = P (T0 > t) = e-λt  
Failure Density function f (t, λ) = λ e-λt  
The Upper Confidence Limit, , allows the calculation of the MINIMUM MTBF 
that would occur in the given Probability Confidence Interval.  Using this value, we can 
calculate the MAXIMUM number of parts that would be needed to remain within this 
confidence interval.  The value of F used is the Expected Mean Failure calculated with 
the given MTBF. 
µλ
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 B. SUPPORT METHOD SCENARIOS 
In this case study there are three main practical scenarios that could be 
implemented to support the SSDS program over the defined ten-year period and each are 
described in a separate worksheet labeled with the names identified below. 
1. LTB(1) 
This scenario is the likely track for COTS product support without any assistance 
from the SSB infrastructure.  The costs for this scenario are the estimated financial 
impacts that the SSDS Program Office must plan for.  The support methods are broken 
down into two methods: 1) Life Time Buy (LTB), which is a bridge buy as described 
previously, and 2) OTHER. OTHER refers to redesign, spares utilization, reclamation 
from other fleet assets or maintenance contracts. 
2. SSB(1) 
This scenario is the most appropriate implementation of the SSB infrastructure as 
agreed upon by the SSDS COTS Working Group (SCWG).  Three main support methods 
are employed: 1) SSB, 2) LTB and 3) OTHER as described above. 
3. SSB Optimized 
This scenario implements the SSB method wherever possible.  Certain support 
decisions were made for specific COTS products prior to the availability of the SSB 
infrastructure.  Some COTS products have already been slated for redesign or 
reclamation efforts. 
In addition to these scenarios, three additional scenarios are identified.  These 
represent the What-If scenarios.  
• LTB Only  This scenario uses the LTB support method for all COTS 
products. 
• SSB Only  This scenario uses the SSM support method for all COTS 
products. 
• Complete Tech Refresh  In this scenario every COTS product within the 
SSDS is planned for redesign or technology refresh over the next ten-year 
period. 
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 C. CURRENT STATE ASSESSMENT 
Military acquisition is characterized by high development costs and very long 
development cycles; therefore military procurements are forced to project future needs 
and purchase as many products or components as they think they will need.  Furthermore, 
in light of unique military applications, the lengthy life cycles and the 5 to 7 year 
technology refresh rate, the DoD realizes that they presently have no control over product 
evolution, and therefore must compensate by staying aware of pending changes.  This is 
critical if the military is to expect any appreciable success in support of their weapon 
systems.  Operational and maintainability support is expected over the entire life cycle of 
the system.  This includes support for design and development efforts as well.  As 
mentioned previously, DoD design and development cycles spanning 10 to 15 years, are 
expensive and often deploy out of date equipment.  These design and development 
activities must rely on commercial products to be available when the design goes into 
production.  Furthermore, production and manufacturing facilities must rely on the source 
of supply in producing the systems they were contracted for, which will include 
commercial products that contain their own supportability issues. 
The impacts of ineffectiveness to support our weapon systems throughout their 
life cycle will be realized in military readiness and capability.  When we consider the 
huge investments that DoD makes in getting technology to the warfighter and training 
our warfighter, support of our weapon systems should not be the weak link in 
maintaining high levels of combat readiness and personnel safety.  This weak link might 
be the result of the ever-increasing pressure to reduce costs.  Very often we hear of cost 
as the independent variable in design and development efforts and that Total Ownership 
Costs (TOC) should be factored into the design process.  To do this the design activities 
must maintain a holistic perspective of the system to include life cycle support of 
technologies that have been selected for insertion into their weapon systems.  With the 
challenge of reducing costs and effectively supporting the warfighter, today's systems 
architects for DoD systems must understand what drives cost in order to carefully 
consider alternatives for life cycle support. 
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 The cost associated with supporting weapon systems throughout their life cycle is 
perhaps most sensitive to the availability of components that are needed to maintain 
stability in the operational context.  As legacy systems age, their associated support and 
maintenance costs rise dramatically due to obsolescence, reliability and supportability 
problems while at the same time the performance of the system decreases.  As original 
equipment manufacturers synchronize their product lines with technology, products 
presently deployed in DoD weapon systems, as well as products intended for use in 
developmental systems, will be affected.  Alternate components or parts will need to be 
considered for acceptance or rejection.  There will be material shortages occurring 
because of the social, economic, and political environments.  In either case there will be 
costs associated with these decisions and cost must be managed effectively.  If the 
alternate part is accepted, an engineering change proposal will need to be initiated.  There 
is cost associated with preparation, coordination, scheduling and testing of the alternate 
part.  If the alternate part is unacceptable, large product buys will be needed to ensure 
operational integrity and support of the system over its life cycle.  There is cost with 
developing a new source of supply.  In these cases there are issues of where to buy, how 
much to buy, where to stock them, and how to manage the costs and logistical support to 
meet the needs of the customer. 
Recently, the Navy has gone to a concept called Performance Based Logistics 
(PBL) in an effort to provide the fleet with increased reliability and availability at the 
same or reduced cost.  The Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) ensures that PBL 
arrangements meet the requirements of the fleet.  In essence, under a PBL arrangement, a 
single supplier provides material and support to the fleet consistent with the Navys 
requirements.  This contract is executed without the intervention of, or need for 
government inventory managers, storage, material handling, and transportation systems.  
The goal is to provide increased availability, reliability, technology insertion, and 
obsolescence management at a lower cost to the Navy.  They use a Business Case 
Analysis (BCA) approach to determine a best value approach given reduced funding.  
For each PBL initiative, NAVICP will conduct a BCA.  This BCA is designed to quantify 
any cost benefits the Navy will realize through the initiation of a PBL contract.  The BCA 
process involves determining the Navy's current cost of doing business.  This "without 
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 PBL" cost is then compared to the cost to the Navy if they execute a PBL arrangement.  
This "with PBL" cost includes both the PBL supplier's costs as well as the residual costs 
the Navy will retain even under a PBL arrangement.  All savings must be quantifiable 
and traceable.  
Under this arrangement, the supplier is contractually bounded to deliver the 
prescribed capabilities a defined period of time.  Performance of the supplier is 
continually assessed against the terms of the contract.  Consider a typical contract period 
of five years and assume this is the first contract this particular supplier has received.  At 
some point in the five-year period, a COTS obsolescence issue may arise.  If this occurs 
even within the first year, recall we expect a 2-3 year planning period to solve the 
obsolescence issue and another 5-7 year implementation effort, easily exceeding the five-
year contract period.  So in essence we are continually outdating ourselves because we 
cannot keep up with commercial technology turnover.  Given the DoDD 5000 guidance 
and the institutionalized budgeting and planning process for appropriations, the only 
alternative is to extend supportability for those near-obsolete COTS products so that a 
more effective planning and execution phase can take place.  This newly developed 
scenario should provide enough flexibility so that changes during the acquisition cycle 
will have minimal impact to the program. 
D. CURRENT STAKEHOLDER ASSESSMENT 
1. Program Management Office 
The PMO through its Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) group orders COTS 
assemblies through the normal support systems by contract, purchase order, or Navy 
supply system.  If an OEM no longer supports a product, then the PMO must look for 
another avenue to solve the issue, typically an engineering analysis and review is 
necessary yielding a variety of solutions most of which are very expensive.  If the PMO 
is lucky or just well informed (which is not always the case), the OEM will provide a 
notice stating an End Of Life (EOL) date after which the OEM will no longer support 
the specific COTS product.  At this point the PMO must make some choices.  Regardless 
of the choices made, the PMO incurs a significant amount of risk usually at a hefty price. 
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 2. Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
The OEM is usually a leading edge technology/design firm that is market driven 
and produces at high volume and cost reflective of commercial economies of scale.  The 
fast paced environment requires short-lived products (~18-24 months) to keep up with the 
ever-changing technology.  The business case is just not there to cater to the 
DoD/governments needs and although the OEM wishes to keep this group of consumers, 
the momentum of the business cycle keeps the OEM focused elsewhere.  Under these 
circumstances supportability is limited to production run time (~18-24 months) with 
approximately a 12-month follow-on repair and test capability period. 
3. Small Business (SSB Supplier) 
The SSB supplier is envisioned to come from the large base of smaller suppliers 
who, over the past three decades, have provided the DoD/government with high tech. 
custom products.  Using this supplier base will reduce the risk caused during the 
technology transfer process because of the proven track record earned when dealing with 
other DoD/government products.  However, this will be a collaborative process and the 
final decision will reside with and between the OEM and the SSB supplier.  Here the 
OEM holds the trump card and must be willing to live with the choice.  The small 
business SSB supplier typically has extensive technical know how in the manufacturing 
area but lacks the expertise to accomplish proactive, predictive obsolescence 
management.  These companies are customer focused, agile, and seek long-term 
relationships with their customers. 
4. DoD Navy Field Activities/Resources 
Most, if not all, of the functions identified in Figure 2 (17-Step SSB 
Implementation Process) are already accomplished by internal DoD/government 
resources; however they are done in an ad-hoc fashion without the collaborative 
environment, and with no defined, supportable, and repeatable process in place.  The 
expertise has always been available in the DoD/government but in a different form using 
a different process.  Prior to Acquisition Reform, the MIL-Specs and standards provided 
a requirements-rich environment with well-defined processes for implementation.  These 
processes and implementation methods required the same expertise needed today but 
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 applied in a different context.  Todays environment is requirements-poor, and the 
talented expertise must adjust to this performance-based versus MIL-Spec-based 
environment.  The context in todays environment is relationship-based, not rule-base, 
and the survivability of this entire group of talented experts will depend on their 
adaptability to todays context.  Acquisition Reform removed the barriers put in place by 
the MIL-Spec, rule-based environment, but it failed to provide an adequate substitute, 
which would provide a robust process that can meet the supportability requirements and 
needs of the end user. 
E. FUTURE STATE ASSESSMENT 
The future impacts, as a result of SSB implementation, are an environment where 
various support scenarios are defined and ready for service to the particular program.  A 
team approach is envisioned to assess the current program state in terms of support and 
performance requirements.  They will also evaluate all possible mechanisms for reaching 
these objectives.  This team effectively performs a solution analysis for a particular 
program and produces draft scenarios to the customer.  The customer examines the 
scenarios for appropriateness and feasibility.  If necessary, the scenarios are modified, 
expanded upon, rejected, or split into multiple scenarios.  Identifying various life cycle 
support management strategies helps the PM select a strategy, which best fits, their 
requirements.  Cost/risk trade-off and availability of support funding play major roles in 
determining the strategy that best suites each individual programs requirement.  Proper 
life cycle management of military weapons systems and their associated product 
implementation is critical when commercial products are used.  As the commercial 
product content of military systems increases, the number of required product upgrades 
and technology refreshes within the system will increase.  Engineering changes must be 
processed to overcome obsolescence problems, meet new performance requirements, or 
provide more cost efficient support.  Resolving these types of issues requires a phased 
technology management approach that: assesses the technical and supportability status of 
current equipment; identifies solutions to overcome recognized problems; and provides a 
life cycle cost analysis to determine the costs over the time of implementing solutions. 
The future infrastructure shall address the development of a cost estimate for 
technology refresh.  Several cost estimating tools exist for system life cycle costs but do 
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 not adequately address the unique cost elements of a technology refresh.  A cost model 
that is effective for use in the technology assessment process must be designed to work 
whether or not specific system hardware or software has been chosen and project costs 
for items that may not exist at the time of analysis.  In order to accommodate this, 
NAVSEA Crane Division provides a technology planning and management cost model 
that uses either standard cost estimation parameters or specific cost estimation 
parameters, depending upon whether specific upgrade hardware has been chosen.  This 
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Appendix C Figure 8: Cost Estimating of Support Options 
The costs associated with multiple platforms and shared costs associated with 
common platforms are taken into account in the cost estimate by identifying the different 
classes of platforms and the number of occurrences where the system is to be installed on 
each platform class. Commodity consumption, assets on-hand, and replacement cost 
data are used when determining the most cost effective refresh strategy.  For example, 
insertion of new COTS equipment may allow for redistribution of available repair assets 
in the supply support pipeline, thereby solving two logistic support problems with one 
COTS insertion. 
The support strategy is crucial to the success of the program in terms of 
availability and readiness as well as cost.  In fact the creation of various support strategies 
helps to quantify refresh costs.  The refresh costs become an important tool in identifying 
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 a preferred method of replacement.  Typically, three solution approaches may be 
portrayed in the cost estimate: 
• Single Item Refreshes - The costs associated with single item replacements 
based upon market trends.  The target dates of the refreshes are approximate 
to the end of production and prior to end of support. 
• Single Block Refresh - The refresh includes all items within the configuration 
that are at risk due to availability or changes in mission requirement.  A 
refresh date is selected and costs applied to implementation of the change. 
• Multiple Block refreshes - Blocks of items are defined based upon 
technological trends and their relation to functional blocks within the unit or 
system under analysis.  Plans are established to refresh these blocks over the 
life cycle of the system.  Costs are applied to the implementation of this 
approach and graphed for comparison with other approaches. 
Additionally, the process of cost estimating can be used as a program 
management tool to identify drivers within a particular refresh approach for further 
analysis.  These drivers may be candidates for improvement in the process of engineering 
and supportability analysis.  In order to summarize the results of the analysis, a model is 
employed that totals cost estimates and compares work efforts with trends and known 
requirements.  The model is a simplified representation of the real world, which abstracts 
the features of the situation relative to the problem being analyzed.  It is a tool employed 
by the analyst to assess the likely consequences of various alternative courses of action 
being examined.  The model, in itself, is not the decision-maker, but is a tool that 
provides the necessary data in a timely manner in support of the decision-making process.  
It is a way to let the collected data drive the decision to plan for a technology refresh.  
Specific data requirements are identified from the evaluation criteria and from the input 
requirements of the model used for evaluation purposes.  The objective is to accomplish 
the analysis keeping in mind the interface relationship between logistic support and the 
hardware or software choice for resolution of the problem.  In performance of the cost 
analysis, there may be a few key parameters about which the analyst is very uncertain 
(due to inadequate data, pushing the state of the art, etc.).  Therefore, the analyst will run 
a trade-off analysis in which the model is run several times using different key input 
parameters to determine the effect on the results.  Variation is accomplished by applying 
different multiple factors to the input parameter being tested.  As a result, the analyst will 
be able to readily determine whether or not to probe further in an effort to provide 
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 improved input data or to select an alternative that is less risky.  Inherent in the process of 
cost analysis is the aspects of risk and uncertainty since the future is, of course, unknown.  
Risk analysis will explore these various aspects and document assumptions that had to be 
made in completing the analysis.   
A risk analysis is performed in order to avoid the road, which leads to crisis 
management, a resource-intensive process that is normally constrained by many 
obstacles.  An up front look into the associated risks of different solutions allows 
planning to avoid the crisis and maintain system readiness.  Risk is considered the 
probability of occurrence of a particular adverse effect upon the planning and estimating 
for technology management.  A method of analysis is employed to quantify variables 
associated with a set of solutions that may affect the outcome of planning.  In other 
words, the process of developing solutions is reviewed to determine what risks are 
associated with each solution and which ones are significant.  These risks are categorized 
as low, moderate or high based upon their likelihood of occurrence and the potential 
impact.  Three key assumptions are made that are at risk: 
• Failure data used in calculations is accurate for the period under analysis,  
• Life-cycles for commercial products used to set technology refresh initiative 
dates and to procure bridge buys is accurate 
• System operational requirements will not change through the systems life 
cycle either from mission requirement changes or system interoperability 
requirement changes.   
If failure data is inadequate, the greatest impact will be to schedule in terms of the 
application platform mission readiness.  Quantities procured for bridge buys would be 
affected by individual product but it is believed that the aggregate effect would be 
insignificant.  If product life cycles varied from those used in planning, both the 
scheduling of technology refreshes and bridge buys would be impacted.  This is again a 
schedule risk.  Finally, if the system operational requirement changes due to changes in 





 • Quantities of bridge buys may be excessive or short of needs 
• Engineering estimates for implementing a technology refresh may be short of 
requirements 
Reduced government funding and manpower levels have further emphasized the 
need to improve life cycle management processes.  Perhaps the focal point for this effort 
is COTS risk mitigation during development and for fielded weapon systems.  This type 
of continual assessment is needed to offset the fast technology update cycle experienced 
in the commercial realm.  This will provide system baseline configuration stability and 
supportability.  Key to this is the need to continually assess original equipment 
manufacturers.  This assessment should provide valuable insight to the vendor's stability, 
which in turn impacts the level of risk associated with specific components employed by 
the DoD.  Such assessments would perhaps look at how limited a vendor's product line is 
and/or make judgments on the potential of specific products in that line to change or 
disappear.  To this end, it becomes important to determine the likelihood that a vendor 
will continue to provide DoD assets and the consistency of that product line.  The 
challenge is in the architecting of a process that is proactive, disciplined and systematic, 
and will consider and address the needs as discussed here for the intended audience.  The 
audience being those customers or stakeholders whose needs must be fulfilled 
F. FUTURE STAKEHOLDERS ASSESSMENT 
1. Program Management Office 
The collaborative process is illustrated in Figure 9 and shows the relationship and 


























































































Appendix C Figure 9: Collaborative Processes 
Figure 10, Implementation Process, shows the process flow at a functional level 
delineating the relationship each player has to the others during the SSB development.  
As a collaborator in this process, the PMO provides the funding resources to internal 
government activities to facilitate, assess, and report.  Also, the PMO is agreeing to pay 
for the implementation of the SSB system and provide the Bill Of Material (BOM) for 
the system under consideration.  For their efforts the PMO receives:  1) an alternate long 
term supplier of the COTS product and a relationship with that supplier and their 
associated OEM that may be extended for other OEM discontinued items, 2) as identified 
in Figure 9, a continuous update to the risk identification and mitigation efforts, 
proactively adjudicating obsolescence issues seamlessly on behalf of the PMO, 3) 
provides the PMO with a corporate knowledge data base on which future decisions can 
leverage, 4) although not identified through the figures, the program gains reparability 
and testability attributes over the life cycle of the system defined by the Navys needs.  
The method of communication being online is nearly in real time so the effort expended 




Appendix C Figure 10: Implementation Process 
2. Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
The OEM for their part in the collaboration effort has a lot to gain and little to 
lose.  There is a business case to be made for making a profit from their intellectual 
property they no longer find useful.  The 5-15% royalty is the incentive, but other non-
tangible benefits enhance the business aspects in favor of the collaboration effort.  
Protection of their proprietary design is an inherent part of the SSB process through 
Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA) and contractual mechanisms.  Important to note is 
that the contractual arrangements are made with another company, the SSB supplier, not 
the government, which many OEMs find favorable since governmental red tape would 
poison the business case.  This situation leaves the ownership and control of the 
commercial products in the hands of the industry.  Additionally, the government does not 
have to pay for the design only the product, a tenet of Acquisition Reform.  By 
participation in the collaborative system the OEM establishes a long-term relationship 
with the DoD/government without the ongoing supportability issues.  In turn these new 
emergent properties of the system can be used to enhance the ability of the OEM to 
market enhanced product supportability, not only to the DoD/government environment, 
but also any entity, which is configuration constrained due to the business constraints (i.e. 
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 refineries, paper mills, electrical power generation and control applications, etc.).  The 
OEM efforts are concentrated during the establishment of the SSB supplier and play a 
crucial part in assuring that the OEM reputation will be in safe hands when the SSB 
supplier delivers products.  The OEM however does agree to allow the internal Navy 
resources visibility into the products design by letting the SSB supplier share the parts list 
complete with associated component vendor information along with a top level assembly 
drawing.  This is information the government has not been privy to in the past but it is 
essential for accomplishment of risk analysis and yielding the desired emergent 
properties of the system. 
3. Small Business Supplier (Sunset Supplier) 
As for their part in the collaboration process, the SSB supplier must be willing to 
be contractually bound by the agreement with the OEM and at the same time be willing 
to work the internal government resources to coordinate and facilitate supportability 
efforts while reducing risk to the program.  Actions required by the SSB supplier will 
include: 
• Sharing the OEM parts list and drawings. 
• Be the purchaser, stock handler, and storage facility for parts that have gone 
obsolete and are awaiting consumption once an assembly order is placed. 
• As requested by the program, be willing to stock all up assemblies (which 
have already been paid for) to enable immediate turnaround times of fielded 
assemblies, which have failed. 
• Accept all the responsibility for being the prime supplier of the subject 
assembly. 
In return for its efforts the SSB supplier is rewarded through:  
• A new relationship with a pre-eminent commercial firm. 
• A new product line. 
• New customers, DoD/government and non-government. 
• Long term relationships with the new customers which enables long term 
business planning. 
• Technical partnering with internal DoD/government resources not only for 
predictive obsolescence management but a whole host of other specialties. 
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 4. DoD Field Activities/Resources 
The internal DoD/government resources have a very crucial role to play regarding 
the supportability of all our systems from design to fielded systems.  Supportability is an 
inherently governmental function for several reasons:  1) the motivation of our internal 
resources is in support of the end user needs; this perpetuates and enhances our positions 
and esteem, 2) due to the overarching scope and the long term broad based characteristics 
of supportability issues, no one prime contractor could, without conflict of interest, 
accomplish these functions, and 3) No entity has or even wishes to obtain the corporate 
knowledge maintained by our internal resource pool.  The collaborative environment as is 
evident in Figures 1, 9 and 10 embeds the talented expertise into the SSB process in a 
way, which leverages these resources and creates a value stream for the program.  The 
relationship building characteristics of our internal resources is very evident in Figure 9 
where this crucial resource takes center stage in enabling the collaborative system.  
Taking both figures (1 & 9) in concert it is easy to see how the resource can gain program 
equity and support by reducing life cycle costs (LLC), extending supportability of 
systems, and reducing program risk 
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 XI.  ANALYSIS 
A. BUSINESS IMPACTS 
In this section the potential financial consequences will be presented along with 
specific areas of benefit to the business process.  An analysis of the cost data will be 
presented in the form of data summaries in an effort to answer the questions stated at the 
beginning of this document.  The data will be offered in an objective and direct manner 
so as to keep interpretations and explanatory text to a minimum.  This section will 
address the direct financial impacts as well as contributions they make to the business 
objectives.  And finally, an alignment between the financial model and the business needs 
will be offered that will provide a summary of results, to include non-financial impacts, 
as well as a statement on feasibility. 
B. FINANCIAL MODEL 
The purpose of the financial model is to collect, manage, and analyze cost data.  
In this way, the model essentially converts the data into information in a convenient and 
easily understood format.  For this business case we are looking at the life cycle costs 
(LLC), over a 10-year period.  LLC estimates are typically given for the life cycle of a 
system and in particular for capital programs.  The LLC usually provides the total cost of 
acquiring, installing, using, changing and disposal across the entire life of the system.  In 
this case, we target only the period between technology refresh dates.  This specific 
interval (i.e., time periods between initial fielding of the equipment and the next 
technology refresh) is the appropriate application for SSB Systems use.  Since it was 
designed specifically for these intervals, the SSB System provides the largest potential 
benefit to the program.  The SSB process, as stated previously, is meant to stabilize the 
system baseline between technology refresh dates and thereby ensure supportability for 
this period.  The program management team determined the 10-year cycle.  Nevertheless, 
similar cost data could have been derived and analysis performed for any technology 
refresh period.  The information presented in this section (Financial Model) addresses 
only the costs aspects of supporting the SSDS under different scenarios.  In this way, the 
analysis will provide expected future support costs for budgetary planning purposes, as 
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 well as identify potential problems or opportunities.  Non-financial benefits will be 
offered in subsequent sections.  Together they support the decision-making process that 
leads to the most effective supportability strategy.  
Six different support scenarios were prepared by running the Cost Model using 
the SSDS MK 1 data set.    A scenario consists of a chosen combination of the various 
support methods for each COTS item, the three choices included: Life of Type Buy  
LTB, Sunset Supply Base  SSB, or Refresh.  These scenarios were put into two groups 
for side-by-side comparison (within a group) of impacts due to type of support chosen. 
 The first group consisted of three scenarios, each on a separate worksheet in the 
Cost Model workbook of Enclosure (28) labeled with the following names  LTB(1), 
SSB(1), SSB optimized.  These scenarios varied the amount of involvement the SSB 






LTB(1)  Is a bridge buy of all procurable COTS products, NO SSB used 
SSB(1)  Is the scenario that the SSDS COTS Working Group decided to 
execute.  Implementation SSB system at 75% of potential candidates. 
SSB optimized  Reflects the implementation of SSB process for all presently 
procurable COTS products and where the OEMs were willing to participate, 
this would represent 100% SSB system utilization with the given constraints. 
 
The second group presented the exclusive use of only one of the support methods 
at a time showing the global, aggregate impact on the supportability costs over the 
interval.  Due the constraints on the SSDS MK 1 many of these support choices are not 
feasible but the comparison is provided to show a notional impact if given the right 
constraints what the potential outcome would be.  Identification of these worksheet 
names in Enclosure (28) and potential cases for using these support methods are as 
follows:  
LTB only  LTB used for all COTS products, NO SSB & NO REFRESH.  This 
type of support method is sometimes used at the beginning of a systems life to 
insure supportability over a given period.  
SSB only  SSB used for all COTS products, NO LTB & NO REFRESH.  This 
type of support method must be implemented before irreversible obsolescence 
takes place on any of the items, typically this would be done as soon as possible 










Refresh only  Refresh only reflects a situation where a program will chase 
the changing technology, resulting in a redesign every time a COTS product 
becomes obsolete.  These obsolescence dates are identified by the End-of-
Production (EOP) dates, information published by the OEM and documented in 
Enclosure (28).  This type of support solution typically necessitates an open 
systems architecture to be cost effective. 
Financial models were developed for the use of evaluating the impact of 
implementing various support options given the SSDS MK1 data set.  The Financial 
Models were primarily derived using the Cost Model, identified in a previous section of 
this BCA, with four additional constraints requiring manually calculated cost data.  These 
four cost areas are explained in the subsequent text as Variants 1-3 and Red Parts costs.  
This additional information allows modification of the general Cost Model to 
accommodate for special program needs or implementation of alternative risk mitigation 
methods (i.e. ECP, ISEA actions).  In assigning a support method to the affected COTS 
products covered by one of the Variants a label of Other is given to them in the 
worksheet column Support Method of Enclosure (28).  Taking the Cost Model outputs 
and combining them with this additional information adequately describes the cost 
impact in supporting the SSDS MK 1 over the 10 year support window.  Enclosure 28 
merges all costs together to provide the total supportability costs over the 10 year 
interval.   
1. First Variant 
The COTS products that have been determined to be near obsolete and 
unsupportable must be redesigned.  Enclosure (30) (Resource Cost Models, worksheet 
Required Tech Refresh) provides the resource cost model for those COTS products that 
will have to be replaced in the 2005-6 timeframe and bridge buys are not possible.  Based 
on market surveillance, NSWC Crane determined that nine COTS products are affected. 
Aydin 19" CRT Monitor (replaced with flat panel) 
4 mm DAT Drive (replaced with similar product)  
Electro Luminescent Panel (replaced with similar product)  
Ethernet Network Card (VLANME2 being refreshed to VLANME3)  
Red Rock 2.1 G drive (replaced with next generation product)  
FDDI DAS replacement (pulling half of the cards in each configuration and 
replacing with slot bypass boards)  
Concentrator replacement (pulling half of the cards in each configuration and 




NTDS Type A/B (replacing 530-2000-001's and 530-2005-001's with 530-
3000-001)  
Red Rock Dual DAT (replaced with next generation product). 
The SSB process team has deemed these items as OTHER and a redesign effort to 
accommodate replacement of these items is necessary.  This worksheet represents a 
simulation model to estimate the potential cost impact of all nine items that require 
technical refresh/insertion, which means implementing a new design or configuration.  
The following table is taken from the worksheet and shows the total cost for each WBS 
element and a total additional cost to the program of $7.063M. 
WBS Element Total ($K) 
Total 7063 
Configuration Management 126 
Hardware/Software Engineering 1684 
Testing And Documentation 944 
Procurement 3866 
ILS Planning and Management 337 
Installation 107 
Appendix C Table 2: Total Support Costs (Required Tech Refresh, 9 Items) 
This amount is essentially the total cost to replace all nine items through analysis, 
redesign and installation in the Fleet The SSB process was not applied to these COTS 
products as a cost avoidance measure because of timing.  By the time the SSB concept 
was implemented for the SSDS MK I, commitment was made to replace these items with 
a redesign.  Subsequently this cost must be added to all three scenarios to get a total cost 
of support over the ten-year cycle. 
2. Second Variant 
For each worksheet in the procurement model there is a value of $1,300,000 
under Sub-Total for Program Year 1 as shown below. 
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Program Year 1 
Supplier Part # Support Method # Buy Sub-Total-$ Cost 
PT-VME610A-
10534 OTHER 0 $1,300,000.00 
Appendix C Table 3: Engineering Change Proposal Costs: Second Variant 
This value is based on preliminary data determined from actual Navy supply 
research by the In-Service Engineering Activity (ISEA), NSWC Port Hueneme and is a 
conservative estimate of implementing an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) to 
perform engineering analysis, design, test and installation in the Fleet. 
3. Third Variant 
For each worksheet in the procurement model there is a value of $102,877.00 
identified as Total Other (Misc.) for all cost matrices. 
Total  $5,820,641.00 
 Total Other (Misc.) $102,877.00 
 FY 03 Total $5,923,518.00 
Total Red Parts   
   
Net Present Value $6,795,517.54  
Appendix C Table 4: Miscellaneous Costs: Third Variant 
This value comes from the worksheet titled ‘Special Data for MK I’.  This value 
represents the costs associated with the items that are not covered in the cost matrices: 
and not part of the SSDS Master Assembly List’ worksheet.  These items are unique and 
must be purchased to support the program.  Consideration is being given to extending the 
SSB concept to these items at the request of the PMO.  These items tended to be low cost 
and supported by a bridge buy.  This figure is found in all procurement cost matrices. 
4. Red Parts 
Red Parts are those items that are dangerously close to being obsolete and must be 
purchased in order to support the production of the COTS product. 
331 
  
 Column I     
      
 Total     
  Total Other 
(Misc.) 
$102,877.00   
  FY 03 Total $3,058,736.27   
Total Red 
Parts Cost 
$520,240.57    $26,012.03 
 Net Present 
Value 
$6,021,954.17    
Appendix C Table 5: Red Parts Cost Example 
The Red Parts cost for FY03 was calculated from the aggregate of all Red Parts 
costs for each COTS configuration.  This value is presented in Enclosure (28) “SSDS 
Assembly Master and Cost Matrices” in column I.  Our implementation experience has 
shown that the rate of increase of obsolete parts (Red Parts) increases at the average rate 
of approximately 5% per year.  To account for this increase in future years, we have 
projected that this increase could provide a good estimator for the amount of budget 
needed in the out years.  
As evident in the procurement cost models, the FY dollars needed each year is 
calculated as follows: 
[We will use worksheet SSB (1) values to demonstrate] 
FY03 = $520,240.57 
FY04 = ($520,240.57)(0.05) = $26,012.03 
FY05 = ($520,240.57 + $26,012)(0.05) = $27,31.63 
FY06 = (FY03 + FY04 + FY05)(0.05) = $28,678.26  
. . . 
FY12 = (FY03 + FY04 + - - - - -  + FY11)(0.05) = $38,431.61 
In an effort to compare same year dollars from different scenarios spread over the 
10 year interval, calculations of Net Preset Value (NPV) were done to compare the 
support costs in FY 03 dollars.  NPV calculations were based on a rate of 5.1% across the 
period of analysis as required per OMB Circular-A94. [32) OMB] 
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 There are two enclosures from which we have derived the following results.   
• Enclosure (28) - SSDS Assembly Master and Cost Matrices  provides the 
detailed procurements costs for each scenario.  
• Enclosure (30)  Resource Cost Models  provides the detailed resource 
costs needed to set up and maintain each scenario. 
The procurement costs for the resource cost models was derived from the 
procurement costs calculated in Enclosure (28).  In this way, the two enclosures are 
linked and represent a consistent picture of the costs needed to execute this analysis. 
Sunset Supply Costs 8404 
Operations Cost 1550 
Component Surveillance 650 
Sunset Supply Industry Interface 650 
Sunset Supply Set Up 250 
Procurements 6854 
Red Parts Cost (5% of inventory per 
year) 
287 
Procurements of Replenishment 
Spares 
6567 
NPV Total  $6,021,954.17 
   
Grand Total  $6,851,397.68 
Taken from  Enclosure (28) 
0.038% error 
  Taken from Enclosure (30) 
Appendix C Table 6: Procurement Cost Example  
One final note, for each scenario (LTB(1), SSB(1) and SSB Optimized) there is 
an additional cost of $701,217 for consumed inventory.  This is the amount that has 
already been invested for providing spares.  This amount will be considered when we 
address total support cost in the Analysis of Results section. 
C. RESULTS 
As previously mentioned, there is a cost ($7.063M) associated with Required 
Tech Refresh that must be included for each of the three scenarios 1) LTB(1), 2) SSB(1), 
and 3) SSB Optimized to get an overall cost to support the SSDS over the ten-year 
period.  Since this cost is unchanged due to the scenario, we have excluded from this part 
of the results discussion.  The focus here will be on the total support costs and 
procurement costs minus the costs due to a required technical refresh or redesign. 
 
All cost figures are given in $K, 
unless otherwise stated. 
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Total Cost NPV Total
LTB(1) SSB(1) SSB Optimized
 
Chart 1: Total Support Costs (LTB (1), SSB (1), SSB Optimized) 
The overall total support cost is highest when implementing the LTB(1) method.  
Implementation of SSB (actual or optimized) provides a cost reduction of approximately 
15% as compared to a traditional LTB approach.  
If we look at how these costs are allocated over the ten-year period we get the 
following profile. 
334 









2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
LTB(1) SSB(1) SSB Optimized
 
Chart 2: Annual Total Costs (LTB (1), SSB (1), SSB Optimized) 
The funding profile for the LTB(1) approach not only has a greater total support 
cost, it also incurs the majority of this cost upfront with a very erratic funding profile for 
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Chart 3: Total Initial Cost (LTB (1), SSB (1), SSB Optimized) 
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Chart 4: Remaining Annual Costs (LTB (1), SSB (1), SSB Optimized) 
The LTB (1) approach is burden with more then half of the overall costs in the 
first year (see graph below) and has a more unstable funding profile in the remaining 
years.  This instability affects the planning and budgeting process executed at the 
beginning of the period. 

















LTB(1) SSB(1) SSB Optimized
 
Chart 5: Initial Cost as a Percent of Total (LTB (1), SSB (1), SSB Optimized) 
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 The total support cost consists of two major sources: 1) procurement of the 
hardware, and 2) the resources needed for managing the system configuration, 
engineering tasks, testing, documentation, ILS planning and management, and 
installation.  










LTB(1) SSB(1) SSB Optimized
Procurement Resources
 
Chart 6: Total Support Costs (LTB (1), SSB (1), SSB Optimized) 
From the above graph, we see that the procurement costs contributes significantly 
more than the resource costs. 
Focusing on the procurement costs we get: 
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Chart 7: Total Procurement Cost (LTB (1), SSB (1), SSB Optimized) 
Through further inspection we see that the procurem
also larger than for the SSB methods.  Furthermore, the N
lower for the SSB methods.  This leads us to conclude th
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Chart 8: Annual Procurement Costs (LTB (1), SSB (1), SSB Optimized) 
From the above chart, we see that the procurement costs for the LTB(1) are 
primarily incurred in the first year, typical for bridge buy scenarios.  The SSB methods 
have lower initial costs and share the remaining costs with the remaining years.  The next 











LTB(1) SSB(1) SSB Optimized
 
Chart 9: Initial Procurement Costs (LTB (1), SSB (1), SSB Optimized) 
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Chart 10: Remaining Initial Procurement Cost (LTB (1), SSB (1), SSB Optimized) 
The important points to make here is that the SSB methods require less upfront 
costs, spreads the remaining costs out over the rest of the support period, and deliver a 
more stabilized funding profile for the remaining years as depicted by the trend lines in 
the above graph.  The amount of the initial procurement costs invested in each scenario is 
illustrated below. 



















LTB(1) SSB(1) SSB Optimized
 
Chart 11: Initial Procurement Cost as a Percentage of Total Procurement Cost (LTB (1), SSB (1), 
SSB Optimized) 
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 The above graph clearly shows the level of commitment needed to initiate a 
particular support method.  For completeness, the procurement costs for the remaining 
years as a percentage of the total procurement costs is given below, again emphasizing 
the stability of the funding profiles for the SSB implementations. 
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LTB(1) SSB(1) SSB Optimized
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Chart 12: Remaining Procurement Costs as a Percentage of Total (LTB (1), SSB (1), SSB Optimized) 
As earlier, for each scenario presented above an additional cost must be 
considered due to those items that are planned to undergo a redesign.  The amount of 
$7.063M must be considered in presenting a complete picture of cost for each scenario. 
WBS Element Total ($K) 
Total 7063 
Configuration Management 126 
Hardware/Software Engineering 1684 
Testing And Documentation 944 
Procurement 3866 
ILS Planning and Management 337 
Installation 107 
Appendix C Table 7: Work Breakdown Structure Element 
Part of this total cost is also procurement in the amount of $3.866M.  These 
amounts are constant between all three scenarios and therefore excluded from the results 
in order to focus on the actual contributions of each support method.  This redesign effort 
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 is essentially a technical refresh task required for those COTS products that cannot or 
have been chosen not be supported by either the LTB or SSB mechanisms. 
In order to avoid this technical refresh and its subsequent costs the PMO would 
have to employ the LTB or SSB methods from the beginning or consider a complete 
redesign of the entire SSDS.  In this next section we will look at supporting the SSDS by 
three additional scenarios in order to avoid the technical refresh that would otherwise be 




LTB for all COTS products over the ten-year period. 
SSB for all COTS products over the ten-year period. 
A complete redesign of the system. 
The following graphs will help depict the cost structure for each scenario.  This 












LTB Only SSB Only Complete Tech Refresh
 
Chart 13: Total Support Cost (LTB Only, SSB Only, Complete Tech Refresh) 
Its not hard to see that a complete redesign or technology refresh is by far the 
most expensive method.  This is anticipated considering all of the elements that must be 
funded.  The following chart shows the elements and their contribution to this particular 
effort.  
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Chart 14: Complete Technology Refresh (Cost Allocation) 
In addition to a huge procurement cost ($54.7M), notice the engineering costs at 
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LTB Only SSB Only Complete Tech Refresh
 
Chart 15: Annual Total Costs (LTB Only, SSB Only, Complete Tech Refresh) 
343 
 The annual costs are shown above.  The majority of the costs for a complete 
redesign occur in 2004, 2005 and 2006.  These amounts are significant and are based on 
proper planning in year 2003.  What this implies is that poor planning can cause these 
figures to increase; therefore a great deal of risk is assumed if this scenario were 
executed.  
As with other scenarios, procurement costs make up the majority of the overall 
costs.  The following graph illustrates the contributions of procurement and required 











LTB SSB Complete Tech Refresh
Procurement Cost Resource Cost
 
Chart 16: Total Support Cost (LTB Only, SSB Only, Complete Redesign) 
In each case, procurement costs are the overriding contributor to overall costs and 
a complete technology refresh requires huge procurement dollars.  This is easy to 
understand since this effort is outfitting the entire fleet where the other two scenarios are 
simply replacing anticipated failed COTS products.  The next graph illustrates the 
procurement impact for each. 
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Chart 17: Total Procurement Costs (LTB Only, SSB Only, Complete Tech Refresh) 
Needless, to say, a tremendous amount of investment in hardware is needed to 
support this scenario. 
Furthermore this investment is made early in the ten-year period.  This brings us 
back to a recurring theme, which is hardware procured early is likely to be obsolete by 
the time you reach the end of the ten-year period when it is to be installed.  From the 
illustration in Chart 15, significant expense is incurred in the 2005 and 2006 timeframe 
for tech refresh.  This is 3-5 years before we expect to install.  
From this point forward we will exclude the Complete Technology Refresh 
scenario as a reasonable choice simply because of the large cost associated with it.  In 
doing so we assume that the benefits derived from a complete tech refresh is not worth 
the costs, because when driven by COTS obsolescence cycles these refresh costs reoccur 
every 2-5 years unless supported with other support alternatives like SSB or LTB.  We 
will now concentrate on the remaining two scenarios of LTB Only and SSB Only.  In 
order to simplify the graphs, the LTB Only and SSB Only will be replaced by LTB and 
SSB respectively.  The Total Support Costs for each are indeed comparable, as seen from 
the below graph. 
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Chart 18: Total Support Cost (LTB, SSB, NPV LTB, NPV SSB) 
At first glance, it looks like the SSB approach is slightly more expensive overall, 
but applying Net Present Value we see it actually costs less.  The following graphs will 
help us to understand why this is so.  Looking at the annual costs we see two familiar 
attributes of the SSB method: 
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Chart 19: Annual Procurement Costs (LTB, SSB) 
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 The next graph targets specifically the initial cost. 









Chart 20: Total Initial Procurement Cost (LTB, SSB) 
The LTB method must invest nearly $3.
method. 
In terms of overall costs the following pr
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otal Procurement Costs (LTB, SSB) 
 Nearly 82% of the total procurement costs for LTB are allocated in the first year.  
This introduces significant risk to the program.  The number of COTS products procured 
is based on failure rate analysis data.  This investment essentially locks the PM in for the 
duration of the ten-year period with little flexibility.  Additionally, conservative failure 
rate estimates, that is high failure rates must be used in order to ensure the COTS items 
can be supported for the entire ten years.  The SSB on the other hand invests less than 
18%, which results in spreading out the costs over the out years.  The following graph 
illustrates. 
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Chart 22: Remaining Years Annual Procurement Cost (LTB, SSB) 
Less investment is needed up front, leading to larger expenditures in the later 
years.  First of all, less up front expense results in lower risk and more flexibility.  The 
flexibility comes from the fact that you have more of the total allocated dollars for the 
program not invested.  Secondly, each subsequent years costs are higher but with each 
passing year the risk associated with expenditures is lower as we approach the end of the 
ten-year period.  Also, procurement costs are associated with actual failures for that year.  
In this case study, we had to predict the actual failures based on MTBF and MRDB data.  
In reality, under the SSB method, procurement costs would only be incurred when a 
COTS product fails.  Under the LTB method we are procuring COTS products in 
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 advance of their failure.  If they dont fail, weve bought an item for no reason.  Finally, 
the SSB method has a much more stable funding profile.  This has significant impacts to 
improving the planning and budgeting aspects of the program.  
One final thought is to compare all six scenarios.  Given the tremendous cost 
associated with a complete technology refresh, we will exclude this alternative in the 
following two graphs.  This allows us to focus on the five remaining support scenarios.  
In this way we can see what can be gained by initiating a particular support strategy early 
in the acquisition cycle. 










LTB(1) LTB Only SSB(1) SSB Optimized SSB Only
 
Chart 23: Total Initial Support Cost (LTB(1), LTB Only, SSB(1), SSB Optimized, SSB Only) 
From this we can see that the greater degrees to which we implement the SSB 
process the lower the initial investment.  The lower initial investment translates into 
lower risk.  So in effect, implementing the SSB System acts a risk mitigation tool.  
Considering the following cost profiles further emphasizes this. 
The following graph shows the annual support costs for the remaining years out to 
2012.  The trend lines show the stability in funding over this period. 
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
LTB(1) LTB Only SSB(1) SSB Optimized SSB Only
LTB(1) LTB Only SSB(1) SSB Optimized SSB Only
 
Chart 24: Remaining Annual Support Costs (LTB(1), LTB Only, SSB(1), SSB Optimized, SSB Only) 
Of all the scenarios, only the SSB Only’ scenario exhibits a stable funding 
profile.  Recall for the SSB(1)’ and SSB Optimized’ scenarios, we had to include the 
cost for a partial tech refresh for those nine identified COTS products.  This additional 
cost skews the stability for these two scenarios.  Of course, after the first few years 
(2003-2006) their funding profiles become more consistent from one year to the next. 
D. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
In this section we derive usable, decision-making information from the results of 
the previous section.  The results will be summarized and evaluated for their contribution 
to the business objectives.  This section will address both financial metrics as well as 
non-financial implications. 
1. Direct Financial Impacts 
The financial aspects are summarized below for the four scenarios we defined in 
the previous section. 
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LTB(1) $5,924 $9,639 $8,651 $701 $9,352 
SSB(1) $3,440 $8,415 $7,333 $701 $8,034 
SSB 
Optimized $2,858 $8,665 $7,321 $701 $8,022 
LTB Only $5,234 $8,970 $7,981 $0 $7,981 
SSB Only $1,727 $9,170 $7,539 $0 $7,539 
Appendix C Table 8: Total Support Costs 
The above table demonstrates the potential savings in the first year as well as the 
overall costs to support the SSDS program over the defined ten-year period.  These 
values are taken directly from the cost models in Enclosure 30.  
1) 
2) 
When the SSB process was implemented, regardless of degree, significant 
savings were realized.  See column NPV Adjusted Total in the above table. 
When the SSB process was implemented, the initial year costs were reduced 
indirectly proportional to the degree of SSB implementation.  See column First 
Year Costs in the above table. 










LTB(1) $5,924 $7,069 $6,871 $701 $7,571 
SSB(1) $3,059 $6,854 $6,025 $701 $6,726 
SSB 
Optimized $2,477 $7,004 $6,012 $701 $6,712 
LTB Only $5,234 $6,400 $6,201 $0 $6,201 
SSB Only $1,346 $7,609 $6,231 $0 $6,231 
Appendix C Table 9: Procurement Costs 
The above table demonstrates the potential procurement savings in the first year 
as well as the overall costs to support the SSDS program over the defined ten-year period.  




When the SSB process was implemented, regardless of degree, significant 
savings were realized.  See column NPV Adjusted Total in the above table.  The 
figure for SSB Only is slightly larger than for LTB Only.  The reason for this is 
because the SSB process requires a cost to purchase Red Parts each year, the 
first year being $534,011 and a total for all years of $828,426.  The LTB 
methods make the assumption that they can purchase all the required items 
upfront for usage throughout the ten-year period and that all item will be 
consumed.  There is risk involved with buying too many or not enough items. 
When the SSB process was implemented, the initial year costs were reduced 
indirectly proportional to the degree of SSB implementation.  See column First 
Year Costs in the above table. 
When we perform standard deviation calculations over the ten-year period we get 
the following.  
STD DEV LTB(1) LTB Only SSB(1) SSB Optimized SSB Only 
2003-2012 






55 61 111 
2004-2011 
Middle years 105 108 10 7 16 
Appendix C Table 10: Standard Deviation Procurement Costs 
1) When the SSB process is implemented, we experience a more stabilized 
funding profile for procurement, particularly for the middle eight years.  See the 
above table. 
When we look at the standard deviation for the total support costs for each 
scenario we get the following.  Remember, for the LTB(1) and SSB(1) scenarios we had 
to take into account a redesign effort for nine COTS items.  This cost is incurred early in 
the ten-year period and affects the overall stability of the funding profile. 
STD DEV LTB(1) LTB Only SSB(1) SSB Optimized SSB Only 
2003-2012 




1068 508 1135 1131 111 
2004-2011 
Middle years 1056 526 1188 1186 16 
Appendix C Table 11: Standard Deviation Total Support Costs 
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 1) When SSB is implemented early enough we can effectively avoid any redesign 
costs that would be needed due to obsolescence during the ten-year period and 
therefore expect the greatest stability in the funding profile over the ten-year 
period. 
The percentage of overall initial costs associated with each scenario is given 
below. 











LTB Only LTB(1) SSB(1) SSB Optimized SSB Only
 




When the SSB process was implemented, the initial cost as a percentage of the 
total cost to the program was significantly reduced depending on the degree of 
implementation.  This helps to reduce the risks associated with making large 
upfront investments as the costs are more evenly distributed over the entire ten 
years.  
When the SSB process was implemented, the costs are more evenly distributed 
over the ten-year period depending on the degree of implementation.  This is 
more desirable for planning and budgetary purposes. 
The following table provides the costs associated with having to redesign those 
COTS products that were targeted for redesign prior to SSB implementation.  These 
items were determined to become obsolete prior to 2003, and unsupportable via 
traditional support mechanisms. 
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WBS Element Total ($K) 
Total 7063 
Configuration Management 126 
Hardware/Software Engineering 1684 
Testing And Documentation 944 
Procurement 3866 
ILS Planning and Management 337 
Installation 107 
Appendix C Table 12: Total Support Costs Required for Tech Refresh 
1) The total cost that could have been potentially avoided if the SSB process had 
been implemented for those identified COTS products is approximately 
$7.063M. 
This $7.063M cost is considered the potential Avoided Costs when implementing 
the SSB process during SSDS design.  The optimal SSB implementation point being the 
earliest point in the system engineering process. 
The following summaries show the savings for procurement, resources and the 
total support costs between the two most practical scenarios (LTB(1) and SSB(1). 
LTB(1) Procurement Cost (Typical scenario) $6871 
SSB(1) Procurement Cost  (Actual SSB Implementation) $6025 
Procurement Savings $ 846 
LTB(1) Resource Cost $1780 
SSB(1) Resource Cost $1308 
Cost Savings $  472 
LTB(1) Total Support Cost $8651 
SSB(1) Total Support Cost $7333 
Cost Savings $1318 
Appendix C Table 13: Total Support Cost Savings: SSB(1) versus LTB(1) 
1) When the SSB process was implemented significant cost savings is realized. 
The following data illustrates the potential savings of the current typical support 
scenario of LTB and a required tech refresh of nine items and SSB for all COTS products 




SSB Only $7539 
Potential Cost Savings $1112 
Cost Tech Refresh of 9 Items $7063 
Cost to SSB the 9 Items $669 
Avoided Cost Savings $6394 
Total Potential Cost + Avoided Cost $7506 
Appendix C Table 14: Total Savings: Potential Cost + Avoided Cost  
1) If SSB was implemented for all COTS products early enough we can 
essentially avoid the cost associated with a required partial tech refresh. 
The final summary of data looks at the extreme cases.  The following illustrates 
the savings between implementing SSB early in the acquisition cycle to affect all COTS 
products and redesigning all COTS products. 
Complete Tech Refresh $61089 
SSB Only $ 7539 
Procurement Savings $53550 
Appendix C Table 15: Savings: SSB Only versus Complete Tech Refresh 
In looking at the SSB portion of the first year procurement costs for each scenario 
we get the following table. 
Support Method Non SSB Costs SSB Costs SSB% of Total Costs 
LTB(1) $5,924 $      0 0.0% 
LTB Only $5,234 $      0 0.0% 
SSB(1) $2,097 $  962 31.4% 
SSB Optimized $1,321 $1,156 46.7% 
SSB Only $ 103 $1,243 92.3% 
Table 13: SSB Portion of Total Support Cost 
For all but the SSB’ Only scenario four, the majority of the initial procurement 
costs are associated with non-SSB support mechanisms.  
1) 
2) The greater degree of SSB implementation the lower the initial investment and 
thus lower program risk. 
In comparing the resource models for the traditional and actual implementations 
we notice similar orders of magnitude for total costs. 
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WBS Element Actual ($K) Traditional ($K) 
Total 8415 9639 
    Configuration Management 0 57 
     Hardware/Software Engineering 0 0 
     Testing and Documentation 0 0 
     Procurement 10 7069 
     ILS Planning and Management 0 2354 
     Installation  158 
     Sunset Supply Costs 8404 - 
Appendix C Table 16: Support Cost Comparison: SSB(1) – Actual versus LTB(1) Traditional 
The SSB infrastructure absorbs nearly all the costs for supporting COTS products 
over the ten-year period.  
1) 
2) 
The actual scenario provides infrastructure to support the SSDS program, 
resulting in greater flexibility and manageability for the PM. 
Implementation of the SSB infrastructure is possible at the same or lower cost 
to the program as traditional methods. 
5. NON-FINANCIAL IMPACTS 
Certain non-financial impacts materialize based in part on financial consequences.  
In order to successfully evaluate the results of implementing the SSB process we must 
look at these non-financial aspects in light of the business objectives.  But first we must 
clearly derive such impacts.  Since no clear financial metric can be applied to these 
impacts we will discuss them in broad terms and in ways that can be observed and 
verified.  The approach here will declare a financial outcome or business practice of 
implementing the SSB infrastructure, and explain in non-financial terms the tangible 
impact.  
a. Low Initial Expense 
By reducing the upfront costs for procuring expected spares, the SSB process 
brings improved flexibility to planning and budgeting.  If the initial costs are large then 
the PMO is forced to stay the course for the entire period in order to derive the maximum 
return on investment.  Changing program direction during the ten-year period would be 
difficult to argue given the number of spare COTS products that would become 
potentially useless.  Under the SSB infrastructure much of the initial costs are still 
associated with non-SSB support mechanisms; therefore, these costs will be absorbed in 
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 the event the program did not make use of the assets that were procured.  In the All SSB 
scenario, nearly all, about 92%, of the upfront costs are for SSB support.  The benefits 
associated with this cost are immediately realized, that is the procured COTS items are 
deployed to the fleet for use upon purchase.  Furthermore, in the event that performance 
requirements change, driving a change in system design, the risks are greatly reduced if 
less of an investment was made for spares that may not be needed.  So therefore the SSB 
process effectively reduces the risk of overspending early in the support cycle. 
Derived Benefits: 
• Cost Savings  
• Flexibility 
• Reduced risk 
• Stability 
b. Stable Funding Profile 
The SSB process spreads the procurement costs more evenly throughout the ten-
year period.  This makes efficient use of funds and is easier to budget and manage.  The 
yearly costs are higher under the SSB, but thats because no investment in spares was 
made the first year.  Nevertheless, as before, the costs associated with these years are for 
forecasted replacements on an as need basis.  The costs are incurred at the moment a 
requisition is made for a replacement COTS item.  The benefit is immediately realized.  
Furthermore, by procuring COTS replacement products only on demand the PM makes 
better use of funds.  Also, continual market surveillance is practiced throughout the 
support cycle providing real-time data in terms of obsolescence and diminishing 
materials.  In this way the PM is better equipped to make effective decisions that benefit 
the overall program.  This environment creates a flexible process that by taking a 
proactive posture can react to changes in material availability.  
Derived Benefits: 
• Stability 
• Efficient use of funds 
• Flexibility 
• Risk Mitigation 
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 c. The Sunset Supplier Shares Risk 
One area of cost savings not addressed was the cost to the Navy for stockage, 
storage and issue of COTS spares and repair parts.  These are costs not directly borne by 
the SSDS program.  But in addition to the cost savings to the Navy for not having to 
house, manage and transport these COTS items, the Sunset Supplier now assumes the 
responsibility, and thus risk, of facilitating these functions and recoup the value added by 
adjusting the product purchase price by 5% on each COTS item procured. 
Derived Benefits: 
• Risk Mitigation & Management 
• Shared Risk 
• Shared responsibility 
• Collaborative Environment 
d. Extending COTS Supportability 
Recall the costs derived due to COTS products that were supported by OTHER. 
The resource model, Enclosure 30 (Resource_Cost_Model, worksheet Partial Tech 
Refresh), demonstrated the costs associated with having to redesign before the end of the 
support cycle.  This figure was $7.063M.  The point here is that by implementing the 
SSB process early enough in the program, we can effectively extend supportability for 
these items.  And in fact we can extend the reparability of these items by identifying and 
procuring near-obsolete components (Red Parts).  In this particular case, by the time the 
SSB infrastructure was in place, it was too late and subsequently cost the program an 
additional 7 million dollars.  The planning for redesign carries certain risks as well.  The 
DoD will almost certainly use COTS products for the commercial technology advantages 
touched on earlier in this document.  And they will work towards specific warfighter 
performance requirements.  For the COTS products identified in Enclosure 30, the items 
were determined to be obsolete by 2005-6 timeframe.  Now remember that there is a 2-3 
year planning period and additional 3-5 year implementation period for new designs.  If 
the period of concern starts in 2003, the COTS products could become unsupportable 
before the planning phase even ends.  By implementing the SSB process we effectively 
avoid this situation by extending supportability of the COTS products so that warfighter 
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 requirements can continue to be met while plans are made to upgrade the system.  By 
stabilizing the system baseline this way we mitigate the risks of not being able to support 
the warfighter to acceptable levels. 
Derived Benefits: 
• Extending COTS Supportability 
• Extend COTS Reparability 
• Cost Savings/Cost Avoidance 
• Stabilize System Baseline 
• Risk Mitigation & Management 
e. Initial Investment  
Recall that the initial cost for setting up the SSB infrastructure and making the 
initial COTS product assessments was approximately $380K (taken from Enclosure 
(30)).  This is a minor investment considering that the realizable return is substantial 
depending on how early in the acquisition cycle SSB is implemented.  For example, the 
cost of support for the present SSDS before SSB was considered was estimated to be 
$8651K plus an additional partial tech refresh cost of $6394K (total of $15045).  The 
estimated cost of implementing SSB early enough to affect all COTS products was 
$7539K.  The potential savings is roughly $7.5M.  That, in itself, is a wonderful 
marketing element, however there is also another point to made; and that is that this setup 
and assessment can be performed for any program.  Thus, the SSB process is 
transportable and repeatable.  And as the proliferation of COTS products increases 
throughout the military, there is a strong likelihood that commonality of COTS products 
across weapon systems will grow.  Having a SSB process that maintains and continually 
updates a database of these COTS products for usage, obsolescence, and diminishing 
materials will provide a tremendous benefit whose value will grow exponentially.  Thus, 
the SSB process is also expandable.  This initial investment is made within the DoD, 
tasking Navy resources to perform supportability assessments and 
DMSMS/Obsolescence Management.  The reports generated become government 
property and distributed among the DoD PMOs as well as commercial support entities 
(Sunset Supplier).  Therefore other programs can leverage the data and the relationships 
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 from the SSB infrastructure.  This initial investment is also used to fund the government 
facilitating activity for pursuing and coordinating potential OEM and Sunset Suppliers.  
Derived Benefits: 
• Transportable, repeatable and expandable. 
• DMSMS/Obsolescence reporting 
• Collaborative Environment 
• Coordination 
6. SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL BENEFITS 
Summary of Benefits 
Financial Non-Financial 
• Reduced Procurement Cost 
• Lower Upfront Costs 
• Significant Cost Avoidance 
• Stabilized Funding Profile 
• Overall Cost Savings to the 
Program 
 
• Flexibility  Planning & 
Budgeting 
• Reduced risk 
• Stability Funding Profile 
• Efficient use of funds 
• Risk Mitigation & Management 
• Shared Risk 
• Shared Responsibility 
• Collaborative Environment 
• Extending COTS Supportability 
• Extend COTS Reparability 
• Stabilize System Baseline 





Appendix C Table 17: Summary of Benefits 
7. ALIGNMENT WITH SSB SPECIFIC GOALS 
SSB Specific Goal Derived Benefit 
Achieve significant and quantifiable cost 
savings over the product life cycle. 
 
• Reduced Procurement Cost 
• Lower Upfront Costs 
• Significant Cost Avoidance 
• Stabilized Funding Profile 
• Overall LC Cost Savings to the 
Program 
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 SSB Specific Goal Derived Benefit 
To be able to identify, quantify, and 
mitigate supportability risk to programs. 
• DMSMS/Obsolescence 
reporting 
• Reduced risk 
• Risk Mitigation & Management 
• Shared Risk 
Extend the life cycle and supportability of 
COTS. 
 
• Extending COTS Supportability 
• Extending COTS Reparability 
Provide infrastructure to support existing 
platform/combat systems in support of the 
PMO. 
• Transportable, repeatable and 
expandable. 
• Coordination 
• Collaborative Environment 
By virtue of SSB implementation and the benefits 
documented within this section, an infrastructure is 
obviously in place to support existing weapon 
systems. 
A reliable, affordable, repeatable, and 
expandable process that meets the 
customers performance expectations (e.g., 





• Transportable, repeatable and 
expandable. 
• Stabilize System Baseline 
Institutionalize methods for proactive 





• Collaborative Environment 
A system that leverages Navy and 
commercial supportability assets and 
provides a networked solution. 
 
• Collaborative Environment 
• Shared Responsibility 
• Shared Risk 
• Coordination 
Leverage across government programs with 
extended applicability through contract 
strategies, methodologies, and incentives to 
entice commercial industry participation. 
 
• Flexibility  Planning & 
Budgeting 
• Transportable, repeatable and 
expandable 
• Collaborative Environment 
Forecast budget requirements in support of 
the programs/war fighter/consumer 
 
• Flexibility  Planning & 
Budgeting 
• Efficient use of funds 
• DMSMS/Obsolescence 
reporting 
Improve schedule flexibility and support 
options of system upgrades or new 
development initiatives. 
 
• Flexibility  Planning & 
Budgeting 
• Extending COTS Supportability 
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 SSB Specific Goal Derived Benefit 
• Stabilize System Baseline 
 
Appendix C Table 18: Alignment of Benefits with SSB Specific Goals 
8. CONTRIBUTIONS TO BUSINESS OBJECTIVES 
a.  Financial and Business Performance 
The implementation of the SSB process to the SSDS program has had positive 
impacts to both the financial and business performance requirements.  The SSB process 
essentially provides an architecture that specifically addresses the issue of obsolescence, 
diminishing manufacturing sources, and material shortages.  In this way the risk to the 
program is significantly reduced.  The architecture provides effective coordination and 
networking leading to tremendous cost savings as well as the ability to ensure long-term 
supportability for COTS products.  From a financial perspective, the SSB process allows 
for the opportunity to significantly reduce the upfront costs and stabilize the funding 
profile over the period of support leading to a much more efficient use of funds.  This is 
in addition to sizeable cost savings and avoidance.  From a business perspective, the 
overall awareness of obsolescence and material shortages gives the PM more information 
for making effective decisions.  Furthermore, the risk mitigation aspects of the SSB 
process come from establishing a collaborative environment where the responsibilities 
and risks are shared between the commercial and government activities.  Out of this 
environment come positive business impacts in terms supportability, program planning, 
program risk and life cycle cost management. 
b. Strategic Positioning and Ownership 
The SSB infrastructure was implemented into the SSDS program.  The overall 
environment is one of collaboration, coordination and trust.  The functions are 
coordinated across a network of commercial and government activities.  The expertise 
from both the private and public sectors is shared across this network.  This situation 
nurtures long-term relationships between the commercial entities and the DoD.  These 
relationships are consistent with present DoD and industry partnering initiatives.  This 
and the fact that the SSB process has provided tremendous cost savings to the SSDS 
program only strengthens the strategic position of the SSB concept within the set of 
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 support alternative solutions presently available to the PMO.  Furthermore, the mere fact 
that the PMO has discretion and authority to create an SSB environment illustrates the 
control and ownership the PMO has in face of COTS product proliferation.  Remember, 
the COTS initiative essentially reduces the control the DoD has historically had over 
system design and support.  The SSB process allows the PMO to regain some control in 
that it extends supportability and maintains key technologies for stabilizing the system 
baseline. 
c. Operations and Functions 
Reviewing the benefits that are derived by implementing the SSB process, we 
immediately realize the positive effect it has on extending COTS product supportability 
for the SSDS program.  Recall, that commercial product life cycles are typically 18-
months to 2-years, whereas DoD planning and implementation easily exceeds 5 years.  In 
this case the SSB process allowed the PMO to postpone likely redesigns that result from 
obsolescence.  By extending supportability, the SSB processes gives the PMO the 
opportunity to better forecast and react to changes in warfighter requirements as well as 
in the market.  Overall management of the program is made more efficient given the 
extended timeframe for assessing technology trends and evolving warfighter 
requirements.  By extending COTS product supportability, the PMO can now align 
technology refresh cycles with product end-of-production dates.  In this case we are 
talking about the extended production of a specific COTS product by the Sunset Supplier.  
At the same time we can essentially compress the timeframe for delivering support to the 
warfighter.  Sunset Suppliers take on the responsibility of stockage, storage, and issue of 
COTS replacement and repair parts.  Improved delivery to the warfighter is expected 
since the Sunset Supplier is contractually responsible for specific performance metrics.  
d. Product and Services 
With the implementation of the SSB process, key enabling technologies are 
retained through extended supportability over a defined period of time.  The net result is a 
stabilized system performance baseline with an overall improvement in terms of product 
and service.  The SSB process allowed the PM to match the COTS product update cycles 
with the programs technical roadmap or refresh effort.  Furthermore, as a product, the 
SSB infrastructure becomes part of a toolset that provides obsolescence indicators and 
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 reports as well as the ability to mitigate maintenance and supportability issues at the 
assembly level.  This support strategy can now include a mechanism for establishing and 
managing the information obtained from the assessment and reporting activities, thus 
empowering the PM with the knowledge necessary to deliver an improved customer 
service.  In the long run the system integrity is maintained, which has several 
implications in terms of integrated logistical support (i.e. training, manuals, configuration 
control, etc..) 
e. Image 
The financial and non-financial benefits derived and identified within this 
document prove the viability, effectiveness and value of the SSB concept as alternative to 
conventional support mechanisms.  Not necessarily as a replacement for these traditional 
methods but as another option.  The SSB process does not intend to extend supportability 
for the sake of retaining old technology, but rather to stabilize the system performance 
baseline for periods that can be aligned with typical DoD acquisition cycles.  It offers an 
opportunity for the PMO to consider redesigns based on performance enhancements in 
response to evolving warfighter requirements rather than redesigns due to obsolescence.  
This mere fact makes this an attractive scenario from a PMs perspective for improving 
life cycle management.  And in conjunction with the significant cost savings the overall 
appeal of the SSB concept should make it the alternative of choice for PMs seeking to 
optimize their support strategy. 
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 XII.  CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
The overall acquisition of military weapon systems is a challenging endeavor to 
say the least.  One thing that has been reported, and confirmed in this business case 
analysis, is that procurement costs make up more than half of the acquisition costs.  In 
fact, the procurement costs incurred after a system has been fielded still accounts for the 
majority of the life cycle costs.  This scenario has lead DoD to begin leveraging 
commercial standards, products and practices in an attempt to lower risk and life cycle 
costs.  The use of COTS products has made great strides to reducing life cycle cost while 
transferring state-of-the-art technologies to the warfighter.  However, these gains have 
come with their own set of problems.  Given the mission criticality and software-
intensive architectures of present weapon systems, slight changes in COTS products are 
simply unacceptable.  Minor changes to a piece of COTS hardware can have serious 
implications to readiness and program costs, given their software intensive nature.  It 
typically takes a significant effort, in terms of time and money, to develop, test and 
deploy upgraded changes.  To further, complicate the issue, these weapon systems are 
developed and deployed in small quantities making them unattractive for typical 
commercial business interest.  The uniqueness of these systems makes them difficult to 
support affordably.  And given that commercial technology refresh cycles are around 18-
24 months where the DoD can barely hope to refresh every 5-7 years, there is little 
incentive for major equipment manufacturers to continue production of a product that no 
longer fulfills their business objectives just for the sake of accommodating the military, 
which makes up less than 0.4% of the market.  There is really only one of two ways to 
handle this dilemma.  Either accelerate the acquisition phase, which is highly unlikely 
given the conservative DoD acquisition approach, or extend the supportability of the 
COTS products.  Additionally, as the commercial content within military systems 
increase, the issue of COTS product supportability is complicated by orders of 
magnitude.  Consider for a moment the eventual increase in technology refreshes needed 
across the DoD/Navy program spectrum as a result of the tremendous proliferation of 
COTS in military applications.  This increase makes the issue of COTS supportability a 
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 major concern during acquisition and support strategy development.  For program 
planning and budgeting purposes a mechanism is needed to effectively assess the COTS 
product supportability position for a particular program.  To this end, the SSB concept 
provides a support recommendation process for each COTS product in the weapon 
system under analysis.  This approach assists the Program Manager (PM) in making 
decisions that will impact life cycle costs of the weapon system while meeting technical 
design requirements.  And from a planning and budgeting perspective it provides higher 
confidence in future program cost predictions.  The output of the SSB process helps PMs 
map proposed technology updates to system deployment, operation and support plans. 
B. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
The results presented in of this document clearly illustrate that the SSB 
implementation has the potential to offer significant cost savings to the SSDS MKI 
program in terms of total support.  The savings come from many areas depending on the 
present state of the program.  For the SSDS program certain COTS products have already 
been slated for specific support methods.  These include redesign, reclamation, spares 
utilization, maintenance contracts and bridge buys.  For those items designated as a 
candidate for bridge buys, the SCWG considered implementing the SSB process as a 
support solution alternative.  Cost models were generated for comparison purposes in 
order to fully understand the impacts.  Three main scenarios considered to be the most 
practical, were analyzed in terms of resource and procurement costs.  In an effort to fully 
evaluate the SSB implementation three additional scenarios were generated.  These 
scenarios are impractical at this stage in the SSDS program but could be viable 
alternatives given the right circumstances such as early in the acquisition cycle.  
Nevertheless, the results not only reflect an overall cost savings for the ten-year analysis 
period, they also provided further insight to other desirable benefits.  In particular, risk 
mitigation and management was enhanced for the PM.  The SSB method had an 
extremely low initial investment as well as a profoundly stable funding profile over the 
ten-year period.  The low initial cost translated into less of upfront buy-in.  The more 
money that is invested upfront, the more you are locked into a situation in order to derive 
the greatest return on those initial investments.  For example, let us say that you purchase 
a million dollars worth of spares in the first year in an effort to support a particular 
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 product over ten years.  After the first two years you use up $200K of the spares when 
you are presented with an opportunity to improve product support, reduce costs and/or 
enhance system capabilities.  You still have $800K invested in spares.  In this case you 
are unlikely to take advantage of this opportunity.  Subsequently, low initial cost reduces 
the risk of staying the course and fully optimizing program attributes.  Furthermore, in 
the situation where you have made significant investment in spares upfront, you are 
calculating this amount based on a forecast of failures for a particular item.  There are 
two risks associated with this.  First, investing too much means making purchases in 
spares that will never be used.  Secondly, buying too little, runs the risk of not being able 
to support the weapon system for the prescribed period of support.  Along with the low 
initial costs, the SSB method allows for even expenditures of the remaining funds.  To 
whatever degree the SSB was implemented, the resulting funding profile was very stable.  
This stability is important to the planning and budgeting process.  Effective planning and 
budgeting is essentially a process in risk mitigation, and anything we can do to help the 
planning and budgeting process helps us to reduce risk.  Also, remember the very nature 
of the SSB infrastructure is a collaborative venture in which responsibility and thus risk is 
shared between the commercial and government entities, a further step in risk reduction.  
Furthermore, by stabilizing the funding profile we can make efficient use of funds, which 
is a recurring mandate throughout government acquisition directives.  The effects of SSB 
implementation have clear financial impacts, which are aligned with Federal and DoD 
initiatives, regulations and guidelines.  
The financial aspects of SSB implementation are not enough to conclude it as a 
viable support solution alternative.  Just because we can save money, we have to ensure 
that it meets the requirements of the program and ultimately the warfighter as well.  The 
SSB process extends the supportability and reparability of COTS products.  By 
establishing arrangements between Navy Field Activities/Resources, the OEMs and third 
party small businesses (Sunset Suppliers), we can provide insurance to the Program 
Management Office (PMO) that a particular COTS product will be sustained for a 
defined period of time.  In fact, delivery of the replacement spare is initiated at the time 
of failure in the fleet.  The COTS item is purchased on demand rather than upfront, which 
is based on failure rate data.  If ten items fail over ten years, you will only purchase ten 
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 replacement items.  This approach again is flexible and provides a mechanism for 
improving the planning and budgeting for the next tech refresh point.  The extension of 
support stabilizes the system baseline so that a more focused approach is given to 
planning for future product or system redesign efforts.  By stabilizing the system baseline 
for a defined period of time, we again reduce risk to COTS obsolescence during this 
period.  In fact, the very SSB infrastructure facilitates effective obsolescence and material 
shortage assessment and reporting.  This assessment capability is a coordinated effort 
across the SSB infrastructure.  As the SSB is implemented on more programs 
membership in the SSB process grows allowing greater access to programs Navy-wide.  
In effect, the data collected in one program is likely valuable to other programs given the 
growing proliferation of COTS products in military applications.  Therefore we visualize 
a process that is transportable, repeatable and expandable for all DoD/Navy programs. 
C. IMPACT TO ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
This Business Case Analysis has demonstrated that the SSB infrastructure is an 
affordable approach for mitigating program supportability risk.  The collaborative nature 
of the SSB process leverages the various areas of high performance and ability residing in 
the government, big business and the small businesses.  The risks are quantifiable and 
shared across the infrastructure.  The SSB process was conceived for and therefore 
sensitive to the supportability of fielded COTS products as defined by the warfighter.  As 
an acquisition strategy it extends the life cycle and supportability of COTS and ensures 
late-life cycle supply support.  The SSB process essentially permits the DoD to be 
successful in leveraging commercial developments with appropriate economies of scale 
in order to reach its military performance goals while offsetting the problem of DMSMS.  
The SSB infrastructure directly supports existing combat/weapon systems.  In this 
way it provides the PMO an additional support solution alternative.  This alternative can 
be implemented early in the acquisition process to demonstrate the value and viability of 
COTS product usage.  The SSB process can also provide insight to the supportability of 
selected COTS products early enough in the acquisition process to significantly reduce 
program risk related to COTS and life cycle management.  Additionally, when applied to 
various DoD/Navy programs, component commonality could lead to a flexible, integrated 
logistical support approach.  This scenario would likely have a ripple effect that 
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 incentivizes the commercial industry to develop long-term relationships with the 
respective PMOs. 
The essence of the SSB process lies in its ability to detect potential supportability 
problems.  And by extending the supportability, it provides sufficient time for analysis of 
alternatives and solutions in the decision-making processes.  Furthermore, accurate 
assessment of COTS supportability can be accomplished at any level (subsystem, 
equipment, component, or piece part).  This approach not only extends supportability but 
reparability as well.  The SSB approach is to procure assemblies when the customer 
requires them.  To this end, the SSB process is committed to continual assessment over 
the entire COTS product life cycle.  Again, this approach breeds a more informed 
decision-making process translating to improved support performance and lower life 
cycle costs. 
Overall, the SSB process becomes an additional and likely the preferred support 
solution alternative for PMs who will welcome the schedule flexibility provided by the 
SSB process.  The flexibility comes from the fact that the SSB infrastructure can tailor 
the support options in terms of functions and expectations demanded by the warfighter.  
These functions include immediate supportability and fast, reliable and direct delivery to 
the warfighter.  The COTS product supportability assessments are critical to effective 
SSB implementation and therefore a great deal of emphasis is placed on the collection, 
maintenance and dissemination of the information and knowledge derived.  In this way 
the SSB process is definable and repeatable.  In the end, the SSB provides the PM with 
an independent utility for implementing COTS products and has minimal or no impact on 
system operational performance.  Once implemented, the SSB is an affordable, 
expandable, repeatable and reliable process that will meet the users performance 
expectations.  It provides the best of both worlds.  It leverages the inherently 
governmental functions of the Navy supply process and coordinates with commercial 
supportability assets through a thoroughly meshed and maintainable communication 
network solution. 
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 D. RECOMMENDATION 
DoD has recognized that product support solutions can be more effectively 
designed and implemented if the acquisition and logistics communities work in 
partnership.  Within the SSB infrastructure integrated acquisition and logistics functions 
conduct supportability analysis as an integral element of the systems engineering process.  
This process (SSB) should occur at the beginning of program initiation to ensure 
designed in reliability and maintainability throughout the program life cycle.  This will 
also ensure that the system performance baseline remains unchanged therefore continuing 
to meet the warfighter's supportability requirements.  Although applicable at any phase of 
the acquisition cycle, it is critical to consider the SSB implementation in the earliest 
possible stage to gain maximum benefit.  Consider the SSB Only support scenario.  This 
scenario essentially employs the SSB method for all COTS products.  The SSB Only 
method illustrates a situation where SSB was implemented prior to other support method 
choices and subsequent commitments.  In this case we saw the greatest stability in the 
funding profile and the lowest initial investment amount.  Together they result in the 
lowest risk to the program while providing more flexibility and sustainment capability.  
The SSB process should be a continuous process.  COTS product supportability 
assessments should be repeated frequently throughout the acquisition cycle.  This 
approach not only keeps the data stored on COTS products fresh, but also allows for 
some maturation of the process.  The plan is to effect a Continuous Measurable 
Improvement environment that will ensure that the most cost-effective methods of 
support are being considered and subsequently offered to the PM.  
The PM is expected per DoDD 5000 to use the most effective source of support 
that optimizes performance and life cycle cost, consistent with military and statutory 
requirements.  The source of support may be Organic or commercial, but its primary 
focus is to optimize customer support, achieve maximum weapon system availability at 
the lowest Total Ownership Cost.  At their disposal, the PM has a set of support methods 
that can be used to achieve this objective, the SSB process, as proven in this BCA to be a 
viable and effective support method, should be included as an additional support solution 
alternative in this set. 
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This Marketing Plan is one of the four foundational documents created to 
establish the Sunset Supply Base (SSB) system as a Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) 
supportability alternative for Navy fielded systems containing COTS products. The plan 
analyzes the environments (external, internal, customer) in which the marketing functions 
will be operating in.   The SSB system is evaluated for its attributes, both positives and 
negatives through a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis.  
Each of these characteristics is then matched to a marketing strategy to improve the 
systems marketability. Two goals are set: A) capture 20% of market share (72 Navy 
programs or 80 man-yr per year effort), B) Establish an Image for the SSB system as the 
alternative of choice for COTS supportability that enables cost effective Technology 
Insertion in fielded Navy systems.  Based on a defined Target Market, a Marketing Mix 
is defined that identifies a series of marketing actions to achieve a competitive advantage 
for the SSB system in maximizing market penetration. This Marketing Plan is an integral 
part of overall System Engineering approach used to develop the SSB system whereby 
the implementation of this plan is contained within the system implementation process. 
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17 Steps SSB System Implementation Process 
2 yr/board Two years per board, reflects necessary design and 
development time. 
$ Low life cycle cost 
$$ Mid Range life cycle cost 
$$$$ Most expesive life cycle cost 
$K Cost represented in thousands of dollars 
AIDA Attention, interest, desire, action  marketing action model 
AN/ASQ-20X Designator for Sonar Mine Detecting Set developed for the 
Navy under the program management code PMS-210 
AR Acquisition Reform 
ASN Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy 
BCA Business Case Analysis 
BOM Bill of Material 
CAGE Contractor and Government Entity, manufacturers unique 
identifier number. 
CLS Contractor Logistic Support 
CM Configuration Management 
CMM Coordinate Measurement Machine 
CMSE Commercialization of Military and Space Electronics 
Conference 
COTS Commercial Off the Shelf 
DAU Defense Acquisition University 
DEMS Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service 
DMEA Defense Microelectronics Activity 
DMS Diminishing Manufacturers Supply 
DMSMS Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages 
DoD Department of Defense 
E&MD Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase 
ECP Engineering Change Proposal 
F3I Form, Fit, Functional replacement 
FAR Funding Allocation Review 
FY Fiscal Year 
GIA Government Industry Association 
GIDEP Government Industry Data Exchange Program 
Govt. Government 
H High Risk 
ICP Inventory Control Point 
IEEE 1722 Capability Assessment Tool 
ILS Integrated Logistics Support 
IPT Integrated Product Team 
ISEA In-Service Engineering Agent 
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 ITIMP Integrated Technical Item Management and Procurement 
System 
Ktr Contractor 
L Low Risk 
LCC Life Cycle Cost 
LT Long term supportability  greater than ten years 
LTB Life of Type Buy (also referred to as LOT Buy) 
LSA Logistics Support Analysis 
M Medium Risk 
MAN-YR Level of effort for one person over one year 
MIL-Spec Military Specifications 
MIN/MAX minimum/maximum 
MKI SSDS Mark I System 
MKII SSDS Mark II System 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
MSP-Plus PBL-MSP with MIN/MAX stocking requirements 
MT Mid Term supportability  five to seven years 
MVP Most valuable performer 
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command 
NAVICP Naval Inventory Control Point 
NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command 
NDIA National Defense Industrial Association 
NRFI Not ready for issue 
NSWC/Corona Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division 
NSWC/Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 
OFPP Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
OJT On the job training 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
# programs Number of program 
PBC Performance Based Contracting 
PBL Performance Based Logistics 
PBL-O Performance Based Logistics Organic 
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PBL-MSP Performance Based Logistics  Mini Stock Point 
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control 
PEO Program Executive Offices 
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PM Program Manager 
PMO Program Management Office 
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POM Program Objective Memorandum 
PPBS Programming, Planning and Budgeting System 
R&D Research and Development 
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 ROI Return on Investment 
ROM Rough order of magnitude 
SECNAV Secretary of the Navy 
SEDI Systems Engineering Development and Implementation Plan 
SOW Statement of Work 
SPAWAR Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
SSB Sunset Supply Base 
SSDS The Ship Self Defense System developed for the Navy under 
the program management code PMS-461 
ST Short Term supportability  less than five years 
SYSCOM Systems Command Structure 
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats Analysis 
TOC Total Ownership Cost 
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 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This Marketing Plan is one of the four foundational documents created to 
establish the SSB system as a Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) supportability alternative 
for Navy fielded systems containing COTS products.  The SSB concept is a unique After-
Market approach to extend the supportability of COTS products predicated on the needs 
of Navy Programs.  The extension of product availability, beyond the OEM assigned date 
to drop the products as obsolete items, provides stability to the system baseline 
configuration, during periods of time between installation and scheduled Technical 
Refresh/ Insertion.  The uniqueness of the SSB concept is evident through how it is 
structured.  The OEMs are: a) market driven, b) high volume and high technology, c) 
their business plan is driven by their commercial customer base, with only about 0.4 % of 
their business going to Department of Defense (DoD) [1) Glum, 2) Robinson, 3) 
Hartshorn] and d) experience fast update cycles (< 18 months)[1) Glum, 2) Robinson, 4) 
McDermott]. In contrast to these OEM attributes, DoD has: 1) unique applications with 
lengthy life cycles (20-40 years), 2) requires a minimum technology refresh or update 
cycle of not less than 5 years [4) McDermott], and 3) have operational readiness and 
maintainability support issue that span the entire life cycle.  To bridge the gap between 
the OEM business planning and the Navys need for long term support a third party is 
brought in.  This is the Sunset Supplier.  The Sunset Supplier makes a contractual 
relationship with the OEM to produce the obsolete products for the OEM customer base.  
The OEM transfers the intellectual property and assembly know-how to the Sunset 
Supplier and for this the OEM receives royalty on the sale of all products produced.  
Internal to the Navy are support infrastructures to ensure supportability of sunset products 
by mitigating any component part obsolescence issues if they exist on those products.  
The infrastructure and support of the SSB process yields, not only significant cost 
savings, but also provides other benefits, such as: 
• Supportability of products defined by customer need (5, 10, 15, 20 years.) 
• Life Cycle Cost (LCC) savings, due to no life-time buy at the assembly level 
is needed, so the assemblies are procured as the customer requires them. 
• Reparability of assemblies over the designated life cycle(5, 10, 15, 20 years) 
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 • Hardware/Software/Firmware stability between Technology Refresh/Insertion 
Cycles. 
• Significant reduction in program risk as related to COTS and life cycle 
management. 
• Improved schedule flexibility and support options that can be tailored for 
Fleet needs. 
• Minimal or no impact on system operational performance.  The performance 
will remain constant through the use of exactly the same part: form, fit, 
and function replacement, which has been made by the alternate 
manufacturer, the Sunset Supplier.
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 II. ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS 
A. THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
1. Competitive Forces  
The Sunset Supply Base (SSB) system is designed to work with existing support 
systems as an interfacing method to optimize solutions in managing the obsolescence risk 
on Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) electronic products.  The environment of 
Diminishing Manufacturer Sources and Material Suppliers (DMSMS) is complex 
because each of the groups or entities set up to address these issues are established and 
function independently of any other entity.  There are many working groups functioning 







Department of Defense level 
Each of the services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps) 
The Defense Logistics Agency 
Most major Program Management Offices (PMO) have programmatic teams 
and many other lower level groups and teams that have been established just 
within the Department of Defense.   
Every major prime contractor to DoD, establishes their own internal working 
groups and teams.   
Most of the well-established industry working groups, associations, and 
societies also have set up teams or groups to work the DMSMS issues. 
Although the SSB system is designed to work with this diversity of incongruent 
problem solvers, not all participants perceive it in that context.  Competitive attributes or 
characteristics that will impede or totally block the SSB system can be categorized into 
several groups. 
B. COMPETITION CATEGORIES 
1. Resource Competition 
In this category the available resources, primarily funding, take priority over 
incorporating another way to do business even if it is better and more appropriate in 
lowering the obsolescence risk to the program or entity evolved.  This type of view point 
looks at the funding potential as a zero sum game -- if they need to add another group or 
function, the end result is less funding to the existing funded groups or entities.  This 
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 barrier to entry is more complex than providing a compelling business case for the SSB 
systems inclusion, it will require a cultural shift to work collaboratively instead of 
competitively.  Some extremely active and powerful groups within this category are the 
DoD and service branch (Army, Navy, etc.) field activities.  This behavior is referred to 
as a rice bowl mentality and has a long-standing tradition with a complete culture that 
supports it.  
2. Territorial Competition 
Each entity has its reasons in taking care of its own problems and challenges.  
Among these reasons the most prominent is self-preservation, that is, being perceived as 
the activity or entity of choice when the customer needs DMSMS issues resolved.  This 
situation has always existed but it was exacerbated when the Acquisition Reform (AR) 
policies and practices encouraged competition between the various support functions.   
Entrance of the SSB system into the existing DMSMS tools, methods, and processes is 
viewed as an undefined risk and possibly as a territorial breach.  Territorial boundaries 
are expected across service branches but in the case of DMSMS the boundaries can be 
scribed down to the lowest level working groups and teams. 
3. Contractual Competition 
The traditional contracting practices are being displaced by a new set of 
performance based contracts that shift the burden of responsibility onto the contractor for 
design, manufacturing, and support.  These contracts may take various degrees of 
responsibility sharing between the government and the contractor, especially with respect 
to support of fielded systems.  Regardless of the split in responsibility, a tension between 
the customer, the government, and the contractor usually develops regarding DMSMS 
management. Here the golden rule applies  He who has the gold, makes the rules.  In 
terms of the competitive environment, the issues affecting DMSMS resolutions will be 
decided when the funds and contracted responsibility are partitioned with the only real 
arbitrator being the way the contractor receives incentives through the contract language.   
4. Functional Competition 
Although the utility of having an Integrated Product Teaming (IPT) environment 
has been well documented, a good percentage of the working groups and teams do not 
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 implement the concepts.  The impact to the DMSMS efforts due to lack of an IPT 
environment is a fragmented approach that produces Stovepipe functional group 
activities.  These Stovepipe activities lack the overarching cohesive structure provided 
by a Systems Engineering approach and many times yield functional areas where 
protectionism and information hiding is an accepted practice.  An IPT environment will 
be composed of some combination of the following functions: DMSMS specialists, 
Integrated Logistic Support, Sustainment Engineering, design engineering, procurement, 
contracts, business management, and Program Management Office (PMO) -- and these 
functions must work together in developing solutions.  The impact of the Stovepipe 
mindset by any one function may limit the potential solution options.  The SSB system as 
a solution option is designed to impact every functional area on the support team and, 
when interfacing with this isolationist disposition, will challenge that functional area to 
participate.  The SSB system is a collaborative system that necessitates voluntary 
participation and if a functional area uses the Stovepipe mentality it becomes readily 
apparent to the entire team as an area of concern.  The inevitable confrontation between 
the SSB system and the isolationists will usually be exhibited as functional competition.  
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 III. THE MARKET PLACE & THE PLAYERS   
A. THE MARKETS 
There are three primary market segments, which constitute the microelectronics 
market place each with a unique environment.  The microelectronic market place is 
important to the DoD/military consumers because the majority of the weapons and 
support systems derive their functionality and performance from the microelectronics 
attributes.  There are three primary market segments each with a unique environment that 
constitute the Market Place.  The first of these segments is the commercial market; 
characterized by fast paced, intense competition, driven by market forces, and state-of-
the-art technology and innovation.  This commercial market segment (89.5%) is 
illustrated in Figure 1 [3) Hartshorn] and is the sum of the combined sub-markets of 
Communication (16.8%), Consumer (12.3%), Auto (5.1%), and Computers (55.3%).  The 
perception of supportability for fielded products given this market driven environment, is 
that of upgrading to the newest technology on a continuous basis and retire the older 
technology.  The approach taken regarding the COTS obsolescence risk is viewed by this 
segment as an opportunity to sell more of the newer products because the products are 
considered either throw away items or the cost of doing business.  This segment is by far 
the largest consumer of the COTS products and therefore the prime motivational force 
which drives the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs).   
The second largest customer of COTS products making up the next segment of 
the market is the industrial consumer (10.1%).  This segment has a whole range of 
applications and consumption habits.  Depending on the application, the amount of 
capital investment and type of competitive pressures, taken together, will determine the 
approach taken regarding the COTS obsolescence risk.  The industrial segment consumes 
COTS products in the mid range of volume, incorporating them as part of the end item to 
sell or used in producing some other product such as their use in paper mills, petroleum 
distillate plants, and in pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities.  The impact of 
obsolescence on those COTS products consumed to make end products is considered 
minimal because the end products are redesigned to accommodate the newer versions or 
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 newest technology offered by the market; typically these type end products have minimal 
support and certification requirements.  The other primary application for COTS products 
consumed by the industrial segment integrates these COTS products into larger systems, 
which are capitally intensive and configuration constrained.  Examples of these types of 
systems include such items as aircraft, industrial production facilities, medical 
equipment, safety and life support equipment.  Many of these systems necessitate 
additional support requirements such as certification or complex and involved start-up 
processes taking up to a year to get online.  The smallest of the three primary segments is 
the government procurement (0.4%) portion of the market, consumed predominately in 
the defense products.  This small segment has a greater amount of constraints levied 
against it than any other market segment.  The government segment is capitally intensive 
and configuration constrained with the additional burden of being a highly regulated 
environment. 
Appendix D Figure 1: Year 2001 Semiconductor Usage 
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 Appendix D Figure 2: Declining Military Presence 
1. The Players 
The players involved with the first market segment are the buyers of the general 
electronic products.  This market includes such items as: games, personal computers, 
stereos, calculators, handheld computers, televisions, CDs, video recorders/players or any 
of the millions of consumable electronic devises in the general market place.  Although 
studies and segmentation of this portion of the market could be done it is not within the 
scope of this evaluation.  The important thing to realize is that it is this diverse market 
segment which provides the driving motivational force for change and innovation in the 
COTS products.  These market driven forces directly impact the rate of change in the 
products and the subsequent short cycle times from product introduction to product 
discontinuance resulting in the obsolescence of the COTS products.   
The industrial market place is divided into two groups: the followers and the 
extended users.  The follower group has the capability to track their use of COTS 
products with the commercial market place and, because of their niche market 
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 applications, can completely sidestep the obsolescence risk issues of the COTS products.  
The players in this group of the industrial market do not play an influential role in 
mitigation methods for the obsolescence risk for COTS products and therefore are not 
considered within scope for this evaluation.  The industrial market extended users, on the 
other hand, have an investment in the capital equipment and many are accompanied by 
additional constraints. Two such constraints are: 1) frozen baseline configuration of 
capitally intensive equipment, and 2) certification or process requirements. An example 
of the first constraint is a chemical processing plan which may take up to 5 years to 
design, 3-5 years to build, and up to 1-2 years to balance and bring into equilibrium for 
constant processing of end products.  The second typical constraint, that of certification, 
can come in many different forms: Food and Drug Association (FDA) (US & foreign 
countries), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC), safety certifications, food handling, and a host of other well defined approval and 
certification requirements.  Regardless of the type of constraints, this market segment 
must identify and mitigate the obsolescence risk due to COTS products in order to 
maintain the supportability of their fielded systems.  The players involved with this 
market segment are extremely complicated to define because it depends on a number of 
factors such as: type of industry, the company organizational structure, the structure and 
requirements of the certifying entity (i.e. FDA may require a doctors assessment, where 
as, FAA may call on in-house FAA experts to perform evaluations, etc.).  The 
perturbations imbedded within all these possibilities yields a set of players that has too 
much variability to categorize into neat groupings and therefore must be lumped into the 
large grouping of the entire market segment.  For the purposes of this market study the 
influence and impact of the entire group will be taken into account where applicable. 
The final market segment, the government segment, has a large and diverse group 
of players and are the primary focus of this marketing plan.  The position in the market 
place of the government segment group has shifted drastically over the past thirty years to 
a minor participant (0.4%) as depicted graphically in Figure 2 [3) Hartshorn], leaving the 
players in this group with little or no leverage in the overall market place.  As mentioned 
earlier these players come from various areas: at the DoD level down to the lowest level 
program working team, all work the DMSMS issues. Furthermore the DMSMS issues are 
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 system issues requiring teaming from all functional areas: ILS, Sustainment Engineering, 
design engineering, procurement, contracts, business management, and PMO, from the 
government side of the house and from the contractors side of the house.  Although many 
support groups have been formed to provide help, guidance, and support the final 
responsible entity for the long term supportability of fielded hardware is the Program 
Manager (PM) for the program.  In many cases the PMOs are grouped into larger entities 
called Program Executive Offices (PEO) and will sometimes function cohesively when 
addressing DMSMS issues although never in complete concert with each other -- the net 
result is that the DMSMS issues are handled at the PMO level. Therefore the primary 
players regarding DMSMS issues are the functional participants within any given PMO 
and all other entities are advisory in nature. 
Important to take into account when considering the various players and their 
roles in the COTS environment and the DMSMS community is the changing contractual 
landscape employing Performance Based Logistics (PBL) and Contractor Logistic 
Support (CLS) [6) DUSD L&MR].  The impact of these contract methodologies is the 
transference of responsibility for long term planning, including the obsolescence risk due 
to COTS products, to the contractor while subordinating the governments role to an 
advisory capacity.  This changing contractual landscape has a direct impact on who the 
players are and what role they assume.  Therefore the company contracted using PBL or 
CLS to perform support functions provides another competitive force when considering 
the SSB system as a potential alternative.  When using the PBL or CLS type contracts, 
the primary player becomes the contractor.  The competitive issues which arise with 
regard to the SSB system, stem from the fact that the SSB system is an internal 
government functional system and not readily transferable to the contractor.  The inherent 
nature of the SSB system necessitates an independent third party to collaborate with 
OEMs and SSB suppliers to optimize the best value for the government.  The contractor 
on the other hand, has as their primary motivational force the bottom line profit and 
supporting the overall business case.  If the SSB system is perceived as not being in the 
contractors best interest for whatever reason, the SSB system will have no real chance of 
success.  The key strengths of the contractor as a competitor are: 1) the contractor many 
times was the entity who designed the system in the first place so they possess intimate 
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 knowledge of the system, 2) the contractor has developed working relationships with the 
government PMO and understands the programs structure, the political environment, and 
even the short comings of the system, and 3) typically the contractor can provide full 
service of all necessary functions (i.e. engineering, Integrated Logistic Support (ILS), 
procurement, test and evaluation, configuration management, etc.).   
Given the above scenario, the inherent weaknesses with the contractor as a 
competitor are: 1) since the SSB system is uniquely a governmental function not directly 
transferable to the contractor, the contractor must search for other methods to support the 
COTS products over the long term, and they must do so with an equivalent level of cost, 
schedule, and performance.  Since no other system has been identified, tested, and 
implemented which shows the same efficiencies as the SSB system, the weakness the 
contractor must contend with is the amount of risk to the program success due to a less 
efficient support process.  2) The contractor will have and inherent conflict of interest in 
supporting COTS long term because of competing interests within their own company.  
As stated above, PBL & CLS are typically awarded to contractors who can support all 
functions (i.e. design, maintenance, procurement, etc.) and the companys business case 
in support of these types of contractors will reflect the amount that each functional area 
within the company will contribute to the bottom line profits.  Without the long-term 
support of COTS products, the company will need to redesign the system to 
accommodate a different part when the COTS product goes obsolete and this in turn 
provides profit margins for the engineering functions.  These profit margins from 
engineering have historically been the cash generator as compared with the margins 
gained through ILS or procurement functions which contribute only a minor amount of 
cash generation potential.  When using the SSB System for the long-term supportability 
of COTS products is implemented, the subsequent resulting impact to the engineering 
functions will yield fewer opportunities for redesign and therefore negative impact to the 
bottom line profits.  The internal conflicts within the PBL/CLS contractor could be 
resolved to maximize the bottom line profits of the company to the detriment to the 
supportability of fielded Navy system and unnecessary negative impacts to the systems 
Life Cycle Cost (LCC). 3) These large full service contractors are burdened by the 
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 contracting constraints of doing business with the government and have adjusted their 
price of doing business accordingly resulting in an expensive arrangement for the Navy. 
2. Market Place Size 
Although, as mentioned above, there are several market segments, which could be 
analyzed with regard to utilizing the SSB system, for the purposes of this analysis we will 
consider only a subset of the potential market place, namely the Navy PMOs. Other 
potential markets such as Industrial segment extended users and other government 
users (i.e. Air Force, DOE, Coast Guard, etc.) will be treated as potential future markets 
but will not be characterized with respect to size or dollar amounts.  Within the Navys 
System Command Structure (SYSCOM) there are three major SYSCOMs which 
represent the lions share of all acquisition programs for the Navy having an annual 
procurement budget totaling approximately $43.4 Billion in FY2001 [7) Cowley] and of 
this total budget only a small fraction is spent on electronic COTS products.  Within a 
SYSCOM the acquisition programs are assigned to Program Management Offices 
(PMOs) and more than one acquisition program may be assigned to a PMO.  The three 
major SYSCOMs and the quantity of acquisition programs associated with each one are 
as follows: Naval Sea Systems Command  NAVSEA with 134 programs [8) NAVSEA], 
Naval Air System Command  NAVAIR with 148 programs [9) NAVAIR], and Space 
and Warfare System Command  SPAWAR with 83 programs [10) SPAWAR].  The 
number of programs for each SYSCOM is an estimate base on web published 
information.  The total available estimated market size is the sum of all programs within 
the Navy and that value is 365 programs. 
B. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 
The economic growth and stability for the DMSMS communities is in a growth 
mode because the obsolescence risk issues are getting worse for several reasons: 1) the 
use of COTS products has been endorsed as the preferred alternative for use in the DoD 
systems, as identified in the DoD 5000 series documents [11) DoD, 12) DoD, 13) DoD], 
2) the service life extension of currently fielded systems  see Figure 3 [14) King], and 3) 
the fast pace that our Original Equipment  Manufacturers (OEM) leave the market with 
their product before the end of the Navys systems service life and sometimes even 
before the system is fielded.  To exacerbate the obsolescence risk issues, the support 
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 structures (i.e. contracting, procurement, ILS, etc.) traditionally used by the Navy were 
purposely designed to be conservative, deliberate, and methodical which yielded a slow 
bureaucratic system.  The PMOs being the responsible entity to assure the supportability 
of fielded systems have in the past and will continue to in the future necessitate funding 
and support of DMSMS activities to meet the Navys ever increasing need. 
Appendix D Figure 3: System Life Cycle Extensions 
C. POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND REGULATORY TRENDS 
The current trends which take on overtones of political and legal characteristics 
are activities involving performance based contracting, ranging from Performance Based 
Logistics (PBL) to Contractor Logistic Support (CLS), on all new procurements wherever 
possible [7) Cowley].  The impact to the existing DMSMS community could be 
significant in that, the support responsibility will be approached in a more rigorous 
manner and have legal ramifications with regards to the contract.  There are political 
forces pushing for contractor involvement in support of fielded systems and abandoning 
the traditional organic support, this would include DMSMS support as well.  Depending 
on the political environment and the contracting methodology, the existing DMSMS 
support functions and the SSB system could be excluded from participating.  Let us 
explore this before moving on; if a contract is being evaluated for Full PBL to include: 
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 1) engineering evaluations, both new and in-service support, 2) Integrated Logistic 
Support (ILS), 3) Maintenance and repair support (i.e. Depot level), 4) Procurement 
support, and 5) DMSMS support  and the contract explicitly states these functions for an 
indivisible package of support, then the DMSMS support function must go with the 
contract if it is to be awarded.  Traditionally the support of the above functions, have 
been accomplished internally in the Navy but the functions are not centrally located and 
are dispersed throughout the various field activities and in the PMO.  The dispersed 
organic functions, in order to participate in bidding on the contract must collectively and 
collaboratively group together to support the indivisible package of support.  In the 
current internal organic support environment a collaborative, coordinated response is not 
likely.  The scenario provided above is not unique in identifying requirements for PBL 
contracts, as is shown in Table 1 below.  Table 1 is followed by the definitions of the 
Type of PBL so that a better understanding of the table can be achieved by providing 
context to the information presented.  Notice that under the column heading  Provider 
manages obsolescence - that if the service is defined as being incorporated into the 
contract, the function always rests with the contractor, although as a potential resolution 
the contractor, at their discretion, may hire as a subcontractor a government activity or 
Organic entity.  



































































































Mini-Stock Point (MSP) X X
MSP Plus X X Negotiated Negotiated
Organic (PBL-O) X X X X
Commercial (PBL-C) X X X X X
Partnership (PBL-P) X X X X X X Negotiated
"Full" PBL X X X X X X Negotiated Negotiated
Total Logistics Support X X X X X X X X  
Appendix D Table 1: Illustrates the various PBL categories and their associated attributes 
D. PERFORMANCE BASED LOGISTICS DEFINITIONS 
The following categories are used by Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) to 
describe the various types of PBL arrangements [15) NAVICP]:  
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 PBL-Mini-Stock Point (PBL-MSP): 
Navy owns the inventorycontractor receives, stores, issues, and may also repair 
the material MSP-Plus includes a negotiated level of requirements determination 
(MIN/MAX). 
PBL-Organic (PBL-O) 
An arrangement with an organic activity (normally via Memorandum of 
Agreement) to procure, repair, stock and issue material.  
PBL-Commercial (PBL-C): 
An arrangement where commercial items are supplied by the contractor.  
Customer requisitions are automatically routed through procurement system (ITIMP) 
directly to the contractor as a delivery order.   
PBL-Partnership (PBL-P):  
An arrangement between a contractor and Navy such that the Navy performs a 
portion of support required by and for the contractor.  For example, the contractor may 
sub-contract the Navy to perform maintenance support at an organic depot.  This can be 
highly beneficial when addressing Core maintenance issues, in that the Navy is able to 
retain Core capability while acting as a sub to the contractor.  
“Full” PBL: 
A contractual arrangement where the contractor manages (and may also own) the 
inventory, determines stockage levels, typically repairs NRFI material, and is required to 
meet specific performance metrics.  Requisitions still flow through ICP, and ICP pays the 
contractor for performance but bills customers traditionally. Reliability improvements, 
technology insertion and reduced obsolescence may be some of the inherent benefits of a 
Full PBL.  The contractor usually is given Class II ECP authority and in some cases may 
also have configuration control.  Additionally, Logistics Engineering Change Proposal 
(LECP) arrangements will be considered a subset of this category if they contain supply 
support clauses that fall under the definition noted above.   
Total Logistics Support: 
A most robust form of PBL (typically referred to as Contractor Logistics Support 
(CLS)), where the contractor manages most or all facets of logistic support (i.e. ILS 
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 elements), including inventory levels, maintenance philosophy, training manuals, 
PHS&T, full configuration control, support equipment, etc. 
Taken over time, the effects of this type of contracting will decimate the Navys 
internal DMSMS support capability leaving it in the hands of the contractors.  There is an 
important tie to the political environment.  The contractors in the defense industry have, 
for a long time, been lobbying Congress to allow them more control over the systems 
they design and develop.  These contractors have a great deal of influence with the 
congressional representatives, in that, the representatives constituencies, may and often 
do, work for these large defense contractors.  Additionally the contractors have been 
known to move manufacturing/assembly operations into a specific congressional district 
to entice a favorable and supportive political ally.  With the past years of declining 
defense budget for new acquisition programs and the natural increase of the support 
budget being spent on the ageing assets, the contractors interest in the support portion of 
the market has intensified.  There is currently no counteracting force from the internal 
Navy support functions/activities to counter balance this move by the defense contractors.  
The performance based contracting process is a mechanism developed to shift the amount 
of contractor involvement in all areas and of special interest is their expanding role in the 
support area of the market.  The premise for the argument given by the contractor driving 
the need for change is the cost reductions possible by using the more efficient processes 
and methods available at the contractors, and in leveraging the industrial base 
community.  The foundation documents, discussed in subsequent paragraphs, put in place 
to establish the performance based contracting methodology, identify this cost focus as 
the primary discriminating criteria.  The guidance documents, discussed in subsequent 
paragraphs, used to implement the methods, go beyond the cost criteria by adding 
additional caveats and restrictions, such as an all or nothing involvement, for 
functionally different but related portions of the support effort.  Furthermore, by dictating 
the allocation of certain functions to be accomplished by specific entities, the guidance 
documents constrain the cost focus of the foundational documents potentially yielding 
sub-optimal results.  Other considerations regarding the guidance documents are the 
methods, tools, and processes used to implement the requirements of the document.  
These practices have a direct impact on the decisions surrounding the award of the 
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 performance based contracts.  Central to the decision making process regarding the 
potential use of a PBL contract is the development of the Business Case Analysis (BCA).  
The ground rules currently used in developing the baseline cost estimates for Organic 
support (i.e. in-house Navy support activity) uses historical performance data and 
compares this data with contractor proposed estimates in evaluating cost effectiveness of 
the contractors proposed cost.  Important to notice is that the Organic support costs rely 
solely on the past data and by doing the analysis in this manner three major assumptions 
are made: 1) the past performance data is accurate, applied in an appropriate manner, and 
the data reflects current and future performance of the Organic activities/functions, 2) 
there are no opportunities to reduce, streamline, or improve the Organic cost figures, and 
3) the Organic activities/functions would not be affected by the competitive environment.  
Applying historical costs to the Organic entities and comparing these to the cost estimates 
in a proposal from the contractor yields a bias in favor of the contractor.  Although this 
type of analysis is considered to be a competitive environment where the lowest cost gets 
the contract, the process side steps many of the tenets of true competition.  The 
implementation methods employed in developing performance based contracts handicaps 
the Organic activity/function, provides a non level playing field, and in no way assures 
the Navy receives the best possible value available in todays market place.   
The combination of the change in focus and the exclusionary policies invoked by 
the guidance documents and implementation policies, defines a new system and, as in all 
systems, there will be new and emerging attributes that may be supportive or counter 
productive to the initial purposes of the foundational objectives.  One of these counter 
productive attributes that has some disturbing unintended consequences, deals with a 
built in conflict of interest for the contractor during the performance period of the PBL 
contract.  This inherent conflict of interest is a result of the interrelationship between the 
Engineering Design functions and the Sustainment Engineering functions providing 
DMSMS support.  Since both of these functions are controlled by the contractor where 
non Organic support methods are used, decisions will necessitate the trade-off between 
better bottom line profits for the company or best value for the Navy evident in lowest 
Life Cycle Cost (LCC) and/or Total Ownership Cost (TOC).  To illustrate this 
interrelationship, Figure 4 identifies a typical example in notional graphical form and 
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 provides a ready reference in explaining the cause and effect relationship between the 
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Appendix D Figure 4: Performance based Contract Scenarios 
Figure 4 Illustrates two scenarios for different types of performance based 
contracts: PBL  C, Performance Based Logistic contract having the contractor as the 
sole provider, PBL  P, Performance Based Logistic contract having the contractor as the 
lead and partnering with Organic activities/functions to provide contract support.  The 
type of Organic support specified in the example implements the SSB system.  For both 
scenarios a singular occurrence of obsolescence notice for a generic assembly  Board 
AA  provides an example to show how each contract type typically would support the 
program given current PBL implementation practices. 
Most PBL  C contracts are written for a period of a 5 year support window with 
a follow-on Navy option for another 5 years.  Included as part of the contract 
responsibilities are the DMSMS issues, that occur during the contract period but support 
is limited to the contracted period only.  All other support cost and subsequent impacts 
regarding the obsolescence issue must be dealt with using other contracting methods 
since those impacts are beyond the scope of the 5 year contracted period.   Board AA in 
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 the example given above, goes obsolete 2 years into the 5 year contracted period.  In 
response to this issue the contractor is obligated to provide the board for the entire 
contracted period and to meet this commitment the contractor most often will chose to 
perform a Life of Type Buy (LTB) or also called a Bridge buy.  Depending on the 
contract language the contractor may or may not be required to notify the supported 
program that the mitigating activity of the Bridge buy has taken place.  This Bridge buy 
indicates a future risk to the supportability of the impacted program.  Regardless of 
notification to the program by the contractor the end of the first 5 year PBL  C contract 
exposes the supportability risk to the program.  Even if the program was notified of the 
impending engineering analysis and potential redesign, the PBL  C contracts consider 
such efforts to be out of scope and therefore must be dealt with another way.  If the 
program had chosen to do nothing about the notice or if they were never told about the 
issue, the program can no longer be supported by Board AA and another alternative must 
be found, typically this takes up to 2 years for full qualification.  The PMO must deal 
with not only the 2 year supportability risk but they must also pay for the alternate 
solution to be developed and implemented.  The cost for such solutions have large 
variability but for minor redesign the amounts range from $22,400 to $250,000 with an 
average of $111,034 [16) DMEA].  These costs identify only the Design Engineering 
efforts which does not include the other necessary support functions/actions (i.e. 
procurement, Configuration Management, ILS support, etc.)  Provided with the 
comparison between the PBL-C and the PBL-P, a quick inspection of the notional 
graphical example illustrates the difference between the two contracting methods 
predominantly that of lower risk and less cost of the PBL-P support.  This PBL-P support 
method should be considered as a potential alternative method of support and contained 
within the solution space.  In an effort to examine the total environment with respect to 
the political, legal, and contracting issues, a detailed review of both the foundational and 
implementation guidance documents will be accomplished so that potential alternative 
paths can be uncovered.  However, prior to looking at these regulatory documents the 
role that engineering plays in the decision making processes needs to be expanded upon 
in order to overlay the context of the supportability issues to the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) 
impacts. 
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 The engineering functions are all about Trade-offs and balance of requirements 
and needs. In the example provided in Figure 4, it is readily evident that there are Trade-
offs between the Sustainment Engineering function and the Design Engineering function, 
in that, one function can and will affect the inclusion or exclusion of the other function.  
This interrelationship has an important association to the type of response the PMO will 
receive from a sole source contractor controlling both functions when providing 
supportability alternatives.  If the contractor was able to provide a support system that 
was of such a high quality that is was the most cost effective, lowest risk, and provided 
the performance that met the customers needs, then the impact may take the Design 
Engineering function completely out of the solution space.  Conversely, if the perfect 
design solution was formulated to allow an easily upgradeable system at lowest cost, with 
no impact to operations, then the Sustainment Engineering function would drop to an 
extremely low amount.  Although both cases stated here are hypothetical, it is important 
to realize the Trade-offs that must be undertaken when considering alternatives for a 
particular solution space.  Some solutions within this solution space are less than 
desirable for the Navy.  Remembering that one of the primary driving parameters, which 
must be satisfied by the contractor, is to achieve the best bottom line profits, this includes 
all functions and operations.  Combining this bottom line focus with the current 
implementation guidelines provides unintentional incentives for the contractor to 
optimize the bottom line focus for both functions, instead of providing the best value 
for the Navy.  The current guidance documents ignore the need for the checks and 
balances in providing good tension to obtain the best possible solution.  Like cost and 
performance as a pairing provide good tension, Sustainment Engineering and Design 
Engineering need to be paired to compare and contrast various alternatives in the solution 
space.  Furthermore, these engineering discipline areas must be independently evaluated 
or decoupled from one another to maintain this good tension.  As a result of the bottom 
line incentive focus of our contractors, independent evaluation or decoupling of the two 
engineering functions is impractical and may be impossible.  Given the current guidelines 
for PBL contracting, our contractors are provided incentives to yield solutions, which 
may not be and probably are not optimal for the Navy.  Understanding the current status 
of incentives provided to the contractor and the potential outcome is important in 
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 considering better alternatives that provide the good tension in an effort to achieve the 
best value for the Navy.  Until other incentives are available which provide the good 
tension scenarios, that can provide best value for the Navy, perhaps the DMSMS 
support functions should not be contracted out but kept as an in-house function.  The 
most appropriate alternative, given the current contracting methods, is to define the 
Sustainment Engineering function, especially with regards to DMSMS solutions, as an 
inherently governmental function.  The amount of judgment calls and decisions made in 
developing DMSMS solutions will by default define latter actions to be taken by the 
PMO in contracting for goods and services.  With the current guidance, the PMO may or 
may not be informed of these decisions and/or possibilities, whereby the contractor in 
essence makes future PMO decisions because of todays DMSMS solutions alternatives.  
The net result of the interaction between current decisions and future decisions, with or 
without the PMO knowledge, identifies a situation in which the contractors are at their 
discretion making PMO decisions.  As identified below in review of the foundational and 
guidance documents, these types of involved decision-making processes are reserved for 
inherently governmental functions only.  However, due to variability in the contracting 
process the DMSMS support functions are at times contracted out using the PBL 
contracting methods.  Therefore the contracting environment (i.e. competitive, non-
competitive) as identified by the foundational and guidance documentation should be 
reviewed.   
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 IV. THE PERFORMANCE BASED CONTRACTING 
ENVIRONMENT 
In this section the direction provided through both sets of documents, 
foundational and guidance, will be evaluated with respect to: 1) Responsibility of the 
Contractor versus that of the Government, and 2) The Contracting Environment.  These 
two evaluation criteria were chosen to address the questions: What if - DMSMS support 
functions were defined to be inherent Governmental functions then do the documents 
provide adequate definition and justification?  Secondly, if the DMSMS support 
functions were considered a commercial activity then - What is the resulting contracting 
environment, as defined in these documents? Finally to close out the section a conclusion 
paragraph will summarize and identify the potential impact to the SSB implementation 
efforts.  
A. THE FOUNDATIONAL PERFORMANCE BASED CONTRACTING 
DOCUMENTATION 
The following references and documents are considered as the foundational set of 
documents in evaluating the Performance Based Contracting (PBC) requirements: 
• DoD Directive 5000.1 [11) DoD] 
• DoD Instruction 5000.2 [12) DoD] 
• DoD Regulation 5000.2-R [13) DoD] 
• OMB Circular No. A-11 [17) OMB] 
• OMB Circular No. A-76 [18) OMB] 
• OMB Circular No. A-76 [19) OMB] 
B. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CONTRACTOR VERSUS THAT OF THE 
GOVERNMENT 
The 5000 series documents identify the need to streamline the acquisition and 
support process while focusing on performance criteria as the preeminent evaluation 
characteristic.  These documents identify Life Cycle Cost (LCC) and Total Ownership 
Cost (TOC) as the driving mechanism to receive best value for the DoD.  In essence, 
the 5000 series documents describe the backdrop for changes but focus on best value 
while improving the support system for the warfighter.  The methods, processes, and 
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 tools identified in the documents rely heavily on the use of a Systems Engineering 
approach in assuring that an overarching view of the systems life cycle process is taken 
into account.  In setting the stage for allowing a performance based contracting approach, 
OMB Circular A-11 identifies the budgetary process wherein Appendix 8  Alternative 
Competitions and OMB Circular A-76 - describes a summary of a referenced document 
and explains how the cost comparison process is designed to deliver best value to the 
government: Appendix 8 specifically states: 
Circular A-76 provides a minimum level of analytic rigor for the 
evaluation of these alternatives. It is designed to: (1) balance the interests 
of the parties; (2) provide a level playing field between public and private 
offerors; and (3) encourage competition and customer choice.   
With these expectations from the budgetary process in mind we will next look at 
the requirements provided in OMB Circular A-76.  The A-76 first identifies what an 
inherently Governmental function is and, due to the impact this definition has on the 
requirements detailed in the remainder of the document, it is important to understand this 
perspective.  As part of the definition description, the following statements are extracted 
from the full text: 
An inherently Governmental function is a function which is so intimately 
related to the public interest as to mandate performance by Government 
employees. Consistent with definitions provided in the Federal Activities 
Inventory Act of 1998 and OFPP Policy Letter 92-1, these functions 
include those activities which require either the exercise of discretion in 
applying Government authority or the use of value judgment in making 
decisions for the Government...Inherently Governmental functions 
normally fall into two categories: (1) The act of governing; i.e., the 
discretionary exercise of Government authority. Examples include. 
combat support or combat service support role...selection of program 
priorities; direction of Federal employees...[20) OFPP] 
Due the nature and long-term impacts with regards to DMSMS support functions 
and their irreversible influence on future PMO decisions, the issue of the act of 
governing is as real problem which could yield blanket approval authority to the 
contractor to act on behalf of the PMO.  To add additional perspective regarding 
inherently Governmental functions a review of the OFPP Policy Letter 92-1 yields the 
following descriptions: 
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 Agencies have occasionally relied on contractors to perform certain 
functions in such a way as to raise questions about whether Government 
policy is being created by private persons... 
As a matter of policy, and inherently governmental function is a 
function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate 
performance by Government employees. These functions include those 
activities that require either the exercise of discretion in applying 
Government authority or the making of value judgements in making 
decisions for the Government... 
An inherently governmental function involves, among other things, the 
interpretation and execution of the laws of the United States so as to: 
(a)bind the United States to take or not to take some action by contract, 
policy, regulation, authorization, order, or otherwise; 
(b)determine, protect, and advance its economic, political, territorial, 
property, or other interests by military or diplomatic action, civil or 
criminal judicial proceedings, contract management, or otherwise... 
(d)Commission, appoint, direct, or control officers or employees of the 
United States; or 
(e) exert ultimate control over the acquisition, use or disposition of the 
property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, of the United States... 
7. Guidelines... (a) The exercise of discretion. While inherently 
governmental functions necessarily involve the exercise of substantial 
discretion, not every exercise of discretion is evidence that such a function 
is involved. Rather the use of discretion must have the effect of 
committing the Federal Government to a course of action when two or 
more alternatives course of action exist... 
7. Guidelines...(b) Totality of the circumstances....(2) The degree to which 
official discretion is or would be limited, i.e., whether the contractors 
involvement in agency functions is or would be so extensive or his or her 
work product is so far advanced toward completion that the agencys 
ability to develop and consider options other than those provided by the 
contractor is restricted.... 
Appendix A to OFFP Policy Letter 92-1-  The following is an illustrative list of 
functions considered to be inherently governmental functions: 
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 6. The determination of Federal program priorities or budget requests... 
7. The direction and control of Federal employees ... 
11... (a) determining what supplies or services are to be acquired by the 
Government... 
16. The determination of budget policy, guidance, and strategy. 
Summary: Responsibility of the Contractor versus that of the Government 
A short summary and evaluation of the extracted portions of the documents 
identified above will provide some concise understanding in determining if the DMSMS 
support functions are or are not inherently governmental functions.  The DoD 5000 series 
documents provide the upper most level of guidance and the context for implementation 
of Performance Based Contracting (PBC) focusing primarily on using the Systems 
Engineering approach to yield the best value for the Navy.  OMB Circular No. A-11 
sets the expectation from a budgetary perspective that uses OMB Circular No. A-76 
criteria resulting in an environment which: balances the interest of the parties, provides a 
level playing field, and promotes competition while increasing customer choice.  The 
guidance provided, thus far, places no constraints on what entity is performing the 
function and specifically in our case does not identify who should accomplish the 
support function for the PMO.  The next set of extracts from the OMB Circular No. A-76 
and the OFPP Policy Letter 92-1 identify several instances, which must be taken into 
account when deciding who is the appropriate entity to perform certain functions and 
engage in the PMO decision making processes.  Several issues are described which 
would define certain functions to be set aside as inherently governmental functions . 
The primary issues identified include:  
• act of governing; i.e., the discretionary exercise of Government authority,  
• use of value judgment in making decisions for the Government,  
• selection of program priorities,  
• direction of Federal employees,  
• bind the United States to take or not to take some action,  
• exert ultimate control over the acquisition, use or disposition of the property,  
416 
 • committing the Federal Government to a course of action when two or more 
alternatives course of action exist,  
• product is so far advanced toward completion that the agencys ability to 
develop and consider options other than those provided by the contractor 
is restricted,  
• determining what supplies or services are to be acquired by the Government, 
and  
• determination of Federal program priorities or budget requests.   
Considering the discussion regarding the impacts that DMSMS support functions 
have on the PMOs current and future decision making processes, then applying the 
definition of inherently governmental functions some logical conclusions can be drawn 
regarding the DMSMS functions.  As described earlier the DMSMS support functions 
require the use of value judgments and when made, dictate the future discretionary 
exercise of Government authority.  Furthermore these support decisions bind the 
government to a course of action, sometimes to a very specific course of action like 
redesign.  Depending on the support strategy the DMSMS support decisions may lead to 
scenarios that constrain the PMOs priorities, budgets, and options to only those potential 
outcomes identified by the DMSMS support provider.  Additionally the highest level 
guidance documents, the DoD 5000 series, endorse the use of the Systems Engineering 
approach which has a one of its primary tenets  the use of good tension in performing 
Trade-offs and achieving best value.  Previous discussion regarding the DMSMS 
support functions identified the conflict of interest issue when a contractor had total 
control over both the Sustainment Engineering and Design Engineering functions.  The 
conflict of interest, the lack of having good tension, the use of value judgments, and 
the irreversible and binding decision making necessary in performing the DMSMS 
support function identify these functions as inherently governmental functions.  
C. THE CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENT: 
1. Excerpts DoD 5000.1 
The DoD 5000.1 document specifically addresses Performance Based 
Acquisition and the methods and practices needed to support that type of acquisition. The 
following are excerpts from DoD 5000.1 that help describe the expectation and 
requirements of the contracting environment: 
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 4.2.4  Performance-Based Acquisition. 
In order to maximize competition, innovation, and interoperability, and to 
enable greater flexibility in capitalizing on commercial technologies to 
reduce costs, performance-based strategies for the acquisition of products 
and services shall be considered and used whenever practical.. 
4.3.3.  Competition. 
Competition is critical for providing innovation, product quality, and 
affordability. All DoD Components shall acquire systems, subsystems, 
equipment, supplies and services in accordance with the statutory 
requirements for competition. Competition provides major incentives to 
industry and Government organizations to reduce cost and increase 
quality.  The Department must take all necessary actions to promote a 
competitive environment, including examination of alternative systems to 
meet stated mission needs; structuring Science and Technology 
investments and acquisition strategies to ensure the availability of 
competitive suppliers throughout a programs life and for future 
programs 
4.4.1.  Total Systems Approach. 
Acquisition programs shall be managed to optimize total system 
performance and minimize total ownership costs by addressing both the 
equipment and the human part of the total system equation, through 
application of systems engineering 
4.4.2  Logistic Transformation. 
Logistics transformation is fundamental to acquisition reform.  Decision-
makers shall take all appropriate enabling actions to integrate acquisition 
and logistics to ensure a superior product support process.  The 
Department shall strive for an integrated acquisition and logistics process 
characterized by constant focus on total cost of ownership; supportability 
as a key design and performance factor; logistics emphasis in the systems 
engineering process; and that meets the challenges of rapidly evolving 
logistics systems supporting joint operational forces. 
OMB Circular A-76 & Supplemental Handbook defines several criteria, which 
impact the PBL contracting environment. The following are excerpts from these 
documents: 
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 Circular A-76 
5. Policya.  Achieve Economy and Enhance Productivity. Competition 
enhances quality, economy, and productivity.  Whenever commercial 
sector performance of a Government operated commercial activity is 
permissible, in accordance with this Circular and its Supplement, 
comparison of the cost of contracting and the cost of in-house 
performance shall be performed to determine who will do the work.  
When conducting cost comparisons, agencies must ensure that all costs are 
considered and that these costs are realistic and fair. 
6. Definitions.f.  A cost comparison is the process of developing an 
estimate of the cost of Government performance of a commercial activity 
and comparing it, in accordance with the requirements of the Supplement, 
to the cost to the Government for contract performance of the activity. 
8. Government Performance of a Commercial Activityd. Lower cost. 
Government performance of a commercial activity is authorized if a cost 
comparison prepared in accordance with the Supplement demonstrates that 
the Government is operating or can operate the activity on an ongoing 
basis at an estimated lower cost than a qualified commercial source. 
Circular A-76 Supplemental Handbook 
Introduction.Circular A-76 is not designed to simply contract out. 
Rather, it is designed to: (1) balance the interests of the parties to make or 
buy cost comparison, (2) provide a level playing field between public and 
private offerors to a competition, and (3) encourage competition and 
choice in the management and performance of commercial 
activities..Reliable cost and performance information is crucial to the 
effective management of Government operations and to the conduct of 
competitions between public or private sector offerors. 
Chapter 1  General Provisions.C. Government Performance of 
Commercial Activities3. Core Capability.  A minimum core capability 
of specialized, scientific or technical in-house or contract employees and 
related commercial workload, may be maintained, without cost 
comparison, to ensure that the Government has the necessary capabilities 
to fulfill its mission responsibilities or meet emergency requirement. 
Government Performance of Commercial Activities7. Meet 
Performance Standarda. Performance by in-house, contract or ISSA 
may be authorized if an agency demonstrated that performance meets or 
exceeds generally recognized industry performance and cost standards. 
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 Government Performance of Commercial Activities8. Lower Cost.  In-
house, contract or ISSA performance of a commercial activity may be 
warranted by the results of a cost comparison conducted in accordance 
with the procedures described in this Supplement. 
G. Review of Documents.1. Access to Supporting Documentation.  a. 
At the earliest possible stages of development, consistent with 
procurement and conflict of interest requirements, affected parties will 
have the opportunity to fully participate in the development of supporting 
documents and proposals, including the development of performance 
standards, performance work statements, management plans, and the 
development of in-house and contract cost estimates.  b. Upon issuance, a 
solicitation used in the conduct of a cost comparison will be made 
available to directly affected Federal employees or their representatives 
for comment.  The employees or their representatives will be given 
sufficient time to review the document and submit comments before final 
receipt of offers from the private sector. 
Chapter 3 Cost ComparisonsB. The Cost Comparison Study 
Team1 The team should document mission requirements and seek 
new and innovative ways to provide the required products or services. 
Chapter 3 Cost ComparisonsC. Performance Work Statements1. 
Performance Work Statements (PWS) should be developed for all 
activities being resolicited for contract or scheduled for direct conversion 
to or from in-house, contract or ISSA performance4. Special care 
should be taken when developing the PWS to ensure that it does not limit 
service options, arbitrarily increase risk, reduce competition, unnecessarily 
violate industry service or service grouping norms or omit statutory or 
regulatory requirements without full justification.. 
2. Summary  
The DoD 5000 series documents require the contracting environment to maximize 
competition and considers it critical in providing innovation, product quality, 
affordability and reducing costs from both government and industry providers alike.  
Through the use of the Systems Engineering approach, an integrated acquisition and 
logistic process must focus on Total Ownership Cost (TOC); supportability as a key 
design and performance factor.  The OMB Circular A-76 requires through policy 
statements, the use of competition to enhance quality, economy, and productivity.  These 
enhancements are possible by performing cost comparisons of commercial activities 
performed by the government, with contracted commercial activities from either within 
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 the government or from industry.  Circular A-76 is not designed to simply contract out. 
Rather, it is designed to: (1) balance the interests of the parties to make or buy cost 
comparison, (2) provide a level playing field between public and private offerors to a 
competition, and (3) encourage competition and choice in the management and 
performance of commercial activities 
D. PERFORMANCE BASED CONTRACTING IMPLEMENTATION 
GUIDANCE DOCUMENTATION: 
1. Excerpts 
The following references and documents are considered as the implementation 
guidance set of documents in evaluating the Performance Based Contracting (PBC) 
requirements: 
• Product Support Guide: Product Support A Program Managers Guide to 
Buying Performance [6) DUSD L&MR] 
• Performance Based Logistics: NAVICP Fact Sheet [15) NAVICP] 
• Performance Based Logistics Business Case Analysis (BCA) [15) NAVICP] 
The following are excerpts from Product Support A Program Managers Guide to 
Buying Performance and are chosen because the excerpt identifies a new requirement or 
a further refinement of higher level requirement which will impact implementation 
efforts 
1.3 Performance-Based Logistics..PMs will implement PBL on all new 
systems and on Acquisition Category I and II fielded systems selected on 
the basis of a sound business case 
2.7 Developing Program Baseline Performance and CostFor legacy 
systems, the Baseline assessments form the basis for business case 
analysis of PBL approaches being considered. In conducting the business 
case analysis, alternative solutions are assessed in terms of their ability to 
meet the logistics performance objectives of the warfighters compared 
particularly to existing support strategies. 
2.9 Establishing a Product Support Integration Function.A concluding 
step in developing a product support strategy is establishing a product 
support integrator function. As with the PBL strategy and the agreement 
with the warfighter, the product support integration function is a key 
component of the product support strategy documented in the acquisition 
strategy. 
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 The following are excerpts from  NAVICP Performance Based Logistics Fact 
Sheet and are chosen because the excerpt identifies a new requirement or a further 
refinement of higher level requirement which will impact implementation efforts: 
Concept.Under the PBL program, NAVICP awards a contract to a 
single supplier. 
PBL suppliers may take on a number of functions normally performed by 
various Departments of Defense (DoD) services or agencies. 
Arrangements may be made with industry partners supporting 
commercially available equipment, with industry partners supporting 
military unique equipment, government activities supporting military 
unique equipment or industry partners who have government activities 
functioning as their sub-vendors 
Potential candidates can be broken down into two categories. Category I 
items are those we should automatically pursue as PBL contracts. 
Category II items are those we should consider as PBL candidates 
Category I Items (automatic PBL candidates):c. New Items/Systems: 
These are items/systems being introduced into the Navy/Marine Corps. 
These systems are very early in their life cycle and are at a point where 
maximum financial benefit can be derived from a PBL. An early PBL 
decision can avoid costly investment in test equipment, training, Logistics 
Support Analysis (LSA) development, wholesale spares investment, 
etc.. 
Category II Items (possible PBL candidates):Items/systems not covered 
under Category I where we are experiencing difficulty providing adequate 
support to our fleet customers. These includec. Items with low supply 
material availability.e. Items with parts obsolescence issues. 
Business ApproachFor each PBL initiative, NAVICP will conduct a 
Business Case Analysis (BCA).. 
PBL CategoriesThe following categories are used by NAVICP to 
describe the various types of PBL arrangements:( special note the table 
with specific assigned capabilities or services is presented in this section 
along with description of each category, this information is also  displayed 
in the body of the text of this Marketing Plan). 
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 The following are excerpts from  NAVICP Performance Based Logistics 
Business Case Analysis (BCA) Fact Sheet and are chosen because the excerpt identifies a 
new requirement or a further refinement of higher level requirement which will impact 
implementation efforts: 
For each PBL initiative, NAVICP will conduct a Business Case Analysis 
(BCA).. 
The BCA process involves determining the Navys current cost of doing 
business. This without PBL cost is then compared to the cost to the 
Navy if we execute a PBL arrangement. This with PBL cost includes 
both the PBL suppliers cost as well as residual costs the Navy will retain 
even under a PBL arrangement. 
The foundation documents, put in place to establish the performance based 
contracting methodology, identify this cost focus as the primary discriminating criteria.  
The guidance documents, used to implement the methods, go beyond the cost criteria by 
adding additional caveats and restrictions, such as an all or nothing involvement, for 
functionally different but related portions of the support effort.  Furthermore by dictating 
the allocation of certain functions to be accomplished by specific entities, the guidance 
documents constrain the cost focus of the foundational documents potentially yielding to 
sub-optimal results. The NAVICP implementation documents defines three baseline 
assumptions which mold the contracting environment: 1) awards a contract to a single 
supplier, 2) assess current in-house government activities/functions on past performance 
only, and 3) defines a government employee and/or activity as sub-contracting to a 
contractor. The singular contract requirement cannot be implemented within the Organic 
activities due to built-in constraints defined by the Navys structure. In identifying this as 
a pivotal requirement the implementation documents define a non-competitive 
environment with respect to the Organic activities. The second implemented baseline 
assumption provides bias when performing cost comparisons.  Central to the decision 
making process regarding the potential use of a Performance Based Logistics (PBL) 
contract is the development of the Business Case Analysis (BCA).  The ground rules 
currently used in developing the baseline cost estimates for Organic support (i.e. in-house 
Navy support activity) uses historical performance data and compares this data with 
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 contractor proposed estimates in evaluating cost effectiveness of the contractors 
proposed cost.  Important to notice is that the Organic support costs rely solely on the 
past data and by doing the analysis in this manner three major assumptions are made: 1) 
the past performance data is accurate, applied in an appropriate manner, and the data 
reflects current and future performance of the Organic activities/functions, 2) there are no 
opportunities to reduce, streamline, or improve the Organic cost figures, and 3) the 
Organic activities/functions would not be affected by the competitive environment.  
Applying historical costs to the Organic entities and comparing the cost estimates in a 
proposal from the contractor yields a bias in favor of the contractor.  Although this type 
of analysis is considered to foster a competitive environment where the lowest cost gets 
the contract, the process side steps many of the tenets of true competition.  The third 
baseline assumption appears to be in direct conflict with the foundational documents for 
functions/activities, which require the use of value judgments having long-term 
programmatic impacts. The implementation methods employed in developing 
performance based contracts handicaps the Organic activity/function, identifies no 
method to input into the decision-making criteria, potentially places Government 
employees in a position of having a conflict of interest, provides a non level playing 
field, and in no way assures the Navy receives the best possible value available in 
todays market place. 
2. Conclusion: The Performance Based Contracting Environment 
The new emphasis in the contracting environment using PBL contracting 
methodologies presents challenges to the Organic activity/functions with respect to 
implementing the SSB system.  It appears evident that these challenges include: 1) a 
barrier to entry into the PBL contracting environment due to exclusionary policies at the 
contract implementation level although the upper level policies support the SSB systems 
concepts, 2) the current contracting methodologies establish scenarios in which there 
could be a conflict of interest for Government employees when providing sub-
contracting services for a contractor, this potential could directly impact the SSB system 
applicability since it is performed by Organic activities/functions, and 3) no 
definition/designation is provided with regards to the DMSMS support function and its 
categorization as an inherently Governmental function or a commercial activity, 
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 without such an identification there exists an amount of uncertainty about who would be 
performing the SSB systems functions in the future. The purpose of this section is to 
identify and describe the factors, which could influence the success of the SSB system in 
the current market place. Responses, adjustments, and/or resolution to the challenges 
described above will be addressed later in this Marketing Plan. 
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 II. THE CUSTOMER ENVIRONMENT 
A. WHO ARE OUR CURRENT AND POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS?  
As identified in the external environmental analysis our current customers are the 
Navy programs who need long-term COTS supportability.  Our end customer is the 
Program Manager (PM) who has the ultimate responsibility for the life cycle 
supportability for fielded products.  The PM in managing this responsibility delegates 
much of the supportability responsibilities to a team specifically chartered for that 
purpose.  Although the type of team can take many forms (i.e. Integrated Product 
Development, working group, etc.), the methods, practices, and processes used in 
supporting the long-term supportability strategy is a team product and, as such, the actual 
using customer is the support team.  The support team is a cross functional group of 
teaming members who must identify, implement, and measure the effectiveness of the 
support solution alternatives.  The PM has the authority and power to direct and empower 
the team and must also provide adequate resources for the team to function.  Potential 
customers include other entities who face similar requirements and constraints as our 
current Navy customer base.  Provided below is a sample list if prioritized potential 




a. Aircraft industry 
Military Branch Services: 
a. Army, Air Force, Special Forces 
Non-Military Branch Services: 
a. Coast Guard 
b. Homeland Defense Support Entities 
c. Alphabet Soup of Governmental Entities: FBI, CIA, NSA, NASA, DOE, 
NOAA, USGS, DARPA, etc. 
Industrial Segment using COTS such as: 
b. Industrial Machinery (i.e. Numerically Controlled Laths) 
c. Farm Equipment 
d. Industrial Production Facilities (i.e. Assembly plants, petrochemical, etc) 
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 B. WHAT DO OUR CUSTOMERS DO WITH OUR PRODUCTS? 
The service we provide establishes relationships with the manufacturer of the 
COTS products, the aftermarket manufacturer  SSB supplier, the supportability planning 
team and the procurement functions.  The customer (i.e. support team) will embed the 
SSB system within the overall supportability strategy, then task us to implement and 
monitor the effort.  The long-term supportability planning for a Navy fielded system 
requires continuous review and updating through inserting new technology on a regular 
basis.  The SSB system is easily adaptable for sequential reuse reducing the Life Cycle 
Cost (LCC) of the Navys fielded systems. 
C. WHERE DO OUR CUSTOMERS PURCHASE OUR PRODUCTS? 
As with many professional services, our service satisfies a niche requirement for 
our customers accomplished through a teaming environment.  The community of players 
 PM, the support team, the upper level support organizational structures (i.e. SYSCOMs, 
PEOs, Field Activities, etc.)  are all potential network points to match our service with 
the customer base.  Knowing that it is this community with its unstructured network that 
provides the primary mechanism through which our services get requested, it becomes 
evident that it is not so much the place that holds importance (the right place at the right 
time) but instead it is the relationship with the community (networking) that places our 
service in front of the customers. 
D. WHEN DO OUR CUSTOMERS PURCHASE OUR PRODUCTS? 
The purchasing of our services are situational based, in that, either there is an 
immediate threat or emergency or as part of the established planning process.  If the 
services are in response to an immediate threat the customers procure the required 
amount of service at that time and if satisfied will usually make arrangements to retain 
services for future issues.  If our services are purchased as part of the established 
planning processes the customer will request a proposal for services for the next Fiscal 
Year (FY) around March/April time frame of each year. Next the customer will work 
with us to establish a Statement of Work (SOW) and a funding profile for the next Fiscal 
Year (FY) budget and funding process, which will come to fruition in the coming new 
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 FY starting in October.  In summary, unplanned services can be procured at any time and 
planned services are purchased on an annual basis at the start of the new FY. 
E. WHY (AND HOW) DO OUR CUSTOMERS SELECT OUR PRODUCTS? 
Our services are unique and provide attributes not found through any other 
methods, processes or services.  Our customers select our services for the wide range of 
positive characteristics resulting from implementing our services, some of the major 
positive aspects include: 50% reduction in Life Cycle Costs (LCC) as compared to the 
typically employed methods, substantial reduction in supportability risk to the program, 
long-term relationship building, long-term business planning including  tech refresh 
cycles, Fleet deployment planning, supporting system equipment baselines, and inputs 
which allow stabilization of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). 
F. WHY DO POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS NOT PURCHASE OUR 
PRODUCTS? 
The SSB system is new and is just now returning the kind of results identified 
above.  Without a proven track record many would be customers are unwilling to take the 
risk and embrace the system.  As we gain more implementation experience, the risk to 
our customers can be identified in a more concise way and eventually we will be able to 
win over some of these skeptical potential customers.  Another reason for potential 
customers not purchasing our services is because of the Navys contracting 
methodologies. These contracting methods exclude our participation while providing 
incentives to the contractor to produce less optimal support systems. The SSB system is 
actually accepted or rejected by a support team and as described under the competitive 
environment section of this plan, there are a host of reasons why such a team would 
reject the SSB system. 
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 III. INTERNAL (ORGANIZATIONAL) ENVIRONMENT 
A. REVIEW OF THE MISSION 
Our mission is to provide our customers with cost effective services and products, 
which address the business, technical, and management issues associated with the 
inherent supportability risks of COTS products in fielded systems. 
 
B. REVIEW OF MARKETING GOALS, OBJECTIVES, AND 
PERFORMANCE 
What are our current marketing goals and objectives? 
The marketing objectives involve establishing the SSB system a unique standard 
practice while projecting the image as an enabler of currently used support systems that 
are employed during the decision-making processes regarding supportability of COTS 
products.  The SSB system is a collaborative system in which the participants voluntarily 
use the system and in return receive value added products and outputs.  Described 
another way, think of the collaborative process much in the same way you would think of 
a Franchise: Why would someone join and why would they chose to stay. One of the 
most important parameters in showing the utility of the SSB system will be in describing 
the value-add proposition and its applicability to other situations.  The System 
Engineering approach provided through implementation of the SSB system allows us (the 
Navy), to leverage currently used methods and processes and yielding more robust and 
cost effective support systems.  The projected image must be substantiated with real 
life examples of the value-added proposition results and this Marketing Plan shall 
illustrate these characteristics.  Our current goal of 20% capture of the Navy programs 
translates to 72 programs or an equivalent 80 man-years per year effort, and it is 
estimated that this quantity of programs will establish the SSB system as one of the 
standard solution alternatives.  It is important to understand that the SSB system is one of 
the potential solutions to a given solution space and the term capture refers to the 
programs funding of an analysis to evaluate the potential in implementing the SSB 
system which may or may not be chosen as the final alternative.  In essence a program 
431 
 will need to invest in the relationship building portion of the SSB system as part of a 
trade-off to be identified as being captured.  
Are our marketing goals and objectives consistent with the mission, goals, and objectives 
of the firm (i.e. Navy)?  Are our marketing goals and objectives consistent with recent 
changes in the marketing or customer environments? 
Unfortunately the answer is both yes and no.  The Navy totally supports the 
value-added proposition and the measurable results captured to substantiate it, however 
some of the contracting policies such as PBL have unintended consequences that work in 
a counter productive way to this support.  The risk management methods, processes, and 
tools implemented through the SSB system were not available when the counter 
productive contracting policies and practices were put into place. The inconsistencies 
identified here will be addressed later in the marketing plan. 
How are our current marketing strategies performing in terms of sales volume, market 
share, profitability and communication (e.g., awareness and preference) objectives? 
The SSB Systems strategic direction for marketing is that of Product Leadership.  
Currently the SSB system is the only system developed to address proactive long-term 
COTS supportability without the reliance on specific design architecture.  There exists 
some proactive design architectures such as open systems architectures which allow for 
very quick change out of one COTS item for another without major design changes. 
However the limitations in using this approach is that it must be instantiated upfront in 
the design of the system and the approach does not apply to all possible cases.  The SSB 
system has unique characteristics that allow application to most systems independent of 
design and allow the Program Manager (PM) to choose the length of support, for 
example length of time between tech refreshes.  Using this Product Leadership strategy in 
the early marketing stages we have captured 4 programs or .01% of all programs and with 
respect to our goal of 72 programs or the equivalent of 5.5% of the goal.  These programs 
are leading edge thinkers identified as innovators and are willing to take the risk in 
using a new and novel approach.  From these first few programs we have gathered the 
data and metrics to show in a Business Case Analysis (BCA) the value-added proposition 
provided by the system.  The position strategy of Product Leader may always be part of 
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 the SSB system marketing approach, however once the 20% goal is reached and the 
system is considered as one of the standard methods, competition will emerge, such that, 
in order to grow our market share we will need to adjust.  The strategic direction we 
believe will slowly shift from Product Leader to Customer Intimacy where our 
personnels direct involvement with the programs and the continuous name recognition 
of SSB will provide a branding regarding proactive long-term COTS supportability.  
An inherent characteristic of the SSB system is that the more inputs or business added to 
the core database, the greater utility the system becomes at solving new customers issues. 
For example the first four programs had only a few COTS configurations, which 
overlapped programs or OEMs.  The next programs may find that when having their 
COTS configuration list checked against the current database perhaps we will see a 10% 
overlap, whereby the 10% represents the amount of work that has already been 
accomplished.  This percent overlap will continue to rise as workload increases over time 
so that each new program gains leverage from all previous implemented programs.  The 
more the Navy uses the SSB system the more there is to be gained by the Navy in both 
short and long-term support of its programs.  As part of the initial System Architecture 
the SSB system is structured to perform many of its data review and evaluations using 
computer programs to accomplish these repetitive time consuming task then 
automatically generate a menu driven reporting system. For the first few programs the 
data manipulation, review, evaluation, and reporting functions were accomplished by 
hand, although a computer program is being developed based on this initial data input.  
This automation combined with the expected growth of the system will produce 
efficiencies that may allow us to pursue a marketing strategy of Operational Excellence.  
This type of strategy may be reviewed only after the computer based system is mature 
and the market forces are requiring us to change our strategic approach.  Using our initial 
strategy as a Product Leader the response from our potential customer base has been 
outstanding.  Several calls each week for more information and request for proposals, 
have been coming in at a constant rate.  The draw seems to be the novel approach in an 
area with no or few other choices.  The method of communication yielding this type of 
response is a product of two different delivery methods: conference presentations and 
433 
 word of mouth.  The split between the two types is about 40/60  conference 
presentations to word of mouth.  
How does our current performance compare to other firms in the industry? Is the 
performance of the industry as a whole improving or declining? Why? 
The entire industry catering to the DMSMS market is in a growth mode partially 
due to the increased content of COTS products in the fielded DoD systems and also due 
to the life extension to many of the major combat weapon systems.  The interest in our 
products and services appears to have a larger increase with other players in the industry 
than the Organic participants.  We believe that this is primarily due to the unique 
attributes of our services and products because the type of inquires we have received thus 
far. 
If our performance is improving, what actions can we take to ensure that our 
performance continues to improve? Is the improvement in performance due to a better 
than anticipated environment or superior planning and implementation? 
The next phase of our System Engineering Development and Implementation 
(SEDI) Plan is to publish the results of the first 3 programs implementation results.  This 
phase, as planned, is currently underway and results will be released concurrent with the 
release of this Marketing Plan.  The impact to the marketing effort will be significant 
because the Business Case Analysis (BCA), using real data, has shown the benefit to the 
program accompanied by a well defined path for implementation.  The SSB system will 
sell itself on its own merits if given a fair and open competitive environment.  We have 
already received requests from several program representatives to let them know 
immediately where they could get the data once released.  Continuous reporting on initial 
performance will further improve our market position.  Continuous improvements are 
expected because, they were driven by design, structure, planning, and feedback from the 
implementation efforts. 
 
C. REVIEW OF CURRENT AND ANTICIPATED RESOURCES    
What is the state of our current organizational resources (e.g., financial, capital, human, 
experience, relationships with key suppliers or customers)?  Are these resources likely to 
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 change for the better or worse in the near future?  If the changes are for the better, how 
can we utilize these added resources to our advantage in meeting customer needs better 
than competitors?  
The SSB system as currently implemented is a pay-as-you-go type financial 
arrangement. A program is solicited that has an immediate need for support appropriate 
to the SSB systems attributes.  The funding is then allocated by the program for the SSB 
support for the next Fiscal Year (FY), if the need arises mid year the programs have short 
term funding mechanisms to receive help immediately.  Although the SSB system is 
capable of helping in the short term the strategic focus and use of the system is long-term 
support, therefore short term projects are looked at as a marketing tool, in that we are able 
to get our foot in the door to demonstrate the utility of the system.  The capital needed 
to provide our services is minimal, a server and work stations, and most are already in 
place and local management allocate these resources to the SSB effort with the 
expectation of growing the business.  There are two primary resources needed for support 
and growth of the SSB efforts: experienced personnel and development of close 
relationships with the supply base (OEMs and SSB suppliers).  The SEDI plan was 
conceived and implemented with the idea of using the implementation efforts as a 
training mechanism to provide on-the-job (OJT) for existing personnel resources to 
expand their experience base to include the SSB systems methods, processes, and tools.  
Currently there are five experienced engineers already capable of implementing the SSB 
system and four more slated for training.  Additionally the SEDI plan has been prepared 
to be used as a prescriptive document in which a senior engineer could take the 
information and by applying the appropriate skills, implement the SSB system with some 
trial and error efforts.  Even if independent implementation efforts are initiated, central to 
the success of the efforts will be the leverage available from previous work.  The 
database that was established for the SSB system contains valuable information that, 
when used will lessen the work load for a  new program implementation effort and 
provide a track record of success to springboard the new effort.  Captured within the 
database are the established relationships that have been set up with the supply base, 
described either to the level identifying the suppliers or further delineating the exact 
configuration item already analyzed in support of another program.  Initially no 
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 information existed but after implementing on just four programs over 40 supplier 
relationships have been defined and the individual number of configurations covers over 
130.  It is expected on the next program about 10% of the existing data will be reusable 
and the following added program will benefit by as much as 15% reuse.  Eventually a 
new program added to the existing database may have as much as, 50% coverage due to 
reuse.  Following this logical progression, it is clear to see that the more the Navy uses 
the SSB system the more leverage it gains and that additional usage will provide even 
greater utility through use of the system. 
D. REVIEW OF CURRENT AND ANTICIPATED CULTURAL AND 
STRUCTURAL ISSUES 
What are the positive and negative aspects of the current and anticipated culture of the 
firm?   
The Navy as compared to other branch services is most willing to allow a new 
idea on the basis that the oversight rules and regulations do not restrict it, whereas other 
service branches take the approach that unless the rules and regulations specifically allow 
the addition of a new idea then it is not allowed.  This allowance of the Navy to 
experiment with new ideas provides an excellent environment to initiate the SSB system.  
However notwithstanding this freedom the Navy Program Management Offices (PMO) 
are conservative and have a tendency to lean on past experience with available 
products/processes instead of jumping on a new way to do business.  The two factors that 
seem to be the deciding factors for the PMOs is impact on the bottom line and the 
reduction of risk to the program.  The SSB system excels at influencing both of these 
factors and therefore the culture works in our favor.  
What issues related to internal politics and power struggles might affect our marketing 
activities?   
The single largest issue, as identified above, is the position NAVICP has taken 
with their contracting policies that excludes Organic activities from providing DMSMS 
support in the primary contracting method, PBL.  Without the support of NAVICP in 
allowing the SSB system (an Organic function accomplished by an Organic activity) does 
not keep the SSB system from being implemented but will require SSB system to be 
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 marketed to the individual PMO organizations.  Conversely, if NAVICP endorsed the use 
of the SSB system they could use their centralized position in the Navy as an effective 
advertisement method to enable the SSB efforts.  The marketing situation as it is 
currently will necessitate us to approach each of the 365 different PMOs with the SSB 
potential so that at the PMOs direction NAVICP must not contract away the DMSMS 
functions.  Although this last alternative is the least attractive it may be the only method 
to implement the SSB system within the current Navy structure. 
What is the overall position and importance of the marketing function as seen by other 
functional areas?   
In the DoD environment, marketing functions are relatively new and are looked 
upon with skepticism and mistrust.  Historically the marketing duties were additional 
duties accomplished by the upper level management in the typical personal marketing 
approach.  Over the past few years (e.g., 5-10 years) independent non-coordinated 
marketing endeavors attempted to promote certain Organic activities and/or functions.  
However at the working level, in many cases the decision level, modern marketing 
methods and practices are usually frowned upon and instead the personal contacts, 
political affiliations, the reputation, past involvement, and past performance are the 
preferred credentials to be used as marketing approaches.  It is important to understand 
this mindset when developing a marketing plan so that in introducing new marketing 
practices, they should be blended with at least some of the acceptance criteria required by 
the focus audience. 
Are key executive positions expected to change in the future?   
The Navy like all the other branch services has as a normal turn over in top 
military management approximately every 2 years and depending on the upper level 
policies, economic environment, and top level strategies the impact of the change will 
depend on the new management and their agenda.  The Federal Civil Servant 
management, on the other hand, is typically long lived and maintains the corporate 
knowledge and know-how to enable the PMO function.  There seems to be no 
expectations of change at the civilian management levels that would be key in impacting 
the SSB system, however the current downsizing efforts at the upper level PMO located 
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 in the central office in the D.C area may have a dramatic affect.  This downsizing could 
bring about two different impacts to the SSB system efforts: 1) acquiesce to the NAVICP 
PBL implementation plans since it is an easy path to offload the work that the PMOs no 
longer have the staff to handle, or 2) be more open to allowing a new method used by an 
Organic activity to perform functions previously held by PMO personnel, keeping the 
function in-house although at a distance.  
How will the overall customer orientation of the firm (or lack thereof) affect our 
marketing activities?   
As described earlier, the using customers are the PMO support teams and the 
metrics, which guide their decisions are, by design, in alignment with the goals, 
objectives, and attributes provided through the use of the SSB system.  The positive 
impact the SSB system will have on Life Cycle Cost (LCC) and obsolescence risk 
reductions will open the door for our marketing activities. 
Does the firm emphasize a long-term or short-term planning horizon?  
Although the Navy in general emphasizes long-term relationships and planning 
horizons, the way in which these long-term attributes are assessed uses short-term 
metrics, such as the funding and manning level goals of the current year and cutting or 
curtailing functions to meet this FY goals with little regard for impact on future years.  
Since the SSB system provides the best bottom line for the current year along with the 
long-term horizon optimization both end effect and immediate needs can be met. 
How will this emphasis affect our marketing activities?   
The Business Case Analysis (BCA) should take center stage when introducing the 
SSB systems concepts so as to open the door for other marketing opportunities. Over 
time the track record on successful implementations and documented customer 
satisfaction will add some assurances to the PMO regarding the perceived risk of 
implementing the SSB system.  
Currently, are there positive or negative issues with respect to motivating our employees, 
especially those in customer contact positions (e.g., sales, customer service)?   
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 Currently the SSB system implementation efforts are carried out in an Integrated 
Product Teaming (IPT) environment, which has fostered a sense of ownership and 
interest with the employees.  Every employee knows that by implementing the SSB 
system they are helping solve one of the largest, most costly problems with the fielded 
systems. Motivation among the employees is high at this initial introduction level but 
over time it is expected that as the effort appears to become more of a day-to-day job 
instead of this great opportunity and challenge, that motivation may be a future problem. 
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 IV. SWOT ANALYSIS FOR THE SSB SYSTEM 
A. STRENGTHS 
Strength 1:  The SSB system provides expandable, transportable and Life 
Cycle Cost (LCC) reducing processes, methods, and tools. 
How does this strength assist in meeting customer need?   
The expandable characteristic of the SSB system allows it to be applicable to 
most any program regardless of size.  This scalability ensures that the SSB system will be 
able to keep pace with a programs growth and the addition of other COTS products as 
the programs system is modernized.  The transportability feature addresses the issue of 
long-term support of the SSB system itself so if it was no longer viable to receive 
services from the current Organic activity providing the service then at the programs 
option the support function could be moved to another activity.  Simply stated this feature 
assures the longevity of the SSB systems support.  The LCC reductions possible due to 
the implementation of the SSB system is the strongest driver or draw by the PMO for the 
SSB system being employed.  These reductions are one of the most unique characteristics 
of the SSB system and a clear differentiating attribute which impacts one of the most 
prominent metrics the PMOs success is judged against, Life Cycle Cost.  The 
documented processes, methods, and tools provide assurances to the customer that the 
service received through implementing the SSB system is repeatable, continuous, and 
reliable.  These documented practices have been delineated in the Systems Engineering 
Development and Implementation (SEDI) Plan with detailed examples, instructions, 
templates, processes, etc. which can be immediately implemented.  
How does this strength compare to our competitor’s strengths?  Does this Strength make 
us different from (better than) our competitors in the minds of our customers?   
The SSB system provides an additional alternative to the PMOs in resolving 
obsolescence issues, however it differs from the dozen or so point solutions currently 
available in three distinct ways: 1) the collaborative architecture necessitates the use of 
close partnerships with the supply base and includes these entities in the resolution 
process and in the business planning, 2) the Systems Engineering approach embedded 
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 within the SSB system optimizes on the LCC and long-term support providing a structure 
spanning all functional disciplines life cycle elements - this allows other point solutions 
to be incorporated where appropriate to achieve maximum utility, and 3) the SSB system 
when used at the appropriate time yields the lowest LCC and best value risk management 
process for COTS products.  All three of these attributes impact the programs ability to 
provide long-term support of COTS products and are reflected in the evaluation criteria 
used in assessing the PMOs accomplishments, as viewed from their sponsors.  
Strength 2:  The SSB system provides new supportability options to the 
PMOs. 
How does this strength assist in meeting customer need?   
The SSB system reduces the amount of program investment, extends the 
repair/depot support, and establishes methods to reduce the mean logistic delay time for 
supplier supported COTS products.  The investment the program would need to make to 
cover the spares required over the supportability period will be drastically different when 
using the SSB systems methods and processes, as compared to usual method of support 
of Life Time Buy (LTB) option.  As an example, consider a $6,000.00 COTS assembly 
used in the fielded systems which requires 100 spares to be bought for life cycle support 
of 10 years. This particular assembly is going obsolete due to two chips on the assembly 
with a total cost of $200.00 per assembly.  Without the SSB system and using the LTB 
option instead, the immediate cost to the program would be ($6,000.00)*(100) or 
$600,000.00. Conversely by employing the SSB system the resulting immediate cost to 
support the program would be ($200.00)*(100) or $20,000.00 + Non-Reoccurring 
Engineering Cost (if applicable.)  When an aggregate of cost over all COTS products on a 
given program/system is rolled up, to quantify the immediate cost to the program the 
amount is usually staggering.  The SSB system support allows the PMO to meet 
budgetary constraints while providing long-term supportability requirements.  The close 
partnership with the supply base provides insight into not only the obsolescence issues 
but also gives the Navy the chance to negotiate for long-term supplier support of fielded 
products for repair and maintenance.  The experience gained during the implementation 
of the SSB system on three programs showed that every SSB participant was capable and 
willing to perform these needed depot functions.  The relationship building accomplished 
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 as part of the SSB implementation process also addressed another Fleet need that the 
suppliers would be capable and willing to help with which is quick turnaround times for 
field returns.  Many of the suppliers are willing to keep a spare COTS item on their shelf 
to replace immediately a Fleet returned unit, this could bring the turnaround time to days 
instead of weeks or months. 
How does this strength compare to our competitor’s strengths? Does this Strength make 
us different from (better than) our competitors in the minds of our customers?   
The SSB system is the only alternative that institutionalizes the Navy-supplier 
partnerships through a well defined infrastructure and set of implementation tools.  As 
part of the process the PMO (customer) defines the supportability boundary criteria such 
as how many years does the fielded system require support till the next tech refresh 
activity.  Only the SSB system allows the customer to choose the length of support 
desired, all other support methods are reactive and as such require the program to react 
with a point solution constraining the possible alternatives and associated time elements. 
The structures set in place by the SSB system provides additional opportunities for the 
PMO to perform business planning such as PPBS, funding allocations, and equipment 
install scheduling.  The System Engineering approach inherent in the SSB system 
provides these added benefits, which are not available through the use of point solutions. 
Strength 3: The SSB system provides a proactive COTS obsolescence risk 
management process. 
How does this strength assist in meeting customer need?  
The customer has a need to support fielded systems for extended periods of no 
less than 5 years but support could be required up to 15-20 years.  Since COTS products 
generally have life spans of 2-5 years after which supportability is not an option without 
some type of intervention.  The SSB system is a planned intervention that is based on the 
support needs as identified by the customer.  The partnering and information sharing 
between the supply base and the Navy, provides insight to previously undisclosed 
potential obsolescence risks of COTS products. Combining this new knowledge with the 
SSB infrastructures yields the risk management methods, processes, and tools for use by 
the PMO to proactively address the inherent COTS risk issues. 
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 How does this strength compare to our competitor’s strengths? Does this Strength make 
us different from (better than) our competitors in the minds of our customers?  
The SSB system was specifically designed to be the first alternative containing 
architectural elements capable of addressing the risk issues involved with COTS 
products.  The key to success in managing this risk is the use of a systemic, broad based, 
life cycle approach to deal with the entire fielded system.  These key elements are absent 
when using the point solution approach employed by the other alternatives.  The SSB 
system is the only practice, known to the authors, which provides opportunities to the 
customer to address risks previously identified as large and open-ended programmatic 
risks. 
Strength 4: The SSB system provides the infrastructure to enable Business 
planning and Management system for fielded system containing COTS 
products. 
How does this strength assist in meeting customer need?   
Management of fielded systems containing COTS products has historically been a 
very difficult and unsuccessful venture for PMOs.  Several characteristics of the COTS 
products compound the management efforts and make it exceedingly difficult to maintain 
control over these products, the major exacerbating attributes are: 1) the OEM controls 
the configuration of the product and may change it without notice, 2) the rate of change 
of the COTS products is measured in months (i.e. < 18-24 months product life cycle) 
whereas Fleet installation is measured in years, and 3) many COTS products do not have 
long-term support available.  The SSB system was specifically designed to address these 
issues  head on  with methods to gain the configuration knowledge and potentially 
freeze that configuration if needed, and finally the issue of long-term support and 
obsolescence management is addressed through processes and tools embedded within the 
system.  As an emergent new property of the SSB system due to the long-term planning 
and holistic view taken, the knowledge gained regarding the fielded system identifies the 
input data necessary to perform long-term business planning such as: estimated spares 
required each year of support, an estimated dollar value needed each year to extend the 
COTS life cycle, the total amount of proposed budgetary requirements.  The SSB system 
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 provides the first system, which yields this type of knowledge that is based on justifiable 
detailed information used in predicting the estimates.  
How does this strength compare to our competitor’s strengths? Does this Strength make 
us different from (better than) our competitors in the minds of our customers?   
With the designed-in and emergent properties of the SSB system the PMO 
(customer) can now control, manage, and plan the physical support of the hardware along 
with the business support (i.e. the PPBS, resource allocations).  No point solution 
alternatives can produce these systemic characteristics and the PMOs have been 
requesting such a solution with no implementable practices identified until the SSB 
system was introduced. 
B. WEAKNESSES 
Weakness 1:  The SSB system is a new system with a very small track record.  
How does this weakness hinder us in meeting customer needs?  
The first issue that emerges due to this low level of implementation of the SSB 
system is a concern that, regardless of the outcome of the first implementation efforts, has 
the system been adequately tested out and found capable for every or most every 
application.  Like any new system - performance over time - will be the arbitrator for the 
inclusion and growth of the SSB system.  The lack of long standing track record will 
impact the acceptance of the system by well established support teams, who are typically 
conservative and slow to incorporate new approaches.  
How does this weakness compare to our competitors’ weaknesses? Does the weakness 
make us different from (worse than) our competitors in the minds of our customers?  
Although the point solution alternatives lack many desirable characteristics 
obtained through the use of the SSB system, the point solutions have been used to support 
the existing fielded systems and therefore have a proven track record and an expected 
outcome.  A PMO or their support team will need to perform a trade-off analysis with 
regards to comparing existing methods and solution alternatives with the SSB systems 
attributes.  Depending on what criteria is used and who is making the decisions, the SSB 
system may or may not be considered as a potential alternative.  Possible roadblocks and 
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 constraints are described in the Competitive Forces section of this plan and provide 
insights to the motivation behind some group or person wanting to exploit this weakness. 
 Weakness 2:  The SSB system necessitates the up-front PMO support and a 
long-term commitment on behalf of the PMO and the support team. 
How does this weakness hinder us in meeting customer needs?  
The SSB system is built on a collaborative architecture that necessitates the 
voluntarily participation of its members.  As with most proactive methodologies the SSB 
system requires some up-front investment to initiate any kind of return.  Typically before 
the PMO will invest in a potential alternative they will want to know what kind of return 
can be expected and what kind of risk they are taking.  Compared to point solution 
alternatives, which are usually singular events, the SSB system requires continuous 
support over the life cycle of the fielded COTS products, in essence locking the PMO 
into a long-term commitment.  Both the up-front support and the long-term commitment 
present the PMO with a potential risk to the program with respect to funding and 
technical support issues. 
How does this weakness compare to our competitors’ weaknesses? Does the weakness 
make us different from (worse than) our competitors in the minds of our customers?  
The PMO or their support team will need to perform a trade-off study, formally or 
informally, to identify the cost-benefit comparison in using or not using the SSB system 
on their specific program.  The approach taken in performing the trade-off study will be 
reflective of the outcome.  If the approach focuses mostly on the short-term results with 
little attention paid to the long-term outcome, then a point solution alternative may look 
the most promising.  However if the long-term view is taken and the focus is on LCC and 
reducing programmatic risk the most probable outcome will be implementing the SSB 
system. 
Weakness 3: The SSB system is not part of the mainstream contracting 
process implemented by NAVICP. 
How does this weakness hinder us in meeting customer needs?  
When a PMO tasks NAVICP to contract for the program support functions, any 
Organic activity providing DMSMS/obsolescence support functions are specifically 
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 excluded from participating in the contracting process -- this exclusionary policy includes 
the SSB system.  Unless the PMO has an awareness of the situation and interjects the 
desire to pursue the SSB system specifically, the SSB system will not even receive 
consideration as a possible alternative.  As identified earlier under the section labeled  
The Performance Based Contracting Environment  the implementation policies and 
guidelines imposed by NAVICP do not allow a competitive environment with a level 
playing field and constrain Organic activities potential involvement to one in which 
places the government employee in a conflict of interest position.  These exclusionary 
policies directly hinder the PMO access to the SSB system and provide a contracting 
situation in which the Navy does not have the potential to receive the best value for 
services under contract. 
How does this weakness compare to our competitors’ weaknesses? Does the weakness 
make us different from (worse than) our competitors in the minds of our customers?  
In the analysis thus far, various solution alternatives were compared to each other 
in competing for resources, however with the exclusion of all potential alternatives 
except as deemed appropriate by NAVICP the situation shifts the argument.  If the PMO 
tasks NAVICP to contract for the support functions, no competitive environment exists 
and no consideration can be made by the PMO regarding the utility and cost effectiveness 
of the SSB system. 
Weakness 4:  Implementation of the SSB system will require a cultural shift 
from an independent competitive environment to a collaborative 
interdependency of diverse functional groups.  
How does this weakness hinder us in meeting customer needs?   
The PMO support teams that have already been established to take of the 
DMSMS issues and are quite diverse with respect to the teaming methodology and have 
developed their current culture.  Many of these teams use working group techniques 
where work is accomplished off line in functional silos then brought to the team for 
approval expecting only minor changes.  Some of the support teams accomplish their 
work as an IPT and leverage the cross functional aspects of the group.  Sometimes the 
PMO support comes from independent functional silos that have little use for the teaming 
atmosphere. The variations of the support efforts are to numerous to mention although 
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 there seems to be an underlying base assumption that all activities and/or functions are 
vying for the same resource pool of funding.  The SSB system, to be successful, must 
foster an atmosphere of a win-win scenario and stay away from the zero sum game 
so prevalent in funding resource struggles.  The SSB system will need inputs from and 
provide outputs to, almost every function on the support team and therefore the 
interdependency relationships need to be established and matured.  The lack of a SSB 
system friendly environment does not spell out failure for the system but such an 
environment will impede implementation progress and constrain the potential benefits 
from the system. 
How does this weakness compare to our competitors’ weaknesses? Does the weakness 
make us different from (worse than) our competitors in the minds of our customers?   
The comparison between, the way support teams currently do business and the 
practices used in the SSB system will be evident over time and will be unique to each 
team.  The implementation of the SSB system will require a certain amount of 
cooperation and adjustment but these changes are usually possible within most 
established groups established cultural norms.  From the perspective of the customer, the 
cultural shift is more of a challenge that should be eventually overcome instead of a 
better or worse attribute. 
 
C. OPPORTUNITIES 
Opportunity 1: Meeting the PMO objectives in providing Life Cycle Cost 
(LCC) reductions of 50% or more on all systems. 
How is this opportunity related to serving the needs of our customer?  
The LCC is one of the primary evaluation criteria placed on the PMO during their 
annual and semiannual reviews.  One of the biggest issues the PMO faces when 
quantifying the LCC is in defining the parameters that need to be measured and tracked.  
The structure of the SSB system encapsulates these metrics into a reporting system that 
keeps the PMO abreast of the projected and actual costs incurred by the program with the 
added benefit of incorporating other non-SSB point solutions.  In this way the PMO has 
an oversight view regarding the true cost of support of the programs systems. 
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 What actions can we take to capitalize on this opportunity in the short term?  
With the results of the three pilot programs available to us, we can take these 
results and draw comparisons with other target programs, which have shown interest.  
The three example programs were specifically chosen because each represents a specific 
part of the developmental cycle such as: the AN/ASQ-20X Sonar Mine Detecting Set 
program is just finishing the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (E&MD) 
phase, the SSDS MK 2 is in the Production phase with less than one eighth of the 
projected units fielded, the SSDS MK 1 is considered a legacy system with 17 fielded 
system that need to be supported, as is, for the next 10 years.  The most complete data set 
we have compiled, at the time this paper was written is for the SSDS MK 1 systems 
although the data for the other system is still being compiled and so far seem to reflect 
the same type of LCC reductions as experienced with the MK 1 systems.  With this 
implementation experience we can capitalize on the fact that we can address programs 
regardless of where in the developmental life cycle they are and we can use the captured 
MK 1 data set to show expected reductions in LCC. 
Opportunity 2: The SSB system defines pro-active risk management methods 
for COTS products that provide the Fleet user with the assurance that their 
system will be supportable over time and available when needed. 
How is this opportunity related to serving the needs of our customer?   
Risk management like LCC is an evaluation criteria for the PMO and carries 
considerable weight with their resource sponsors in obtaining and keeping their funding 
allocations.  The SSB system is the only post design pro-active method, known to the 
authors, that is capable of yielding a quantifiable COTS obsolescence risk management 
method.  The SSB system identifies the current risk state and a projected risk state in a 
measurable fashion so that it can be tracked and trended.  These metrics can then be used 
by the PMO as objective evidence in justification of the funding allocations. 
What actions can we take to capitalize on this opportunity in the short term?   
Since the risk management methods are an inherent part of the SSB system and 
reflected in the reporting processes and tools, a direct analogy can be made with any new 
potential program and the three programs successfully implemented.  The reporting 
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 products used on the three programs are by design simple graphical representations so 
they can be readily identifiable by the PMO representatives.  To gain the most leverage 
out of the work already accomplished, the previously prepared risk reports will be briefed 
to any new potential candidate programs making a direct comparison between the 
benefits received by the previous program and the candidate program.  Additionally there 
are various oversight groups who have, on behalf of the programs sponsor, evaluated the 
risk management aspects provided by the SSB system and reported their findings up the 
ladder to the resource sponsor.  All such oversight reports have been positive to very 
positive with regards to the processes and methods used when implementing the SSB 
system as a risk reduction and management method. 
Opportunity 3: Growth and maturity of the SSB system provides greater 
opportunity for other Navy programs to leverage this unique internal 
resource expanding its value proposition to the Navy. 
How is this opportunity related to serving the needs of our customer?   
The first programs that supported the implementation of the SSB system had no 
previous work to leverage from and therefore needed to pay for each relationship 
building effort and every configuration assessment.  However with over 40 OEM 
relationships established and analysis of over 130 configurations, the next programs to 
implement will more than likely use a portion of the previous efforts.  The expectation is 
that over the next 5-7 program implementations, the amount of reuse of previous work 
may be as much as 10-15% of the total effort.  The implementation efforts which follow 
are expected to have an increased percent of reuse perhaps eventually yielding as much as 
50% reuse in later implementation efforts.  As the SSB system is used, implemented, and 
matured the utility the programs receive from it will increase and the programs sponsors 
will look favorably upon the use of the system since it was their resources that are being 
reused instead of being spent on efforts which reinvent the wheel. 
What actions can we take to capitalize on this opportunity in the short term?   
The actions that are being taken to exploit this reuse characteristic of the SSB 
system is to make available the list of OEM participants and the specific configurations 
that the SSB system was implemented on.  On a personal sell level we use the current 
listing as an example of the potential out come, then identify if any of the configurations 
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 appearing on the list or OEM names on the list are a match to the new potential candidate 
system.  If an exact configuration match takes place, we offer to share the obsolescence 
risk analysis with the new program.  If further interest is apparent and the program is 
willing to engage further analysis, we could work with program representatives to 
prepare a risk mitigation report specific to the programs needs (i.e. part number obsolete, 
how many parts per assembly, how many assemblies per new system, how many new 
systems, how long is the expected support window, etc.)  A quick demonstration of the 
SSB systems capabilities will illustrate to the program the real utility of the information 
and the subsequent knowledge gained through its use.  In order to reach a large or mass 
audience with this information, we have near term plans to post the information on a web 
site used by our target audience.  The GIDEP (Government Industry Data Exchange 
Program) web site( www.gidep.gov ) has over 1,500 membership organizations boasting 
a user pool of over 4,500 individual users.  During the MIL-Spec era before Acquisition 
Reform, membership in this system was one of the acquisition requirements for all Navy 
programs and their prime contractors, therefore most of our potential new program 
candidates will have access to this system.  The GIDEP organization has agreed to host a 
list of OEM participants and the specific configurations contained in the current SSB 
system active participation lists.  All presentation materials and future announcements 
will subsequently be updated to reflect this reference whereby it can be tapped as a ready 
reference. 
Opportunity 4: The SSB system employees several simulation and modeling 
tools to optimize the business planning and future support requirements for 
fielded program systems.  
How is this opportunity related to serving the needs of our customer?   
As part of the implementation effort regarding the SSB system, detailed resource 
and procurement models were prepared for the SSDS MK 1 system from which various 
scenarios can be simulated iteratively and recursively showing the possible outcomes.  It 
can easily be demonstrated that the structure of these tools allows modification and 
customization to be applicable to most any program.  Furthermore the results of running 
the various models using the SSDS MK 1 data provides a stunning real life example of 
the positive results attainable through SSB system implementation.  To the authors 
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 knowledge, no other system or method has identified a method to work within the PPBS 
funding system to support an overarching DMSMS support system.  These models are 
tailored to reflect the requirements of the PPBS system such that the outputs from the 
models could be directly transferred to the Funding Allocation Request (FAR) an input to 
the PPBS system.  The procurement models identify, within the constraints levied by the 
program, the expected level of support with regards to the hardware for each year of 
support.  These levels are predicted based on the actual failure rate exhibited in the fleet.  
The resource modeling is accomplished using the NSWC Crane cost model, which takes 
into account all the various aspects of implementing an Engineering Change Proposal 
(ECP).  This model covers over 128 functions/activities and is tailored to meet the needs 
of the application under consideration.  Between these two models and a few other tools 
used in the SSB system, the program can get the Big Picture view of the supportability 
requirements for their program. 
What actions can we take to capitalize on this opportunity in the short term?   
Every program has a requirement to substantiate and justify their business 
planning (funding and allocation), support strategy, and risk management efforts.  The 
knowledge of these requirements and the inherent capabilities of the SSB system which 
are designed into the system to meet the program needs and this information must be 
communicated when presenting the system to a candidate program.  Again, the use of the 
SSDS MK1 data set in the models then running simulations structured around the 
constraints of the candidate program can be an illustrative and convincing tool.  These 
simulations can be run quickly providing immediate results to show the new candidate 
program that the constraints presented by their program can fit within the modeling 
structure.  Showing the applicability of the tool and methods within the confines of the 
candidate program will provide them some assurance of potential success.  The 
confidence gained through these demonstrations may be enough to bridge the gap and 
provide a comfort level great enough to make the up-front commitment and provide 
adequate resources to implement the SSB system on their program. 
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 Opportunity 5: The Naval Audit Service (NAS) has recently released reports 
indicating that the implementation of the Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) 
contracting methodologies used by NAVSEA and SPAWAR lacks adequate 
visibility and metrics that would assure proper oversight. 
How is this opportunity related to serving the needs of our customer? 
 The NAS report numbers N2002-0049 [20) NAS NAVSEA] and N2002-0069 
[21) NAS SPAWAR] both identify a lack of a performance plan, strategy, or 
management control to implement the CLS acquisition reform initiative by NAVSEA and 
SPAWAR respectively.  The lack of controls and measurements to achieve the desired 
results of reduced cost and improve system availability was identified as an inadequacy 
in Program Management.  CLS can and many times does take into account the DMSMS 
support functions usually in the form of Performance Based Logistics (PBL) contracting 
methods.  As discussed earlier in this plan, PBL contracting methods do not provide the 
most advantageous environment for the Organic field activities participation including 
the use of the SSB system.  Both SYSCOMs (NAVSEA & SPAWAR) need to develop 
reporting and management structures to overcome the identified shortcomings.   
What actions can we take to capitalize on this opportunity in the short term?   
The BCA prepared in support of the SSB system in conjunction with the reporting 
mechanisms inherent to the SSB system will meet these shortcomings reported by NAS.  
The reporting and management structures needed by the SYSCOMs, have already been 
set up and are functioning for COTS supportability, available only if the programs choose 
to implement the SSB system.  The SYSCOMs management and the Program Managers 
need to be informed of the availability of the SSB system in order to leverage the 
currently available assets.  This additional attribute of the SSB system should be 
announced at the same time we communicate the potential negative impacts when CLS or 
PBL are implemented through NAVICP using their exclusionary implementation 
practices. 
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 Opportunity 6:  In early September 2002 Secretary of Defense office 
rescinded the existing DoD 5000 series documents with a memo that stated, 
the identified hard requirements – the “must do” – Systems Engineering 
methods will be replaced by a guidance document to provide more leeway to 
the Program Managers. 
How is this opportunity related to serving the needs of our customer? 
How is this threat related to serving the needs of our customer?   
The removal of requirements documents relaxes the discipline required by the 
implemented processes and inevitably produces larger risks to the Program Manager 
(PM) and the acquisition process.  To be successful in a requirements poor environment 
the PM must institute risk management methods and practices to maintain control or at 
least visibility into the program activities.  With this new change of direction from DoD 
the need for the risk management disciplines increases dramatically and must be 
instituted on a continuous ongoing basis.  The SSB System is a risk management method 
for COTS products. 
What actions can we take to capitalize on this opportunity in the short term?   
The communications with the customer base should identify the obsolescence risk 
management attributes of the SSB system and how these attributes provide the PM with 
the visibility into the program activities.  One of the keys to illustrating the utility of the 
system will be in displaying reporting products from previously assessed COTS products 
on other programs especially if they are also used on the PMs equipment.  The 
continuous and all encompassing insight provided through the reporting mechanisms as 
part of the SSB system are packaged and tailored to meet the needs of the program. 
D. THREATS 
Threat 1: Current contracting implementation policy regarding Performance 
Based Contracting (PBC) may curtail or eliminate the possibility of using the 
SSB system. 
As identified in the preceding material, the implementation policies of NAVICP 
can preemptively exclude the participation of all Organic activities and therefore exclude 
the SSB system.  The PMO may unknowingly task NAVICP to subcontract out the 
DMSMS support functions believing that the best value for their program will result 
from a competitive environment.  As discussed in detail, NAVICP does not provide a 
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 competitive environment nor do their processes assure best value, therefore without 
prior knowledge of the contracting environment or intimate knowledge of the capabilities 
of the SSB system the programs may never know of these shortcomings.   
What actions can we take to prevent this threat from limiting our capabilities in the short 
term and in the long term?     
NAVICPs exclusionary policies are either: 1) an unintended consequence of their 
goal to streamline their processes, or 2) intended to streamline and optimize their internal 
processes while in the bigger picture does/may not provide the Navy with the best 
value.  Regardless of the reason for or logic behind these policies, the impact of them 
needs to addressed.  A three pronged approach is recommended in dealing with the 
current situation: 1) address NAVICP directly through a set of meeting with the decision 
makers to illustrate the impacts of the policies and show bottom line figures from 
implemented examples of the SSB system and show what the Navy is missing out on 
because of their policies, hopefully resulting in a change in policy direction, 2) since it 
has been shown that their policies are in conflict with the guidance documents and 
executive mandates, that a request for clarification be sent to Secretary of the Navy, 
Advocate for Competitive Environment and have NAVICP implementation policies 
reviewed for adequacy and possible revision, and 3) develop a mass broadcast to all PMO 
and provide them with intimate knowledge of the SSB system and specifically highlight 
the shortcomings of the NAVICP implementation policies.  All three of these approaches 
are being undertaken at this time.  With the completion of the Business Case Analysis 
(BCA) as a result of the SSB system implementation process for SSDS MK 1, we will 
have accurate real data to prove the viability of the SSB alternative and with that data we 
can approach NAVICP with a supportable and justifiable case in point.  A set of 
clarification questions have been prepared and is being sent to the point of contact in the 
SECNAV office to review our interpretations of the cause and affect impacts due to the 
NAVICP implementation policies.  Articles are being prepared for three separate 
publications well read by our target audience:  
1) 
2) 
3) Defense Acquisition University  Program Manager, PM Magazine.   
The COTS Journal,  
Defense Acquisition University (DAU)  Acquisition Review Quarterly, and  
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 Additionally the following conferences and workshops have been or will be 
presenting the SSB system during the event and contained as part of the proceedings:  
1) 
2) 2002 International Military & Aerospace/Avionics COTS Conference, 
Exhibition & Seminar, San Diego, CA.  
3) 
4) 
5) National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), 5 s 
Engineering Conference, October 21-24, Tampa, FL.  
6) 
7) The 7 rnational Commercialization of Military and Space Electronics 
Conference & Exhibition (CMSE), February 10-13, 2003, Los Angeles, CA.  
Threat 2: Subcontracting government DMSMS support personnel to 
contractors creates a “conflict of interest” situation for the government 
employee while yielding sub optimal results for the Navy. 
2002 GIDEP Workshop and Information Sharing Conference, May 24-16, 
2002, San Diego, CA.  
Naval-Industry R&D Partnership Conference, Sponsored by Office of Naval 
Research, August 13-14, 2002, Washington D.C.  
Government Industry Association (GIA) Conference, September 10-11, Kent, 
WA.  
th Annual System
NAVSEA COTS Steering Board Workshop 2002, October 30-31, Laurel, MD,  
th Inte
Of these seven conferences/workshops, all have confirmed acceptance of 
submitted abstract and materials with the exception of the last entry #7.  With regard to 
the long term mitigation of this threat, our plans are to: 1) Institutionalize the SSB system 
as a standard alternative by updating the DAU publication  Program Managers 
Handbook  to reflect the SSB system as the preferred practice, 2) keep vigilant with 
regard to the DMSMS community by providing presentations at future 
conferences/workshops, 3) provide face to face presentations to as many programs as 
possible, thus far over a dozen such presentations have been given, 4) present to the 
Program Executive Offices (PEOs) and resource sponsors showing the bottom line 
benefits to get a top down endorsement/sponsorship. 
How is this threat related to serving the needs of our customer?   
The primary purpose in implementing the SSB system is to provide the best 
value to the Navy through defining a process yielding manageable risk at the lowest 
LCC.  If a conflict of interest situation exists either within the contractor - the bottom 
line versus best value for the Navy  or with the government employee trying to 
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 balance the requirements of  their employer directives versus best value for the Navy 
 the lack of independence of DMSMS support function will most likely produce sub 
optimal results for the Navy.  Since the NAVICP implementation policies have no 
counter acting force or change agent activists, contracting out this vital function 
appears inevitable.  Over time the internal Organic activities will become either the 
willing participants of the contractors directives or a non-participant whereby the 
internal Navy resources for DMSMS support will eventually disappear.  In the end the 
PMO (customer) will receive DMSMS support that will reflect the contractors  best 
bottom line  versus the Navys  best value. 
What actions can we take to prevent this threat from limiting our capabilities in the short 
term and in the long term?   
The same action plan identified for Threat 1 is applicable with regard to the 
conflict of interest issues although a few actions will require modification. With a 
conflict of interest problem the issues take on more of a political overtone versus the 
straight business implications in arriving at the best value for the Navy, as identified in 
Threat 1.  Therefore it is important to work this issue in a low-key fashion up the chain of 
command instead of broadcasting it at every conference and workshop.   The preventative 
actions to mitigate this threat are to confront NAVICP directly and request interpretation 
and action from SECNAV. 
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• An expandable, transportable 
and Life Cycle Cost (LCC) 
reducing processes, methods, 
and tools 
• Life Cycle Cost (LCC) 
reductions of as much as 50% 
on all systems depending on 
program constraints 
• New supportability options to 
the PMOs 
• Provide the Fleet user with the 
assurance that their system will 
be supportable over time and 
available when needed 
• Proactive COTS obsolescence 
risk management process 
• The greater the use of the 
system the greater the leverage 
to be gained, thereby 
expanding its value proposition 
to the Navy 
• Enables Business planning and 
Management processes for 
fielded systems  
• Simulation and modeling tools, 
optimize the business planning 
and identify future support 
requirements 
• The SYSCOMs require a 
performance plan, strategy, 
and management control for 
CLS/PBL contracting efforts 
• DoD has a greater need for risk 
management methods and 
practices due to the changes in 
the DoD 5000 series 
documents 
• New system with a very short 
track record 
• Implementation policy 
regarding Performance Based 
Contracting (PBC) may curtail 
or eliminate the possibility of 
using the SSB system 
• Up-front PMO support and 
long-term commitment on 
behalf of the PMO and the 
support team • Subcontracting government 
DMSMS support personnel to 
contractors creates a conflict 
of interest situation for the 
government employee while 
yielding sub optimal results for 
the Navy 
• The SSB system is not part of 
the mainstream contracting 
process implemented by 
NAVICP 
• Requires a cultural shift from 
an independent competitive 
environment to a collaborative 
interdependency 
Appendix D Table 2: SWOT Matrix 
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E. SWOT MATCHING, CONVERTING, MINIMIZING, AND AVOIDING 
STRATEGIES 
How can we match our strengths to our opportunities to create capabilities in serving the 






An expandable, transportable, Life Cycle Cost (LCC) reducing processes, 
methods, and tools 
New supportability options to the PMOs 
Proactive COTS obsolescence risk management process 
Enables Business planning and Management processes for fielded systems  
Opportunity 1: Meeting the PMO objectives in providing Life Cycle Cost 
(LCC) reductions of as much as 50% on all systems depending on program 
constraints. 
The opportunity to reduce the LCC by 50% will be a result of combining three 
strengths (1, 2, 4) together to maintain an environment where the PMO has cost effective 
options, which can be planned for and then implemented according the plan.  
Implementing the processes, methods, and tools of the SSB system as part of the Systems 
Architecture will leverage other functional areas based on sound Business Planning and 
Management processes that will provide the PMO with options.  The variety of options 
available to the PMO due to the SSB systems structure allow programmatic decisions to 
take into account the programs core requirements by elevating many of the once hard 
and fast constraints inherent in COTS products.  Using this flexibility the PMO can 
choose to focus on reducing the overall program LCC. 
Opportunity 2: The SSB system defines pro-active risk management methods 
for COTS products that provide the Fleet user with the assurance that their 
system will be supportable over time and available when needed. 
The long-term supportability of fielded systems is the primary purpose of the SSB 
system because it directly impacts the availability and utility of the fielded systems used 
by the Fleet.  The processes, methods, and tools identify the specific obsolescence risks 
involved with each COTS product, the Business Planning and Management processes are 
then used to manage these risks through the use of a cross functional team.  The emergent 
property provided by the SSB system associated with this identification and management 
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 practice yields the assurance that the fielded COTS products will have long-term support 
and predictable performance to meet the Fleet user requirements.  The strengths (1,3,4) 
map directly to the pro-active risk management whereby the Fleet user requirements are 
met. 
Opportunity 3: Growth and maturity of the SSB system provides greater 
opportunity for other Navy programs to leverage this unique internal 
resource expanding its value proposition to the Navy. 
The expandable and transportable characteristics identified in strength #1, directly 
influences the leveraging opportunity, which expands the value proposition to the Navy.  
The SSB system establishes a reusable foundation of relationships with the OEMs and 
detailed information with respect to specific configurations whereby subsequent program 
implementations that use the same COTS products will not need to redo this work but 
instead just reuse the current established information.  The logical follow-on to this 
capability is that as the Navy implementation of the SSB system increases the possibility 
of reuse also increases and therefore greater leverage can be captured.  The attributes of 
planning and managing identified in strength 4 provide the PMO with the methods and 
practices to take advantage of the reuse capability and, as a product of the Systems 
Engineering approach, allow the expansion of the value added proposition to the Navy. 
Opportunity 4: The SSB system employs several simulation and modeling 
tools to optimize the business planning and future support requirements for 
fielded program systems. 
All four strengths in some way support the simulation and modeling tool and the 
ability to do business planning specifically required for forecasting of funding 
requirements and future fielded product needs. The predictive attributes of the SSB 
system are a direct result of the inherent characteristics of the System Architecture and 
the Systems Engineering approach employed in the SSB systems design. 
Opportunity 5: The Naval Audit Service (NAS) has recently released reports 
indicating that the implementation of the Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) 
contracting methodologies used by NAVSEA and SPAWAR lacks adequate 
visibility and metrics that would assure proper oversight 
The first and fourth strengths map directly to this opportunity, in that, the SSB 
system contains processes, methods, and tools, which provide the infrastructure necessary 
to support the business and management needs that were found to be lacking identified in 
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 the NAS reports.  This infrastructure is an inherent part of the SSB system and can be 
directly transferable to a program to meet the shortcomings they (the programs) currently 
exhibit. 
Opportunity 6:  In early September 2002 Secretary of Defense office 
rescinded the existing DoD 5000 series documents [22) DJSM] with a memo 
that stated, the identified hard requirements – the “must do” – Systems 
Engineering methods will be replaced by a guidance document to provide 
more leeway to the Program Managers. 
One of the predominate strengths provided through the SSB system is the ability 
to manage the obsolescence risk inherent in COTS products.  Additional support 
processes, methods and tool available through the use of the SSB system allows the PM 
insight into the programmatic activities and associated costs to the program in managing 
the long-term supportability issues.  With the relaxation of the constraints on the 
Requirements Generation System the key to success for the PM will be in managing the 
risks involved with this approach, the SSB system has been developed to help with this 
task. 






The SSB system is a new system with a very small track record. 
The SSB system necessitates the up-front PMO support and a long-term 
commitment on behalf of the PMO and the support team. 
The SSB system is not part of the mainstream contracting process implemented 
by NAVICP. 
Implementation of the SSB system will require a cultural shift from an 
independent competitive environment to a collaborative interdependency of 
diverse functional groups. 
Weaknesses 1&4: 
The issues identified in weaknesses 1 & 4 can be directly linked and converted 
into opportunities using the same approach essentially killing two birds with one stone.  
The competitive environment illustrated earlier in this plan identifies many of the 
characteristics shown by existing DMSMS support groups.  Characteristics such as rice 
bowl mentality, the not invented here attitude, and functional stove pipes are typical 
of existing DMSMS support groups.  These attitudes are exacerbated by the newness of 
the SSB systems approach and can only be converted into strengths by proving out the 
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 system.  The proving out process will require objective evidence showing that once the 
system has been implemented as a collaborative process the resulting impact to the 
program lowers LCC, reduces COTS obsolescence risk and provides the PMO with 
additional options not available prior to the SSB system implementation.  Therefore the 
converting mechanism to go from a weakness to a strength will be evident through the 
data collected quantifying the success or failure of implementing the SSB system.  
Keeping a well defined set of metrics regarding LCC reductions and impacts to fielded 
systems supportability and using these values to illustrate the utility of the system will be 
critical in having the SSB system embraced by existing DMSMS supports groups. 
Weakness 2: 
Although the set of metrics listed above will be pivotal in proving the viability of 
the SSB system some additional information may be needed to convince the PMO and 
support teams to make long-term commitments and provide the upfront resources.  Two 
approaches can be undertaken to address these concerns.  Assuming the viability of the 
SSB system has been demonstrated through the metrics, a case needs to be made that the 
metrics taken over time is where the big payoff is for the implementation of the SSB 
system.  This case is well illustrated in the Business Case Analysis (BCA), which can be 
provided as objective evidence.  However, just as impressive would be a testimony from 
a PMO where the impact to the PMOs systems could be relayed to other PMOs 
considering the SSB system alternative.  This testimony could be as simple as a phone 
call or perhaps a more formal written statement of accomplishments due to SSB system 
implementation.  The testimony coupled with justification data available in the BCA 
presents a strong case for making the long-term commitment.  The second approach to 
gain the up-front support can be gleaned from the BCA and other data by examining the 
particular programmatic system in question and developing predictive indicators that 
show potential impacts to the program.  One such indicator would be calculation of the 
Return On Investment (ROI) using the criteria from the program in question.  This value 
will bring home to the program the viability of the SSB system when used to meet the 
program objectives. 
462 
 Weakness 3: 
As identified in several sections of this plan, the implementation policies of 
NAVICP can present limitations to the SSB implementation efforts although some work 
around and direct confrontational alternatives have been discussed.  These alternatives 
necessitate additional work in order to get the SSB system to receive adequate 
consideration.  Notwithstanding the negative impacts this has on the SSB system 
implementation efforts the situation does have some redeeming qualities.  The current 
contracting situation requires the SSB system implementation efforts to prove out its 
utility based on its own merits and advertise or broadcast to a wide range of potential 
candidate PMOs.  If the SSB system is accepted based on its proven utility to PMOs in 
spite of the lack of support from the contracting processes, then like many successful 
grass roots initiatives the success will help change the contracting process.  Use of the 
SSB system alternative may be the key in incorporating the Organic activities 
involvement on future DMSMS support teams regardless of the contracting methodology.  
Should this become the case, the SSB system will be a positive and necessary alternative 
to be encapsulated in the DMSMS support team planning when accomplished by any 
Organic activity. 
How can we convert our threats into opportunities?   
How can we minimize or avoid those weaknesses and threats that cannot be successfully 
converted? 
Both identified threats are a result of the NAVICPs implementation policies with 
regards to Performance Based Contracting (PBC).  Three strategies have been identified 
to deal with these threats: directly confronting NAVICP, request SECNAV intervention, 
and increase the awareness of the SSB system in the DMSMS support community.  By 
confronting NAVICP directly there is a potential that they could alter their policies to 
mitigate the issues regarding Organic activities participation, this change could also go 
even further and allow the SSB system to compete in an environment having a level 
playing field, a situation that would favor incorporation of the SSB system as the 
preferred alternative.  SECNAV intervention is another method to instigate the same kind 
of potential changes as identified with direct confrontation with NAVICP.  Either of these 
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 methods could result in converting the threats to opportunities.  The third strategy of 
raising the awareness of the SSB system is meant to avoid, as much as possible, the 
negative impact of the contracting policies if they cannot be converted. 
Do we possess any major liabilities (unconverted weaknesses that match 
unconverted threats)? 
Are these liabilities and limitations obvious to our customers?  Are there ways that these 
liabilities and limitations can be minimized or avoided? 
There is one area in which we carry a liability and that is in the area of customer 
(PMO and support teams) perception of the intent of the SSB system.  Many potential 
customers at first glance will look at the SSB systems as having the intentions of sending 
old, antiquated technology out to the Fleet and forcing this sub-par equipment on them 
for time indefinite.  Although this first perception is not the intention nor does it describe 
the purpose of the SSB system, it is a liability, which must be overcome.  To address this 
issue we will be developing through this plan, methods and tools to project an Image 
that is more closely aligned with the purpose and objectives intended through the use of 
the SSB system. 
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 V. MARKETING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
The marketing objectives involve establishing the SSB system as a unique 
standard practice while projecting the image as an enabler of currently used support 
systems, that are employed during the decision-making processes regarding 
supportability of COTS products.  Our current goal of 20% capture of the Navy programs 
translates to 72 programs or an equivalent 80 man-years per year, and it is estimated that 
this amount of captured programs will establish the SSB system as one of the standard 
solution alternatives. 
A. MARKETING GOAL A 
• Implement the SSB system on 20% of the available Navy programs over the 
next 3 years. 
Objective A1 
• Project the amount of Organic activity workload generated by capture of 20% 
of the available Navy programs. 
 
Specific and Measurable outcome: 
The total available estimated market size is the sum of all programs within the 
Navy and that value is 365 programs.  The size of each program is unique -- some are 
very small (i.e. small unique pieces of equipment) while others are extremely large like 
AEGIS and the Virginia Class submarines.  The SSB system is designed, to be tailored to 
meet the needs of the programs, this includes the size and other unique factors specific to 
a program.  The larger the program size, the more expansive the SSB effort becomes for 
that given program.  The number of programs directly relates to the number of potential 
customers and each customer will have a unique SSB effort tailored to its needs.  The 
amount of COTS products on a program will also define the SSB efforts since the SSB 
system is designed to provide long-term supportability for the COTS products. 
In an effort to estimate the amount of COTS on the total distribution of Navy 
acquisition programs we queried the COTS database at NSWC Crane.  This database 
contains several Navy acquisition programs, of them 13 were evaluated and assigned an 
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 estimate of the percent of COTS per program using engineering judgment, as identified in 
Table 1 [23) Braun]. 
 
Program Equipment Type % COTS 
AN/SPS-48E Radar 30% 
AN/SPS-73(V)12 Radar 75% 
CEC Cooperative Engagement 
Capability 
67% 
Electronic Countermeasures 15% 
LPD-17 SWAN Shipboard Wide Area Network 95% 
AN/SSN-6 Navigation Sensor System 
Interface 
75% 
MK162 Ship Gridlock System 90% 
MK98 Mod 4 Trident Fire Control 70% 
AN/BQQ-10 ARCI Sonar System 85% 
AN/MSQ-124 Air Defense Communications 
Platform 
75% 
SSDS MK1 Ships Self Defense System 98% 
SSDS MK2 Ships Self Defense System 98% 
AN/AQS-20/X Sonar Mine Detecting Set 20% 
SLQ-32 
Appendix D Table 3: Percentage COTS of some Navy systems 
Using the data presented in Table 3 a distribution for the percentage of programs 
using various levels of COTS within the systems can be calculated.  The assumption 
made when developing this distribution is that the Navy system has undergone COTS 
insertion somewhere in its life cycle.  This distribution is only an estimate to achieve a 
rough order of magnitude regarding the COTS distribution out in our fielded systems.  
The percent of programs which will have less than 25% COTS should be about  15% of 
the programs.   The percent of programs which will have greater than 25% but less than 
50% COTS should be about  7% of the programs.  The percent of programs which will 
have greater than 50% but less than 75% COTS should be about  39% of the programs.  
The percent of programs which will have greater than 75% COTS should be about  39% 
of the programs.   Using this estimated distribution and applying it against all Navy 




% COTS % Programs  Number of Navy Programs 
expected to be within 
distribution defined, Assumes 
total programs as 365 
Assume a 20% Program 
Capture Rate, yields the 
following number of 
programs to service 
< 25% 15% 55 11 
25% < 
50% 
7% 26 5 
50% < 
75% 
39% 142 28 
> 75% 39% 142 28 
Appendix D Table 4: Target Market 
Assuming a 20% capture rate of the potential market with the given distribution 
and assuming the programs are all medium size programs we can apply our 
implementation experience with the SSB system to estimate the amount of potential 
man/year funding possible. Based on the stated assumptions our experience shows that if 
the evaluated system is < 25% COTS then it would translate into approximately ½ 
man/year of work. If the system is between, 25% - 50% COTS it would translate into 
approximately ¾ man/year. For any programs having 50-75 % COTS, the work effort 
translates into about 1 man/year. If the COTS content is greater than 75% the work effort 
is about 1 ½ man/years. This rough approximation yields the following expected target 
market size: 
Target Market Size = (# programs,<25% COTS)(.5) + (# 
programs,25-50% COTS)(.75) + (# programs, 50-75 % COTS)(1) 
+ (# programs, > 75% COTS)(1.5) 
Target Market Size = (11)(.5) + (5)(.75) + (28)(1) + 
(28)(1.5) = 79.25 man/year per year 
 
Time Frame:  
Fiscal Years  FY03 through FY06 
Responsible unit/person: 
The SSB Integrated Product Team (IPT), NSWC Corona 
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 Relationship to SWOT: 
• Life Cycle Cost (LCC) reductions of as much as 50% on all systems 
depending on program constraints. 
• Provide the Fleet user with the assurance that their system will be supportable 
over time and available when needed. 
• The greater the use of the system the greater the leverage to be gained, thereby 
expanding its value proposition to the Navy. 
• Simulation and modeling tools, optimize the business planning and identify 
future support requirements. 
 
B. MARKETING GOAL B 
Project an Image showing symbiotic nature of the SSB system with the Tech 
refresh/insertion efforts. 
 Objective B1: 
Prepare presentation materials and reports to link the captured metrics (LCC 
reductions, risk management, long-term supportability) regarding the SSB systems 
implementation with information provided from the affected programs on the SSB 
systems ability to support tech refresh/insertion. 
Specific and Measurable outcome: 
For each program that implements the SSB system the following set of data will 
be captured or recorded: 
The total LCC reduction comparing SSB system bottom line versus Life of Type Buy 
(LTB) bottom line. 
The total cost avoidance due to SSB system mitigating the necessity for redesign. 
Assessment of the accuracy of the predicted versus actual costs and impacts due to SSB 
system implementation. 
Survey of customer satisfaction with regard to the SSB implementation efforts 
Interview with customer then prepare a structured report covering implementation 
experience and lessons learned. 
A summary assessment of the implementation effort prepared by the SSB systems 
implementer and the supporting SSB IPT. 
A summary report will be prepared for each program evaluating and reporting all 
data gathered.  All summary reports will be combined and analyzed for trends, common 
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 threads, exceptional areas (good and bad), and effectiveness of implementation.   Both 
types of reports will be prepared for publication and available upon request. 
Time Frame: 
Reporting information will be collected and a report prepared within one quarter 
after the close of FY03 and repeated every year thereafter. 
Responsible unit/person: 
The SSB IPT leader 
Relationship to SWOT:  
The greater the use of the system the greater the leverage to be gained, thereby 
expanding its value proposition to the Navy. 
• Requires a cultural shift from an independent competitive environment to a 
collaborative interdependency. 
• New system with a very small track record. 
• Up-front PMO support and long-term commitment on behalf of the PMO and 
the support team. 
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 VI. MARKETING STRATEGIES 
A. SEGMENTATION & DIFFERENTIATION 
Segmentation: The first tier of segmentation is at the Market level.  For our 
services and products the appropriate segment at the Market level is the Niche Marketing.  
The particular niche market is specific to Navy programs with a need to support their 
systems that contain COTS products.  The criteria that can be applied to our niche 
market, which forms the basis for differentiation, can be described using three 
independent attributes, which are critically important to the customer.  The specific 
characteristics that define these attributes are: Life Cycle Cost (LCC) impact, 
obsolescence risk management, and Long-term supportability attributes. Table 5 below 
identifies the primary methods employed by DoD/Navy DMSMS support teams/groups. 
The position of the SSB system relative to these established practices and a few other 
commonly used methods are discussed in subsequent paragraphs to illustrate the 







Existing Stock 0 0 0
Reclamation 629 1,884 3,249
Alternate 2,750 6,384 16,500
Substitute 5,000 18,111 50,276
Aftermarket 15,390 47,360 114,882
Emulation 17,000 68,012 150,000
Redesign Minor 22,400 111,034 250,000
Redesign Major 200,000 410,152 770,000
Appendix D Table 5: Alternatives Cost Matrix [16) DMEA] 
 
 In addition to these 8 categories of alternatives listed in Table 5, the Department of 
Defense DMSMS Working Group [24) DoD] defines three other 
commonly used methods:  
• Redefine Requirement to Accept Commercial Item 
• Life of Type Buy (LTB)  also known as Life Time Buy or Bridge Buy 
• Reverse Engineering (RE) 
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 Combining all these alternatives (including the SSB system) and applying 
experience and engineering judgment we will assign values/labels for the 
measurable criteria using the following parameters: 
• Risk  High, Medium, Low  to identify that once this resolution method is 
used it carries with it an amount of risk of being problematic or 
unsuccessful 
• Cost  $$$$ (most expensive), $$ (mid range cost), $ (low LCC) - Unlike the 
point solution cost shown in Table 5, the cost identified here is impact to 
Life Cycle Cost (LCC) which may or may not be the least expensive 
initial cost, for example and alternative part may be found but that 
resolution may be short lived whereby within a few years another 
alternative part needs to be identified, paid for and implemented. 
• LTS  Long-term supportability, LT (long term > 10 years), MT (Mid Term 
5-7 years), ST (Short Term <5 years), these values are based on 
engineering judgment and experience. 
The alternative of Existing Stock is not considered as an alternative because if 
stock currently exists and there is a shortage, other alternatives will be used to mitigate 
the issue (i.e. LTB). The remaining alternatives are assigned the following attributes: 
 
Alternative Type Risk Cost (LCC) Supportability 
(LTS) 
SSB system L $ LT 
Life-of-Type (LOT) Buy L-M $$ LT 
Reclamation M $$ ST 
Alternate Source L-M $ MT 
Substitute M $ MT 
Aftermarket M-H $ MT 
Redefine Requirements H $$ MT 
Emulation H $$ ST 
Redesign - Minor M-H $$$$ MT 
Reverse Engineering H $$$$ ST 
Redesign - Major M $$$$ LT 
Appendix D Table 6: Positioning and Differentiation Table 
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Appendix D Figure 5: Positioning & Differentiation of Support Alternatives 
B. TARGETING & POSITIONING 
1. Resolution Type & Positioning Justification 
SSB System  
A method to extend the life cycle of an assembly using a Systems Engineering 
approach to manage the obsolescence risk inherent in COTS products and provide long-
term support of fielded systems. 
• Risk  Establishes risk management methods, processes, and tools to provide 
Low Risk to the programs systems.  Low Risk - L 
• Cost  Uses business and management processes and practices to partner with 
the OEM and supplier community to constrain the LCC.  Low Cost - $ 
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 • Supportability  Provides an overarching Systems Architecture, which enables 
long-term support.  Long Term - LT 
Life-of-Type (LTB) Buy (also referred to as LOT) 
The OEM, its distributors, or aftermarket suppliers may have enough inventory to 
meet the projected demands of the supported equipment for the rest of its operational 
lifetime or may continue to produce the component for a specified amount of time. [16) 
DMEA] 
• Risk  The LTB Buy requires a good deal of upfront investment which if not 
used will be wasted, this is especially risky if and when the program 
requirements are altered and equipment configurations changed.  Risk to 
the financial health of the program and potential lack of flexibility in 
meeting future program requirements.  Risk  L-M 
• Cost  Large initial investment at the very beginning of the program system 
life cycle and potential large impact to LCC if program requirements are 
altered.  Mid Range Cost - $$ 
• Supportability  Even though the LTB Buy alternative requires large upfront 
costs the long-term supportability is very good provided that no changes in 
requirements are experienced.  Long Term - LT 
Reclamation 
The component may be available from surplus inventory; from equipment that is 
beyond economical repair, is in deactivated or decommissioned units, or was removed as 
part of a modernization program; or from the Defense Reutilization and Marketing 
Service (DEMS).  Some refurbishment or testing may be required.[16) DMEA] 
• Risk  This point solution usually entails incorporating a part of unknown 
origin and using it in a functioning system, such things as MTBF, previous 
stressful environments, and current component condition present the new 
system with undefined risks.  The process of reclaiming the part may 
further deteriorate the component adding other undisclosed risks.  Medium 
Risk - M  
• Cost  The cost of reclaiming parts/assemblies is expensive not only because 
of the process but also because of the detailed documentation and testing 
necessary.  Mid Range Cost - $$ 
• Supportability  Reclamation is a point solution usually used a last result in 
making up some short-gaps in the supportability of the fielded system.  
Long Term - LT 
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 Alternate Source 
If part specifications and test, acceptance, and related technical data are complete 
and available, an evaluation of the manufacturer production capabilities, tooling, test 
programs, etc., must be accomplished to ensure the ability to meet the original item 
specification requirements. [24) DoD] 
• Risk  The risk involved with establishing an Alternate Source is primarily the 
technical risk accompanying technology transfer.  Potential performance 
risk to fielded system.  Risk Low - Medium  L-M 
• Cost  Technology transfer if done well can be accomplished at low cost 
although set-up, testing, and qualification may vary in their impact to the 
overall cost.  Low Cost - $ 
• Supportability  Depending on the purpose for the technology transfer and the 
associated supplier relationship the support requirements for the Alternate 
Source are typically used for mid term needs but could be extended to 
meet long-term requirements.  Mid Term - MT 
Substitute 
It may be possible to use a similar component with an acceptable number of 
design differences that will not degrade the performance of the equipment. [16) DMEA] 
• Risk  The risk involved in using a substitute part is mostly technical, 
essentially the way the new part responds to the fielded system and visa-a-
versa, many times its response is an unknown until fully exercised and 
tested in the system.  This mid range risk is considered slightly less than 
the Alternate Source because the OEM for the substitute part has a history 
with manufacturing and testing the part so they understand the parts 
capabilities.  Medium Risk - M 
• Cost  With regard to LCC the resolution is usually as simple as picking a part 
already in production then paying to have it tested and qualified for the 
application.  Low Cost - $ 
• Supportability  The substitute part has its own life cycle and the expectation 
that this part also may go obsolete and therefore categorizes a substitute 
part a point solution that may or may not last the life cycle of the fielded 
system.  Mid term - MT 
Aftermarket 
Manufacturers sometimes buy discontinued production lines to maintain 
component production, or suppliers buy quantities of components that are obsolete and 
store them for future sale. [16) DMEA] 
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 • Risk  The issues which arise from implementing an Aftermarket 
Manufacturer are problems and risks that become evident due to a lack of 
adequate processes, specifically: Technology Transfer processes not 
addressing technical issue, business processes not addressing the OEM or 
Aftermarket Manufacturer needs (i.e. contractual issues), and Program 
Management processes not providing adequate up-front planning. Unless a 
Systems Engineering approach is taken to address these risks, the 
successful transfer of the technology is at best at high risk.  Medium  
High Risk  M-H  
• Cost  The impact to the LCC using this alternative, if accomplished 
correctly, is low and even if the technology transfer has problems the 
Aftermarket Manufacturer usually is stuck with most of the costs.  Low 
Cost - L 
• Supportability  The part once transferred is not necessarily protected against 
the obsolescence risk issues prevalent in COTS products.  This exposure 
will eventually lead to a short-fall in providing adequate supportability 
over the life cycle of the fielded system.  Mid Term - MT 
Redefine Requirements 
The process is similar to the substitution alternative, except you are redefining the 
item to accept a commercial item already available, instead of finding an item which is 
similar to the DMSMS item. [24) DoD] 
• Risk  Although the technical process of evaluation may be the same the 
impact to risk is completely different.  Changing the systems requirements 
has a large risk associated with it because of the unknown perturbations 
and unintentional consequences that may result.  Additionally the 
changing of the system specification is another process that injects added 
business and programmatic risks into the scenario. This alternative 
represents a high risk to the program and fielded system.  High Risk - H 
• Cost  The impact to the LCC will be due in part to the defining, 
implementing, qualification and testing of the new part and in part because 
the business and programmatic processes will need to be altered or used 
and therefore must be funded.  Mid Range Cost - $$ 
• Supportability  Like the substitute part, this new part with redefined 
requirements, has its own life cycle and the expectation that this part also 
may go obsolete and therefore categorizes a the part as a point solution 




A government or industry laboratory may have developed or have the capability 
to develop an F3I (Form, Fit, Functional)  compatible replacement that matches the 
obsolete component. [16) DMEA] 
• Risk  The technical and applications risks are mid to high when employing 
emulation.  Not all the technical risks are evident when first designing, 
fabricating, and testing the emulated part and therefore a medium risk.  
The application the part will be put into will not have all potential 
parameters defined and many times critical parameters cause failures in 
the application and are totally unexpected resulting in a high risk in 
integrating into the application.  High Risk - H 
• Cost  Emulation carries with it a fairly substantial price because it is an 
engineering design function just at a lower functional level, it therefore 
must be funded appropriately.  The impact to the LCC may be significant 
over time since the emulation is a point solution that may need to be 
repeated over the system life cycle.  Mid Range Cost - $$ 
• Supportability  Like the substitute part, this new part is specific to this 
unique application and has its own life cycle and the expectation that this 
part also may go obsolete and therefore categorizes a the part as a point 
solution that may or may not last the life cycle of the fielded system. 
Emulation exacerbates the life cycle issue in that it is specifically made for 
the application and therefore cannot leverage off of other applications to 
keep the obsolete parts supported.  Short Term - ST 
Redesign – Minor 
The equipment may need to be redesigned to accept alternative components (e.g., 
a new layout of the circuit board).  If no other resolution is cost-effective, a new design 
may be necessary to completely replace the obsolete component. [16) DMEA]  Although 
both minor and major redesign efforts are given the same definition by DMEA the two 
are differentiated by the level of indenture. The minor redesign typically deals with either 
a component on a lower level of assembly or the lower level assembly itself.  The major 
redesign efforts encompass such areas as significant impacts to software, interoperability, 
or some dependent interaction with the system as whole.  
• Risk  The technical and applications risks must be combined with business 
(e.g., contracts, funding profiles, PPBS, etc.) and Program Management 
(i.e. Configuration Management (CM), ILS, scheduling, funding 
allocation, etc.) processes as part of the risk scenario. Although it must be 
pointed out that a minor redesign will carry with it a smaller impact and 
therefore lower risk than a major redesign.  Medium  High Risk  M-H 
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 • Cost  On our crude scale of impact to LCC both minor and major redesigns 
carry the same identifier even though the costs between the two types are 
vastly different.  Most Expensive - $$$$ 
• Supportability  Important to note is that the major redesign should result in a 
fairly robust long-term supportability of the fielded system.  The 
expectation is that the designers are required to take into account the 
system supportability issues when redesigning the system.  However, 
through our implementation experience with the SSB on COTS products, 
we found that most every major and minor redesign had obsolescence 
issues even before being incorporated into the system.  Therefore major 
redesign reflects the same mid term supportability as is the case with 
minor redesign.  On the other hand, a minor redesign by definition is 
constrained to a lower level of indenture and will not look at overall 
system supportability since it is out of scope for the effort.  The minor 
redesign therefore has the potential of being affected by system impacts 
decreasing its long-term supportability to somewhere just above the mid 
range.  Mid Term - MT 
Reverse Engineering 
An exact replica of the component may sometimes be developed by 
disassembling and analyzing the component; developing design data through 
measurement, testing, and destructive evaluation; producing coordinate measurement 
machine (CMM) documentation of the component; conducting technology insertion 
reviews; developing and verifying technical data packages; and performing first article 
inspection and testing. [16) DMEA] 
• Risk  The technical and applications risks must be combined with business 
(e.g., contracts, funding profiles, PPBS, etc.) and Program Management 
(i.e. CM, ILS, scheduling, funding allocation, etc.) processes as part of the 
risk scenario.  Reverse Engineering is an alternative of last resort because 
it many times fails completely.  High Risk - H 
• Cost  The LCC drivers are obvious as is the impact to the program but if 
successful the program will have in its position the ability to make the part 
for as long as needed.  Most Expensive - $$$$ 
• Supportability  The Reverse Engineering alternative is not only costly with 
high risks but is a point solution for a very specific application.  This 
application may be affected by other parts of the system and the result 
may render the effort meaningless.  Only if the remainder of the system is 
constrained by an Iron Fisted CM requirement should one consider this 
option. Therefore this alternative is labeled as a short-term supportability 
alternative. 
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 Redesign – Major – (see Redesign – Minor) 
C. TARGET MARKETS 
The target markets which are of interest to us are those PMOs (customers) that 
will receive the most benefit by implementing the SSB system thereby building on our 
satisfied customer base. Our customer base will be a subset of the identified 365 
established Navy programs, with the goal of capturing 20% of the total.  Certain 
characteristics of a program will enhance the potential benefits received through 
implementation of the SSB system.  A few of the characteristics we will focus on are: 
required supportability time, fielded system life cycle phase, criticality of fielded system 
baseline, total number of COTS units fielded systems.  The required supportability time 
identifies the number of years the COTS products must be obtainable to install new 
applications, repair/replace Fleet returns, and maintain fielded systems.  The preferred 
supportability time should be greater than 5 years as measured from the date of inclusion 
into the fielded system design.  The reason that this 5 year period is significant is because 
of the 1.5-2 year life cycle of the COTS products along with the typical support period of 
2-4 years combined together will support the fielded systems without the need for 
extended support.  The fielded system life cycle phase is important since it describes the 
maturity of the system, which in turn provides an indicator of the current supportability 
of the system.  The sooner in the life cycle the better with regards to implementing the 
SSB system and if given a choice the preferred time interval would be within 10-15 years 
of design.  After this 10-15 year period more and more of the supportability solutions 
result in redesign and fewer can be remedied using the SSB system.  Depending on the 
fielded system the Configuration Management of the system baseline may be critically 
important to the customer, this is especially true when dealing with certified systems (i.e. 
combat weapon system, safety system, etc.)  Our target market will usually have some 
kind of constraint regarding the system baseline.  The last characteristic to look for with 
our target market is simply common sense and following the business math, in essence 
the more volume the greater potential to save cost.  In summary our Target Market can 
be describe by the following attributes: 
• Supportability time requirements > 5 years from design/refresh date 
• Fielded Systems age < 10-15 years from design/refresh date 
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 • Customer has CM constraints for fielded system baseline 
• Look for programs with high percentage of COTS products. 
It is important to remember that the above listed fielded systems characteristics 
are not constraints, in other words the candidate system under consideration need not 
have any of these characteristics for the SSB system to be implemented. However, if it 
were Christmas and we could pick and choose which programs to go after, this list is a 
good starting point because on these types of systems the SSB system returns maximum 
results. 
D. KEY CUSTOMER AND COMPETITOR REACTIONS 
What are the likely customer and competitor reactions to marketing mix?  How does the 
marketing mix give us a competitive advantage in serving the needs of the target market?  
Is this competitive advantage sustainable? 
The SSB system has been designed using a Systems Engineering approach 
whereby the sustainable attributes and long-term viability were taken into account as part 
of the system requirements.  The marketing mix reflects this long-term viability and 
addresses each of the 4 Ps (Product, Pricing, Distribution, Promotion) through various 
actions aimed at enhancing the marketability of these designed in attributes.  The SSB 
system is, to the authors knowledge, the only COTS supportability system built from the 
ground up to take a system wide life cycle view using a Systems Engineering approach. 
In essence the competitive advantage achieved through the SSB system is permanently 
embedded into the methods, processes, and tools incorporated into the System 
Architecture. 
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 VII. MARKETING IMPLEMENTATION 
A. STRUCTURAL ISSUES 
The Marketing Plan is neither an independent or stand alone process/method, 
instead it is embedded as an integral part of the SSB system itself such that a marketing 
customer focus is maintained throughout all aspects of the approach.  Especially true in 
the product development phase. Therefore in order to understand the marketing 
implementation efforts knowledge of the SSB systems implementation or SEDI is 
necessary. The Systems Engineering Development and Implementation (SEDI) plan is 
one of four foundational documents prepared in support of the Sunset Supply Base (SSB) 
system. Although the SEDI is extensive and should be reviewed for a complete 
understanding the following description illustrate some of the major areas in which the 
Marketing Plan must interface.  The purpose of the SEDI plan is to put into perspective 
the processes, methods and tools needed to implement the Sunset Supply Base (SSB) 
system.  The SEDI plan document is presented as a stand-alone prescriptive set of 
actions, which can be taken in the establishment of an SSB system.  However, the SEDI 
plan document does not portend that it is the only process or method to establish such a 
system but instead is the method the authors have chosen to implement the SSB system.  
The document is constructed in three major sections, which follow a brief introduction to 
the SSB system concept.  The primary issues grappled with in the SEDI plan are those 
faced during implementation and encountered primarily when bringing the idea into 
reality.  The first section of the SEDI plan addresses introduction to the program and the 
infrastructure needed to support the effort, such areas as: teaming structure, computer 
resources, communication methods, interface with the programs, data structure 
requirements, management participation, etc.  The second section of the plan covers the 
implementation of the SSB system and, in turn, presents many challenges to overcome in 
realizing the SSB system. The final section of the plan identifies methods and metrics to 
measure the impact of implementing a SSB system, thereby providing adequate 




 B. MARKETING MIX 
Product 
The SSB system provides a structured set of processes, methods, and tools 
embedded in a System Architecture based on a collaborative framework.  Although the 
SSB system yields many sub-products, discussed below, this Marketing Plan is focused 
on the SSB system as the product provided to the customer and not just the sub-products 
identified herein.  The SSB system employs information and risk sharing, relationship 
building, and long-term planning to yield definable, measurable, and reportable impacts 
to fielded systems. The customers (PMO and support teams) consider both the 
implementing of the SSB system and the report outputs of the SSB system as products. 
As such, the implementing processes such as information and risk sharing directly impact 
the qualitative output assessments like the obsolescence risk of COTS products in fielded 
systems.  The customers expectations include visibility into the processes and 
qualitative/quantitative assessments that accurately define the subsequent output of the 
process. To meet these expectations we have developed the following implementation 
and output products: 
 Implementation Products  
  Documented 17 Step Process 
  Prioritized COTS List & Vendor Information 
  Vendor Status Report 
 Output Products   
  Obsolescence Health Report 
  High Risk (RED) Component List 
  Obsolescence Impact & Purchase Request Report 
  Assembly Master & Cost Matrices, with Definition Worksheet 
The implementation products provide the insight to the customer regarding the 
qualitative assessment of programmatic risk with respect to the relationship building, 
information sharing, and risk management practices employed.  The output products 
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 organize the data and information gathered then assesses the potential impacts and 
recommends proactive actions to mitigate programmatic risks.  These processes, methods 
and tools are quantitative in nature and are presented in a format to provide input directly 
into the business and program management processes.  Collectively these products 
represent new knowledge and options for the PMO and support team.  Furthermore the 
modeling and simulation tools give the decision makers the opportunity to make side-by-
side comparisons of different potential candidate recommendations prior to making the 
final decision.  As identified in Figure 5 Targeting and Positioning, the SSB system 
provides exceptional and unmatched customer service in three important areas: 
obsolescence risk management, Long-Term Supportability, and Life Cycle Cost 
Reduction. 
The products themselves are designed to provide unambiguous bottom line LCC 
and risk assessments and present the results in easily communicated format.  The reports 
from one program application can be aggregated with others to provide a composite 
picture of the SSB systems success story.  The reports required per goal and objective 
B were defined to meet this aggregate/composite success story in order to help define 
the SSB systems Image as  Alternative of Choice  as perceived by the PMO and the 
support teams.  This reporting mechanism can be used as an Evergreen product (i.e. 
constantly be updated with the newest information) to promote the use of the SSB system 
and placed on a web site readily available to the DMSMS community.  User observations 
and information have and will be used to develop the product.  Business case study 
results will be used to further perfect and build the product.  The product will continue to 
be built as more and more users use the product and the database grows.   
Pricing 
The pricing of our services and products will need to be estimated and identified 
in a proposal to the PMO specifically tailored to the application.  Rough Order of 
Magnitude (ROM) estimate methods were suggested early on in this plan to estimate 
market size and to set marketing goals. These ROM estimates assumed that the identified 
programs (see Table 3) were approximately the same size as the SSDS program which 
has about 115 different unique COTS products and is considered a medium size program.  
To these estimated values are reiterated here so if no other method is available at lease a 
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 ROM could be generated to get the process going.  Based on the stated assumptions our 
experience shows that if the evaluated system is < 25% COTS then it would translate into 
approximately ½ man/year of work. If the system is between, 25% - 50% COTS it would 
translate into approximately ¾ man/year. For any programs having 50-75 % COTS, the 
work effort translates into about 1 man/year. If the COTS content is greater than 75% the 
work effort is about 1 ½ man/years. 
Another way to look at the pricing issue would be to use the SSDS MK 1 data set 
and estimates of support resources to drive an average cost per part per year. Estimates 
for the MK 1 system resource support covering the setup and long-term support for 89 
unique items over a ten year period resulted in a cost of $1,836.00 per item per year.  
Since this value is derived from other estimates there is a large amount of uncertainty 
associated with the accuracy and utility of the number, however it is another approach 
that could be use to perform estimating efforts.  
Distribution 
The SSB system comprises several processes during the implementation of the 
concept.  As identified in Figure 6 Implementation Process, a relationship building 
process is established to obtain the COTS Component Information from the Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for analysis.  Arrangements are made at this time to 
involve a third party to continue manufacturing the products if the OEM chooses not to 
continue making the products.  However if the OEM wishes to participate by 
continuation of production of the COTS products and share the risk of stockpiling 
obsolete parts, then the dashed box in Figure 6 identifies the scope of their participation.  
The component information is then analyzed for obsolescence risk and an assessment is 
provided to the DMSMS support team to determine the appropriate action plan.  
Typically the number of high risk parts are defined along with an estimated quantity of 
each part needed to support the program fielded equipment for a prescribed period of 
time, usually until the next tech refresh/insertion.  These parts are then stocked on the 
OEM or third parties shelves until they are consumed to make the COTS assemblies 
needed in the Fleet.  Dependent on the programs needs this process provides long-term 
support for the end user, the Fleet. 
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Appendix D Figure 7: 17 Step Implementation Process 
The 17 Step Process describes the detailed sub-processes needed to implement the SSB system and 
identifies many of the intermediary products used by the PM to provide visibility into the process are 
identified here.  This process flow illustrates how information and data are collected and 
disseminated; where in the process these actions take place; what are the expected outcomes of the 
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 process; and who is expected to accomplish which tasks. Below is a definition of each step in the 
process: 
Case Opened: Requires initial information (BOM, COTS list, etc). 
Step 1.0 
The Program Office provides the indentured Bill Of Materials (BOM) complete 
with suppliers CAGE codes and part numbers, to NSWC Corona for analysis. The 
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) products, usually at the assembly level, are identified 
and compared against the current SSB database to identify if any of the items have 
already been placed in the Sunset Supply Base (SSB).  The products will fall in one of 
three groups: 1) Part Number at the assembly level is already placed with the SSB, 2) An 
SSB relationship is set up but not for assembly in question, and 3) No SSB relationship 
exists.  For any products not already in the database (groups 2&3), the Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)  COTS Vendor  will be contacted to identify 
supportability time line for each assembly, additionally parts lists along with an outline 
drawing at the assembly level will be requested for use later.  Some suppliers prefer to 
wait until assurances are provided (such as a Non-disclosure agreement) before releasing 
this information. 
Step 2.0 & 3.0 
A health analysis (Red, Yellow, Green) of any microcircuits and COTS 
assemblies is obtained or generated to identify risk and set priorities.  An obsolescence 
report is developed to inform the PMO of known obsolescence issues and the plan of 
action regarding the un-identified risk issues with regard to COTS assemblies.  If a COTS 
assembly exists in the SSB database and has obsolete parts, a coordinated 
recommendation between NSWC Corona and the PMO or support agent, will be made to 
purchase the amount of obsolete component parts necessary to support the expected 
future orders to meet the programs requirements.  These piece parts will be bought 
through the SSB supplier who will then store them on his shelf until consumed through 
future assembly orders from the program. 
Step 6.0  
After signing Non-Disclosure Agreement between NSWC Corona and OEM, the 
list of components on the COTS assembly of interest is received by NSWC Corona, a 
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 health assessment of each component on the assembly is conducted to determine status 
(red, yellow, green), and finally an assembly level health assessment report is issued. 
Step 7.0 & 8.0 
 Program Management Office or support agent to review the plan of action and 
recommendations, iterate if necessary, task NSWC Corona to implement the plan and 
provide the purchase order(s) to the appropriate SSB suppliers to mitigate risk to specific 
COTS assemblies. 
Step 4.0, 5.0, and 9.0 
Based on experience and knowledge of the SSB supplier and the OEM, NSWC 
Corona will use a Systems Engineering approach and senior Quality Engineers to match 
the two companies in three primary areas: performance, technical capabilities, and 
Business Practices.  Periodic, in-plant, formal reviews at the SSB suppliers facilities will 
be used to keep a current assessment of these three areas. Assessments will be based on 
the IEEE assessment templates and other industry best practices.  The two companies will 
be matched but since this is a collaborative system and necessitates voluntary 
involvement, the final choice of teaming partners is with the two companies.  NSWC 
Coronas role is one of technical assistance and facilitation.  A contractual agreement is 
defined by and implemented through the two companies, a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) may be used encompassing all three entities to facilitate 
communication. 
Step 10.0, 11.0, 12.0, and 13.0 
These steps identify major milestone activities, which must be accomplished 
successfully to establish the SSB supplier as a second source for the COTS assembly. 
Transfer of the technology from the OEM to the SSB supplier is assisted through the 
technical assistance of NSWC Corona Quality Engineering staff. Facilitation and 
coordination with the Program Office and other involved parties (i.e. In-Service 
Engineering Agent (ISEA), field activities, procurement agent, etc.) is one of the key 
functional responsibilities of NSWC Corona and during this transfer process NSWC 
Corona will perform an operational and capabilities review thereby establishing the 
original baseline assessment of the SSB supplier.  The OEM is the responsible party in all 
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 these steps, as the design and manufacturing expert and owner of the intellectual 
property, they (the OEM) have a vested interest in assuring the successful transfer to 
substantiate the business case. 
Step 14.0, 15.0, 16.0, and 17.0 
The full-scale production of the transferred COTS assembly will be dependant 
upon the Navys requirements for the product. Procurement of the assemblies will take 
place using existing methods and processes but be directed to the SSB supplier by adding 
the SSB supplier CAGE code as an alternate manufacturer in the procurement system 
controls. On a periodic basis an obsolescence report will be generated to assess the on-
going risk to the program and assess if component parts need to be purchased and placed 
in the SSB suppliers inventory to support future build requirements.  The SSB supplier 
will provide visibility and control over the Navy assets in their inventory.  Periodic 
reviews of the SSB suppliers facilities, operations, business practices, manufacturing 
methods and quality, will be accomplished to assure the long-term viability of the SSB 
suppliers, providing a pro-active risk management approach. 
When evaluating the distribution process it is important to include the network 
and partnerships we have cultivated through implementing the SSB system. The 
collaborative approach we have taken with other groups, activities, and other members of 
the community has yielded several partnerships where our partners have identified SSB 
system opportunities and brought us the work. Conversely we have been tasked by PMOs 
to accomplish some work which a portion of the work another activity is better suited to 
do, so in this case we bring in their expertise and provide the funding.  Working in this 
manner  Ill scratch your back if you scratch mine  we have several Navy activities, 
OEMs, and contractors suggesting to their PMO that our services be brought in to help 
solve the issues with COTS products.  Essentially our partners are working as our 
marketing and sales force and they do it because it makes good business sense; by 
incorporating the SSB system it brings greater value to their services and products as 
perceived by their customer.  
Promotion 





Decision Makers  Contractor & Government - [Early Adopters] 
a. Program Manager 
b. Design/Developers 
c. Technology Insertion Managers 
d. DMSMS Support, Policy making Community 
e. Recourse Sponsor 
GateKeepers / middlemen / intermediaries -  [Early Majority - Late Majority] 
a. ILS Manager 
b. Procurement Managers 
c. DMSMS Team Lead/Managers 
d. SYSCOM Policy Managers 
e. Fleet Support Managers/ISEAs 
Using Community  [Innovators  Early Adopters - Early Majority] 
a. Designer/Developer  Government & Industry 
b. Software/Hardware Integration sites 
c. End Users  Fleet & Shore 
d. DMSMS Professionals, Gov. & Industry 
Summary of overall promotion strategy: 
Each of the segmented consumers/influences provided above will have a tailored 
plan crafted to meet their obsolescence risk needs or create desire for the SSB system 
products. Given that our product is in the Market Introduction part of the product life 
cycle and quickly headed toward a Market Growth as a result of successful initial 
implementation efforts on three Navy programs, provides some special attributes, a fact 
that will and should be evident in our promotions. Another re-occurring theme 
throughout our promotion will be stressing our Product Leadership as our marketing 
strategic direction. This direction will be evident through the emphasis on the new and 
unique SSB attributes regarding, Life Cycle Cost reductions, establishment of risk 
management methods and business/PMO flexibility and the resulting benefits to the 
adopters. As a means to shift our target segmented consumer base, an assessment will be 
made to their current position with respect to the adoption process (i.e. Awareness, 
interest, evaluation, trial, decision, or confirmation), then identify the most appropriate 
promotion objective(s) (Informing, Persuading, or Reminding) to produce the desired 
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 change, by eliciting the responses evident in the action-orientated model AIDA 
(Attention, Interest, Desire, Action). Finally the type or types of promotion(s) (Personal 
Selling, Mass Selling, Sales Promotion, Advertising, Publicity) will be utilized to elicit 
the most favorable response. 
1. Promotion Plan for Group 1, Decision Makers  
The evaluative criteria (i.e. what criteria the group will use in evaluating the 
utility of the SSB system) for the decision makers, Group 1 will be risk management 
capability, Life Cycle Cost reduction characteristics, and Long-term supportability 
attributes.  Additionally this group will look at the SSB system from a business 
perspective by evaluating the funding profile generated through the use of the system.  
These criteria are graphically displayed in Figure 8 showing the first three criteria 
described and Figure 9 illustrating the funding profile of the SSB system versus the Life 
of Type Buy (LTB) and Refresh alternatives. 
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Appendix D Figure 8: Positioning & Differentiation of Support Alternatives 
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Appendix D Figure 9: Comparison of Funding Profiles 
The Decision Makers are an extremely important part of our consumer base. 
The promotion approach, to be most effective, must take into account that this group, as 
identified by market research, is in the Early Adopters and are open to evaluating new 
options when provided the choice. Availability of potential choices must be made base on 
the awareness of other choices, capturing the groups interest through cost benefit analysis 
and by showing that evaluation of alternatives will yield outstanding benefits. Therefore 
the primary promotion objective for our Decision Maker group must be informing to get 
their attention and spark their interest, the characteristic of being in the Early Adopters 
category should be self-perpetuating after that. The following marketing activities will 
initiate our offensive to capture this consumer segment: 
Activity 1 - Education & Enlightenment 
 Conferences 
The SSB IPT Team, NSWC Corona (here after referred to as the SSB Team) will 
take a leadership role and present the SSB system at the leading conferences, which focus 
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 on the Program Manager, Design/Developer and Technology Insertion communities. A 
vendor booth in the Exhibit Hall where our advertising pamphlets, nic-nac giveaways, 
and free software on CD ROMs can be combined with our personnel's face-to-face time 
with the consumer should augment this type of publicity. Although the approach would 
be identical for all three of these major elements of the group, more than likely, one or 
two separate conferences for each element may be required. [cost - $1000/day for 3 days 
times 6 conferences + 6 trips @ $1500 per trip = $27,000] 
 Publications 
The SSB Team will author and sponsor authorship of authoritative articles to be 
strategically placed in the trade publications targeting this Decision Makers group. These 
articles will be provided to the internal Navy publication groups: Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU), Program Manager  PM Magazine, DAU - Acquisition Review 
Quarterly, etc., at the same time and identified as a leading edge COTS support system. 
[Team authored - cost $4000 per publication external, times 6 publishers, times 4 
separate articles (provided every 3 months) = $96,000 : Sponsored Authorship - cost 
$5000 to author times 4 separate articles, $4000 per publication external, times 6 
publishers, times 4 separate articles = $116,000 : Internal publication considered free of 
charge] 
 Collaborative Advertising 
In concert with the running of the publications identified above a collaborative 
and symbiotic relationship should be crafted with the SSB system participants 
encompassing the entire range of our OEM relationships including industry leaders like 
Motorola and DY4, to medium and small size companies. The collaborative effort would 
work this way - the SSB Team would underwrite the feature article and surrounding that 
article the industry leaders/participants will buy all available (within reason) advertising 
space displaying their newest, state-of-the-art, COTS supportable products. The Navy 
will be perceived as part of the industrial supportability solution space pushing state-of-
the-art and the industry leaders will be marketing to the Decision Maker group in the 
Navy. The Navy will need to be directly identified in the article, so as to make this 
connection and perhaps the industry leaders may wish to also identify the Navy 
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 specifically in their advertising. [cost - Since this is perceived as a collaborative effort 
minimal cost is associated with this approach] 
Activity 2 - Influencing Policy 
 Point-Counter-Point 
The SSB Team will prepare various written artifacts such as White Papers, 
articles, letters to the editor and reports directed at current policy, illustrating the utility of 
a policy endorsing the use of the SSB system products. These written artifacts are meant 
to be used primarily inside the Navy in internal publications pointed specifically at the 
closed community of policy makers. [cost - expected to be minimal] 
 Face-To-Face 
Since the group of policy makers is relatively small although somewhat spread 
out, regular face time with this group is planned. To augment these visits, high profile 
individuals of the SSB system community (i.e. industry leader VPs, academia, Presidents 
of OEM COTS companies, etc.) will be requested to accompany our Teams personnel to 
meet and possibly present to this policy making group.[cost - $1500 per trip for 6 
requested visitors (travel costs) = $9,000] 
 On-going Policy 
Policy is in a continuous state of flux with changes, re-writes and reviews taking 
place daily. The SSB Team will become part of the technical review community to 
champion the SSB systems approach and eventually influence downstream policy. [cost - 
approximately one fourth a man year, $200,000/4 = $50,000] 
Activity 3 - Inform Resource Sponsors 
 Money Talks 
Since the Resource Sponsors provide all funding spent in the Navy it is 
imperative that the benefits of SSB system products, especially reductions of Life Cycle 
Cost (LCC), COTS risk management, and business/management process support, get 
identified to this group as often as possible. This group is also responsible to make sure 
the needs of the Fleet are met in a cost effective, continuous manner, which is consistent 
with the priorities they have identified. The attributes of the SSB system and its products 
play into several of the set priorities such as availability, interoperability, maintainability, 
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 and supportability to name just a few. The SSB Team will identify the set of priorities 
and find the biggest problem areas where the SSB system products are applicable, then 
craft potential solutions to a few of these showing how the priorities will be met and 
highlight the resulting reduction in LCC. The report should be presented to the Resource 
Sponsor community as an example of potential possibilities and how with the Right 
policies in place, the effort could be duplicated and implemented.[cost - one third of a 
man year $200,000/3 = $67,000] 
 Independent Assessment 
Identify the primary informational sources research the Resource Sponsors use as 
a community to base their funding resource decisions on (i.e. MIT study, GAO report, 
Fleet feedback, expenditure reports, etc.). Once the primary information resources are 
identified, commission an independent study focusing the work in application of the SSB 
system to solve the aforementioned problems. Direct the independent assessment to focus 
on and use the informational data sources the group usually relies on as 
comparison/contrasting base information with the outputs of the SSB system evaluation. 
Provide this independent assessment report to the Resource Sponsors community using as 
large a distribution as applicable boldly stressing both the data source and the 
independent nature of its generation.[cost - $125,000] 
 Success Stories 
Getting success stories in front of this community is important and the use of the 
usual printed publications will be done as mentioned above to illustrate these successes. 
However to make a more lasting impression the stories need to be told in a more 
convincing context. The SSB Team understands that the Resource Sponsor community 
presents regularly to various audiences to get the word out on their initiatives and 
priorities. Since the Resource Sponsor will already be present at these meetings, if the 
speaker just prior or just succeeding his or her presentation, was to present the success 
story of the month resulting from the SSB system, it would be a non-intrusive way to get 
the word out. [cost - expected to be already incorporated in conferences above]   
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  Authoritative Show & Tell 
Prepare a presentation to give to the entire community during their annual 
meeting conference. Co-present the material with a very well respected industry leader 
like a prime contractor, OEM, and other SSB participants focusing in on the impact to 
these entities while touching on the communities needs and priorities. The proceedings 
and the presentation will be published and provide a documented resource to the 
community.[cost - see conferences above]  
Activity 4 – Address NAVICP Contracting Policies Threat 
  The Direct Approach 
As identified in the SWOT analysis the threat created by the implementation 
policies put in place by NAVICP can be dealt with using several avenues.  The preferred 
approach is to provide the NAVICP leadership with the analysis presented in this plan, 
then work collaboratively with them to modify the current policy.  To initiate this 
approach will require first finding the right group of decision makers to present the 
information to.  Once identified the decision makers will be provided the information to 
study prior to a face-to-face meeting.  The face-to-face meeting will be important in 
gaining credibility and expedite information exchange and communication.  As part of 
the logical argument in substantiating the claims made in the analysis a presentation on 
the SSB system will illustrate the potential gain to the Navy through changing the current 
policies.  Included in the material presented will be the methodologies and results from 
the Business Case Analysis (BCA) which should be of special interest to the NAVICP 
audience.  Furthermore special examples of successful implementation efforts showing 
how the government unique position yields positive attributes for the Navy that are 
unobtainable if attempted through a contractor.  The issue of conflict of interest should 
also be addressed through the presentation materials showing specific examples based on 
implementation experience.  The expectation of this meeting has a lot a variability 
ranging from being thrown out of the office to NAVICP embracing the SSB system as a 
preferred alternative. [cost - $1500 per trip for 1 trip (travel costs) = $1,500] 
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 The Customer Request Approach 
Identify one of the programs that have a requirement to place their next contract 
on a Performance Based Contract (PBC) or a Performance Based Logistic (PBL) contract 
with a contractor and is willing to implement the SSB system.  Partner with the program 
in addressing the issues threatening the use of the SSB system.  The meeting format is as 
described as above but with the additional inputs from NAVICPs customer the PMO. 
[cost - $1500 per trip for 1 trip (travel costs) = $1,500] 
Reporting Up the Chain of Command Approach 
This approach can be used in parallel with either of the approaches listed above or 
accomplished independently.  As describe earlier in this plan the issues will be presented 
in a concise written format and forwarded to ASN for review, interpretation and possible 
intervention.  Once the actions are accomplished by ASN the expected next steps will 
depend on the ASNs findings. If the answer comes back with No Policy Change 
Needed then other avenues need to be addressed (i.e. Direct Approach, focus on 
program relationships, etc.). Should ASN agree that Yes a Policy Change is Needed 
then the next step will depend on how much involvement ASN will have in making the 
necessary changes.  One possibility is that they take the lead and request NAVICP make 
appropriate changes independent of our involvement. Another possibility is to respond to 
our request directly back to us with a written interpretation and we at that point would 
need to work out the details with NAVICP in changing the policy.  The impact of the 
NAVICP policies is so large that to do nothing will be detrimental to the SSB system 
acceptance. The impact justifies the risk in making the request and attempting to change 
the current policies.[cost -  no cost impact in making the request considered a part of staff 
normal function] 
2. Promotion Plan for Group 2, GateKeepers / Middlemen / 
Intermediaries 
The evaluative criteria for Group 2 are 1) meeting the PM expectations as 
illustrated in Figures 8 & 9, 2) a process that is easy to use, 3) provides solutions which 
take into account the time dependency of the solution space, 4) generally this group is 
looking for quick returns to capitalize on the success for personal/professional gain. 
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 This group represents the implementers of other groups policies and initiatives, as 
such, this group tends to take a wait and see or  let someone else test the waters 
thereby entering the market cycle much later, participating as Early Majority - Late 
Majority. Meeting goals and objectives of their command structure takes priority in 
accomplishment of their function and the less risky the method the better, since the 
establishment has as its foundation a risk avoidance mentality. Continuous personnel 
movement through these positions produces high turn over rate and therefore the people 
in these positions focus on the quick return on their efforts. The use of the Persuading 
strategy as the promotional objective will be most effective when coupled with personal 
selling (Face-to-Face) and potentially the use of Sales promotions. However in 
government business activities the Sales promotions are a bit different than implemented 
in the commercial industry. The Sales promotion here is more of a marketing of the 
accomplishment or work done by the specific person one is interacting with, for example 
a success in implementing the SSB system will be advertised in the SSB Team newsletter 
to all the Navy Program Offices and Resource Sponsors, with special attention to 
highlight the implementing personnel with name, position, quotes and picture. Using this 
approach we provide a promotional method to enhance the personal value or 
marketability of the involved personnel. 
Activity 1 – Newsletter 
The SSB Team will define a distribution of the Newsletter to cover not only all 
groups identified within this marketing plan but to the government entities across the 
board, DoD, non-DoD, and the associated contractor and industrial / commercial entities 
who interact with our market segment. The Newsletter, although specific format is yet to 
be determined, shall focus on delivering special sections covering the needs, interest and 
desires of each of the consumer segments we have identified (Decision Makers  
GateKeepers / middlemen / intermediaries - Using Community). The approach may be 
different in addressing each group, for example; the Decision Makers section will dwell 
on providing information, the GateKeepers section will focus on selling the people, the 
Using Community section will post usable tidbits of information or post the winners of 
this months Most Valuable Performer (MVP) an award sponsored by the SSB Team. 
[cost  one fifth of a man year, $125,000/5 = $25,000 + monthly publication costs of  12 
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 months times 5,000 copies per month times $0.20 per copy + $600 set up charge = 
$12,600, distribution costs not included, TBD] 
Activity 2 – A Meeting Place  
All implementers regardless of focus have a need to network with other sharing in 
the same misery, specifically for this segment group who are searching for leverage in the 
pursuit of professional gain and acknowledgement. The web site for SSB system support 
for the SSB community or also known as SSB Web Central is maintained by the SSB 
Team to initiate and promulgate on-going discussions to enable the communities 
networking efforts. This web site is augmented with an Answer Garden providing past 
efforts in dealing with SSB issues and projects, included in this searchable data base are 
such things as lessons learned, Navy internal best practices, Industry Best Practices, 
Transitioning Planning documentation, related internal Navy resources and did we 
mention the SSB Team Newsletters, etc. The SSB Team will keep account of and trend 
all Cookies of visitors and prepare an analysis report to share among the staff. The SSB 
Team staff will also monitor the site content and participants comments. These efforts are 
meant to craft the environment for the COTS community to entice the evaluation and trial 
of the SSB system at minimal risk. [cost - $40,000 initial set-up and license fees,  
$10,000 per year maintenance cost, no cost impact on the monitoring considered a part of 
staff normal function] 
3. Promotion Plan for Group 3, Using Community 
The evaluative criteria for this group deals with implementation details and 
probable outcomes, these criteria are: 1) ease of use, 2) visibility into the process, 3) risk 
identification and management, 4) a resolution centric process methodology.  
This group because of the function they perform is all over the map when it 
comes to adopting of a product. These people are the true implementers of support 
solutions, living with and solving, the issues and challenges of the COTS products that 
someone else buys as a result of a policy decision made at an even more removed 
hierarchical level within the Navy. This group by necessity is a task orientated, 
technically driven, application focused community of problem solvers. As identified in 
the External Environment  Competitive forces  this community has over time, 
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 developed its own culture exhibiting some specific characteristics.  Not all members of 
this community have organized into well-defined structures/teams/working groups but 
they too can and do exhibit many of the same characteristics as the well-established 
teams. The Using Community has great influence with respect to which alternatives are 
chosen, how they are implemented, and the strategic approach to obsolescence risk 
management.  Depending on individual members relationship within this community, the 
marketing methods already identified (i.e. conferences, publications, Point-Counter-Point 
written discussions etc.) have probably provided exposure to the SSB system.  This 
community has a need to keeping up with the latest processes, methods, and tools 
employed to support fielded systems and therefore will seek out the kind of information 
we have placed in their environment.  Driven by their functional positions, this 
community will be intensely interested in the News Letters and SSB Web Central, if and 
only if the content of the information addresses the actual implementation and problem 
resolution aspects of support.  
Activity 1 - SSB Web Central 
In an effort to service the market segment, a substantial portion of the SSB Web 
Central will be set aside to provide focused implement able solutions, success stories, 
detailed analysis of other PMO implementation efforts, and tailored SSB system 
implementation planning with Lessons Learned. Also posted and of great interest will be 
the yearly summary reports showing how over time the SSB system is performing. A 
Discussion Board will be provided and monitored to encourage networking and 
information sharing.  The Using Community section will post usable tidbits of 
information or post the winners of this months Most Valuable Performer (MVP) an 
award sponsored by the SSB Team. Current and historical copies of the News Letter will 
also be available at the site. [cost  as identified in previous section] 
Activity 2 – Most Valuable Performer (MVP) Award 
The SSB Team will establish an award to be given to the implementing 
community to recognize its outstanding performers with respect to SSB system 
implementation.  The criteria for nomination, acceptance and down select shall be 
developed by the SSB Team. However the criteria shall cover all aspects of the processes, 
methods and tools, so that singular parameters like reductions in LCC will not drive the 
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 awarding process. In this way all implementers have a chance to receive the award such 
as exceptional tools, very effective implementations by small programs, innovative 
methods, etc.  [cost  TBD  recommendations by the SSB Team and endorsement by 
management] 
Activity 3 – Competition Forces Addressed  
The barriers and impediments institutionalized through the existing cultures 
evident in the User Community must be addressed to assure maximum market 
penetration. Four major areas identified in earlier sections of this plan need to be 
considered: Resource, Territorial, Contractual, and Functional competition. Each of these 
responses from individuals or groups will require analysis to identify the root cause, 
potential remedies, and possible data collection efforts to mitigate the concerns that 
provoked the response.  The SSB Team will perform research, analysis, provide 
recommendations, then publish in a White Paper format the results of the study.  Some 
of the resolutions will come for logical analysis of data however several identified 
responses are behavioral traits which may require a completely different approach. 
Regardless of the resolution method, the White Paper report will be posted on SSB 
Web Central and a discussion thread will be initiated on the Discussion Board to elicit 
feedback from the community.  The SSB Team shall make a special effort to be involved 
in the discussion thread to answer questions, collect data about our customers, and help 
break down the competitive force structures. [cost - Team authored - $4000 per report 
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